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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. The Frequency of Migration and Optimal Restriction Policies

verfasst von : Kenji Kondoh

Erschienen in: The Economics of International Immigration

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

Most of the studies on the economic welfare of host countries of international immigration have concluded that immigration is beneficial to the host country. The typical examples of such studies are Berry and Soligo (1969), Rivera-Batiz (1982), Quibria (1989), Wong (1995), and Kondoh (1999); however, it should be noted that these studies consider workers who have the same ability, skill level, and working spirits. In reality, potential immigrants have different levels of ability, skills, and work spirits, and the government of the host country is likely to be selective in granting entry and work permits to foreign workers. Further, developed countries accept only skilled workers. Sometimes, these theoretical analyses failed to consider the major reason why developed countries are reluctant to accept immigrants. In order to minimize the potentially negative externalities associated with the sizeable inflow of foreign workers, it is necessary to consider the effectiveness of qualitative restrictions. When adopted effectively, these policies enable countries not only to gain useful skilled workers for their workforce but also help prevent an influx of “undesirable,” disgruntled immigrants who might bring problems with them.

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Fußnoten
1
The most important example of a study that arrives at a contrary conclusion is Galor (1986). This study concludes that although migration is harmful for the citizens of the host country, it will not affect its economic welfare.
 
2
All are static analyses. The pioneers Berry and Soligo (1969) follow a two-factor one-good model framework. Rivera-Batiz (1982), Quibria (1989), and Kondoh (1999) adopted a two-factor two-good model, where the good is nontradable. Wong (1995) extended the m-factor n-good model.
 
3
Some countries, such as the United States, have adopted quantitative restrictions. However, recently, these countries have begun using “ability and future contribution to the host country” as the main criterion for granting immigration permits, rather than the traditional requirement of “having family ties” with the host country’s residents. On the other hand, the majority of European countries take not only skilled workers. There are thousands of so-called economic migrants, asylum workers, and “favored” country migrants in those countries.
 
4
The pioneering theoretical work that analyzed two restriction policies against illegal migration—border enforcement and internal enforcement—was carried out by Ethier (1986). Bond and Chen (1987) studied the welfare aspects of the internal enforcement policy by adopting a two-country model. Djajić (1997) focused on illegal migrants who are not allowed to work in the formal sector. Yoshida (1993) concluded that tighter restrictions on illegal migrants would reduce the economic welfare of not only the home country but also the rest of world. Djajić (1987) analyzed the cost of the border enforcement policy in equilibrium by adopting a dynamic Harris–Todaro model.
 
5
There are several papers on return migration. For example, Djajić and Milbourne (1988) analyzed the optimal behavior of an immigrant who can determine his optimal length of stay. Dustmann (1997) and Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) studied return migration, taking into consideration the effects of uncertainty. Applying the overlapping generations model, Galor and Stark (1990) also considered the possibility of return migration immediately after the first period.
 
6
Alternatively, if we assume that each worker can adapt himself well to foreign life, his utility level might increase during his stay in country A. In this case, unlike our framework, a must have a negative sign, and, therefore, the immigrant’ working spirits should also increase during his stay abroad. Such a situation does not provide any reason to engage in a repeat migration.
 
7
By applying a similar approach, we can easily obtain the condition in which an individual prefers three (or more)-time migration to one-time migration. In our model, to simplify our analysis, we only consider two-time migration as repeat migration.
 
8
To obtain the above results, we apply the following relationship:
$$ \partial R/\partial z=2\left[u\left(\overline{c}\right)-v\left({c}_0\right)\right]+2a\left(z-\tau \right)+a{T}_1>2\left[u\left(\overline{c}\right)-v\left({c}_0\right)\right]+a\left({T}_1-\tau \right)>0 $$
.
 
Literatur
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Metadaten
Titel
The Frequency of Migration and Optimal Restriction Policies
verfasst von
Kenji Kondoh
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0092-8_6