Stopping Authoritarian Populist Projects: Why Constitutionalism Is Not the Sole Answer

See e.g., Tushnet and Bugarič (2021).

Kyle and Gultchin (2018), p. 4.

By authoritarian populism, I adopt a tweaked (and expansive) version of Robert Dix’s definition and refer to a style of populism wherein charismatic leaders or political parties rely on mass support and electoral victories to concentrate and remove checks on their power. See generally Dix (1985).

See Galston (2018).

Subverting democracy incrementally through law is a characteristic of any modern-day autocrat—populist, non-populist, or anti-populist. Nevertheless, what separates them from a non-populist or anti-populist autocrat is (1) their convincing rhetorical tools that follow a typical playbook, (2) their widespread popularity at the expense of the weak, divided, and dysfunctional traditional political parties, and (3) their convincing electoral victories. Although an anti-populist or non-populist autocrat might share one or more of the aforesaid three characteristics, this is not a given, and most certainly not a common factor across all anti-populist or non-populist autocrats. This small difference does have certain ramifications for halting their projects; it makes it vital to consider authoritarian populists and the ways to halt their projects separately (though even this enterprise might have some overlaps).

By societal and political leverages, I refer to whatever leverages an opposition might have by virtue of their existence in politics (formally or otherwise).

See Berman (2021); see also Moffit (2016).

Often, this ‘real people’ rhetoric takes a majoritarian view of society, pinning the majoritarian population as the real people of the country, and minorities and immigrants as enemies of the state.

See Görlach (2018), pp. 37–41; see also Laclau (2005); Shils (1954), pp. 100–101; Barr (2009), pp. 29–41.

See Martins (2012), pp. 5–12; see also Kende and Krekó (2020), pp. 29–33.

See generally Müller (2016).

Ibid.

Corrales (2015), pp. 8–15.

See Huq and Ginsburg (2018), pp. 117–161.

See Varol (2018).

See Landau and Dixon (2021), pp. 116–152.

Sethi (2021a), pp. 19–20.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

A constitutional culture implies that people care about the constitution and its values and recognize and accept that they are governed by it; it also indicates that the constitution is taken seriously in political discourse and that officials incorporate a responsive interpretation of the constitution and public views regarding it into the fabric of constitutional law. See Mazzone (2013), p. 672; Siegel (2006), p. 1325.

See Roznai (2017), pp. 105–178; see also Landau (2019), pp. 586–588; Partlett (2021), pp. 53–74.

See Issacharoff (2015); see also Choudhry (2009); Landau and Dixon (2015); Tushnet (2018).

Carpaccio (2013), pp. 207–226.

Scholars have suggested other mechanisms (albeit with less frequency), such as adopting proportional representation systems and parliamentary systems. See e.g., Ginsburg and Huq (2018), pp. 171–204; Ackerman (2000), pp. 633–725. The problem with options to move to parliamentary and proportional systems are as follows. (1) Although they might result in more veto points in the system, they have failed to stop the rise of authoritarian populist projects. India, Turkey, Poland, Sri Lanka, etc., have parliamentary systems, and still, populists came into power. Likewise, Brazil, Poland, Sri Lanka, Honduras, South Africa, and Turkey has proportional representation systems. (2) Another problem with these systems is that because they allot seats proportionally, they allow populist autocrats and their parties (who will always have some support) to win a certain percentage of seats and remain relevant. (3) It is questionable if, beyond democracy protection, these options are in the best interests of certain countries to pass policies and ensure better governance. (4) Given extremely rigid constitutional structures, it would be an arduous task to undertake such major shifts. Like the options discussed in this section, none of these solutions can be the sole answer to confronting populist autocrats.

Chilton and Versteeg (2020), p. 7.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See Marsteintredet (2015).

Ibid.

Sethi (2021b), pp. 75–77.

Vanberg (2015), pp. 179–182.

Sethi (2021b), pp. 75–77.

Ibid.

See Issacharoff (2015).

Ibid.

Bali (2013), p. 672.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Tait (2008).

Ibid.

Data self-calculated using the comparative constitutions project.

Data self-calculated using the comparative constitutions project.

For example, Article 9 of the Czech Republic Constitution of 1993 states “Legal norms may not be interpreted so as to authorize anyone to do away with or jeopardize the democratic foundations of the state.”

Scheppele (2018), p. 563.

Landau and Dixon (2020), pp. 1334–1344.

See Ibid, pp. 1353–1370.

Cameron and Sharpe (2010), pp. 60–71.

Landau (2020), pp. 94–96.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Gamboa (2017), pp. 470–472.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See e.g., Alston (2017), p. 3; Galston (2018), pp. 15–17.

Kenny (2017), pp. 100–122.

Austin (1999), pp. 393–408.

Ibid.

Ibid.