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Review of Industrial Organization

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19.05.2018

The Chilean Anti-cartel Experience: Accomplishments and Challenges

verfasst von: Umut Aydin, Nicolás Figueroa

Erschienen in: Review of Industrial Organization | Ausgabe 2/2019

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Abstract

We evaluate the Chilean law and enforcement record in the area of cartels. We identify the high probability of cartel detection, severe sanctions for detected cartels, and the predictability and consistency of enforcement practices as crucial factors that help enforcement agencies maximize the deterrent effect of anti-cartel law and policy. Reforms to the competition law in Chile in 2009 and 2016 have increased the probability of cartel detection by introducing more extensive investigative powers and a leniency program, have made sanctions more severe by increasing monetary fines and introducing prison sentences, and have improved the predictability of the leniency program.

Vorheriger Artikel Institutional Design of Select Competition Authorities in South Asia: Identifying Challenges and Opportunities

Nächster Artikel Recurrent Collusion: Cartel Episodes and Overcharges in the South African Cement Market

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See Bernedo (2013, pp. 53–58) for a history of the bank nationalization case. While the Commission started its investigation into the case in 1971, the final decision was not issued until 1975.

The cap on fines is expressed in the law as 20,000 Annual Tax Units (Unidad Tributaria Anual), and is thereby automatically adjusted to inflation.

In practice, leniency was already used in the pharmacies cartel case in 2009, as the FNE made an out-of-court settlement with the first company that came forward with information on collusion.

The cap on fines is expressed as 30,000 Annual Tax Units in the law.

The Law No. 20.945 also introduced a pre-merger notification requirement for the first time in Chile.

Calculated on the basis of data collected by the authors from the annual reports of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition (http://www.uohs.cz/en/information-centre/annual-reports.html), Israel Antitrust Authority (http://www.antitrust.gov.il/eng/subject/178.aspx), Competition Commission of Singapore (https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/publications/in-house-publications/annual-reports), their annual reports to the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/annualreportsbycompetitionagencies.htm) and personal communication with these agencies (Personal communication with the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition, December 18, 2017; Personal communication with the Competition Commission of Singapore, December 13, 2017). The Czech Republic, Israel, and Singapore were selected for comparison because their GDPs—at US$183.6 billion, US$189 billion, and US$170.7 billion respectively in 2016—are comparable to that of Chile at US$181.7 billion (World Bank 2017).

See also the discussion in Lianos et al. (2014, pp. 82–84, 86–87) for a discussion of illicit gains versus the fines imposed in the pharmacies and poultry producers cases.

Conversion done according to the 2016 exchange rate.

Stephan and Nikpay (2015) report that, in the EU, cases that rely on leniency programs have increased to 75% of all cases.

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Titel: The Chilean Anti-cartel Experience: Accomplishments and Challenges
verfasst von: Umut Aydin
Nicolás Figueroa
Publikationsdatum: 19.05.2018
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Review of Industrial Organization / Ausgabe 2/2019
Print ISSN: 0889-938X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7160
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-018-9633-0

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