The Alliance of Sahel States, Democratic Relapse, Insecurity, and the Prospects of Regional (Dis)integration or (Re)integration in West Africa

West Africa’s Sahel region has in recent times witnessed a wave of military coups, which has shaken the foundations of the subregion’s fragile democracy. The situation on the ground is further worsened by the growing insecurity that continues to plague the region from terrorism, insurgencies, and extremism. The Sahel region is noteworthy for its high episodes of violence against civilians by the military juntas and Russian forces, including 2109 fatalities in 2024, marking a 36% increase from the previous year (ACSS, 2025a). Across the entire African continent, the Sahel region accounted for 10,400 deaths out of a total of 18,900, representing 55% of all fatalities in 2024. These deaths were specifically caused by the activities of terrorist groups. Similarly, it is pertinent to note that an estimated 67% of all non-combatants killed by terrorist groups across the continent are in the Sahel (ACSS, 2025b). The region, with a combined population of 75 million people (The Economist, 2024) and which stretches from the west coast of Africa eastwards across the continent, remains the epicenter of global terrorism (Orrell, 2025). It is pertinent to note that the Sahel region, according to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), consists of 10 countries, which are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. However, the African Union considers the Sahel region to include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Sudan (UNDP, 2025). This paper adopts the UN’s description of the Sahel.

The economy of the Central Sahel, which makes up countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, is heavily reliant on mineral resources and agriculture, with gold constituting over 70% of its total export (Tchana et al., 2025). As of June 2025, the Central Sahel, which this chapter focuses on, had over 2.9 million displaced persons, with about half of them being children (UNICEF, 2025). The effect of the insecurity in the Central Sahel bears a significant mark on human lives such that more than 8000 schools have been shut down as a result (UNICEF, 2025). The decision by the military juntas of Niger and Burkina Faso to leave the GS Sahel force (Ross, 2023), a force established to fight terrorist groups in the region in December 2023, widened the security gap in the troubled region. This gap was further widened with another similar decision by Niger in April 2025 to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was created to fight Boko Haram (Egbejule, 2025). The situation on the ground has since deteriorated following the withdrawal of French forces and US forces, with other countries such as Russia, China, and Turkey attempting to fill the void.

In addition to the complex insecurity dynamics that have continued to shape the Sahel region is the challenge occasioned by the recent wave of coups d’état, which has resulted in democratic relapse in parts of the region. The suspension of the constitution in countries, disregard for the rule of law, the clampdown on dissident voices and other forms of human rights violations, as well as the elongation of military rule with no clearly defined transition plans by the juntas in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali further erode the prospects of democratic consolidation in the region. In September 2023, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a mutual defence pact, which culminated in the establishment of a security alliance known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), thereby allowing them to cooperate against threats posed by terrorist groups as well as from external aggression (Aljazeera, 2023a). In February 2025, the AES announced the creation of a joint military force to be composed of 5000 troops to fight against terrorist groups that continue to threaten the peace and security of these countries. However, it is pertinent to note that the effective operationalisation of the joint force might not be guaranteed owing to several challenges (Aina, 2025).

The establishment of the AES poses a threat to the continued regional integration of West Africa, despite repeated efforts by the regional body Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to keep its doors open to member states of the alliance. Yet, the AES member states appear to remain defiant in their decision, which has consequences for the prospects of regional disintegration as well as any prospects of regional reintegration. Previous academic works have explored the subject of regional integration in West Africa as well as the challenges faced by ECOWAS in this regard (Ibok and Atayero 2022; Onwuamaeze and Garba, 2024). However, in the wake of the recent coups in the Sahel region, there remains a gap in the literature on the prospects of regional (dis)integration or (re)integration in West Africa in the wake of the AES.

The paper interrogates how the relapse of democracy in the Sahel region amidst the ongoing insecurity impasse in the region, in addition to the establishment of the AES, could contribute to the prospects of (dis)integration or (re)integration of the broader West African subregion. The paper’s central argument is foregrounded in the understanding that this evolving dynamic has a profound effect on the shifts and complexities the Sahel region continues to face, resulting in new and emerging alliances and re-alliances that could significantly alter the region’s power balance, without necessarily leading to outright (dis)integration in the present nor complete (re)integration in the future of the broader West African subregion.

The paper is divided into seven sections following the “Introduction”. It proceeds with the “Methodology” section and then the conceptual clarification, analytical frameworks, and theoretical adaptations upon which its central arguments are grounded. The paper then examines the contemporary insecurity dynamics in the Central Sahel. This section then paves the way for the next section, which interrogates the shifts, complexities, and recalibration in the broader Sahel region. The section on the origins, challenges, and prospects of the AES is then examined. The paper ends with a conclusion that focuses on the future of democracy, regional (re)integration, and (dis)integration in West Africa.

This study is based on an analytical qualitative approach and adopts a descriptive research design that is explorative (Casula et al., 2021). The study draws on data from secondary sources, which include academic journal articles, books, reports, policy briefs, and reputable local and international news reportage. More specifically, the data used for the study include analytical insights derived from news reportage covering context-specific information on insecurity in the Sahel region in the wake of the recent wave of military coups and events following the establishment of the AES. Other data for analytical purposes was obtained from the Armed Conflict & Event Data Project (ACLED) database. In addition to these, through its utility of deductive qualitative analysis (DQA), as an updated form of analytical induction (Gilgun, 2013), the study adopts a deductive reasoning technique. It is pertinent to note that this technique serves the purpose of being useful in the application of theory or conceptual frameworks (Bingham and Witkowsky, 2021). Also adopted are other research techniques such as in-depth literature reviews, which include content analysis, textual criticism, and structural phenomenology.

It is significant to note that the use of context analysis was to ensure effective sorting, ranking, and making meaning of the relevant data that were of particular importance to the study’s central focus. The use of textual criticism was beneficial towards unpacking hidden and crucial information while reading the lines of the reports that were utilised during the study. The utility of structural phenomenology, on the other hand, was useful towards providing the contextual meaning of cited cases as well as their contributions to shaping and informing general narratives, in addition to understanding the objectives which the research set out to accomplish. In the analysis of the data obtained, the research adopts the thematic data analysis method, which is relevant in identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns, which include themes from within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Nation states pursue the goal of regional integration for various purposes, some of which include the need to ensure mutually linked political, economic, and security goals and objectives within their region. As such, governments across nation states pursue regional integration towards the advancement of their national security and economic interests in the context of regional interdependence (Schimmelfennig, 2018). Often this is established through the creation of regional bodies or organisations which serve as a tool or mechanism through which shared ideals are actualised. As such, regional integration theory which began with a broad comparative regional and organisational scope in the 1950 s and 1960 s has in more recent times shifted towards a focus on European integration and the European Union. The theory is intended at explaining the establishment and development of regional international organisations. Over time, the key debates in regional integration theory have taken place between variants of intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theory (Schimmelfennig, 2018).

In offering an explanation on the motivation behind why states might be inclined to pursue regional integration by joining regional organisations (ROs), Panke (2020) notes three crucial points. The first is that powerful states are typically proponents of regional integration given that they serve as platforms through which they can further their national interests. Secondly, trade remains an important incentive as the stronger the trade interests of states are, the more ROs they are likely to become members of. Thirdly, authoritarian states are less inclined towards the idea of regional integration and joining ROs as doing so potentially places a limit on governmental leeway in the future. There are however concerns with the idea of regional integration despite its intended purposes. One of these concerns has to do with its tendency to erode national sovereignty and community, and by extension creating economic and cultural losses. Furthermore, it is often constrained by identity-based and populist mass politicisation which could potentially lead to disintegration (Schimmelfennig, 2018).

As earlier pointed out, regional integration theory has also tended to focus on European integration and the European Union. However, that is not to say that the applicability of regional integration theory cannot be extended to other regions and regional organisations such as in Africa. To lend further credence to this point, Gibb (2009) argues that the Western and Euro-centric conceptions of regionalism, especially those that are centred on the market integration approach, have mostly promoted a very biased understanding of regional integration in many parts of the developing world. In highlighting the limitations of the regional integration theory, Borzel and Risse (2019) have argued that theories upon which regional integration is founded such as neo-functionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism privilege economic interdependence as a key driver of regional integration.

Situated within the broader debate around regional integration is the need for security cooperation which remains crucial to the actualisation of regional integration goals and objectives. Regional security cooperation refers to any attempt to reduce armed violence either within or at the borders of what multiple actors consider to be a region. As such, there is a general understanding that all regional security cooperation is founded on the need to create stability among members through the creation of stable environments in which predictable relations can be nurtured (Gnanguenon and Hofman, 2024). By broadening the understanding of interdependence, part of the functional demands for regionalism stems mainly from security interdependence and the quest for regime stability (Borzel and Risse 2019). As such they encompass extra-regional economic relations, security externalities, as well as regime stability. In explaining the emergence of regional clusters of insecurity and violence, Tavares (2008) offers a useful analytical construct as a departure. He contends that the regional level is singled out in three keyways which include (i) regional reception of intra-regional threats and violence, (ii) regional reception of extra-regional threats and violence, and (iii) regional provision of threats and violence.

Furthermore, Gnanguenon and Hofman (2024) therefore note that there are four types of regional security cooperation which include (i) task-specific regional security cooperation within formalised regional security organisations, (ii) formalised security cooperation within general purpose regional organisations, (iii) informal security cooperation, and (iv) informal security cooperation which exist within general purpose regional informal cooperation.

This broader debate cascades into the regional security complex (RSC) theory which has in recent times received more prominence. According to Buzan and Weaver, cited in Snatini (2017), the key elements that constitute the basis of any RSC are three sets of dichotomies. These include power distribution among actors: anarchy versus integration (polarity), amity versus enmity (relations among units), and securitisation versus de-securitisation (process of threat construction). As Tar and Mustapha (2017) rightly note, the regional security cooperation theory (RSCT) provides a theoretical and conceptual framework towards understanding the emergent structure and dynamics of international security. Yet given the lack of a detailed analytical framework of the RSC in explaining the emergence of RSCs, Amable (2022) propounded the nascent regional security complex theory (n-RSC). He defines the n-RSC as “a set of geographically proximate states whose salient security problems are interconnected and cannot be resolved in isolation, yet there exists meaningful security interaction among them and may require an external power to initiate processes of securitization or securitisation”.

This is evident in the case of West Africa, particularly the Sahel region, which constitutes several states with complex yet interconnected security challenges necessitating joint efforts at resolving these challenges, such as through the establishment of security initiatives. Some of these include the G5 Sahel, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the Accra Initiative, among others. However, despite their establishment, these initiatives have remained largely dependent on external powers such as the USA, France, and the European Union for their operationalisation through funding, and other forms of security force assistance. In more recent times, following the shifts in alliances in the region, other external actors such as Russia, China, and Turkey have now stepped up to fill existing security voids across the region.

This paper therefore adopts both the regional integration theory and the regional security complex theory as two mutually reinforcing theories which shed light on the evolving dynamics in the West African subregion prior to the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and in gaining a better understanding of the region’s changing landscape in the aftermath of its creation. This is especially given in light of the emerging regionalisation of security in the troubled Central Sahel region, which this paper focuses on.

The Central Sahel region has been profoundly affected by the activities of violent extremist groups which continue to pose a serious threat to peace, security, and stability in the broader Sahel region and beyond. The Sahel region has accounted for more fatalities than any other region on the continent since 2021 (ACSS, 2024). The region, which stretches across several West African countries, constitutes a vast area with an arid expanse that is south of the Sahara Desert. The region, which is now known to be the global epicentre of terrorism, has seen significant shifts in its geopolitical outlook in recent times. The Sahel region has one of the world’s highest birth rates with almost two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 (Orrell, 2025). As of 2024, the region accounted for a total of 11,200 deaths across the entire continent, representing more than half of all fatalities on the continent in the same year (ACSS, 2024). The threat posed by the activities of violent extremist groups now extends to coastal West African states such as Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Cote d’Ivoire. The Sahel region has now become a key route for drug traffickers and other illicit economic activities which terrorist groups have taken advantage of including gold mining, kidnappings for ransom, and cattle rustling, among others.

The central Sahel constitutes the countries of Chad, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. All four states are under the control of the military. The more recent coups were the ones in Mali, in the year 2020 and 2021; the two coups in Burkina Faso in 2022; as well as the coup in Niger which occurred in the year 2023. The situation on the ground is further compounded by existing socio-economic grievances, weak institutions, poor governance, and environmental degradation, among others. It is pertinent to note that the insecurity in the Central Sahel has deteriorated with more than 2.9 million people displaced as of June 2025. Troubling is the fact that half of these are children (UNICEF, 2025).

The attacks by violent extremist groups operating across the states in the Central Sahel have taken a toll on schools, health centres, and water points in local communities. Burkina Faso remains the most affected in terms of the scale of violent events and fatalities linked to the activities of terrorist groups in the broader Sahelian theatre (ACSS, 2024). As of August 2024, an estimated 60% of Burkina Faso’s territory was estimated to be outside the control of the military, in addition to an estimated 3 million Burkinabes forcibly displaced (ACSS, 2024). Since Burkina Faso’s insurgency started in 2015, more than 20,000 Burkinabes have died (ADF, 2024a, b).

In addition to the persistent attacks by violent extremist groups across the Central Sahel, there is also the insecurity challenge emanating from the indiscriminate killings of civilians by the military junta forces as well as the Africa Corp, which is a Russian paramilitary militia formerly known as the Wagner Group. Between the period of 2022 and 2024, an estimated 4740 civilians were reported to have been killed by these forces (ACSS, 2024). In recent times, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have pivoted towards Russia, China, and Turkey in their quest for regime survival, marking a departure from traditional Western allies such as the USA and France, thereby reflecting the continued dwindling influence of these powers across the broader region.

Tables 1 and Table 2 reflect the fatalities and displacements and recent geopolitical events across the Sahel region.

Figure 1 shows the sum of attacks and fatalities across the Central Sahelian states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from 2012, which marked the beginning of contemporary insecurity in the region, up to the period of July 2025. The data presented shows that since the military takeovers in these states, insecurity has worsened. Burkina Faso has remained the most affected, followed by Mali and Niger.

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With democracy coming under severe threat in the West African region following the wave of coups in parts of the Sahel region, its future has become increasingly uncertain. ECOWAS, which is the regional body in West Africa, has in the past condemned military takeovers through a series of actions, some of which have included the imposition of sanctions and the suspension of member states under military rule. However, the coup in Niger, which occurred on 26 July 2023, marked a turning point in the political trajectory of the West African subregion, triggering a series of unprecedented political events that would ultimately lead to the decision of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to formally withdraw from ECOWAS, a decision that would culminate in the formation of a defence pact known as the Alliance of Sahel States or the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES).

Figure 2 shows the central Sahelian countries that are part of the AES and ECOWAS in West Africa.

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The Sahel region is fast changing, which reflects the shifts, complexities, and emerging dynamics that have come to characterise the troubled region. As democracy comes under threat owing to the militarisation of political power in parts of the region, autocratic rule and the need to ensure regime survival have assumed prominence over state survival. These shifts are depicted through realignments and the formation of new alliances marking a departure in relations with traditional Western powers in favour of less democratic states such as Russia and China, as well as Turkey, among others. These complexities have been reinforced by the recent spate of military coups across parts of the troubled region. The rationale behind the recent military coups according to the putschists has been the inability of civilian authority to address rising insecurity in addition to making the case for sovereignty (Sheriff, 2024). However, Aurthur (2025) also points to the rise of populism across the political landscape in some Sahelian countries such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Guinea between the period of 2020 and 2023 as the reason for these coups.

While the new alliances that are being formed are based on mutual interests, there are concerns over their implications both in the short and long terms. Countries like Russia and China have continued to take advantage of the security vacuum that was created in the Sahel region following the exit of French and US forces. In the case of Russia, its renewed interests in the region have been manifested through arms transfers, mining opportunism, as well as the amplification of anti-Western propaganda (Ramani, 2021). In April 2025, foreign ministers from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger were in Moscow as part of efforts to strengthen ties in diplomacy, development, and defence, with Russia after cutting relations with France and its allies (RFI, 2025a, b). Ukraine, which is currently embroiled in a 3-year war with Russia, has in recent times sounded a warning to African countries to be cautious of Kremlin-backed deals which it says may seem beneficial now but will carry a heavy cost in the future (Mensah, 2025).

Russia has become a viable alternative for the acquisition of arms and weapons which a significant number of Sahelian states require to wage war against terrorist groups who continue to threaten their peace and security. This also includes its continued shipment of large quantities of military equipment such as to Mali via the port of Conakry in neighbouring Guinea (RFI, 2025b). Around 100 Russian vehicles including light tanks and armoured vehicles had arrived in Bamako, the capital city of Mali, from Guinea in January 2025. As far back as early 2023, Russia had also delivered troop transport helicopters (Roger and Tchoubar, 2025).

A potential fallout of this is the proliferation of weapons that could fall into the hands of terrorist groups such as during attacks on military bases across the Sahel region, thereby further empowering such groups and intensifying the protractedness of the armed conflict in the region. In early April 2024, about 100 Russian instructors from the state-controlled Africa Corps and an air-defence system had arrived in Niger (Schmitt, 2024). What this portends is the likely over-militarisation of the approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism which contributes to the protractedness of the armed conflicts across the region, thereby offering further grounds for its continued posture towards security provisioning for regime survival in a troubled region, a development that has seen the rise of civilian deaths both by junta-led security forces and the Wagner Group paramilitary force in parts of the Sahel region (ACSS, 2024).

The military junta forces and their Russian paramilitary militias were responsible for the deaths of more civilians (2430) than militant Islamist groups (2050) in 2023 across the Sahel region (ACSS, 2024). Another evident complexity in this regard has been the increasing human rights violations across countries in the region which are being led by autocratic regimes. This has dire implications as it further erodes the prospects of democracy in these countries. On this, Adhikari et al. (2024) have rightly argued that such states which experience more democratic backsliding tend to witness more substantial reductions in their human rights conditions. Russia’s Wagner Group has also been accused of kidnappings, imprisonment, and torture of Malian civilians in conjunction with Mali’s military junta (ADF 2025c). Following the death of its former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, he paramilitary force has since been under the control of the commander of Unit 29155, which is one of the most notorious branches of Russia’s GRU military intelligence service (Pronczuk et al., 2025). As part of efforts to enhance ties with the military-led states in the Sahel, Russia has now adopted a more strategic approach that projects its power. This includes leveraging reduced US aid and influence in the region, by increasing humanitarian aid to Burkina Faso and Niger, including 709.5 tons of assistance and 20,000 tons of wheat, respectively (Ekanem, 2025).

China on the other hand has mostly tended to prioritise economic interests in its relations with countries across the region. China’s inroads into Africa occur through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative. However, it has also begun to expand its military footprint in the region through the rapid delivery of affordable equipment (Nyabiage, 2025). It is worth noting that both China and Russia have sought to undermine Western democratic ideals through anticolonial propaganda, triggering anti-French sentiments in countries like Mali and Niger which are former French colonies. These realities have compelled a shift away from the West to the East (Kayali et al., 2023). These complexities and emerging regional dynamics point to the intensification of great power competition (GPC) between these two blocs. Political influence now appears to be shifting away from the dominant Western hegemons in Europe and North America to other emerging powers such as Russia, China, and Turkey.

It is worth mentioning that unlike Russia and China, which are interested in discrediting Western influence in the Sahel, Turkey has been mostly focused on expanding the business dimensions of its security provision through the sale of weapons such as drones and other means. For instance, in September 2023, about 1100 Syrian mercenaries that had been recruited by Turkey’s intelligence services and trained by Turkey’s military were deployed to Niger (ADF, 2024a, b). Both countries also signed a military cooperation agreement in 2020 (ADF, 2024a, b).

One of the most significant implications of these shifts and complexities which have contributed to the emerging regional dynamics in the Sahel particularly regarding insecurity has been that terrorist groups operating across the region have made the most of the security vacuum that exists following the withdrawal of Western forces (VOA, 2024c). The recent decision by Niger for instance to also withdraw from the MNJTF further complicates the security situation on the ground.

Another emerging dynamic in the region have been deals that transcend beyond military cooperation. Such as the taking over of mining operations from Western companies, tilting the balance in Russia’s favour. In April 2025, Burkina Faso’s military junta granted mining license to Russia’s mining company as part of a new gold project as part of an effort to capitalise on record-high gold prices (Agbetiloye, 2025a, b, c). Two months later, Burkina Faso officially signed a historical electronuclear program deal with Russia. The deal involves a collaboration with Russia’s Rosato to develop nuclear infrastructure for peaceful purposes as Burkina Faso seeks to enhance its energy capacity and security through nuclear technology (Okafor, 2025). In June 2025, as part of efforts to further strengthen ties, Russia and Mali signed a trade deal which included a pledge for greater cooperation on nuclear energy (Enendu, 2025). Russia and Niger also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement covering electricity generation, nuclear medicine, infrastructure development, and specialist training (Burman, 2025).

These nuclear deals pose grave concerns given the fragility and instability in the region, including the consequences of nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorist groups across the troubled region. In the same month, Mali also began building a new gold refinery backed by Russia which is intended at helping the country gain greater control over its natural resources. It is significant to note that Mali is the second-largest gold producer in Africa. The gold refinery is expected to be 62% owned by the Malian government and 38% owned by Yadran, a Russian firm (Agbetiloye, 2025c). Similarly, Niger has also shifted towards Russia for uranium production (RFI, 2024). It was worth noting that Niger is the world’s 7th largest uranium producer. There are also concerns that it could leverage this advantage by working on a deal to supply uranium to a country such as Iran, which has shown a renewed interest in the Sahel region (Aljazeera 2024a). In what appears to be a wave of nationalisations, among the central Sahelian states of Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger in June 2025 also nationalised a uranium mine called the Somair mine, which is operated by Orano, a French nuclear firm, which is 90% owned by France (Aljazeera, 2025b). As of December 2024, Niger had already taken over operational control of the mine (Melly, 2024).

Part of the emerging regional dynamics across the Sahel has been the erosion of trust between the military juntas and other democratic states. In December 2024, Niger, which was the latest country to experience a military takeover among the central Sahelian states, accused Nigeria of colluding with France to destabilise it. An accusation which Nigeria outrightly denied (Akinpelu, 2024). There is also a likelihood that as more countries become increasingly involved in the emerging regional dynamics in the Sahel, the armed conflict space could witness a significant expansion with broader geopolitical implications. For instance, in April 2024, following Mali, Niger cut off diplomatic ties with Ukraine in solidarity with Mali, after Wagner mercenaries were attacked by rebels who were being supported by Ukraine’s military (Wedali and Mwai, 2024).

Given the realities on the ground in the Sahel region, the future of democracy has come under threat. The exit of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS and the subsequent formation of the AES mark a turning point in regional integration across the subregion. These realities also reflect the new and emerging alliances and re-alliances across the Sahel region, which could significantly alter the region’s power balance, without necessarily leading to outright (dis)integration in the present nor complete (re)integration in the future of the broader West African subregion.

Despite divergent cultural, religious, and traditional orientations, West Africa, and particularly the Sahel region, remains a largely cohesive region. An outright disintegration of the subregion would imply a collapse in the fabric that holds together its people, its rich culture, and traditions. Yet, the relapse of democracy in parts of the Sahel region owing to the militarisation of political power, as well as the continued human rights abuses by the military-led states in the central Sahel, adds to the growing concerns of what the future holds for democracy in the region and in West Africa.

While the military juntas in the Central Sahel region have failed to live up to expectations, following their promises to address insecurity, the rise in discontent reflects citizens’ desire to hold them accountable. For instance, activists have risen to condemn the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger while calling for the return to civilian rule (Jalloh, 2024). The vocalisation of discontent among citizens suggests that indeed democracy is not lost, despite the lack of a conducive environment for it to thrive in.

As insecurity in parts of West Africa worsens and the socio-economic conditions on the ground further deteriorate, the military juntas could come under increasing pressure both by citizens and the international community to kick-start the transition to democratic rule. In Burkina Faso, the military had initially promised to hold elections in July 2024; however, as of May 2024 of the same year, it has decided to extend its rule for another 5 years (Aljazeera, 2024c). Similarly, in March 2025, Niger’s military leader cemented his grip on political power by naming himself president and extending his rule for another 5 years (Mamane, 2025). In Mali, the military authorities had granted the coup leader a 5-year presidential mandate which could be renewed as many times as necessary without requiring an election (Aljazeera  2025c). The entrenchment of the military rulers in the AES states sends a strong signal to other less democratic leaders who might potentially draw inspiration from them as well as emboldening the militaries in some countries in the region to seize political power. For instance, Togo has also shown a keen interest in joining the AES (Daily Post, 2025).

As part of its efforts to ensure the continued integration of the region while avoiding total disintegration, ECOWAS has chosen to preserve certain privileges for citizens of the AES countries including recognition of ECOWAS-branded documents, trade benefits, and visa-free movement rights, among others. In January 2025, following the exit of the AES member states from ECOWAS, the regional body pledged to keep its door open to these countries (CNN, 2025).

While the likelihood of the return of the AES countries into ECOWAS’ fold appears to be slim for now, it does not necessarily illicit the eventual disintegration of the West African subregion. Rather, what it does is significantly alter the balance of power in the region, putting ECOWAS’ credibility and legitimacy, as well as that of Nigeria, which is the region’s hegemon, to the test. In addition to this, given that the need for regime survival drives the military juntas of the AES and to perpetuate themselves in power, their alignment with countries such as Russia, China, and Turkey marks a departure from their relationship with Western powers, thereby fracturing Western influence in a region that has been of significant national security interests.