The Global South in the Kremlin's Foreign Policy after 24/2

The medieval Russian worldview was based on ideas dating back to the Book of Genesis about the post-Flood division of the world among the sons of Shem, Ham, and Japheth (Gen. 10), which Rus’ adopted through Byzantine literature, particularly the ninth-century chronicle of George the Monk. The author of the Russian Primary Chronicle (Tale of Bygone Years), written in the 1110s, links this division (attributing it not to Noah’s grandsons but to his sons) to the cardinal directions: “To the lot of Shem fell the Orient. … To the lot of Ham fell the southern region. … To the lot of Japheth fell the northern and the western sections” (Cross & Sherbowitz-Wetzor, 1953: 51). He assigned Southern and Western Asia (excluding Asia Minor) to the East, North Africa and most of Asia Minor to the South, and Europe, the Caucasus, and the northeastern part of Asia Minor (Greater Armenia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Galatia) to the North and West. The Slavs are identified as descendants of Japheth: “the Slavic race is derived from the line of Japheth, since they are the Noricians, who are identical with the Slavs” (Cross & Sherbowitz-Wetzor, 1953: 52). Thus, from the very beginning, the Russian Orthodox tradition associated Russians with Western and Northern “civilization,” rather than with the Eastern or Southern ones.

Russia’s “romance with the West” in the 1990s failed to materialize. By the late 1990s, Western policymakers had lost hope that Russia would become a “normal” democratic state by Western standards; for their part, a significant portion of the Russian elite had grown disillusioned with cooperation with the West (Shevtsova, 2010). These sentiments were embodied by the new Russian president, Vladimir Putin (1999–2008, 2012–).

In this chapter, we examine the specific features of Russia’s policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, while setting the stage for understanding the developments of 2022–2024. Sub-Saharan Africa serves as the focal point of this analysis, having gradually emerged as a key target of Russian foreign policy initiatives. This strategic shift has been largely shaped by the Kremlin’s global geopolitical calculations and its increasingly pronounced anti-Western orientation. At the same time, awareness of the strategic significance of Sub-Saharan Africa has grown both within the Russian business community and among the country’s political elites. It is no secret that the region possesses vast reserves of natural resources. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) alone accounts for approximately two-thirds of Africa’s mineral exports by value (Project IQ, 2024). Major mining economies in the region include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. In addition, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to several of the continent’s leading oil producers, including Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, South Sudan, and Chad. Sub-Saharan countries are also rich in critical raw materials, particularly the so-called low-carbon metals that are essential for energy transition technologies—such as cobalt, bauxite, and chromium. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar together account for approximately 50% of global cobalt reserves; Guinea holds around 24% of the world’s bauxite reserves; and South Africa is home to roughly 36% of the planet’s known chromium deposits (Andreoni & Avenyob, 2023: 69).

As a key international geopolitical region owing to its abundance of energy supplies and presence of global trade routes, there was significant competition between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War (Painter, 2014; Breslauer, 2015). This was an ideological struggle for power and influence in the region by the superpowers in the context of a bipolar global order and a zero-sum game in the historical geopolitical competition (Fuller, 1990). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly created Russian Federation lacked the state capability and capacity to continue its engagement in the Middle East and North Africa; it also lacked the political will as it sought closer relations with the West.

The key question this book seeks to answer is whether Russia’s foreign policy pivot to the Global South, which crystallized after February 24, 2022, was merely a situational response driven by the need to find allies in its confrontation with the West, or a long-term strategic transformation. The authors of this book conclude that Russia’s evolving foreign policy trajectory toward the Global South represents not merely a tactical adjustment but a profound structural shift in its international strategy. Facing an abrupt rupture in relations with the West, Moscow has sought to establish a new, consequential role within the reconfigured global political, economic, and security environment. The Kremlin’s invocation of the “World Majority” reflects an attempt to reconceptualize the Global South as a key arena for advancing Russia’s interests in the post-Western world order.