Skip to main content
main-content

Über dieses Buch

This book utilizes historical evidence to describe the development of the Toyota Production System (TPS). The development of TPS typifies the transformation of production control in interchangeable industries in the twentieth century. Much of the extensive literature available on TPS has been geared toward describing TPS from a number of different perspectives. Many researchers consider TPS distinct from American mass-production systems. Although TPS (and, more generally, the production control systems in the Japanese assembly industry) has differentiated itself from similar US production systems, the evolution of TPS is largely attributable to attempts to learn from, imitate, and modify pre-World War II US production methods. Through these efforts, TPS has achieved levels of efficiency in Japan comparable to those of US production systems. Additionally, a reliance on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in relation to production control has facilitated the development of TPS. The literature on TPS, however, has largely ignored the vital relationship between ICT and production control due to an inordinate focus on “Kanban.” Kanban translates to “signboard” in Japanese but is used to refer to an organic linkage between work in preceding and subsequent production processes. This book sheds light on the development of a fully digitalized Bill of Materials (BOM) at Toyota, behind its Kanban and production control.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction

Abstract
Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota) is currently one of the largest automobile companies in the world, manufacturing and selling its cars globally. However, Toyota was not always a dominant player in the auto industry. In the mid-twentieth century, Toyota was a small company that manufactured and sold its cars almost exclusively in Japan.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 2. Acceptance of the Ford Production System by Japanese Manufacturing Industries

Abstract
In 1925, Ford Motor Company established its branch plant in Yokohama, Japan. As Ford accepted visitors, many visited its plant and gazed at the moving assembly line or conveyor system. By then, the concept of the “Ford production system” had spread among Japanese engineers. However, the Ford system’s conveyors were rarely a focus of any explanation of the concept.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 3. The Foundation of the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry: Attempts to Adopt Ford’s Production System

Abstract
In 1907, the year before Ford began to sell its Model T in the USA, Japan domestically produced its first gasoline-powered passenger car, called Takuri-, which was assembled with imported parts.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 4. Establishing Flow Production at Toyota: Collecting the Data on Shop Floors and Its Use

Abstract
By the end of World War II, Toyota did not implement the just-in-time production system that Kiichiro Toyoda desired, nor the Gōguchi production control system that aimed at flow production. The preparation warehouses failed to adjust to the differences in processing times between plants or shops. Consequently, they came to function simply as material storage warehouses.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 5. Findings of Two Toyota Executives

Abstract
Eiji Toyoda, Director of Toyota, embarked on an inspection of the automobile industry in the USA on July 11, 1950, about a month after Toyota settled the labor disputes on June 10, 1950.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 6. The Emergence of Flow Production at Toyota

Abstract
Toyota managed to establish the small-volume production system for automobiles during the war years. However, the company did not achieve smooth production workflow.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 7. Quality and Its Assurance

Abstract
Shortly after the end of World War II, Kiichiro Toyoda claimed that if Japanese automobiles could not compete with foreign counterparts in terms of cost and quality, this meant “the death of the management of the [Japanese] automobile industry” (Wada 1999, p. 522). Once Toyota somehow managed to produce the automobile, the issue of automobile quality was recognized as an important management issue.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 8. Computerization of the Management of Toyota as a Group

Abstract
In 1963, Toyota and Toyota Sales jointly revised its parts numbering method. This step was necessary to further advance mechanization through the use of punch cards and IBM machines.
Kazuo Wada

Chapter 9. Conclusion

Abstract
Much literature on the production system at Toyota has dealt intensively with Kanban. Several of these sources often emphasize that Kanban is unrelated to computers.
Kazuo Wada

Backmatter

Weitere Informationen

Premium Partner

    Bildnachweise