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Dynamic Games and Applications

Erschienen in:

28.07.2018

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: A Learning Approach via Costs to Move

verfasst von: Francesco Caruso, Maria Carmela Ceparano, Jacqueline Morgan

Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Ausgabe 2/2019

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Abstract

In one-leader one-follower two-stage games, also called Stackelberg games, multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria (henceforth SPNEs) arises when the best reply correspondence of the follower is not a single-valued map. This paper concerns a new method to approach SPNEs which makes use of a sequence of SPNEs of perturbed games where the best reply correspondence of the follower is single-valued. The sequence is generated by a learning method where the payoff functions of both players are modified subtracting a term that represents a physical and behavioral cost to move and which relies on the proximal point methods linked to the Moreau–Yosida regularization. Existence results of SPNEs approached via this method are provided under mild assumptions on the data, together with numerical examples and connections with other methods to construct SPNEs.

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Titel: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: A Learning Approach via Costs to Move
verfasst von: Francesco Caruso
Maria Carmela Ceparano
Jacqueline Morgan
Publikationsdatum: 28.07.2018
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications / Ausgabe 2/2019
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Elektronische ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0277-3

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