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Erschienen in:
2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Supply Chain Contract Design of Technology Innovation Collaboration Under Asymmetric Information
verfasst von : Na Wang, Zhenji Zhang, Ruize Gao
Erschienen in: LISS 2014
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Abstract
Supply chain technology innovation collaboration has the characteristics of high uncertainty and risk. Through the equitable distribution of the proceeds compact design can enhance supply chain competitive advantages and help achieve maximum benefit. It assumes a case study of technology innovation collaboration in a manufacturing enterprise, of which the enterprises’ strength and effort level are asymmetric information. This paper firstly analysis the enterprises’ profit-sharing issues in the supply chain through dynamic game. Then it creates the collaborative model with principal-agent theory, and studies the game strategy of cooperative innovation. The research is expected to provide a theoretical support for supply chain enterprises, to help the enterprises grasp the cooperative innovation rules, formulate the technology innovation collaboration strategy and improve the overall competitiveness.