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The Dark Social Capital of Religious Radicals

Jihadi Networks and Mobilization in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 1998–2018

  • 2021
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Über dieses Buch

Mit der Auswanderung europäischer Muslime zum "Islamischen Staat" und einer Welle von Terroranschlägen in Europa in den letzten Jahren stießen die Fragen, warum und wie sich Einzelne zum dschihadistischen Extremismus radikalisieren, auf großes Interesse. Diese These untersucht, wie Individuen sich radikalisieren, indem sie einen theoretischen Rahmen anwenden, der sich in erster Linie auf die Theorie des sozialen Kapitals, die Ökonomie der Religion und die Theorie der sozialen Bewegung bezieht. Die Analyse der biografischen Hintergründe, Wege der Radikalisierung und Netzwerkverbindungen von mehr als 1300 dschihadistischen Extremisten aus Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz zeigt, dass Radikalisierung in erster Linie als gesellschaftlicher Prozess der Isolierung von früheren sozialen Kontakten und der Zugehörigkeit zu einer neuen religiösen Gruppe zu betrachten ist. Radikalisierung ist durch die Transformation des Sozialkapitals gekennzeichnet und wird häufig durch so genannte "starke Verbindungen" zu Freunden und Familienmitgliedern kanalisiert. Diese Peer-Netzwerke bilden das soziale Fundament radikaler Cluster auf lokaler Ebene, die normalerweise durch exklusive Moscheegemeinden und religiöse Autoritäten mit einem breiteren Milieu verbunden sind. Die Bindung von Sozialkapital innerhalb dieser radikalen Gruppen minimiert das Risiko des Verrats und fördert das Vertrauen, das für heimliche und riskante Aktivitäten unverzichtbar ist.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
Two decades ago, a bunch of Muslim students from Hamburg became good friends and comrades-in-arms in the conflict against Western democracies they perceived as global jihad, as a holy war fought worldwide. Three of these friends—Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Marwan al-Shehhi—would arguably change the world once they caused havoc by navigating two hijacked passenger airplanes into the towers of New York’s World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attack not only killed 2,977 people and injured over 6,000 more, but they also branded the event into the collective memory of people around the world, influenced the political climate towards Muslims in Western societies, and altered power relationships in the Islamic world.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 2. Theory: The Dark Social Capital of Religious Radicals
Abstract
Like terrorism researchers, scholars of religion are inevitably confronted with a plethora of definitions and concepts claiming to describe the subject of research adequately. The complexity and diversity of how religious traditions and new religious movements manifest themselves individually and socially make defining religion a problematic endeavor. Principally, religious studies encompass four definitional approaches: experiential or affective (identification of religion by subjective experiences), substantive (identification of religion by genuine belief systems), polythetic (identification of features describing something as a religious phenomenon), and functional definitions (identification of religion by social functions, not beliefs) (Dawes and Maclaurin,.Dawes and Maclaurin (eds), A New Science of Religion, Routledge, New York and London, 2013, 14–16).
Johannes Saal
Chapter 3. Data Sources and Methods of Data Analysis
Abstract
In recent decades, researchers pragmatically adopted a paradigmatic relativism to overcome the longstanding paradigm of the incompatibility of positivism and constructivism in social science (Morgan 2007, 58; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2008, 9). These mixed or multi-methods research designs are merging different methods in different stages of the research process aiming to overcome fundamental methodological shortcomings of each research paradigm in social science, contextuality, and generalizability in particular. Depending on the research question, a mixed-methods design can be led by a confirmatory approach as mainly applied in quantitative research or an exploratory one typical for qualitative research (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2008, 33).
Johannes Saal
Chapter 4. Socio-Demographic and Socio-Economic Backgrounds
Abstract
The phenomenon of Jihadi radicalization concerns especially young males since only 15.2 % of the individuals in the overall sample were women. Between the three countries, however, existed significant differences: while the proportion of female Jihadis in the German sample was 14.5 %, the ratio of the Austrian sample (20.3 %) was almost as double as high as in the Swiss one (12.1 %). Besides gender, age was among the variables with the most consistent data.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 5. Dynamics of Jihadi Networks in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
Abstract
Although the phenomenon of Salafism and Jihadism concerns authorities in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland for more than a decade, almost no official data on the size and development of Salafi and Jihadi networks exist. For several years, Germany's intelligence service BfV regularly publishes official statistics on the membership size of the Salafi milieu that constantly grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 11,300 members in 2018. However, this constitutes only 0.3 % of the Muslim population in Germany.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 6. Geographical Clusters
Abstract
For almost the entire German sample, data on the state (N = 891) and place of residence (N = 884) existed. Regarding the breakdown of the state of residency shown in Table 6.1, it becomes apparent that individuals from the dataset lived in all German states, although there are significant differences. Almost all lived in the area that once constituted the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) including (West-)Berlin and only less than three percent in one of the East German states.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 7. Mobilizing Members
Abstract
Most individuals do not radicalize in social isolation, and only a minority never seems to have established ties to like-minded individuals in the Jihadi milieu. In the German and Austrian samples, less than seven percent of the nodes probably can be considered isolates or so-called “lone wolves”. In Switzerland, their proportion was with almost 17 % higher, reflecting the lower density and brokerage between the few clusters of the local networks in the multi-lingual country.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 8. Mobilizing Cohesion
Abstract
As the involvement in terrorist attacks or the support of terrorist organizations constitutes a high-risk activity that leads to state repression and legal prosecution, with a probability of 37.4 %, arrests ranks as the most common reason for a node's exit from Jihadi networks in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Between 1998 and 2018, at least 371 individuals from the German sample, 67 from the Austrian, and 50 from the Swiss sample were detained and sentenced on average to 5.3 years (Germany), 6.1 years (Austria), and 4.6 years (Switzerland) in prison. Longitudinally, waves of arrests occurred and peaked especially in the last years.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 9. Mobilizing Funds and Charity
Abstract
Besides rallying manpower, the growth of the Salafi and Jihadi milieu in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland depended on the ability to provide material resources. An emerging Salafi economy functions in four different ways. First, it is the source of income for projects that satisfy the collective needs for venues of religious practices, social meetings, and events, producing dawah material or compensate religious authorities.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 10. Mobilizing Violence
Abstract
The database includes 567 so-called “foreign terrorist fighters” (FTF) from Germany, 119 from Austria and 89 from Switzerland as well as another 105 individuals from Germany, 49 from Austria, and 13 from Switzerland who failed for various reasons with their undertaking to become such. Resolution 2178 of the UN Security Council from September 2014 defines foreign terrorist fighters as “individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict” (“Foreign Terrorist Fighters” n.d.). Despite commonly accepted among researchers, the term is not unproblematic per se.
Johannes Saal
Chapter 11. Conclusion
Abstract
Since the attacks of 9/11, the political and academic discourse on Salafism and Jihadism has been primarily concerned with security-relevant aspects. Authorities and researchers alike struggled to find theoretical models to explain phenomena such as radicalization (Schmid 2011, 461; Lewis 2017, 2) and collect sufficient data to test their hypotheses (Silke 2009; P. Neumann and Kleinmann 2013; Schuurman 2018; Vergani et al. 2018). This lack of theoretical explanations and data does not help to inform the, partly very emotional, public debate that is often influenced by partisan attempts to capitalize on a broader discourse on Islam and religion in society, oscillating between the denouncement of an entire religious community as inherently violent and irrational to the denial of any connection between Islam and Jihadi terrorism.
Johannes Saal
Titel
The Dark Social Capital of Religious Radicals
Verfasst von
Johannes Saal
Copyright-Jahr
2021
Electronic ISBN
978-3-658-32842-9
Print ISBN
978-3-658-32841-2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32842-9

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