In the summer of 1941, the United States and Great Britain signed the Atlantic Charter, which functioned both as the unofficial Allied utopia for which war was being waged, and as a policy document on which postwar construction could eventually take place. The Charter was later also signed by the Soviet Union, which thereby also promised to ‘respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’.1 We have already quoted President Roosevelt, stating his hope that Stalin would not try to ‘annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace’. It was both these sometimes overtly, sometimes implicitly formulated expectations by Western politicians which have given rise to the so-called ‘Yalta myth’.
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