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Any instrument of economic policy should exhibit a number of key properties. First, the policymaker should have the legal authority to use the instrument and should not be constrained in its use. Second, that instrument should be effective, in that use of the instrument has a significant and sufficiently rapid impact on the objectives of policy. Third, that transmission should be stable and predictable, in that use of the instrument does not inject uncertainty into the system. Fourth, the instrument should be cost-effective, in that use of the instrument does not entail significant undesirable side effects for the broader goals of the social planner.
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- The Conventional Instruments of Macroprudential Policy
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