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2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

17. Sustainable Poverty Reduction: Credit for the Poor

verfasst von : Asis Kumar Banerjee

Erschienen in: Development and Sustainability

Verlag: Springer India

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Abstract

This chapter is a review of the research done over the past two decades or so on the role of credit supply in sustainable poverty reduction. Naturally, it is credit to the poor that will be the focus of our attention. We shall review both theoretical and empirical research. We shall also suggest possible lines of further research (which do not find mention in other reviews) and make a few policy recommendations (which, again, do not seem to appear in the existing literature) with reference to the Indian economy.

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Metadaten
Titel
Sustainable Poverty Reduction: Credit for the Poor
verfasst von
Asis Kumar Banerjee
Copyright-Jahr
2013
Verlag
Springer India
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1124-2_17