3. The Growth of a Community

The conference took place in September 1971 in Kronberg, Germany. The contributions appeared as the third volume of the Contributions to Experimental Economics. Foreign participants included Austin Hoggatt, Jim Friedman, and Martin Shubik. The previous two volumes (1967, 1970) had only German authors with a single exception of Jim Friedman in volume 2. Sauermann, Heinz. 1972. Contributions to Experimental Economics. Vol. 3 Beiträge zur Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. Band. 3. Tübingen: Mohr.

The founding members in 1977 included Otwin Becker, Rudolf Richter, Heinz Sauermann, Reinhard Selten, Reinhard Tietz, Horst Todt, Ulrike Vidmajer und Hans Jürgen Weber. The society opened up only at the beginning of the 1990s.

Plott attended the 1977 meeting, not the 1972, at least according to the published attendance list. The third International Conference on Experimental Economics took place on August 28^th to September 2^nd, 1977, in Winzenhohl near Aschaffenburg, Germany. The contributions appeared as volumes seven and eight of the Contributions to Experimental Economics series Sauermann, Heinz ed. 1978a. Bargaining Behavior. Tübingen: Mohr, ____ ed. 1978b. Coalition Forming Behavior. Tübingen: Mohr.

The first three NSF grants by Charlie Plott were Political Economic Decision Processes (period: 11/72-11/74, amount $59,800); Experimental Examination of Group Decision Processes with M. P. Fiorina (period: 4/75-4/76, amount: $88,100); A Laboratory Experimental Investigation of Institutional Influences on Political Economic Processes (period: 9/78-9/79, amount $95,083).

That was the NSF grant: Theoretical Research and Collaborative Experimental Research on Micro-economic Games (period: 2/69–2/71, amount: $101,200) and the NSF grant: Theoretical Research in Game Theory, Oligopoly, and Individual Behavior (period: 9/71–9/73, amount: $50,000).

At that time there were two other NSF grants that were used for experimental research. Martin Shubik and Gerrit Wolf's grant was titled Experimental Economic Psychological Modeling in an Automated Laboratory (amount $62,300, periods: 12/69–12/70 & 2/72–2/73, total amount: $110,400). Kagel with Battalio and their advisor Basmann had an NSF grant titled Interpretation Systems for Empirical Economic Theories (periods 1/72–2/75 & 9/75–9/77, amount: $147,700 & $136,000 respectively).

Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholars program started in 1973—incomplete list for the 1970s and 1980s: Vernon Smith 1973-74, Bill Riker 1973-74, Melvin J. Hinich 1975-76, John Ledyard 1977-78, William A. Brock 1978, David Cass 1978-1979, Richard A. Easterlin 1980-81, Howard Rosenthal 1982-83, Norman James Schofield 1983-84, and Leonid Hurwicz 1984-85.

Plott moved to Caltech in June 1971.

Cohen, L. and Charles R. Plott. 1978. “Communication and Agenda Influence: The Chocolate Pizza Design,” H. Sauermann, Coalition Forming Behavior. Tübingen: Mohr, 329–57, Fiorina, Morris P. and Charles R. Plott. 1978. “Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study.” The American Political Science Review, 72(2), 575–98, Plott, Charles R. and Michael E. Levine. 1978. “A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions.” The American Economic Review, 68(1), 146–60.

Editor: Here you are clearly referring to the 1977 and not the 1972 conference in Germany. Charlie Plott: “By 1972 we were circulating papers. The working paper mechanism was functioning well. Things circulated for years before finally finding print. However, I was not part of the 1972 meeting. Looking over the substance, in retrospect, I can see why there was little or no intersection.”

The statement of Purpose of the Public Choice Society: “The Public Choice Society was established in 1965 by Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan. Its goal is to facilitate the exchange of work, and ideas, at the intersection between economics, political science, and sociology. It started when scholars from all three of these groups became interested in the application of essentially economic methods to problems normally dealt with by political theorists. It has retained strong traces of economic methodology, but new and fruitful techniques have been developed that are not clearly identified with any self-contained discipline.” http://​www.​pubchoicesoc.​org/​about_​pubchoice.​php [Accessed on August 16, 2011].

Plott was the Public Choice Society president from 1976 to 1978. Other PCS presidents with experimental track record are Elinor Ostrom (1982-84), John Ledyard (1980-82), Vernon Smith (1988-1990), and John Ferejohn (1990-92).

In the 1990s and early 2000s the Public Choice Society and Economic Science Association held joint annual meetings. The last one took place in Baltimore, Maryland, March 11–14, 2004.

The first workshop took place at the Westward Look Resort, Tucson, March 18‐20, 1977. The second workshop, also titled NSF Experimental Economics conference, took place at the Arizona Inn in Tucson, October 19–21, 1979. The third Experimental Economics Workshop took place at the Westward Look Resort, March 27–9, 1984. The Fourth Experimental Economics workshop that took place at the Westward Look Resort, Tucson, Arizona, from February 27 to March 1, 1986.

Only the second meeting in 1979 took place at the Arizona Inn.

The first workshop had 24 invited participants (three could not come). The second workshop had 34 participants (with five from Arizona, nine from Caltech) and the third from 1984 had 54 listed participants.

The 34 participants in 1979 were (Witness Seminar attendees are in italics): Battalio (Texas A&M), Burns (Australia), Dawes (Oregon), Easley (Cornell), Ferejohn (Caltech), Green (Washington), Grether (Caltech), Groves (UCSD), Harstad (Illinois), Hoffman (NW), Isaac (Caltech), Kagel (Texas A&M), Ledyard (Northwestern), Marrese (Northwestern), Murningham (Illinois), Nelson (Caltech), Newlon (NSF), Noll (Caltech), Palfrey (Caltech), Philips (Cornel), Plott (Caltech), Rachlin (STONY Brook), Roth (Illinois), Rotchschild (Wisconsin), Stadon (Duke), Thaler (Cornell), Wilde (Caltech), Williams (Indiana). From University of Arizona came – Alger, Auster, Cox, Smith, Taylor, and Walker.

Hoffman was a Professor of Economics at University of Wyoming from 1986 to 1988.

The fourth World Congress of the Econometric Society took place from August 28 to September 2, 1980. John Ledyard was one of 49 members of its Program Committee. The session titled Labor Supply had a presentation by Orley Ashenfelter on “Discrete Choice in Labour Supply: The Determinants of Participation in the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiment.” Plott presented in the session on Economics of Information paper titled “The Behavior of Markets with Insiders: A Laboratory Experimental Examination of Rational Expectations Models,” which was done jointly with Shyam Sunder, Chicago. There was one Session on Experimental Economics with the following two papers “An Experimental Test of Several Solution Theories for Cooperative Normal Form Games,” by Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, California Institute of Technology, and “An Experimental Study of the Effect of Exogenous Voting Costs on the Decisions of Majority Rule Committees,” by Elizabeth Hoffman, Northwestern University and Edward W. Packel, California Institute of Technology and Lake Forest College. The chairman of this experimental session was Reinhard Selten, University of Bielefeld, Germany. A field experiment “Complete Demand Systems for India: A Series of Experiments with Linear Expenditure System, under Alternative Specifications” was presented by G. V. S. N. Murty of the Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social Research, Ahmedabad, India.

Plott presented the paper “Allocation by Committee: The Distribution of Airport Capacity” at the 1980 AEA meetings in Denver. It was presented in a session on Models of Antitrust and it was the only experimental paper in that session.

Editor: The Program from Helsinki does not list Selten or van Winden. See: 1977. “Program of the Econometric Society Summer European Meeting, August 24–27, 1976, Helsinki, Finland.” Econometrica, 45(1), 252–56. Frans van Winden: “However, Econometrica didn’t show the Contributed Papers of the meeting; mine was a contributed paper, entitled “The Interaction between State and Business: A First Approach” (Report 76.09, The Economic Institute of Leyden University).”

The meeting in Dallas, Texas, December 28–30, 1975, had a session titled Experimental Economics. Three papers were presented—the one mentioned by Jim Friedman jointly with Austin Hoggatt on Pricing Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly; one paper by Vernon Smith titled Experimental Economics: Some Theories and Results; and a paper by Roger Noll On the Pricing of Public Goods: Public Television Programming. The Chairman was Martin Shubik and commentators Charlie Plott and Michael Rothschild. Ferejohn, John A. and Roger G. Noll. 1976. “An Experimental Market for Public Goods: The Pbs Station Program Cooperative.” The American Economic Review, 66(2), 267–73. Hoggatt, Austin C.; James W. Friedman and Shlomo Gill. Ibid. “Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly.” 261–66, Smith, Vernon L. 1976. “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory.” The American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 66(2), 274–79.

In the period until 1978 Plott presented at the Econometric Society in 1966, 1969, 1970 and was a discussant 1967, 1968, 1972; 1969. 1973, 1975 as discussant and session chairman. Plott, Charles R. “Plott Papers,” personal archive of Charles Plott. California Institute of Technology, For instance, the Program of the 1979 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Montreal, Canada, June 27–30, 1979 session Experimental Studies of Uncertainty and Information had the following presentations: “Risk Aversion and Portfolio Selection: Experimental Evidence,” Ronald M. Harstad and Edward M. Rice, University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana). “Professional Diagnosis vs. Self-Diagnosis: An Experimental Analysis of Markets with Uncertainty,” Charles R. Plott and Louis Wilde, California Institute of Technology. “Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining,” Alvin E. Roth and Michael W. Malouf, University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana). “Consumer Demand Behavior with Pigeons as Subjects: Limits to Rationality,” John H. Kagel, R. C. Battalio, L. Green, and H. Rachlin, Texas A and M University. The discussants were: Phillip Dybvig, Yale University; Robert G. Wolf, Boston University; Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University; Steven A. Mathews, University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana).

Smith, Vernon L. 1976. “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory.” The American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 66(2), 274–79. It appeared earlier as a working paper ____. 1975. “Experimental Economics: Theory and Results.” Social Science Working Paper, California Institute of Technology, 73(January), 1–16. which was based on ____. 1973. “Notes on Some Literature in Experimental Economics.” Social Science Working Paper, California Institute of Technology, 21, 1–27.

Four volumes titled Game Equilibrium Models were published in 1991 that cover a variety of topics in economics, biology, sociology, psychology, political science, and behavioral sciences. Most of the contributions were non-experimental, mostly theoretical (traditional non-cooperative game theory). Among the contributors are also researchers who have conducted experimental research such Wulf Albers, Ron Harstad, James Walker, Roy Gardner, and Elinor Ostrom. Selten, Reinhard. 1991. Game Equilibrium Models. Berlin; New York: Springer Verlag.

Plott moved to Caltech in June 1971.

The paper was presented at the 1980 World Econometric Meeting.

Groves, Theodore and John O. Ledyard. 1977. “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the” Free Rider “Problem.” Econometrica, 45(4), 783–809.

That was in 1989 when Hoffman became the Associate Dean and the MBA Program Director at the Karl Eller Graduate School of Management, University of Arizona.

Wilson, Robert. 1985. “Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions.” Econometrica, 53(5), 1985. Editor: Did you have other Wilson’s papers in mind? Vernon Smith: “This is one of them; but there was also one in a collection in honor of Arrow. I think this latter one was the one in which he showed that the complete information game-theoretic model of the DA led to failure in the end game of a DA trading period. He saw this as an inescapable consequence of complete information—a contradiction—and I always felt this was dead right, that it converged in experiments because the final traders were uncertain about the circumstances and even the number of people left who could feasibly trade.” See also Smith, Vernon L. 2008c. Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kagel and Battalio published two experimental papers in the Western Economic Journal in the 1970s. The first one reported on their token economy experiments and received the Best article Award for 1973. The latter was their first published article with animal experiments. Battalio, Raymond C.; John H. Kagel; Robin C. Winkler; Edwin B. Fisher; Robert L. Basmann and Leonard Krasner. 1973. “A Test of Consumer Demand Theory Using Observations of Individual Consumer Purchases.” Economic Inquiry, 11(4), 411–28, Kagel, John H.; Raymond C. Battalio; Howard Rachlin; Leonard Green; Robert L. Basmann and W. R. Klemm. 1975. “Experimental Studies of Consumer Demand Behavior Using Laboratory Animals.” Ibid.13(1), 22–38.

The Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science is available online at http://​people.​virginia.​edu/​~cah2k/​y2k.​htm [Accessed on March 31, 2015]. This bibliography lists over 2000 publications, plus about 500 discussion papers in experimental economics and social science (updated December 29, 1999).

Nobel Prize of 1994 together with John Nash and John Harsanyi.

Charlie Holt spent the period 1976–1983 at University of Minnesota.

Econometrica had the following editors until 1992: Ragnar Frisch (1933-1954), Robert H. Strotz (1955-1968), Franklin M. Fisher (1968-1977), Hugo Sonnenschein (1977-1984), Angus Deaton (1984-1988), Andreu Mas-Colell (1988-1992).

The proper English translation of the NWO is The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research. The grant entitled Laboratory experiments in political economics lasted from 1991 until 1996.

The International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT) published a special issue on the first Amsterdam workshop. Harstad, Ronald M. 1996. “Special Issue on Laboratory Investigations of Expectations in Games: The Amsterdam Papers.” International journal of game theory., 25(3), n.p.

The full list of 1992 Amsterdam workshop attendees—36 participants (Albers, Antonides, de Beus, Bohm, Bolton, Brandts, van Damme, Forsythe, Güth, Harrison, Harstad, Hessing, Hey, Hoffman, Kagel, Levin, Loomes, McKelvey, Nagel, Noussair, Olson, Ostmann, Palfrey, Potters, van Raay, Robben, Schram, Selten, Smith, Sonnemans, Starmer, Sugden, Tijs, de Vries, Wilke, de Wit) and four guests (Drissen, Mazza, Offerman, and Perdeck). The 1993 Amsterdam workshop had 43 participants and five guests (e.g. Forsythe, Hey, Camerer, Cox, Holt, Damme, Keser, Fehr, Ledyard, Loomes, Porter, McCabe, Morton, Roth, Olson, Plott, Selten, Starmer, Weber). The 1994 Amsterdam workshop had 49 participants (e.g. van Damme, Albers, Andreoni, Bohm, Frey. Fehr, Bohnet, Grether, Kagel, Keser, Knetsch, Loomes, Selten, Smith, Starmer, Weber). The 1995 Amsterdam workshop had 46 participants (e.g. Albers, Bolton, van Damme, Fehr, Forsythe, Dan Friedman, Gächter, Harrison, Harstad, Hey, Holt, Kagel, Morton, Keser, Nagel, Olson, Selten, Plott, Sugden, Rutström, Sadrieh).

From the participants of the Witness Seminar only Jim Friedman and Steve Rassenti did not participate. The former wasn’t active as an experimentalist at that time, the latter primarily specializes in applied contract research in collaboration with Vernon Smith.

Van Winden was the project director of the The European Network for the Development of Experimental Economics and its Application to Research on Institutions and Individual Decision Making from 1998-2003. The Network consisted of the following institutions (local coordinators in parentheses)—University of Amsterdam (van Winden), Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain (Bosch-Domenech), University of York in the UK (John Hey), University of Bonn (Reinhard Selten), Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Economic Research in Vienna (Ernst Fehr), Humboldt University in Berlin (Werner Gűth), Instituto de Analisis Economico in Barcelona (Jordi Brandts) and the Centre for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory at the Hebrew University (Shmuel Zamir). Two main research goal were addressed—1) the development and influence of institutions; 2) the fundamental study of individual decision making in economic situations.

The week before the witness seminar.

Van Winden was the project director of the Research Network grant ENABLE: The European Network for the Advancement of Behavioural Economics 2004-2008. The Network consisted of following nine institutions (local coordinators in parentheses)—Universiteit van Amsterdam (Frans van Winden), Centre for Economic Policy Research (Ian Jewitt), Universität Zürich (Ernst Fehr), Stockholm School of Economics (Magnus Johannesson), Institut d'Economie Industrielle (Bruno Biais), Universität München (Klaus Schmidt), Universität Mannheim (Martin Weber), Harvard University/MIT (David Laibson), and Princeton University (Roland Bénabou).

ESA's presidents in the following periods were: 1986-1987: Vernon Smith 1987-1988: Charles Plott; 1988-1989: Ray Battalio; 1989-1991: Elizabeth Hoffman; 1991-1993: Charles Holt; 1993-1995: Robert Forsythe; 1995-1997: Thomas Palfrey; 1997-1999: James Cox; 1999-2001: Andrew Schotter; 2001-2003: Colin Camerer; 2003-2005: Ernst Fehr; 2005-2007: John Kagel; 2007-2009: James Andreoni; 2009-2011 Tim Cason; 2011-2013 Alvin Roth; 2013-5: Jacob Goeree; 2015-2017: Yan Chen.

Actually they met at the World Econometric Congress in Tokyo “in 1995”.

Michael Keller, a lawyer at Caltech’s Patent Office.

There was a section on Games and Experiments directed by Selten from 1992 to 1995 then by Ron Harstad until 2000.

The International Journal of Game Theory was founded by Oskar Morgenstern in 1971 (volume 1 appeared in 1971 but was actually completed in 1972) The first Managing Editor was Gerhard Schwodiauer who served until 1980 and was followed by Anatol Rapoport until 1984. The Editors were successively William Lucas, Cornell University volumes 9–12 (1980–1983); Reinhard Selten, University of Bielefeld, volumes 13–17 (1984–1988); Joachim Rosenmuller, IMW, Bielefeld, volumes 18–23 (1989–1994); Dov Samet, Tel Aviv University, volumes 24–29 (1995–2000); For details see: 2002. “Preface. International Journal of Game Theory, 1995-2001.” International Journal of Game Theory, 31, 151–53.

A precise reference has not been determined.

The founding co-editors were Charlie Holt (1998-2004) and Arthur Schram (1998-2007). Subsequent co-editors were Tim Cason (2004-2009), Jordi Brandts (2007-2012), Jacob Goeree (2009-2014), David Cooper (2012-) and Charles Noussair (2014-).

Davis, Douglas D. and Charles A. Holt. 1993. “Experimental Economics,” Princeton University Press, 406–26, Friedman, Daniel and Alessandra Cassar. 2004. Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental Economics. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, Friedman, Daniel and Shyam Sunder. 1994. Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, Hey, John Denis. 1991. Experiments in Economics. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, USA: B. Blackwell, Kagel, John H. and Alvin E. Roth. 1995. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Roth, Alvin E. ed. 1987c. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

The following eight chapters were contributed—1. Introduction to Experimental Economics by Alvin E. Roth; 2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research by John O. Ledyard; 3. Coordination Problems by Jack Ochs; 4. Bargaining Experiments by Alvin E. Roth; 5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research by Charles A. Holt; 6. Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey by Shyam Sunder; 7. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research by John H. Kagel; 8. Individual Decision Making by Colin Camerer.

The issue of precepts of economic experiments appeared earlier, most notably in Smith’s seminal 1982 paper which built upon the few previous attempts “to articulate a “theory” of laboratory experiments in economics.” Smith, Vernon L. 1982. “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science.” The American Economic Review, 72(5), 923–55. Smith defined five sufficient conditions for a microeconomic experiment—the precepts of nonsatiation, saliency, dominance, privacy, and parallelism. Other papers on this topics by experimentalists are: Plott, Charles R. 1979. “The Application of Laboratory Experimental Methods to Public Choice,” C. S. Russell, Collective Decision-Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 137–60, Smith, Vernon L. 1976. “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory.” The American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 66(2), 274–79, ____. 1982. “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science.” The American Economic Review, 72(5), 923–55, Wilde, Louis L. 1981. “On the Use of Laboratory Experiments in Economics,” J. C. Pitt, Philosophy in Economics. Amsterdam: Reidel, 137–48. For a philosophical discussion of precepts see: Bardsley, Nick; Robin Cubitt; Graham Loomes; Peter Moffatt; Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden. 2010. Experimental Economics : Rethinking the Rules. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Guala, Francesco. 2005. The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Editor: Is there any particular early example that you recall? John Kagel: “One of the better early examples—although may be not early enough for you—would be an alternative explanation for bidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium first-price independent private value auctions—it is covered a bit in my 1995 chapter in the Handbook.” Roth, Alvin E. 1995. “Bargaining Experiments,” J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics. NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, For a historical treatment of this episode see Svorenčík, Andrej. 2015. “The Experimental Turn: A History of Experimental Economics,” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Utrecht, pp. 193–231.

These pen and paper-based experiments were done around 1983 and eventually developed into two key papers on the winner’s curse. Kagel, John H.; Ronald M. Harstad and Dan Levin. 1987. “Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study.” Econometrica, 55(6), 1275–304, Kagel, John H. and Dan Levin. 1986. “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions.” The American Economic Review, 76(5), 894–920.

Kagel, John H. and Dan Levin. 2002. Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

The publisher of the Siegel Fouraker volume Bargaining and group decision making; experiments in bilateral monopoly (1960) and the Fouraker Siegel volume Bargaining Behavior (1963) was McGraw-Hill.

Editor: Are you referring here to the 1970s? To what extent did these discussions appear in publications? Betsy Hoffman: “Yes, the 1970s. I don’t think there was ever a publication, but it was discussed at meetings.”

It appeared in McGraw-Hill’s series in psychology: Siegel, Sidney. 1956. Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill.

The conference “Laboratory Experimentation in Economics” took place at the University of Pittsburgh on May 16–18, 1985. Participants included Reinhard Selten, Richard Thaler, Marc Knez and Vernon Smith, John Kagel, and Charlie Plott. Roth, Alvin E. ed. 1987c. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roth classified experiments according to the kinds of dialogues they were a part of—as “Speaking to Theorists,” “Searching for Facts,” and “Whispering in the Ears of Princes”—for the first time at a symposium at the 1985 World Econometrics Congress. ____. 1987a. “Laboratory Experimentation in Economics,” T. Bewley, Advances in Economic Theory 1985 (Symposia of the 5th World Congress of the Econometric Society. Cambridge University Press, 269–99. It was also preprinted in____. 1986. “Laboratory Experimentation in Economics.” Economics and Philosophy, 2, 245–73.

Roth moved to Harvard in 1998.

Precise references for such papers have not been determined.

Kagel has published several voting experiments since 2005.

Editor: What did you refer here to? Frans van Winden: “What I meant is that I thought/felt there was a geographical distinction at the time of the Amsterdam Workshop in Experimental Economics. Therefore, my “No” here. Today it is different.”

Editor: Which papers do you have in mind? Al Roth: “Here I have in mind for instance:” Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. 2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(02), 153–74.

Ledyard expands on this later on in this subsection.

John Kagel refers here to Charlie Plott earlier comment about economists visiting Caltech for a semester or a year as Fairchild scholars and getting contaminated with the “experimental bug.”

In the wake of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act Plott conducted the landing slot study jointly with David Grether and then graduate student Mark Isaac for the Civil Aeronautics Board. It concluded that the method of allocating slots at the four high-density airports by a slot committee process as inadequate and suggested using a sealed-bid one-price auction operating at regular, timely intervals with several other features such as computerized aftermarket with “block transaction”. Their report was published as Alternative Methods of Allocating Airport Slots: Performance and Evaluation. Pasadena: Polinomics Research Laboratories, Inc., 1979. It got eventually published as Grether, David M.; R. Mark Isaac and Charles R. Plott. 1989 [1979]. The Allocation of Scarce Resources : Experimental Economics and the Problem of Allocating Airport Slots. Boulder: Westview Press. Stephen Rassenti’s thesis dealt with algorithms for combinatorial auctions allowing sales of blocks of slots: Rassenti, Stephen J.; Vernon L. Smith and R. L. Bulfin. 1982. “A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation.” The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 402–17, Rassenti, Stephen J.; Vernon L. Smith and Bart J. Wilson. 2002. “Using Experiments to Inform the Privatization/Deregulation Movement in Electricity.” CATO Journal, 21, 515–44. Charlie Holt: “The only major FCC combinatorial auction that was actually implemented is Hierarchical Package Bidding for the 2008 Auction 72 in the C block, which was proposed and designed by experimental economists. Goeree, Jacob K. and Charles A. Holt. 2010. “Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction.” Games and Economic Behavior, 70(1), 146–69. Experiments with Jacob Goree, John Ledyard, and then a graduate student Christopher Brunner that were conducted for the FCC were a key factor in their decision not to implement more complicated auctions. Brunner, Christoph; Jacob K. Goeree; Charles A. Holt and John O. Ledyard. 2010. “An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 39–57.

Brewer, Paul J. and Charles R. Plott. 1996. “A Binary Conflict Ascending Price (Bicap) Mechanism for the Decentralized Allocation of the Right to Use Railroad Tracks.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14(6), 857–86.