5. The Fate of the Disarmament Conference

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 69, 71. See also Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 183.

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 69, and Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 183.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 183 and Mr. Patteson (Geneva) to Sir J. Simon (received 29 April), in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 174.

Mr. Patteson (Geneva) to Sir J. Simon (received 29 April), in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 175. Alteras notes that if the proposal to refer the matter of the standardisation of armies to the Permanent Disarmament Commission had been accepted by the General Commission, it ‘would have meant that provision for standardisation could not be decided upon in this first Convention but would have to be delayed for a second Disarmament Conference to be held five years later. In the meantime Germany would be free to keep her professional army side by side with the Storm Troopers and the Stahlhelm, numbering in the hundreds of thousands.’ Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 184.

Alteras further points out that Germany also sought to have France ‘reduce the number of overseas forces stationed near the home country.’ He adds that ‘here too Germany had nothing to lose since she had no overseas forces.’ Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 184–5.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 186.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 187–8.

Sir J. Simon to Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin), 5 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 195–6. Alteras notes that while the Nazis were disposed towards the idea of a ‘short term militia composed mainly of S.A. and Stahlhelm to be dominated by the Nazis, the Nationalists,’ with whom the Nazis were in coalition, ‘on the other hand, wanted to retain the Reichswehr side by side with a militia armed with light tanks, airplanes and heavy artillery.’ Hitler, he adds, ‘was interested in introducing conscription so as to bring the masses indoctrinated with Nazism into the Reichswehr, thus neutralizing any possible opposition to his rule from the officer corps.’ The Nationalists’ calculation was that ‘only a Reichswehr without Nazi influence would be able to retain the Nationalists’ political individuality and independence, thereby avoiding political destruction by the Nazis in the future.’ Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 188–9. On this point, see also Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin) to Sir J. Simon (received 9 May, 4:45 p.m.), 9 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 208.

Ibid.

United States Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 10.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 187–8.

Ibid.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 193.

Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin) to Sir J. Simon (received 12 May), 11 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 226, and Sir J. Simon to Mr. Patteson (Geneva), 12 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 236. Alteras notes that the article appearing in the Leipzieger Illustrirte Zeitung by the German foreign minister on 11 May made clear ‘Germany’s intention to rearm in all military spheres regardless of the outcome at Geneva.’ Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 193.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 193.

Rudolf Nadolny, 1933, quoted in Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 193.

87, Parl. Deb., Lords (5th series) (11 May 1933), 897–8. As Alteras notes, Douglas Hogg, in speaking the House of Lords on 11 May, did not indicate what sanctions he thought should be applied to Germany should it attempt to rearm ‘since the Treaty [of Versailles] did not provide for such a possibility in case of its infraction. The provision for armed sanctions such as the re-occupation of the Rhineland was to be found in the sections dealing with reparations. Nonetheless, [Lord] Halisham’s warning was just another expression of British disenchantment with German tactics.’ Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 194.

Ibid.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 194.

Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on 12 May 1933, 4:50 p.m., Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, series C, 1933–1937, The Third Reich: First Phase, vol. 1, 30 January–14 October 1933 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1959), 410.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 196.

Boeckel, ‘Disarmament or Rearmament; Roosevelt Vs. Hitler,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’

Telegram from the President of the United States to His Majesty the King, 16 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 240. For Davis’s role in prompting Roosevelt to issue a warning to Hitler, see Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 197. For Davis’s relations with Roosevelt, see Robert A. Divine, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and Collective Security,’ Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48, no. 1 (1933): 42–59, 49. See also ‘Davis Proposes a Recess,’ New York Times, May 28, 1933, and ‘Norman H. Davis of Red Cross Dead,’ New York Times, July 2, 1944.

Ibid. Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 197. See also A. Camille Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ in Bourquin, ed., Collective Security, 303.

Ibid., 242. See also Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 303, and ‘À la Conférence permanente des Hautes Études internationales: Conférence générale d’étude sur la sécurité collective (Londres 3-8 juin),’ Coopération Intellectuelle, no. 53–54 (1935): 217–97, 233.

Ibid., 260–1.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 196–7.

Ibid., 261.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 246–7.

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 71–2.

Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin) to Sir J. Simon (received 24 May), 17 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 251.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 200.

Ibid., 255.

‘Herr Hitler’s Speech,’ Times, May 18, 1933. See also, Frederick T. Birchall, ‘Hitler Backs President: Declares Berlin Ready to Support Proposal to End the Crisis,’ New York Times, May 18, 1933.

Ibid.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 202.

Allen Leeper, 1933, quoted in Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 202. Varey notes that Allen Leeper ‘made many incisive analyses about disarmament policies from abroad and carefully sculpted British prescriptions for achieving success within the outline of departmental objectives….Leeper’s high regard for Vansittart, their close working relationship and, importantly, their like-minded treatment of disarmament played a vital role in the projection of Leeper’s ideas beyond the department.’ Varey, Diplomacy and Disarmament, 6.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 202–4.

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 76.

Norman H. Davis, 1933, quoted in ibid., 78.

278, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (26 May 1933), 1446–7.

Ibid., 1447.

Ibid.

Ibid., 1448.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 77. See also Boeckel, ‘Consultation and a Continental European Security Pact,’ and ‘Security and the Supervisions of Arms Reduction,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 77.

278, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (26 May 1933), 1445. See also Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 77.

278, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (26 May 1933), 1445, 1449.

Ibid., 1445–6. See also Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 77.

278, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (26 May 1933), 1448.

Ibid., 1448–9. See also Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 78, and Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933,’ note 11.

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 78.

Boeckel, ‘American Contributions to Possible Agreement,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’ Davis further stated: ‘An aggressor is a State which sends its armed forces across the frontiers of another state in violation of treaty.’ Norman H. Davis, 1933, quoted in Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 76.

For Litvinov’s definition of the aggressor, see Endel Krepp, Security and Non-Aggression: Baltic States and U. S. S. R. Treaties of Non-Aggression (Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre and Latvian National Centre, 1973), 16.

Memorandum submitted by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1951): 33–40, 34. See also Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 296, and Vespasian V. Pella, ‘The Determination of the Aggressor,’ in Bourquin, ed., Collective Security, 319.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 304.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 305.

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 79.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 303. On 23 December 1933, Roosevelt reiterated for the benefit of the Disarmament Conference the test of aggression that he had included in his message to various Heads of State of 16 May. At this later date, he called for a ‘simple declaration that no nation will permit any of its armed forces to cross its own borders into the territory of another nation,’ adding that such ‘an act would be regarded by humanity as an act of aggression, and as an act therefore that would call for condemnation by humanity.’ President Roosevelt, 1933, quoted in Alan B. Plaunt, ‘Collective Security,’ in Bourquin, ed., Collective Security, 296n. Alan B. Plaunt observed that this statement embodied the same basic principle as the Litvinoff [Litvinov] Convention,’ but added that it was not ‘sufficiently comprehensive or definite to be of practical use. It is merely a statement of principle’ (ibid., 296).

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 296–7, 305. See also Convention for the Definition of Aggression, 3 July 1933. Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Turkey: Convention for the Definition of Aggression, Annex and Protocol of Signature, signed at London, 3 July 1933, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 147 (Geneva: LON, 1934), 68–77; Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia: Convention for the Definition of Aggression and Annex, signed at London, 4 July 1933, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 148 (Geneva: LON, 1934), 212–9; Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Convention for the Definition of Aggression and Annex, signed at London, 5 July 1933, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 148 (Geneva: LON, 1934), 80–5; and LON, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, General Commission, Report of the Committee on Security Questions (Rapporteur, M. N. Politis), Conf.D./C/G/108.Conf.D./C./C.R.S./9(1) (Geneva: LON, 24 May 1933), http://​www.​derechos.​org/​peace/​dia/​doc/​dia17.​html. See also Pella, ‘The Determination of the Aggressor,’ 318. Pella referred to the London Conventions as the Litvinoff-Titulescu Conventions.

Pella, ‘The Determination of the Aggressor,’ 318.

Ibid. and Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 296.

Ibid., 318–9. Pella added that ‘participation in common action’ to assist a victim of aggression ‘could not in any case be considered an act of aggression’ (ibid.).

Ibid., 75.

Ibid.

Ibid., and Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 297.

Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 41, 67. Ian Brownlie adds in reference to the nineteenth century experience that the term war ‘might include situations in which no hostilities were taking place but fail to cover conflicts which though perhaps limited in scope were nevertheless serious threats to peace’ (ibid., 41).

LON, OJ 5, no. 4. (1924), 524, Emphasis added. See also Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 300, and Waclaw Komarnicki, ‘Definition of the Aggressor,’ in Bourquin, ed., Collective Security, 314. Waclaw Komarnick pointed out that ‘international practice’ showed the ‘same confusion, the same arbitrariness, the same uncertainty’ as had international jurists in their attempts to define aggression: ‘We need only recall the Corfu incident of 1923, the proclamation on that occasion by the Committee of Jurists of the League of Nations, recognising the legitimacy of coercive measures; the refusal of the Council of the League to authorise Greece to employ the same coercive measures in 1925 at the time of the conflict of that Power with Bulgaria; and finally, the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931.’ Note the following observations by Brownlie concerning the treatment of the terms war and aggression in the interwar period: ‘In spite of...[its]...inherent limitations and of...[its]...other defects,’ the covenant was ‘the source of and inspiration for developments which in sum destroyed the presumption in favour of the lawfulness of war. Thus in 1945 it was possible to argue that resort to war in 1939 and the following years was illegal unless a necessity for self-defence was proved. Between the two world wars “illegal war” was generally equated with war which was not undertaken in self-defence or by virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant; such use of force was characterized as aggressive war, war of aggression, act of aggression, or simply aggression. “War” with its technical and subjective meaning was employed less commonlly...Armed force by state organs directed against other states, otherwise than in self-defence was “illegal”. The growth of the assumption of illegality and the desire to remove ambiguities from non-aggression pacts then fashionable, and from mutual assistance and security treaties led states to examine the problem of defining aggression.’ Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 67–8.

Boeckel observed that the new pact laid down a precise definition of aggression. ‘A state is to be considered the aggressor if it is the first to commit any one of the following acts: (1) declare war, (2) invade the territory of another state, (3) attack the territory, ships, or aircraft of another state with its land, naval, or air forces, (4) give support to armed bands from its territory which have invaded another state, or refuse to take all measures in its power on its own territory to deprive such bands of help or protection.’ Boeckel, ‘Consultation and a Continental European Security Pact,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’

Arnold-Forster, ‘Renunciation of Force,’ 305. See also Komarnicki, ‘Definition of the Aggressor,’ 314. That the term war continued to be accorded a ‘restrictive and technical meaning’ during the period after 1920 is illustrated by aspects of the approach to the invasion and subsequent occupation of Manchuria by Japanese forces adopted by China and Japan and by the LON’s two principal organs in the period dating from September 1931 to February 1933: ‘At no time did China or Japan declare war, break off diplomatic relations, or request third states to observe neutrality. No operations took place at sea and neither party molested the other’s private shipping. On 21 September 1931 China appealed to the League by virtue of Articles 10, 11, and 15 of the Covenant. No reference to Article 16 was made either in the Assembly or the Council. The Japanese delegate in the Council asserted that “it is far from our idea to make war on the Chinese Republic.” On 10 December 1931 Briand stated in the Council that up to then there had been “no resort to war by Japan or China”....In its report the Lytton Commission concluded: “This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausing the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations.” This conclusion was adopted by the Assembly in its resolution of 24 February 1933. The reason for this attitude on the part of the League was primarily the desire to avoid aggravating the situation and exposing weakness in the League by raising the question of applying Article 16. But it is to be noticed that apart from these considerations there was a certain logic in such an attitude. The parties themselves were only willing to use as much force as was necessary to attain their ends and it is desirable in such a case not to remove the self-imposed proportionality principle by a determination that “war” exists on the part of an international organ.’ Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 220, 386.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 297–8.

Ibid., 298. See also, Augustin Camille Jordan, ‘La définition de l’aggression,’ Revue de Droit International 14, no. 3 (1934): 111–28. The Revue de Droit International was founded and directed by the French jurist Albert de Geouffre de La Pradelle, Volume fourteen, number three of the Revue was introduced with an essay penned in 1929 by Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and joint recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931 in part for this promotion of the Pact of Paris. Butler’s essay was on the topic of the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. Most of the rest of this volume and number of the Revue comprised the official documents relating to the ISC’s preliminary study meeting on the topic of collective security which took place in Paris in May 1934.

Plaunt, ‘Collective Security,’ 295. See also Komarnicki, ‘Definition of the Aggressor,’ 315, and Pella, ‘The Determination of the Aggressor,’ 317.

Philip Marshall Brown, ‘The Interpretation of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War,’ American Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (1929): 374–9, 374–5. Philip Marshall Brown observed in relation to Borah’s comments concerning the Spanish–American War of 1898 and in the context of discussing the meaning of the Pact of Paris the following: ‘It needs no argument to show that an interpretation of this nature that converts a treaty for the renunciation of war into a sweeping recognition of an undefined right of self-defence is of immense significance.’ See also Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 302.

Pella, ‘The Determination of the Aggressor,’ 317–8.

Pella, ‘The Determination of the Aggressor,’ 319.

Conventions for the Definition of Aggression, 1933, quoted in Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 297. The English translation of the reservation included in Article 2 of the London Conventions read as follows: ‘subject to agreements in force between the parties.’

Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), https://​www.​loc.​gov/​law/​help/​us-treaties/​bevans/​m-ust000002-0043.​pdf.

210, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (24 November 1927), 2105–6. See also Arnold-Forster, ‘Renunciation of Force,’ 308.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 301. See also Arnold-Forster, ‘Renunciation of Force,’ 308.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 301.

Ibid., and Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 302.

‘Appendix 3: Covenant of the League of Nations, 19 April 1919,’ in United Nations Library (Geneva), League of Nations Archives, The League of Nations, 1920–1946, 163. See also Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 302.

Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 311, 315. Walters observed that the leading figure in the transformation of Article 11 into an instrument for the prevention of war was Belgium’s Louis de Brouckère. ‘[H]is insistence on its importance had created so much interest that, early in 1927, he, Cecil and Titulescu were instructed to make a special study of the subject. Their report, based in large part on the record of what had actually been done in various concrete cases, proved that the Council possessed far greater legal powers to deal with an emergency than had hitherto been realised. It prescribed not only the steps which should be taken to carry out an impartial investigation into the actual facts of the dispute, but also a series of measures calculated to lessen the danger of hostilities, and ranging from the mildest of warnings to a formal order of the withdrawal of troops. It further showed that, if these should be disregarded, the Council could recommend Members of the League to sever diplomatic relations with the offending State, and could authorize naval or air demonstrations or even stronger action than these. The report, which was unanimously approved by the Council and the Assembly, was a startling revelation of the possibilities latent in the Covenant’ (ibid., 379–80).

Ibid., 312.

Ibid., 313, 315.

Ibid., 313. ‘Five weeks later, on December 7th, 1925, the Council reconvened for its regular session, the thirty-seventh of the series. The Commission had already completed its work. It found that the responsibility for the original frontier skirmish was divided. In that skirmish a Greek officer, advancing under the white flag to stop the firing, had been shot dead; and it was natural that this aroused great indignation. But the Greek government, instead of laying its grievance before the League in accordance with the Covenant, had taken the law into its own hands and invaded Bulgarian territory. A considerable number of Bulgarian soldiers and civilians had been killed or wounded. The population of numerous villages had fled; their homes and crops had been pillaged. For the moral and material losses inflicted on Bulgaria the Commission decided that an indemnity of 30 million leva (£45,000) should be paid; adding that, in making its calculation, it had allowed for an indemnity due to Greece for the death of her officer killed under the white flag. It also proposed that each country should appoint a neutral officer to serve on its frontier for two years; the two officers should be of the same nationality, and should at once meet and settle any local incident that might arise. All this was simple enough and was accepted by both parties’ (ibid., 313–4).

Ibid., 379–80.

Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War, in Manly O. Hudson, International Legislation: A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite Instruments of General Interest, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1936), 1090–8. For its adoption by the assembly, see Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 462.

Ibid.

Ibid., 1093.

Ibid., 1093.

Ibid., 1094.

Ibid., 1094–5.

Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War, in Hudson, International Legislation, I1095. See also, Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 462.

‘Appendix 3: Covenant of the League of Nations, 29 April 1919,’ in United Nations Library (Geneva), League of Nations Archives, The League of Nations, 1920–1946, 163.

Alfred E. Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918–1935 (London: Macmillan, 1936), 423.

Ibid., 473.

Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918–1935, 423. Walters maintained that the insistence on unanimity in respect to Article 11 was ‘contrary both to common sense and to the intention of those who drafted its text.’ He also maintained that had ‘the principal governments so desired, they could have found unimpeachable grounds for overriding the legal absurdity of the veto,’ albeit without urging that they should have taken this course of action. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 380, 478.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 302.

210, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (24 November 1927), 2106. Emphasis added.

Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 301.

Ibid., 305.

Arnold-Forster, ‘Renunciation of Force,’ 308–9.

Ibid. See also Jordan, ‘Definition of Aggression,’ 303.

Arnold-Forster, ‘Renunciation of Force,’ 309.

Memorandum by Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, Foreign Office, 29 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 282. See also Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 352, and Boeckel, ‘Security and the Supervisions of Arms Reduction,’ and ‘American Contributions to Possible Agreement,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’

Memorandum by Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, Foreign Office, 29 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 282. See also Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 352.

Lord Tyrrell (Paris) to Sir J. Simon (received 13 June), 7 June 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 331, 333.

United States Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, 23–4.

Lord Tyrrell (Paris) to Sir J. Simon (received 13 June), 7 June 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 333. See also Divine, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and Collective Security,’ 42–59; Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 79; and Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 226n. For Cordell Hull’s declaration, see United States Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, 24.

278, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (26 May 1933), 1442. See also Boeckel, ‘Consultation and a Continental European Security Pact,’ and ‘Effective, Automatic, and Continuous Supervision,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’

278, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (26 May 1933), 1442.

Ibid., 1454.

Ibid.

Lord Tyrrell (Paris) to Sir J. Simon (received 13 June), 7 June 1933, DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 331. See also Memorandum by Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, Foreign Office, 29 May 1933, DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 282.

Ibid., 285. Emphasis in the original. In a memorandum submitted to the British Foreign Office on 10 May, Temperley presented an argument that foreshadowed the argument Leeper presented on 29 May. Temperley argued as follows: ‘The time has come when Germany’s attitude to disarmament and the attitude of the United Kingdom towards Germany ought to be reviewed….If it is dangerous to go forward with disarmament, what then is to be done? There appears to be one bold solution. France, the United States and ourselves should address a stern warning to Germany that there can be no disarmament, no equality of status and no relaxation of the Treaty of Versailles unless a complete reversion of present military preparations and tendencies takes place in Germany. Admittedly this will provoke a crisis and the danger of war will be brought appreciably nearer. We should have to say that we shall insist upon the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles, and in this insistence, with its hint of force in the background, presumably the United States would not join. But Germany knows that she cannot fight at present and we must call her bluff. She is powerless before the French army and our fleet. Hitler, for all his bombast, must give way. If such steps seem too forceful, the only alternative is to carry out some minimum measure of disarmament and to allow things to drift for another five years, by which time, unless there is a change of heart in Germany, war seems inevitable. German rearmament will by then be an accomplished fact….There is a mad dog abroad once more and we must resolutely combine either to ensure its destruction or at least its containment until the disease has run its courses.’ Letter from Mr. Cadogan (Geneva) to Mr. A. W. Leeper, 10 May 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 1933, 213–7. This memorandum was shown to Vansittart who endorsed it in its entirety. At his suggestion, it was circulated to the cabinet. This occurred on 16 May.

Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 353, and Mr. Patteson (Geneva) to Sir J. Simon, 7 June 1933, in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 5, 323.

Boeckel, ‘American Contributions to Possible Agreement,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 227.

Ibid. See also Boeckel, ‘Effective, Automatic, and Continuous Supervision,’ in Boeckel, ‘The Disarmament Conference, 1933.’ Davies notes that Daladier ‘was influenced by the ideas of politicians such as his Air Minister Pierre Cot, who advocated strict supervision procedures as an alternative mechanism for keeping French secure,’ unlike Paul-Boncour ‘who had devoted much of his political career to promoting mutual assistance.’ Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 776.

William Tyrrell, 1933, quoted in Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 777. Davies states that in the view of Maxime Weygand and the rest of ‘the traditional military establishment, Daladier definitely chose the wrong course’ in making the concessions he made in respect to the MacDonald Plan in June 1933. Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 777.

Ibid., and Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 235–6.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 238.

German Government to the President of the Disarmament Conference, 1933, quoted in Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 76.

LON, IIIC, ‘Eleventh Session of the Executive Committee of the Intellectual Committee of Intellectual Co-operation,’ Intellectual Cooperation: Monthly Bulletin, 2, no. 1 (1933–1934): 19–21. See also Renoliet, L’Unesco Oubliée, 241. Renoliet notes that at the meeting of the executive committee of the ICIC in December 1933, only Bonnet, who was present as the director of the IIIC, was reserved on the question of future collaboration with German scholars.

Hoetzsch to Picht, 18 July 1933 and Picht to Hoetzsch, 13 October 1933, AG 1-IICI-K-II-4.b, UA.

Toynbee to Bonnet, 27 June 1934, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.m, UA.