The Impact of Smart Feature Phones on Development

Until recently, the only way for the population of developing countries to access the Internet was through expensive smartphones, designed in and for developed countries. In the past few years, however, a major new innovation has emerged, the smart feature phone with Internet connectivity, which was specifically designed for those with low incomes in developing countries. This chapter explains the development process for the smart feature phone, how this has influenced the nature and extent of adoption, and its use by low-income groups, including their demonstrated preference for uses related to entertainment rather than more traditional ‘work-related’ goals. The focus is on the case of India, where the JioPhone has already reached millions of people with low incomes.

Introduced first in India a few years ago, a major innovation known as the smart feature phone has already brought the Internet to tens of million people in that country. It is affordable even to some of the poor in poor countries, such as those living in Africa, where it sells for around US$20. This price was made possible by a series of design changes, such as the use of open-source software, which distinguish the product from the much more expensive smartphones. Yet, in spite of the vast potential that the new technology brings to developing countries, the actual benefits that accrue to the poor citizens of those countries depend (especially in rural areas) not only on economic mechanisms, but also those of a cultural, social, as well as institutional kind. Such factors range from issues of relevance and localization, to linguistics, the form of communication (whether text or speech), and the extent of literacy and digital skills. What I find is that there are indeed cases where smart feature phones help to promote the degree to which the benefits from the Internet are realized by the poor. Because it substitutes voice for text, for example, Google Assistant allows even the illiterate to participate online and it also provides the highest number of local languages, in India, than any other competing voice-assistant. Then, there is the encouragement given to local developers to submit what one hopes will be locally relevant applications and content that includes live livestock tracking and mobile payments. In other areas, however, such as the severe lack of digital skills to operate the Internet effectively, far too little is being done by governments or private actors, though there are a few notable exceptions.

The two previous chapters have been concerned with various aspects of a revolutionary new technology, that lies somewhere between a basic mobile phone and a relatively expensive smartphone. Before the advent of the new smart feature phone in India, users were required to buy smartphones in order to access the Internet. Now they are able to do so at a much lower cost. This chapter, however, deals with a different issue, namely, of whether and to what extent, the Indian experience can be replicated in other developing regions and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. On the basis mainly of available data, I argue that the biggest obstacle to replication lies in affordability: in the price of handsets, data and incomes, Sub-Saharan Africa is at a disadvantage and with respect to device costs, a severe disadvantage. Other dimensions of replicability, however, were less clear-cut, partly because of a paucity of data. What is clear, though, is that associations between KaiOS Technologies and MTN and Orange have resulted in a strong African demand for mobile money through smart feature phones.

As it is usually conceived, the digital divide between rich and poor countries refers to differences in access to digital technologies. The second digital divide on the other hand, is concerned with the factors that determine whether and how the adopted technologies are used and the extent of the benefits that are derived from them (one such factor, for example, is digital skills). The original feature of this chapter is that it seeks to measure the second digital divide between rich and poor countries and to compare the outcome with the more familiar divide in digital access (and the internet in particular). The former is measured with reference to two key technology complements, namely, attainments in reading and mathematics on the one hand and digital skills on the other. What I find is that even the acute divide in the Internet is surpassed by the figures representing the second divide in literacy and mathematics. This finding is attributed mainly to the acute crisis in learning that besets many schools in poor countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Somewhat oddly, though, the divide in digital skills is less acute than for learning achievements. Apparently, certain digital skills can be acquired without prior competencies in basic education.

Recent years have seen a shift away from issues related to access to new technologies in general and the internet in particular. There is talk, in some policy circles, of extending ‘beyond access’, to examine how such technologies are used and what benefits they actually yield to users. In fact, numerous field studies have now examined this question in the context of developing countries and come to the unexpected conclusion that the selection of uses on the internet tends to favour leisure over work. After reviewing the evidence that underlies this conclusion, this final chapter is concerned to examine its implications. One response is to accept and even commend the result, by suggesting that it reduces the leisure divide between rich and poor countries. An alternative response, one to which I adhere, is to examine the causes that underlie the anti-development bias before deciding to accept it for policy purposes. What I suggest is that the choice of internet uses reflects major gaps in knowledge about the internet and a severe lack of digital skills on the part of first time users of the technology (especially among uneducated and low-income individuals). Policy should attempt to redress these limitations rather than accept the outcomes to which they give rise.