Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
For over 30 years, the TACs (total allowable catches) have been distributed among the Member States of the European Union using a fixed allocation key, supposedly based on historic catches, known as the relative stability. In December 2013, Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy was adopted. This new regulation keeps relative stability as a criterion for allocating fishing opportunities among Member States and also introduces something new: a ban on discards, which are catches returned to the sea. Implementing the discard ban poses a major challenge for mixed fisheries, where more than one species is present. The aim of this paper is to examine this compromise between relative stability and the discard ban.
For easier reading we shall refer to European Union (EU). But for EU we also mean the European Economic Community (EEC, 1958–1993) and the European Community (EC, 1993–2009). The EEC came into being in 1958. With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union in November 1993, the EEC became the EC. And with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the EU replaced and succeeded the EC.
Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC. OJ 2013 L 354/22–61.
Definition of discards: article 4.1.10; ibid.
Definition of mixed fisheries: article 4.1.36; ibid.
The EU has had competence to adopt legislation on fisheries from the outset (EEC Treaty, 1957), but fishing was not a priority for MSs then (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg). Moreover, fishing mostly took place in what were then waters of the high seas. The first step was taken in 1966, with a report from the Commission. In 1968, three draft regulations appeared that eventually led to the adoption in 1970 of two regulations—Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 2141/70 and 2142/70—which, among other things, introduced the “equal access principle”. In accordance with this principle the fishing regulation applied by each MS in its maritime waters—waters under its sovereignty or within its jurisdiction—must not lead to differences in the treatment of other MSs. Churchill and Owen ( 2010), pp. 4–6, state that MSs wanted an acquis for fisheries before starting negotiations with the four candidate states and, in fact, the two regulations cited were adopted the day before formal negotiations started with these states.
Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1972); OJ 1972 L 73; MSs of the EU since 1 January 1973. Both Greenland and the Faroe Islands are part of Denmark, but when Denmark joined the EU in 1973, the Faroe Islands decided to remain outside precisely because of fishing: “the Faroese have not found it their interest to become subject to the Common Fisheries Policy” (The Government of the Faroe Islands, http://www.government.fo/foreign-relations/missions-of-the-faroe-islands-abroad/the-mission-of-the-faroes-to-the-european-union/the-faroe-islands-and-the-european-union/). The Faroe Islands is like a third country with respect to the EU. As for Greenland, it joined the EU in 1973 as part of Denmark but withdrew from it in 1985 as result of a referendum held in 1982. Since then, Greenland is part of the OCT (Overseas Countries and Territories; articles 198–204 TFEU).
Joint action by MSs concerning the waters of the North Sea and North Atlantic. For the evolution of the EU position, and that of its members, on the establishment of the exclusive economic zone within the framework of the III United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973–1982), see Treves ( 1976).
Portugal submitted a formal application for membership in the EU on March 28, 1977. Spain did the same 4 months later, on 28 July 1977. With regard to Spain, the letters exchanged in July 1977 between the Spanish Prime Minister and the Chairman of the European Communities on Spain’s request to start negotiating its integration can be found in Revista de Instituciones Europeas 4 (1977) 1031–1036. The negotiations culminated in 1985 in the Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal (1985); OJ 1985 L 302. Spain and Portugal have been MSs of the EU since 1 January 1986.
In 1981, when the EU was formed by 10 countries, almost 90% of EU resources were captured by the UK (64%) and Ireland (25%); see Lostado i Bojo ( 1985), p. 41.
As stated by Churchill and Owen ( 2010), pp. 11–14, Spain and Portugal had large fleets (the Spanish fleet was nearly ¾ the size of the entire EU fleet, at the time composed by ten MSs), and the waters under the jurisdiction of these two states did not have many resources because their continental shelves—not in the legal but the geological sense—are narrow, and waters located on the continental shelves are the richest in fishery resources. The Commission then spoke of an “imbalance in the fisheries sector between the tonnage of the Spanish fleet and the fishing zones available to Spain”; European Commission, “Opinion on Spain’s application for membership”, sent to the Council by the Commission on 29 November 1978; available at Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 9/78 (1978) 16. On the other hand, Portugal and Spain had sufficient fisheries access agreements with third countries with which the EC had no agreements; see Sobrino Heredia ( 1990).
Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 on certain external aspects of the creation of a 200-mile fishing zone in the Community with effect from 1 January 1977; OJ 1981 C 105/1.
Not published until 1981 (OJ 1981 C 105/1). In 2001, the Advocate General Alber drew attention to its late and incomplete publication; see Opinion of Advocate General Alber delivered on 13 November 2001, Spain v Council, joined cases C-61/96, C-132/97, C-45/98, C-27/99, C-81/00 and C-22/01, ECLI:EU:C:2001:602, footnote 7.
The Hague Resolution had eight annexes. However, in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) only Annex I, on the external aspects, was published. In 1998 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) drew attention to this incompleteness. See Judgment of the Court of 19 February 1998, NIFPO and Northern Ireland Fishermen’s Federation v Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland, C-4/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:67, paragraph 5. The Advocate General in this same case noted that the explanation given by the Council to justify this defect was that some of its annexes contained confidential material regarding instructions given by the Council to the Commission concerning future negotiations by the EU with non-member countries and international organisations (see Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola issued on 30 September 1997, case C-4/96, cit., ECLI:EU:C:1997:444, point 7). In that judgment, the CJEU reproduces the text of Annex VII (see the judgment in case C-4/96, cit., paragraph 4). And many years before, the Advocate General Reischl had reproduced the text of Annex VI (see Opinion in case C-141/78, cit., p. 2945).
“(….) the expression ‘northern parts of the United Kingdom’ for the purposes of the Hague Preferences comprises Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, and that part of England between the ports of Bridling- ton and Berwick”; Opinion in case C-4/96, cit., footnote 9.
See Holden ( 1985), point 6 “Allocation Between Member States of the EEC”. Holden was at that moment Directorate General for Fisheries Commission of the European Communities.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 establishing a Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources; OJ 1983 L 24/1–13. This regulation establishes that the volume of the catches available to the EU must be shared across the MSs in a manner which assures each MS relative stability in fishing activities for each of the stocks considered (art. 4.1) with the notion of relative stability understood in accordance with the Hague Preferences (recitals 6–7).
Council Regulation (EEC) No 172/83 of 25 January 1983 fixing for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks occurring in the Community’s fishing zone, total allowable catches for 1982, the share of these catches available to the Community, the allocation of that share between the Member States and the conditions under which the total allowable catches may be fished; OJ 1983 L 24/30–67.
Ibid. recital 3. These criteria, which were set by the Council in 1980 without further details on their application or how much weight was to be placed on each criterion (Council declaration of 30 May 1980 on the common fisheries policy, OJ 1980 C 158/2) were interpreted by the Commission, which presented a mathematical model that took into account the three criteria and served as a starting point for the allocation of quotas, stock by stock. As Holden ( 1985) states, the Commission interpreted what should be understood by traditional fishing activities (“average catches in the period 1973–78, less industrial by-catches beyond permitted limits and human consumption species caught directly for reduction to meal and oil”), the specific needs of areas particularly dependent on fishing and its dependent industries (“For Greenland: a major share of the catch possibilities in Greenland waters; For Ireland: doubling of the 1975 catches by 1978; For north Britain: maintaining a minimum catch possibility equal to the landings in 1975 by vessels less than 24 m long at ports in northern Ireland, Scotland and along the east coast of England as far south as Bridlington”), and the loss of fishing potential in the waters of third countries (“the difference between what a Member State is actually allowed to catch and what it would have caught if there had been no extension to 200-mile limits. What it would have caught is calculated as its average percentage share of the particular stock for the period 1973–76 multiplied by the TAC, if known, or the estimated TAC, otherwise”).
Penas Lado ( 2016), p. 28, points out that, in exchange for this guarantee, the UK and Ireland agreed to lower TACs—understood as the percentage applied in the context of the RS—than they wanted.
Allocation formula laid down in Regulation 172/83, cit.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture; OJ 1992 L 389/1–14; see recitals 12–14. Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ 2002 L 358/59–80; see recitals 16–18. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., see recitals 35–37.
European Commission, Green Paper of 22 April 2009—Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, COM(2009) 163 final; Green Paper 2009, hereinafter. See point 5.3.
As stated expressly by the CJEU. Judgment of the Court of 30 March 2006, Spain v Council, C-87/03 and C-100/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:207, paragraphs 28–29.
For new states, the application of RS is not based on the three criteria taken into account in the regulations of 1983; rather, it is only based on historical catches. Penas Lado ( 2016), p. 27.
Art. 16.1 of Regulation 1380/2013: “…The interests of each Member State shall be taken into account when new fishing opportunities are allocated”. And in the same sense, formerly, the regulations from 1992 and 2002; see article 8.4.iii) of Regulation 3760/92, and article 20.2 of Regulation 2371/2002.
As stated expressly by the CJEU, the allocation of new fishing opportunities among MSs requires the assessment of a complex economic situation for which the Council enjoys a wide discretionary power (Judgments in cases C-87/03 and C-100/03, cit., paragraph 38). That is not always harmonious process.
Penas Lado ( 2016), p. 348, points out that the Hague Preferences have been applied continuously although not always harmoniously owing to the resistance of negatively affected MSs. This author explains that its application is not automatic but established within a negotiating framework, and often only 50% is applied (i.e., the average between what the UK and/or Ireland would receive by applying RS and what they would obtain under the Hague Preferences).
The distribution of these quotas and the application of the Hague Preferences were specifically addressed in case C-4/96. Judgment of case C-4/96, cit., paragraph 18: “Under that mechanism, Ireland and the United Kingdom are granted annual quotas calculated on the basis of the mid-point between the notional quotas resulting from the application of the 1983 allocation keys alone and the notional quotas corresponding to their Hague Preferences”.
The Act concerning the conditions of accession of Spain (cit., arts. 161.1.f and 162) established that 90% of the quota for anchovy in the Bay of Biscay correspond to Spain and the remaining 10% to France. For example, the TAC of 22,500 tonnes for the EU in the Gulf of Biscay in 2016 is distributed as follows: 22,500 tonnes for Spain and 2500 for France; Council Regulation (EU) 2016/72 of 22 January 2016, OJ 2016 L 22/42.
This allocation took place with the Council Regulation (EC) No 27/2005 of 22 December 2004, OJ 2005 L 12/1. Its character of “new fishing opportunity” was confirmed by the CJEU in Case C 141/05; 5; Judgment of the Court of 8 November 2007, Spain v Council, C-141/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:653, paragraph 90.
See European Commission, Green Paper on the future of the Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2001) 135 final; Green Paper 2001, hereinafter; section 220.127.116.11. This exception to the single market has received great criticism from many quarters (authors, authorities, etc.). For instance, by a region highly dependent on fishing, Galicia (Spain); see Xunta de Galicia, Declaration by the Autonomous Government (Xunta) of Galicia on the Principles of the European Union in the Future Common Fisheries Policy (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 2002).
Regulation 170/83, cit., recitals 35–37.
Regulation 3760/92, cit., recitals 12–14. Regulation 2371/2002, cit., recitals 16–18. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recitals 35–37.
See Parliamentary questions (European Parliament); Answer given by the Commission to the written question E-0139/08, 13 March 2008.
“The principle of relative stability has, since 1983, provided assurances to the Member States with regard to the share of quotas, thus avoiding annual repetitions of a political debate on the allocation key, which would have made the decision-making on TACs even more complicated...” Green Paper 2001, cit.; section 18.104.22.168.
According to the current regulation: “35. In view of the precarious economic state of the fishing industry and the dependence of certain coastal communities on fishing, it is necessary to ensure the relative stability of fishing activities by allocating fishing opportunities among Member States, based on a predictable share of the stocks for each Member State. 36. Such relative stability of fishing activities (…) should safeguard and take full account of the particular needs of regions where local communities are especially dependent on fisheries and related activities (…)”; Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recitals 35–36.
Green Paper 2009, cit., section 5.3.
“88. (…) the principle of relative stability concerns only relations between Member States, it cannot confer individual rights upon private parties, the infringement of which would give rise to a right to compensation (…). 89. (…) The principle of relative stability does not therefore confer on fishermen any guarantee that they can catch a fixed quantity of fish, since the requirement of relative stability must be understood as meaning merely maintenance of a right to a fixed percentage for each Member State in that distribution”. Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 19 October 2005, Cofradía de pescadores de “San Pedro” de Bermeo and Others v Council, T-415/03; ECLI:EU:T:2005:365; paragraphs 88–89.
E.g., Judgment in case C-141/05, cit., paragraphs 11, 44, 48, 62, 85, 87.
Ibid., paragraph 86.
See Sobrino Heredia ( 2009).
E.g. Judgment of the Court of 21 January 2016, “ Eturas” UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, C-74/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, paragraph 38.
E.g. Judgment of the Court of 6 October 2015, Council v Commission, C-73/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:663, paragraph 61.
“It is important for the management of the CFP to be guided by principles of good governance. Those principles include decision-making based on best available scientific advice, broad stakeholder involvement and a long-term perspective. The successful management of the CFP also depends on a clear definition of responsibilities at Union, regional, national and local levels and on the mutual compatibility of the measures taken and their consistency with other Union policies”, Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 14.
“Sustainable exploitation of marine biological resources should be based on the precautionary approach, which derives from the precautionary principle referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 191(2) of the Treaty, taking into account available scientific data”, Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, cit., recital 10. See Proelss and Houghton ( 2012). And for a general reference about the precautionary principle in the EU see: European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, COM (2000) 0001.
Regulation 170/83, cit., recital 7; Regulation 3760/92 cit., recital 14; Regulation 2371/2002, cit., recital 37.
Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 37.
This was expressly stated by the CJEU. Judgment in case C-141/05, cit., paragraph 87.
During the debate prior to the latest reform of the CFP in 2010, Ireland stated that the Hague Preferences in Annex VII of the Hague Resolution were the counterpart to a concession that Ireland had made: access to their exclusive economic zone. It even claimed that it was “not possible to re-open or diminish the principles set out in Annex VII of the Hague Resolution without re-opening the whole issue of access within the 200 mile Exclusive Fisheries Zone”. Government of Ireland, Ireland’s response to the Commission’s Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 2010) 16; http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/ireland_en.pdf.
In the “Transcript of Minister for Europe David Lidington comments to media on the prospects of EU membership for a newly independent Scotland” (extracts from the interviews given to ITV Borders and BBC Scotland on 17 January 2014) published on the British government’s website, Lidington warns: “if we look at the UK in the EU, we have got a good deal for Scotland. In terms of fisheries, the Shetland box, the Hague preferences, that wouldn’t be guaranteed if Scotland walked away from the UK”; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prospects-of-eu-membership-for-a-newly-independent-scotland.
These MSs have stated this on various occasions. For example, see the Statements published in the minutes of the Council, January 2008: “Statement by Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands concerning the Hague Preferences” (p. 13) and “Statement by the French delegation…2. Implementation of the Hague Preferences” (p. 14); available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12272-2008-INIT/en/pdf.
E.g., Judgment in case C-141/05, cit., paragraph 86.
Andersen et al. ( 2014), p. 2.
Food subsidies to wildlife as a result of human activity have an important effect on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, and intentional discarding at sea is recognized as one of the major global subsidies. Heath et al. ( 2014).
Wilson and Jacobsen ( 2009), p. 6.
In 1994, a study by the FAO—Alverson et al. ( 1994)—estimated that between 17.9 and 39.5 million tonnes (average, 27.0 million tonnes) of fish were discarded each year in commercial fisheries. In 2005 other study by the FAO—Kelleher ( 2005)—estimated that the weighted discard rate was 8% (proportion of the catch discarded). Based on this discard rate, the average yearly discards for the 1992–2001 period was estimated to be 7.3 million tonnes. The author warns that because of the different method used in this estimate, it was not directly comparable with the previous estimates of 27 million tonnes. In any case, the author states there was evidence to suggest a substantial reduction in discards in recent years. In geographical terms, the Northeast Atlantic (1.4 million tonnes), the Northwest Pacific (1.3 million tonnes) and the Western Central Atlantic (0.8 million tonnes) generated the highest discards.
In 2011, the Commission created a compilation and review of information on the level of discarding in different fisheries within the EU. The Commission distinguished three categories: high discard fisheries (>40%), medium discard fisheries (15–39%), low discard (<15%). In Table 2 (pp. 11–22), data per zone are shown: Region covered/Target Species/Discard rate/Main discarded species/Reason for discarding. The region with the highest percentage of discards was the Southern North Sea, with a discard rate of 71–95%. Although within a region there may be very different discard practices according to species, for example: North Sea IV (English and Welsh fleets) had a general discard rate of 31%, but 89% for Dub. European Commission (2011) Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment—EU Discards Annex. See also: Uhlmann et al. ( 2013).
We take as a reference, although simplifying some reasons and grouping them into two categories, the work of Lucas ( 1997).
Green Paper 2009, cit., section 5.3.
Borges ( 2015), p. 536, highlights an incident that took place in 2008. A UK trawler (The Prolific) was filmed by the Norwegian coastguard throwing five tonnes of fish overboard immediately after leaving Norwegian waters, where discarding is prohibited. This event was widely reported in the press. See, for example, the Guardian newspaper in its edition of 13/8/2008. Its online version even provides a video over 4 min long showing the operation in which the Prolific discarded nearly 80% of its catch. The boat had previously been inspected in Norwegian waters and declared legal, before crossing into UK waters where it dumped its load; http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/aug/13/fishing.endangeredspecies.
Art. 15, Regulation 1380/2013, cit.
E.g. the discard rate in the North Sea has been 30–40% by weight for the main demersal fish species (cod, haddock, whiting and plaice) since the 1970s; and around 10% for pelagic fish. Heath et al. ( 2014).
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1392/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain small pelagic fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1393/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain pelagic fisheries in north-western waters; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1394/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain pelagic fisheries in south-western waters; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1395/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain small pelagic fisheries and fisheries for industrial purposes in the North Sea; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1396/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan in the Baltic Sea. OJ 2014 L 370.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2438 of 12 October 2015 establishing a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries in north-western waters; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2439 of 12 October 2015 establishing a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries in south-western waters; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2440 of 22 October 2015 establishing a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries in the North Sea and in Union waters of ICES Division IIa. OJ 2015 L 336.
Species for which scientific evidence demonstrates high survival rates, taking into account the characteristics of the gear, of the fishing practices and of the ecosystem. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 27, article 15 paragraph 4.b.
Article 2, Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/2438, cit.
The de minimis exemption shall apply where scientific evidence indicates that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve; or to avoid disproportionate costs of handling unwanted catches, for those fishing gears where unwanted catches per fishing gear do not represent more than a certain percentage, to be established in a plan, of total annual catch of that gear. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 31, article 15 paragraphs 4.c and 5.c.
Article 3.a, Commission Delegated Regulation 1393/2014, cit.
Species in respect of which fishing is prohibited and which are identified as such in a Union legal act adopted in the area of the CFP. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 27, article 15 paragraph 4.a.
Fish which have been damaged by predators such as fish-eating marine mammals, predatory fish or birds, can constitute a risk to humans, to pets and to other fish by virtue of pathogens and bacteria which might be transmitted by such predators. This fish is a new exception to the landing obligation inserted by Regulation (EU) 2015/812 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 may 2015 amending, among others, Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013. JO 2015 L 133, recital 16 and art. 9.a.
European Commission, “1 January 2015: the landing obligation”, http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/landing-obligation/index_en.htm.
European Commission (2011) Impact assessment; Commission staff working paper accompanying the document Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy; IA 2011, hereinafter. SEC (2011) 891 final, de 13.7.2011; Section 2.1.4.
During the discussions prior to the last reform of the CFP, Ireland manifested its support for RS but also proposed a relaxation of it. One of the problems that Ireland pointed out was the mini-quotas: “(…) While these allocations may reflect catch history in the 1970’s, today they are very small quotas in often distant fisheries. In many cases fleets steam many miles (incurring significant carbon foot prints) to catch small allocations in fisheries where they may or may not also have quotas for other stocks caught in mixed fisheries. Given their size it is evident that it is not commercially viable to catch these quotas; indeed many of them are economically unsound and should be redistributed to Member States in a position to utilize them (…).” Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food of the Government of Ireland (2010), Ireland’s Response to the Commission’s Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, pp. 16–17, section 3.3.1; http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/ireland_en.pdf.
Regulation 1380/2013, cit., recital 29 and Art. 16.8.
Ibid., Art. 15.9.
Article 105, Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009; JO 2009 L 343.
Commission warned some years ago (IA 2011, cit., Section 2.1.4) that the Commission got close to 1000 notifications of swaps per year, 50% of which were nearly permanent, the rest were late year ‘regularisations’ intended to legitimise excessive catches.
As the Commission informed (ibid.), MSs exchanged more than 10% of their quotas in the period 2005–2008 on an annual basis. The species with the highest swap volumes were redfish, cod and hake and some pelagic species like herring, blue whiting, jack mackerel, mackerel, sprat, anchovy and sandeel.
The Vessels’ Owners Cooperative of the Spanish Port of Vigo España (ARVI) conducted a study on the situation. The study analyzes 20 major species subject to quotas in the EU for the period 2008–2014. The report concludes (pp. 52–53) that the remaining portion of the quota that was not eventually utilized by MSs amounted to 1 million tonnes (exactly 1,039,549.78 tonnes) over the period 2008–2014, i.e., an average of 23% (an annual average of roughly 143 thousand tonnes). These underutilized quotas represented a total value of 1833.7 million euros (based on the guide prices). ARVI (2016) Update of the TAC and quota system in face of the ban of discards; Spanish-English bilingual edition, http://www.arvi.org/publicaciones/PuestaTacsCuotasDescartes.pdf.
Regulation 1380/2013, cit., Art. 16.2.
This provision only applies where the stock of the non-target species is within safe biological limits. Regulation 1380/2013, cit., Art. 15.8.
E.g. Spanish Government; interview with Carlos Dominguez, at the moment Secretary General for Fisheries of the Government of Spain; published in March 2013 and reported in various media; see La Opinion in its edition of 19.03.2013, http://www.laopinioncoruna.es/mar/2013/03/18/carlos-dominguez-plan-descartes-reducira-pesca-gran-sol-tres-meses-ano/703190.html.
With regard to the issue of choke species and quota swaps, European Commission informs that stakeholders are suggesting that MSs seem to retain quotas rather than increase swapping under the newly introduced landing obligation. Commission staff working document accompanying the document: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—Consultation on the fishing opportunities for 2017 under the Common Fisheries Policy; COM (2016) 396 final, 15.06.2016, p. 10.
And also by promoting technical progress, but it is not what we want to emphasize now.
See art. 39 TFEU. This article sets out the objectives of the common agricultural policy. However, it should be noted that, as occurs in the art. 38.1 TFEU, references to the common agricultural policy or to agriculture, and the use of the term “agricultural”, must be understood as also referring to fisheries.
See Natale et al. ( 2013). The authors identify and map specific local communities in which, given the conditions of accessibility, employment and size of the fishing fleet, the dependence on fishing activities can be considered particularly relevant, i.e., with ratios above 5%. See also European Commission, Facts and figures on the Common Fisheries Policy—Basic statistical data (European Union, Luxembourg, 2014).
European Parliament (2007) Regional dependency on Fisheries, IP/B/PECH/ST/IC/2006-198; study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries and carried out by Pavel Salz and Graeme Macfadyen. E.g. combining income dependency on the fisheries sector and the number employed, the top five-ranked NUTS-2 regions were Galicia (Spain), Highlands and Islands (UK), N-E Scotland (UK), Algarve (Portugal) and Peloponnisos (Greece); see table 11, pp. 17–18. About Galicia, see Surís-Regueiro and Santiago ( 2014); also the latest report published by the Galician Statistics Institute: “Analisis do Sector da Pesca”, 2015, http://www.ige.eu/estatico/pdfs/s3/publicaciones/AnaliseSectorPesca.pdf.
Judgments in cases C-87/03 and C-100/03, cit., paragraph 27.
Alverson DL, Freeberg MH, Pope JG, Murawski SA (1994) A global assessment of fisheries bycatch and discards. FAO fisheries technical paper no. 339
Andersen P, Andersen J, Mardle S (2014) What’s going to happen with the CFP Reform discard policy? In: Conference papers and presentations of the 17th IIFET conference, International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Brisbane, 7–11 July 2014
Borges L (2015) The evolution of a discard policy in Europe. Fish Fisheries 16(3):534–540 CrossRef
Churchill R, Owen D (2010) The EC Common Fisheries Policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford CrossRef
Del Vecchio A (1982) Sull’incidenza della normativa comunitaria sui tratati in materia di pesca fra Stati membri della CEE e Stati terzi. Rivista di diritto internazionale 65:571–582
Franckx E (2012) Sea fisheries cases before the European Court of Justice. In: Wolfrum R (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 42–47
Holden MJ (1985) The procedures followed and the problems met by the European Economic Community in implementing the scientific recommendations of the International Council for the exploration of the sea on total allowable catches. In: Papers presented at the expert consultation on the regulation of fishing effort (fishing mortality), Rome, 17–26 January 1983. FAO Fisheries Rep 289(3):215–470
Kelleher K (2005) Discards in the World’s Marine Fisheries. An update. In: FAO fisheries technical paper no. 470. FAO, Rome
Le Bihan D (2003) La jurisprudence communautaire et le principe de stabilite relative dans la politique commune de la pêche. In: Cudennec A, Gueguen-Hallouet G (eds) Le juge communautaire et la mer. Bruylant, Brussels, pp 143–160
Lostado i Bojo R (1985) La Política Común de la Pesca en la CEE y España. Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales 131:39–69
Lucas I (1997) A study of the options for utilization of by catch and discards from marine capture fisheries. In: FAO fisheries circular no. 928 FIIU/C928. FAO, Rome
Meseguer Sánchez JL (1981) El Derecho comunitario y los derechos de pesca de los Terceros Países. Revista de Instituciones Europeas 8(1):53–65
Natale F, Carvalho N, Harrop M, Guillen J, Frangoudes K (2013) Identifying fisheries dependent communities in EU coastal areas. Mar Policy 42:245–252 CrossRef
Penas Lado E (2016) The Common Fisheries Policy: the quest for sustainability. Wiley-Blackwell CrossRef
Proelss A, Houghton K (2012) The EU Common Fisheries Policy in light of the precautionary principle. Ocean Coastal Manag 70:22–30 CrossRef
Rey Aneiros A (2001) La Unión Europea frente a las transformaciones del Derecho internacional de la pesca. Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia
Sobrido-Prieto M (2013) Los jueces españoles en su papel de jueces comunitarios: el intercambio de cuotas pesqueras de anchoa en el Golfo de Vizcaya y el principio de estabilidad relativa en las sentencias del tribunal de Luxemburgo, de la Audiencia Nacional y del Tribunal Supremo. Revista de Derecho comunitario europeo 45:691–718
Sobrino Heredia JM (1990) Les Accords de pêche conclus par l’Espagne et les pays en voie de développement. In: Velas P (ed) Aspects du droit international économique. Pedone, Paris, pp 203–237
Sobrino Heredia JM (2003) La participación de la Unión Europea en las transformaciones del Derecho de Pesca. Cuadernos de derecho pesquero 2:77–98
Sobrino Heredia JM (2009) La politique communautaire de conservation et gestion des ressources halieutiques et quelques problèmes concernant l’application du droit de l’Union européenne. In: Casado Raigón R, Cataldi G (eds) L’évolution et l’état actuel du droit international de la mer. Mélanges de droit de la mer offerts à Daniel Vignes. Bruylant, Bruxelles, pp 865–885
Sobrino Heredia JM, Rey Aneiros A (1997) La Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas sobre la Política Común de la Pesca. Xunta de Galicia, Santiago de Compostela
Surís-Regueiro JC, Santiago JL (2014) Characterization of fisheries dependence in Galicia (Spain). Mar Policy 47:99–109 CrossRef
Treves T (1976) La Communauté européenne et la zone économique exclusive. Annuaire français de droit international 22(1):653–677 CrossRef
Uhlmann SS, van Helmond ATM, Stefánsdóttir EK, Sigurðardóttir S, Haralabous J, Maria Bellido J, Carbonell A, Catchpole T, Damalas D, Fauconnet L, Feekings J, Garcia T, Madsen N, Mallold S, Margeirsson S, Palialexis A, Readdy L, Valeiras J, Vassilopoulou V, Rochet M-J (2013) Discarded fish in European waters: general patterns and contrasts. ICES J Mar Sci: 1–11. doi: 10.1093/icesjms/fst030
Wilson DC, Jacobsen RB (2009) Governance issues in mixed-fisheries management: an analysis of stakeholder views. IFM—Innovative Fisheries Management, Aalborg University, Aalborg
- The Common Fisheries Policy: A Difficult Compromise Between Relative Stability and the Discard Ban
José Manuel Sobrino