Sweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarity

The concept of neutrality, despite its long tradition and presence in international relations practice, is characterized by lack of uniformity both with regard to the definition of the actual concept and its types. It is both foreign and security policy doctrine and practice. This approach requires paying attention to the way the specific terms are used: foreign policy, security policy, neutrality, and the policy of neutrality.

The development of the Swedish nation state in the 16th century took place in conflict with Lübeck and the Hanseatic League which at that time dominated trade in the Baltic Sea. Sweden gained its independency by breaking away from the Nordic “great state” of the Kalmar Union times established under the rule of Denmark. The rivalry between Sweden and Denmark for a leading position in Scandinavia was for a long time one of the fundamental premises of the foreign policy of the former.

Despite the official non-engagement of Scandinavian states in armed struggle of the First World War and their joint proclamation of neutrality, each state found itself in a different situation (Carlsson and Rosen, Den svenska historien, 14:74–90, 1983).

Throughout the World War II, Sweden was not forced to engage in the armed conflict, although the state came close on many occasions. Several factors have contributed to this, including also Sweden’s active policy of neutrality. The policy was developed and implemented already before the war, and it was strengthened at the outset of the Nazi aggression. Apart from combat readiness in the form of conscripting consecutive draftees and increasing credits for military purposes, it also included changes in the country’s economy. The occupation of Denmark and Norway seriously worsened the situation as it cut Sweden off from the former western partners.

The years 1948–1949 were a decisive period shaping the security choices made by the Scandinavian states and the security order in Northern Europe. On March 17, 1948, the Brussels Pact was signed which gave way to creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which originally was to involve the Scandinavian countries. Observing the activities of the U.S. in that field, the Swedish government decided to bet on two horses: the preservation of neutrality towards the opposing blocs of states in the world order and strengthening the defense capabilities of Northern Europe through establishing a Scandinavian defense union.

In 1962, Ö. Undén was replaced by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson, who is in his exposé on foreign policy, given in the parliament in April 1963, for the first time employed the term “active policy of neutrality” (af Malmborg Neutrality and state-building in Sweden 2001a, p. 161). This new category did not herald the resignation from such staples of the policy of neutrality as credibility or the strong army.

Dissolution of the bipolar political and military system in Europe in the early 1990s had brought significant changes. The Soviet Union lost control over its empire and the Warsaw Pact dissolved and stopped existing as a military alliance. There has been a multitude of attempts to assess the implications of those changes.

Changes in Europe during the turn of the eighties and nineties have been the greatest geopolitical transformation since WWII. The collapse of the bipolar system, regaining of sovereignty by the Baltic States and the Central and Eastern European countries fundamentally changed Sweden’s geostrategic position.

During the last decade of the 20th century, Sweden and its closest neighbors have shared common history, culture and social values—democracy, human rights, pluralism, and the market economy. Institutional links between different industries, trade unions, political parties, research organizations and universities were established.

In the 1990 report by the Swedish Parliament’s Defense Committee, it was predicted that with the end of the Cold War NATO might be dissolved. At the same time, however, the Social Democratic government recognized the role of the United States in building a new world order in Europe.

The first clear manifestations of Swedish solidarity approach towards security problem in the region were noted already in the middle of the first decade of the 20th century. The parliamentary-government Commission’s report of 2006 dealt with not only the security of Sweden, but also introduced the concept of the Nordic-Baltic zone in this context.

The production infrastructure of the Kingdom of Sweden had survived war periods intact, and the social and political environment after WWII turned out to be favorable for economic growth. In the early 1950s, Sweden enjoyed full employment. Economic development reflected the increase in gross domestic product—an average of 4.5% per year (in the late 1940s), which decreased to about 3% in the late 1950s—the reason was the inflation caused by the Korean War in the early years of the decade. The 1960s, widely regarded as the “golden era,” were characterized by a high rate of growth of national income and a great deal of optimism. This has forged a new and so widely appreciated social welfare system, and unemployment rate was reduced to a very low level. This period is also associated with strong restructuring—the agricultural sector noted a significant loss in importance, the unprofitable companies were closed, and smaller companies merged with larger ones.

Gradual transformation of the Swedish foreign and security policy accompanied efforts to establish collective security guarantees in the early years of the 21st century.

The development and evolution of the international community surrounding the Nordic countries has a natural impact on their cooperation.

An important part of the Swedish activity on the international stage, developed during the 1960s and 1970s, was distinctive mediation ‘capabilities’ and negotiations between the parties in conflict. This sprang from both a deep conviction of the Swedes themselves that their country thanks to its neutrality can guarantee impartiality and fairness in the resolution of disputes, and the perception of Sweden on the international stage. Olof Palme himself felt that his duty was to build understanding between East and West. As a member of the Security Council during the years 1975–1976, Sweden offered “good services” and has been active in proposing solutions to global issues such as human rights, disarmament, or the development of the Third World countries. In the United Nations, Sweden has developed a work relationship with these countries to promote their interests within the organization. All these efforts have had two main objectives. On the one hand, it was about building a credible image of an active policy of neutrality, and on the other they were linked to the already mentioned conviction that Sweden’s own national interest dictated its engagement in mitigation of any international disputes which if not resolved, might escalate and threaten Sweden’s security (Agius in The social construction of Swedish neutrality. Challenges to Swedish identity and sovereignty. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 110–111, 2006). A similar belief guided Swedish engagement in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as part of N + N Group (Neutral and Non-Aligned), which played a significant role mediating various compromise solutions (Karsh in Neutrality and Small States, London, pp. 129–130, 1988).