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Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare 3/2016

29.10.2015 | Original Paper

The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models

verfasst von: Yuliya Veselova

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 3/2016

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Abstract

We consider the calculation of Nitzan–Kelly’s manipulability index in the impartial anonymous and neutral culture (IANC) model. We provide a new theoretical study of this model and an estimation for the maximal difference between manipulability indices in the IANC model and a basic model, the impartial culture (IC). The asymptotic behavior of this difference is studied with the help of the impartial anonymous culture (IAC) model. It is shown that the difference between the IAC and IANC models tends to zero as the number of alternatives or the number of voters grows. These results hold for any other probabilistic measure that is anonymous and neutral. Finally, we calculate Nitzan–Kelly’s index in the IANC model for four social choice rules and compare it with the IC model.

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Metadaten
Titel
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
verfasst von
Yuliya Veselova
Publikationsdatum
29.10.2015
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 3/2016
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0930-3

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