Zum Inhalt

The Importance of EU Soft Law in Insurance Distribution: The Case of Poland

  • Open Access
  • 2025
  • OriginalPaper
  • Buchkapitel
Erschienen in:

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The introduction of new technologies in the insurance market is mainly based on market self-regulation through soft law. The aim of this article is to analyze this self-regulation by national supervisory authorities in the absence of legal solutions related to new technologies at the EU level. The structure of the EU insurance market argues in favor of regulating the use of new technologies by insurance distributors as soon as possible, as well as ensuring the harmonization and consistency of legal solutions for the entire insurance market at the level of individual Member States. The author analyzes the legal structure of guidelines and recommendations at EU level and in Polish law, proposing de lege ferenda conclusions in this regard.

1 1Introduction 1

Soft law, and thus also the open method of coordination, is an expression of new governance in the European Union. Non-binding acts represent a departure from the traditional form of governance based on the classic community method. For these reasons, a model of lawmaking has emerged in which formally non-binding resolutions, guidelines, positions, opinions or books have forced a systemic approach to the issue and then led to its standardization.
This represents a departure from the traditional perception of soft law as an instrument set aside for the EU to carry out activities of a purely supportive, coordinating or complementary nature to the actions of member states. In terms of the functioning of the EU single financial market, the legislator has equipped supervisory authorities (national and EU) with the power to issue soft law, which not only interprets the provisions contained in directives and regulations, but also supplements and clarifies their provisions.
The author indicates that there is a trend away from binding, binding norms of insurance market law toward issuing rules and soft law. Although soft law is not legally binding it can often pave the way for legally binding standards (it can lead to the initiation of legally binding standards). The actual effectiveness of soft law becomes important especially in those areas where there is a lack of legal regulation or there are loopholes, most recently in the field of new technologies.
Opinions, resolutions, recommendations, list of warnings of supervisory authorities (national and EU) do not have legal binding force (binding), but they have certain effects in the sphere of law and as also enforce their application on participants of the insurance market (insurance distributors, customers).
This article is largely concerned with the new instrument of supervision of the insurance market, which are recommendations issued by EIOPA and the Insurance Supervisory Commissions (in Poland). In particular, the location of recommendations within the legal system, the procedure for issuing them, as well as the assessment of the impact of recommendations on the proper and safe functioning of insurance distribution will be considered. In addition, the article attempts to assess whether the past actions of the supervisory authorities are appropriate and whether soft law is an appropriate and effective supervisory instrument in terms of eliminating regulatory gaps.

2 2Soft Law in Micro-Prudential Supervision and Its Role in EU

The tasks of EBA, ESMA i EIOPA (hereinafter referred to as the Authorities or ESA) have been specified in Regulations (EU) 1093/2010, 2 1094/2010 3 and 1095/2010, 4 and they are similar, with certain differences following from the characteristic features of the specific market segments (banking, investment, insurance) in which the Authorities operate.
Micro-prudential oversight is a type of external supervision of individual nature, exercised by administrative authorities. It is a manifestation of state intervention in the functioning of the financial market and economic activities of an entrepreneur (financial institution and financial intermediary). This supervision is exercised so as to ensure proper functioning of the internal financial market of the European Union. In a broad sense, the oversight implements the licensing function (by granting authorizations for the establishment of an entrepreneur and initiation of business, permits for appointing particular persons as members of the management board), the regulatory and administrative review functions, current (prudential) supervision, 5 consolidated supervision 6 and supplementary supervision. 7 In a narrower sense – it covers the activities of defining, applying and enforcing prudential standards. Prudential standards define specific operative models intended to ensure the security and stability of operations of supervised institutions. Their application allows to cut down the risk to an appropriate level, which translates into the security of the entire financial system. One of the instruments of intervention of EBA, ESMA and EIOPA in the internal financial market of the EU is the delivery of guidelines and recommendations addressed to appropriate national supervisory authorities or financial market operators (financial institutions). Although the guidelines have no binding force, in certain cases, once the conditions of the EIOPA regulation are met, the national supervisor may be bound by the actions and decisions of the ESAs, which have so far had soft functions such as signalling, warning and coordination. 8

2.1 2.1 Guidelines and Recommendations: Meaning and Legal Character

For recommendations, the TFEU provides several grounds for their issuance by the basic EU institutions such as the Commission, the Council and the European Central Bank. This catalog is not exhaustive, as recommendations, in accordance with the CJEU ruling in the Grimaldi case, are issued by the institutions when they do not have the competence to issue legally binding acts or when the issuance of such an act is not considered necessary by the institution concerned. It should be stressed that guidelines are not mentioned in Article 288 TFEU as a source of EU law, the TFEU in Articles 5(2), 26(3), 120, 121 indicates the obligation to issue this type of legal act. It follows from the cited provisions of the CJEU that guidelines are intended to be of a general nature and to indicate how Member States should behave. 9
Recommendations, on the other hand, should be distinguished from guidelines, which are also EU soft law. They usually specify how a legally binding norm is to be implemented and their purpose is not to create new law, but to clarify existing legal norms. 10
L. Senden qualified recommendations as steering instruments and guidelines as interpretative instruments. 11 She states that both recommendations and guidelines are legal instruments, that they refer to the law, that their purpose is to guide or direct the actions of another in a certain way, and that they are legally non-binding. What distinguishes them, according to Senden, is that the purpose of a recommendation is to cause a certain action by those to whom it is addressed. By contrast, the purpose of guidelines is to clarify how a given provision should be understood or applied. 12
In my view, such distinctions would sort out the distinction between guidelines and recommendations and de lege ferenda the EU legislator should recognize and sort this out in the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA regulations. 13

2.2 2.2Procedure for Reviewing Guidelines and Recommendations

Guidelines and recommendations have no binding force, however, EIOPA has disciplinary measures to persuade the addressee to comply with the instruments. The EIOPA Regulations lay down a review procedure, requiring that, within two months from the delivery of a guideline or recommendation, each appropriate national supervisory authority or supervised entity (financial institution) should confirm whether or not the national supervisory authority or supervised entity intends to comply with the adopted instruments. If the national supervisory authority or financial institution does not intend to comply with a guideline or recommendation, it is obliged to notify that to EIOPA and specify reasons for the above. A disciplinary measure to be imposed on the national supervisory authority or financial institution is publication by the Authority of the information (and, possibly, also the reasons given) about non-compliance with a particular guideline or recommendation. In addition, EIOPA may decide, on a case-by-case basis, to publish the justification provided by the national supervisory authority for not complying with a particular guideline or recommendation. The national supervisory authority shall be informed in advance of such publication. Such publication shall serve as a signal. This supervisory measure is expected to warn the customer of the financial service against the financial institution that fails to comply, in its activities, with the EU guidelines and recommendations adopted by EIOPA within the framework of the internal financial market of the European Union. Such measure is not meaningless bearing in mind high sensitivity of financial markets to any negative information. 14

2.3 2.3Relationship Between EIOPA and KNF

The Polish Financial Supervision Authority (hereinafter referred to as KNF) is one of the authorities forming a part of the European System of Financial Supervision (KNF representatives take part in the works of ESA). A potential area for cooperation between KNF and EIOPA is the power to express opinions and positions by national supervisors in relation to the adoption by EIOPA of supervisory measures in the form of soft law. 15 In respective situations, EIOPA conducts open public consultations with regard to guidelines and recommendations, and analyzes potential costs and benefits correlated to the guidelines and recommendations. Such consultations and analyzes must be proportionate to the scope, nature and impact of the guidelines and recommendations. 16 In addition, it must be pointed out that the national supervisory authority is obliged to confirm (within two months from the delivery of a guideline or recommendation) if the authority complies or intends to comply with the particular guideline or recommendation. However, if the national supervisory authority does not comply with the instrument or does not intend to do so, the authority is obliged to notify that to EIOPA and give relevant reasons. In the light of the above, soft law instruments adopted by EIOPA are not legally binding on national supervisory authorities, however, the authorities are obliged to reply to the guidelines and recommendations received from EIOPA. This is because EIOPA is obliged to publish information that a given national supervisory authority does not comply or does not intend to comply with a given guideline or recommendation. EIOPA may also, on a case-by-case basis, decide to publish the reasons for non-compliance with a particular guideline or recommendation, as given by the appropriate national supervisory authority. The national supervisory authority is notified about such publication in advance. 17
Non-binding legal acts cannot have direct effect, and therefore a national supervisory authority or financial institution cannot derive its powers directly from recommendations or guidelines. However, according to the TSUE ruling in the Grimaldi case study, 18 recommendations will have indirect effect. The same should apparently apply to guidelines. National supervisory authorities are therefore obliged to take into account the guidelines and recommendations issued by EU institutions when issuing their own regulations
In Poland, micro-prudential oversight is exercised by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF). 19
The question of legal status of recommendations adopted by KNF has been given much attention in Polish literature. 20 KNF recommendations are an instrument of influence on the financial (banking, insurance and investment) market operators and, therefore, according to the principle of legality and in the interest of legal transactions, the basis for their adoption should be clearly stipulated in the provisions of law. The principle of legality has been expressed in Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and it consists in the requirement imposed on public authorities to act under and within legal provisions. 21
According to Art. 365 of the Act of 11 September 2015 on insurance and reinsurance activities, 22 KNF was given the right to issue recommendations addressed to insurance and reinsurance undertakings 23 to an extent necessary to implement guidelines and recommendations adopted by EIOPA in accordance with Art. 16 of Regulation (EU) 1094/2010. 24 EIOPA may deliver guidelines and recommendations addressed to appropriate authorities supervising the insurance market which operate in the Member States. Accordingly, so as to enable KNF to legally introduce in the Polish insurance market EIOPA’s guidelines and recommendations addressed to national insurance and reinsurance undertakings, it was necessary to vest such an instrument of impact in the supervisory authority. It must be emphasized that the Act on insurance and reinsurance activities confers on KNF the power to adopt guidelines to an extent necessary to implement EIOPA guidelines and recommendations delivered under Art. 16 of Regulation (EU) 1094/2010. Moreover, the legislator, under Art. 365 (1) item 2 u.d.u.r., confers on KNF also the power to adopt guidelines for the following purposes:
1.
to ensure compliance of the activities of insurance and reinsurance undertakings with the provisions of law,
 
2.
to prevent infringements of the interests of policyholders, insured persons, beneficiaries or persons entitled under insurance contracts,
 
3.
to reduce the risk inherent in the activities of an insurance or reinsurance undertaking,
 
4.
to ensure permanent capacity of an insurance undertaking to fulfil its obligations. 25
 
In the light of the above, the Act on insurance and reinsurance activities provides for extensive powers of KNF to deliver guidelines whenever the supervisory authority ascertains a violation to legal provisions or infringement of interests of policyholders, insured persons, beneficiaries, or threats to the fulfilment of obligations (implementation of EIOPA guidelines and recommendations probably fits also into the purposes specified under Art. 363 (1) item 2 u.d.u.r.). In the explanatory memorandum of the draft u.d.u.r., it was argued that adoption of such guidelines would allow for quick reaction (communication) of the supervisory authority when the authority identified a risk of unlawful behavior of insurance or reinsurance undertakings without a need to initiate individual proceedings. At the same time, this would also guarantee to supervised entities access to knowledge about the position of the supervisory authority in respect of proper operation of the insurance market.
Another important novelty introduced in Art. 365 u.d.u.r. is the possibility left to an insurance or reinsurance undertaking to declare that the undertaking does not intend to comply with the recommendation. 26 This refers to situations in which an insurance undertaking does not comply with the recommendations of the supervisory authority delivered in implementation of EIOPA guidelines and recommendations. In such situation, the insurance undertaking is obliged to notify that to KNF, and the latter is obliged to publicize (disclose) the information.
Such legal solution confirms previous opinions expressed in literature of the subject that recommendations are standards of conduct recommended by KNF, whose observance cannot be enforced by the supervisory authority through imposing sanctions. Recommendations should be approached as instructions for conduct, making an instrument of preventive impact on insurance practice. Nevertheless, this legal solution can be treated as an additional element reinforcing the protection of the customer of an insurance service through information in the form of public warning about non-compliance of insurance undertakings with recommendations adopted by KNF. Such obligation is prescribed under statutory law, which obligates KNF to make available to the public information on the insurance undertakings that decided not to follow the recommendations of the supervisory authority. Such publicized information can be an obstacle for insurance undertakings to acquire new customers, and for the existing customers – and inspiration to change the insurer in the future. In situations when recommendations are adopted by KNF for the purposes laid down in Art. 365 (1) item 2 u.d.u.r., the legislator also leaves an option to an insurance undertaking to not to comply with the instrument delivered. However, in such event, the legislator imposes on the insurance undertaking a requirement to indicate the methods according to which the undertaking is going to achieve the purposes of conduct laid down in the guidelines. Information about the scope of non-compliance with the provisions of the recommendation and information about the methods of achieving the purposes laid down in the recommendation must be provided by the insurance undertaking to the supervisory authority, and the authority makes the information publicly available. It should be emphasized that provision of such information is an obligation of insurance undertakings. As a consequence of the above, when it comes to recommendations delivered by KNF to insurance undertakings as a part of implementing the purposes laid down in Art. 365 (1) item 2 u.d.u.r., an insurance undertaking has no real possibility to opt out of implementing the recommendation, however, the undertaking is free to choose the methods according to which it is going to achieve the purposes laid down in the instrument (there is no leeway when it comes to the implementation of purposes, however, the addressee is in a position to achieve the purposes through means chosen at the addressee’s discretion). An analysis of the discussed provision leads to a conclusion that the insurance undertaking must implement the recommendation, possibly, using methods other than the ones indicated by KNF.
As a result, it should be concluded that, in the applicable provision of Art. 365 u.d.u.r., the legislator points to instruments adopted in implementation of EIOPA recommendations – and they are non-binding on insurance undertakings both when it comes to the means and purposes. 27 On the other hand, other recommendations are binding on insurance undertakings when it comes to implementing the purposes, and non-binding when it comes to the means of such implementation. 28
Therefore, a question arises what happens if the insurance undertaking does not comply with the recommendation adopted by KNF under Art. 365 (1) item 2 u.d.u.r., which is identified in the course of ex-post supervision. By their very nature, recommendations do not belong to the category of legally binding legislative acts, and KNF may not enforce their observance by the insurance undertaking through supervisory measures. As a result, de lege ferenda, it would be legitimate to introduce a legal provision under which, in case of an omission to provide information about the lack of intention to follow an adopted recommendation by an insurance undertaking, the supervisory authority would be empowered to publish such information ex officio. Such public information, announced as a warning, would reinforce protection of the customer of an insurance service. In practice, it can be imagined that an insurance undertaking does not comply with the obligation to provide KNF with information about non-following the recommendation.
The Act also contains a provision on the statutory obligation to conduct consultations of a draft recommendation with interested parties and institutions and to assess predictable social and economic consequences (in terms of costs and benefits) of the instrument before preparing the draft guidelines. 29
Therefore, it seems legitimate to say that recommendations are standards of conduct recommended by KNF whose observance, however, cannot be enforced through state coercion. 30 These are general and abstract norms, being a reaction of the supervisory authority to identified threats to the operation of insurance undertakings. They should be approached as instructions (principles) of recommended conduct. Therefore, the opinion expressed in literature seems legitimate that recollection of such principles is not legislating but fulfilling the mission of market supervisor who must make sure that supervised entities operate according to the applicable law. 31 For the above reasons – as opposed to other instruments prepared under statutory authorization – KNF recommendations may not impose on their addressees any obligations but only recommend specific actions. 32
In addition, it must be emphasized that KNF recommendations do not fit into the category of generally applicable legislation since they have not been referred to in Art. 87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 33 For the above reasons, KNF recommendations cannot serve as basis for the delivery of an administrative decision in the light of their non-imperative status (no sanctions imposed by KNF), and cannot be subject to the review of administrative courts. 34 In case of delivery by KNF of an administrative decision based on a recommendation, a possibility is postulated to declare its invalidity on account of missing legal basis for its adoption, under Art. 156 (1) item 2 of the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure. 35 On the other hand, the legal basis for decisions and judgments may be the provisions of generally applicable law interpreted according to the recommendations. 36 In consequence, recommendations cannot be considered the sources of generally applicable norms. In literature, it has been pointed out that they also cannot be treated as sources of internal law (internal management acts) because, in the light of Art. 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, insurance undertakings (including banks) are not organizationally subordinated to KNF. 37
Guidelines and recommendations are supervisory measures of corrective status and fit into preventive supervision. KNF is responsible for proper operation of the insurance market and, thanks to guidelines and recommendations, it can prevent unfavorable phenomena in that market by influencing the operations of supervised entities.
As a result, it should be concluded that the national legislator adjusted u.d.u.r. to the requirements of Union law in respect to the adoption of recommendations and guidelines for insurance undertakings also when it comes to the use of insurance agents’ services. 38
Such provisions are missing in the currently applicable Polish Act of 15 December 2017 on insurance distribution 39 (implementing the Insurance Distribution Directive 40). Therefore, de lege ferenda, it should be postulated that in the future u.p.u. the legislator includes legal provisions analogous to the ones adopted in u.d.u.r. when it comes to the delivery by KNF of guidelines and recommendations in relation to insurance brokers since – as highlighted above – KNF exercises direct supervision over their activities. In addition, KNF must have a legal basis to introduce, in the Polish insurance market, EIOPA’s guidelines and recommendations in relation to insurance brokers and other insurance distributors. 41

4 4The Role of Soft Law in Introducing New Technologies to the Insurance Market

The above considerations allow to assume that the micro-prudential supervisory authorities (on the national and EU level), to a large extent, eliminate gaps in the legislative framework by adopting guidelines and recommendations addressed to financial institutions. The lack of legislation on the Union level forces the national supervisory authorities to search for appropriate and effective supervisory instruments in the legal solutions adopted in other countries across the world and in Europe for the development of InsurTech and their cooperation with the traditional insurance distributor. An adequate example may be the activities undertaken in the context of creating Innovation Hubs and Regulatory Sandboxes. 42
In literature of the subject an opinion was expressed that oversight over financial innovations is connected with the concept referred to as policy trilemma. Under this concept, supervisory authorities should aim to: 1. provide clear rules, 2. maintain market integrity, and 3. encourage financial innovation. 43 According to academic authors, the main burden of monitoring the market in this regard will be on supervisory authorities. They will use the so called mechanisms of market self-regulation by issuing guidelines or creating Innovation Hubs or Regulatory Sandboxes. Such activities should be based on rules simplicity but, at the same time, enhance transparency, reduce bureaucratic burdens so as to ensure certainty, predictability, stability and coherence of financial provisions, as well as increased competition. Rules simplicity can, by extension, help promote capital formation, hedging, and other financial services by lowering costs to consumers and thereby encouraging a larger and more diverse group to enter the market. 44 In this context, there are new opportunities for innovation and growth and new challenges, particularly for regulation and regulators. Lately, the particular challenge for regulators has been the need to encourage and support disruptive innovation in order to enhance financial inclusion and support economic growth. 45 Extensive interaction between regulators and market participants provides the necessary background for cautious experimentation with, and regulation of Innovation Hub, that is an institutional solution as a part of which FinTech entities, both regulated and non-regulated (e.g. enterprises which fail to obtain license), establish a relation with the regulatory authority to discuss matters relating to their activities (sharing information, opinions, etc.) and to obtain clarification relating to the legality of their business models (regarding the models of cooperation, among others, between innovative insurance companies (InsurTech) and traditional insurance distributors) without the option to test innovative solutions on customers. As a part of an Innovation Hub program, an operator in the InsurTech industry may obtain assistance in identifying appropriate legal provisions, rules or supervisory positions applicable to the given operator, business model, offered product or financial service and, on top of that, the operator may obtain information on the terms of the exercised supervision, procedures of licensing a given type of activity or documents and guidelines available on the website of the supervisory authority. The purpose of such Innovation Hubs is to promote certainty among InsurTech companies and encourage development by such companies of the research previously carried out. On this occasion, supervisory authorities play the role of a consultant, and their position is not binding, which means that it does not guarantee that the suggested solution is the right one. Such opinions may not be relied on before state authorities or courts, because they do not constitute legal opinions or interpretations of law. Undoubtedly, however, Innovation Hubs imply a completely new role and a completely new approach of supervisory authorities in relation to InsurTech. 46
So, a significant step activities undertaken by supervisory authorities in the world (apart from Innovation Hub) was launching virtual Regulatory Sandboxes, 47 which offer controlled space to innovative enterprises in which such enterprises may test innovative FinTech solutions for a limited period with the support of national supervisory authorities (the authority may intervene at any stage of product testing) before they meet all the requirements in the licensing process or succeed in that regard to a limited extent. Innovative enterprises are obliged to file an application (they undergo a simplified authorization process adjusted to their needs) to join the program, and the mere acceptance of their application by the respective supervisory authority is to increase their credibility both among customers and investors. Regulatory sandboxes in different countries differ from one another, however, the scope of this article does not allow to discuss such questions in more detail. Still, the policy of regulatory sandboxes reduces the risk of court proceedings for violation by InsurTech companies of their obligations to regulatory authorities, and helps the supervisory authorities monitor the market, by enabling them to weigh advantages and disadvantages for the sake of preserving appropriate competition on the market. Sandboxes expressly seek to encourage innovation. They offer regulators a means to acquire insight into the development process for innovations, give input into their design, and better understand how emerging products and services might operate in the real world. Particularly for early-stage innovations, sandboxes can be helpful in reducing the pervasive information uncertainties attaching to the growth of algorithms and Al, as well as to the viability of new data. Although sandboxes come in different guises, with Innovation Hub and jurisdictions varying in what terms they offer, the guiding idea is simple enough: rather than be subject to restrictive or complex rules that elevate regulatory risk and potentially stifle innovation, the sandbox offers a means of testing new ideas in a simplified, interactive regulatory environment. 48

5 5Examples of EIOPA and FSA Guidelines and Recommendations on New Technologies and Other Matters – Mentioned

For example, the lack of legal regulations resulted in the fact that the decisive importance in terms of the possibility to apply cloud solutions on the Polish financial market should be attributed to the Communiqué of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority of 23.01.2020. (hereinafter: the Cloud Communiqué) 49 At the same time, it was emphasized at the outset that any guidelines, recommendations or other documents presenting the position of European supervisory authorities, including EIOPA, on the identical subject do not apply to supervised entities. 50 This provision may be seen as problematic in the case of projects within international capital groups involving Polish supervised entities. Nevertheless, according to the Cloud Communiqué referred to here, the European guidelines do not apply to Polish financial entities supervised by the ESA:
1.
EBA outsourcing guidelines of 25 February 2019. (EBA/GL/2019/02), 51
 
2.
EIOPA Guidelines for Outsourcing to Cloud Service Providers (EIOPA-BoS-20-002), 52 – EIOPA repealed such guidelines in December 2024, 53
 
3.
Financial Stability Board (FSB) Guidance - Third party dependencies in cloud services, 54
 
4.
ESMA Guidelines - Guidance on outsourcing to cloud service providers (ESMA50-157-2403). 55
 
The version of the EIOPA Guidelines on Cloud Insurance Outsourcing in force until the end of 2024 was addressed to national supervisors and informed insurance market participants on how outsourcing regulations should be applied to cloud service providers. Insurance intermediaries (agents, insurance brokers) are not part of this circle, which seems to distinguish the EIOPA Guidelines from the KNF Communication. Thus, however, according to the position taken by the KNF, the ESA Guidelines were not at all applicable to domestic entities to the extent that they overlap with the FSC Communication. 56
Such a solution may raise some doubts - but it seems clearer for supervised entities than a situation where two different documents regulating the same issues in practice would be in place. Undoubtedly, however, the relationship between the EIOPA Guidelines and the KNF Communication, as well as the potential differences between these positions, are of particular interest in the context of the requirement for national supervisors and financial institutions to make every effort to apply the EIOPA Guidelines under Article 16(3) of Regulation 1094/2010. However, this provision provides for the possibility not to comply with the EIOPA Guidelines and Recommendations, which the FSC has used by presenting a national approach. 57 Such an approach by a national supervisor may, however, raise concerns, as the EBA and EIOPA aim to harmonize at the EU level the regulatory requirements for outsourcing and, in particular, cloud outsourcing, 58 which, in practice, will be the case, e.g. when a foreign branch of an insurance company operating in Poland will apply the KNF’s Communication and a major insurance company from an EU Member State will apply the EIOPA Guidelines. 59
The KNF’s position in the Communication in question took the form of a practical map for the regulated sector in the process of migration to cloud computing. The Communication, on the one hand, met the expectations of direct support for supervised entities and, on the other hand, set itself the goal of eliminating interpretation doubts. The KNF concretized many concepts, creating new definitions and clarifying existing requirements, while addressing most of the demands raised in industry discussions. 60
Another problem in the Polish insurance market is the performance of an analysis of the customer’s needs and requirements by the insurance distributor. According to the Polish Insurance Distribution Act (implementing the IDD) - before concluding an insurance contract, the insurance distributor determines, on the basis of information obtained from the customer, the customer’s requirements and needs and provides objective information about the insurance product in an understandable form, in order to enable the customer to make an informed decision.
So much for the recipe, but in practice it is unclear exactly what this APK should look like. On the Polish market, one encounters a rather different approach to this process, ranging from a rather cursory questioning of the customer very generally about their needs, through the implementation of various tables and forms to streamline the process, to the implementation of a needs and requirements analysis into sales systems.
All of these solutions have their advantages and disadvantages, but we also see in the course of the audits carried out by the FSC that the expectations of the national authority regarding the analysis of needs and requirements are quite clear. It certainly cannot be a process done in a shoddy manner and definitely needs to be properly documented.
However, apart from the guidance from the audit, the Commission has not yet generated any concrete position on what an analysis of customer needs and requirements should actually look like by 2023. There are also no such recommendations and guidelines at EIOPA level. This is probably related to the different distribution models in the member states and the fact that the IDD has a minimum scope of implementation.
Due to a problem in the Polish insurance market with regard to the preparation and documentation of the customer needs analysis by insurance distributors, the FSA has taken action in 2023. 26 June 2023. The KNF Authority unanimously adopted a new Recommendation U on good bancassurance practices. 61 The aim of Recommendation U is to improve the standards of bancassurance activities and to define the conditions for stable development of the bancassurance market. A key element of the new Recommendation U is to ensure that insurance products offered through bancassurance provide adequate value for the customer. 62
The new version of Recommendation U provides some valuable insights into how needs and requirements analysis should look in bancassurance, which is also probably worth transferring to other distribution channels.
A distributor, which is an insurance intermediary, should have procedures in place to prevent the offering of insurance products that are not adapted to customers’ requirements and needs. The procedures should include both rules for the identification of customer requirements and needs and how to assess whether the insurance product is in line with the customer’s requirements and needs. What is important is that such procedures should relate not only to the identification of the customer’s requirements and needs itself, but should also describe how the distributor came to the conclusion that this and not another product is best for the customer in question. One could say that this is the most difficult part of such a procedure.
The KNF has also proposed a very interesting construction when it comes to third-party insurance. Namely, a policyholder (a party to an insurance contract) intending to conclude such an insurance contract should have procedures in place allowing it, as a policyholder, to obtain information on the requirements and needs of potential clients so as to enable the insurance distributor to offer an insurance contract meeting the requirements and needs of such clients. Thus, we are faced with a rather interesting construction, where the duties related to the analysis of needs and requirements are in practice shifted to the policyholder (party to the insurance contract for a third-party account). After all, the Act on distribution clearly states that it is the distributor’s task to obtain information from the customer in the process of needs and requirements analysis, and in the light of TSUE case law the policyholder (in a contract for a third-party account) is the distributor. 63
Thus, in the process of analyzing needs and requirements, the customer should be asked, among other things, about the risks it wants to insure, which in total is quite obvious and already implemented in practice today. At the same time, the KNF also expects the customer to be shown the limitations and exclusions of the insurance company’s liability.
As another example of the analysis of customer needs and requirements in the Polish insurance market, the KNF has submitted for consultation a draft of new recommendations for insurance companies regarding insurance distribution. 64 Their overriding aim is to ensure that companies offer products that have an appropriate value for customers. Through the recommendations, the KNF also wants to increase the level of protection of customers’ interests by ensuring that insurers apply the law on insurance distribution in a uniform and consistent manner, and to eliminate irregularities it has identified in this process.
With regard to the obligations of the insurance company vis-à-vis customers in insurance distribution, the draft primarily regulates the analysis of customer needs and requirements. In addition to the obligation to clearly separate the needs and requirements analysis from the other distribution stages, to keep the questions simple, to provide the customer with adequate time to read and respond, the KNF obliges insurance companies to ensure that the needs and requirements analysis of the customer shows, in particular:
  • for what circumstances the customer would like to be covered and what the customer’s insurance requirements are, including what sum insured or sum assured is consistent with the customer’s requirements and needs,
  • what are the specific characteristics or situation of the customer, in order to assess whether the exclusions or limitations of liability do not conflict with the requirements and needs of the customer.
The national supervisory authority also emphasized that the use for the needs and requirements analysis of information provided by the customer at earlier stages of the cooperation (e.g. when concluding other insurance contracts) is only permissible with the express consent of the interested party and provided that the scope and source of the information is specifically indicated to the customer and that confirmation of its correctness and validity is obtained from the customer. The client’s refusal to provide the information necessary to identify his or her requirements and needs does not allow the company to make an offer. The exception is compulsory insurance, but then the insurer ensures that it can prove that the customer refused to provide additional information for the assessment of its requirements and needs prior to the conclusion of the insurance contract.
The manner in which the needs and requirements analysis is documented should ensure that the undertaking is able to prove that the information and data it has used for that purpose were obtained from the customer and that the customer has confirmed their accuracy. In turn, the documentation should be retained until the insurance contract’s statute of limitations has run.
In this area, the KNF also recommended that the insurance company should only make contract proposals to the customer that are in line with the customer’s requirements and needs, and familiarize the customer with the provisions of the contract template and other information and documents required by law and supervisory recommendations.
In my view, the draft recommendation should be extended to include insurance intermediaries (in Poland, insurance agents and brokers), as over 90% of insurance contracts are concluded in Poland through insurance intermediation.
It should be noted that there is a lack of guidance related to the analysis of needs and requirements by robo-advisers (via online platforms or mobile applications), which use algorithms to automatically create a customer profile of an insurance product. The insurance product data is assessed by an algorithm and the robo-advisor matches the financial product to the customer and risk profile and generates the required insurance service. Identifying the legal framework for robo-advisers and their responsibility for performing the analysis of customer needs and requirements is a challenge for the EU legislator, as well as for supervisors.

6 6Final Conclusions

The lack of EU regulations forces national supervisory authorities to look for appropriate and effective supervisory instruments in the adopted solutions of other countries in the world and in Europe for the development of InsurTech and their cooperation with the traditional insurance distributor. The activities undertaken related to the creation of Innovation Hubs and Regulatory Sandboxes seem to be the right way out in this situation. In the absence of consistent and unambiguous guidelines at EIOPA level, Innovation Hubs and Regulatory Sandboxes are not homogeneous institutions, as each country decides on their subject matter. In view of the freedoms and rules of the EU single insurance market in terms of cross-border business, de lege ferenda more activity and concrete solutions should be requested from EIOPA on this and other topics. Legal solutions in this respect in the insurance market are far from the banking and investment market. Certain issues in the insurance market are treated selectively, which adds to the lack of legal certainty and inconsistency, thus hindering the development of new technologies in the insurance market.
New technologies pose new challenges for supervisors, the greatest after the 2008 global financial crisis. The lack of regulation is forcing national supervisors to step up and assign them new roles. They have to take into account new risk models and new business models, and thus innovative technologies in the insurance market will have to be supported by supervisors. As far as action is concerned, it is related to the creation of expert working groups and forums, the publication of communications, guidelines and recommendations, which are proposals for new policies for the insurance market to benefit from new technologies while being prepared for the resulting potential risks. Their new role is that, in the absence of regulation, they actually have to find on their own (using models from other countries) a way to prevent disruptive distortions of competition or customer safety, while encouraging and supporting innovation. 65
Finally, it is difficult not to see that the introduction of new technologies in the insurance market is mainly based on market self-regulation through ‘soft law’ (guidelines and recommendations). An analysis of the current construction of guidelines and recommendations in the current legislation allows the thesis that the legislator has ‘reinforced’ the implementation of these guidelines and recommendations by their addressees. They are binding on the addressees as regards the realization of their objectives, but not as regards the means of their realization. The disciplinary tool in this construction is the possibility for the supervisory authority to disclose (publish) the information it has received regarding the refusal of the supervised entity to comply with the issued guidelines and recommendations. All these solutions mean that the introduction of new technologies in the insurance market can take place through the issuance of guidelines and recommendations, but solutions in this regard developed at EU level are necessary. 66 The design of the EU single insurance market means that action on this issue should be mandatory, harmonized and consistent for the entire market and individual Member States.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if you modified the licensed material. You do not have permission under this license to share adapted material derived from this chapter or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
download
DOWNLOAD
print
DRUCKEN
Titel
The Importance of EU Soft Law in Insurance Distribution: The Case of Poland
Verfasst von
M. Szaraniec
Copyright-Jahr
2025
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-09716-3_8
1
This article presents the results of the Project No. 033/EPC/2023/POT, financed from the subsidy granted to the Krakow University of Economics.
 
2
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12 as amended).
 
3
Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48, as amended), hereinafter referred to as the Regulation.
 
4
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331 of 15.12.2010, p. 84 as amended).
 
5
Consisting in the control, exercised by the supervisory authority, of compliance by financial institutions with prudential standards. Prudential standards mean special legal norms setting out the requirements imposed for the purpose of limiting the assumption of excessive risk by financial institutions and increasing the security level of the financial system, and, in consequence, ensuring an appropriate level of protecting the interests of persons entrusting their financial means to such institutions. So: R. Mroczkowski, Nadzór nad funduszami inwestycyjnymi, Warszawa 2011, p. 45.
 
6
Consolidated supervision is an element of security of the Union financial system. It was introduced in a situation when individual supervision over financial institutions forming a part of holding structures was insufficient. Although the law does not define this supervision type, its essence is to monitor financial institutions forming a part of holdings – for the purpose of assessing the operative risk relating to the fact of shareholding links with other entities. This supervision is exercised on the basis of consolidated financial statements, covering the parent entity and its subsidiaries. The exercise of consolidated supervision does not exclude individual supervision.
 
7
Supplementary (additional) supervision is exercised over entities forming a part of a financial conglomerate. A financial conglomerate may be considered a group formed by entrepreneurs conducting their activities in at least two sectors of the financial, banking, insurance or investment market. A financial supervision authority, already existing in the structure of supervisory authorities in the financial market, acquires an additional function of coordinator, together with additional powers necessary to exercise supplementary supervision over financial conglomerates.
 
8
M. Fedorowicz, A. Michór, (2011), p.24.
 
9
R. Grzeszczak, M. Słok-Wódkowska, (2015), pp. 90 and 92.
 
10
Ibid, pp. 90 and 92.
 
11
L. Senden, (2004), p. 156.
 
12
R. Grzeszczak, M. Słok-Wódkowska, (2015), p. 90 and 92.
 
13
Article 16 of the EIOPA Regulation lists these two supervisory instruments (guidelines and recommendations) without making any distinction between them or indicating when they should be used.
 
14
So: A. Michór, (2011), p. 312.
 
15
EIOPA may adopt guidelines and recommendations that are addressed to national supervisors and financial institutions.
 
16
Art. 16 (3) of Regulation (UE) No. 1094/2010.
 
17
See: Art. 16 (3) of Regulation (UE) No. 1094/2010. Moreover, if this is required under a guideline or recommendation, a financial institution must, in a clear and detailed way, notify if the financial institution complies with the guideline or recommendation.
 
18
In Case C-322/88.
 
19
For more on this subject, see: M. Szaraniec, (2017), p. 277 ad 284–288.
 
20
As far as recommendations in the insurance market are concerned, see.: A. Tarasiuk-Flodrowska, (2011), p. 218–227; B. Mrozowska, (2012), p. 30–47; E. Kowalewski, M. Ziemiak, (2014), p. 15–30.
 
21
The above principle has been repeatedly analyzed in case-law. E.g., see: the decision of the Supreme Court of 18 January 2005, WK 22/04, OSNKW 2005, nr 3, poz. 29, Biuletyn SN 2005, nr 3, poz. 23, and the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 March 2006, K4/06, OTK-A 2006, nr 3, poz. 32, or the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 16 March 2011, K 35/8, OTK-A 2011, nr 2, poz.11.
 
22
Dz. U. 2024, poz. 838, hereinafter referred to as u.d.u.r.
 
23
Art. 365 (1) and (2) u.d.u.r.
 
24
For more on that subject, see: M. Szaraniec, (2016), http://sic.pravo.upjs.sk
 
25
Art. 363 (1) item 2 u.d.u.r.
 
26
See: Art. 363 (4) u.d.u.r.
 
27
This refers to recommendations issued under Art. 365 (1) item 1 u.d.u.r. For more on this subject, see: M. Szaraniec, (2017), p.284–288.
 
28
This refers to recommendations issued under Art. 365 (1) item 2 u.d.u.r.
 
29
Art. 365 (2) and (3) u.d.u.r. For more on the subject, see: M. Śliwa-Wajda, P. Wajda, (2023), p. 3–25.
 
30
So: For more on this subject, see: M. Szaraniec, (2017), p. 277 ad 284–288.
 
31
M. Orlicki, (2015),p. 26.
 
32
So: R. Kaszubski, (2006), p. 78.
 
33
S. Wronkowska, (2005), p. 26.
 
34
A. Skoczylas, (2002), p. 58.
 
35
T. Nieborak (2011), p. 78.
 
36
So: T. Nieborak, (2008), p. 26.
 
37
However, in literature, different opinions can be found on that matter. E.g., see: T. Czech, (2009), p. 70–71, where the author discussed positions presented in literature in this regard. No less convincing is the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 28 June 2000, K 25/99, OTK 2000, nr 5, poz. 141, in which the requirements were formulated whose fulfilment allows to adopt acts of internal legislation addressed to entities functionally subordinate to the state authority. The Constitutional Tribunal explained that an authority entitled to the above may only be a constitutional authority, and the acts of internal legislation themselves may only relate to constitutionally defined public tasks. These considerations are decisive for the conclusion that KNF is not authorized to adopt acts of internal legislation addressed to insurance undertakings (banks), because KNF is not a constitutional authority and it does not perform constitutional public tasks. For more on that subject, see: R. Tupin, (2001), z. 1, p. 87.
 
38
So far, KNF has adopted: Recommendations for insurance undertakings on the adequacy of products of 22 March 2016, Recommendations for insurance undertakings on the product management system of 22 March 2016, and Guidelines for insurance undertakings on insurance distribution of 24 June 2014.
 
39
The Act of 15 December 2017 on insurance distribution (Dz. U. 2023, poz. 1111, 1723).
 
40
Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution (recast) (OJ L 26, 02.02.2016, p. 19) – IDD.
 
41
For more on that subject, see: M. Szaraniec, (2017), p. 326–331.
 
42
So: M. Szaraniec, (2020), p. 34.
 
43
B. Chris, Y. Yadav, (2019), p. 242.
 
44
Ibid., p. 243–248.
 
45
So: D. A. Zetzsche; R. P. Buckley; J. N. Barberis; D. W. Arner, (2017): p. 38.
 
46
See: M. Fras, M. Szaraniec, (2019), p. 90–109. The following countries were forerunners in this regard: 1. Australia: The innovation hub launched in 2015 assists FinTech start-ups in navigating the Australian regulatory system: “[E]ligible businesses can request informal guidance from ASIC”; 2. China: Regular outreach with the FinTech sector “is aided by the National Internet Finance Association (NIFA), which guides and supervises the implementation of national policies on the licensing process and key regulatory issues.”; 3. Luxembourg: CSSF has a special department for financial innovation, established in early 2015, which functions as CSSF’s innovation hub; 4. Germany: Bundesanstalt fir Finanzdienstleistungsaufischt (BaFin) offers close contact and advice to FinTech start-ups; 5. Japan: The Japanese Financial Services Agency launched a FinTech Support Desk in December 2015; 6. Singapore: The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) established a financial technology and innovation group with an innovation lab known as “Looking Glass @ MAS” as well as a FinTech Office; 7. South Korea: The Government established a FinTech Centre in 2015; 8. Taiwan: The Financial Supervisory Commission established a FinTech office in 2015 and implemented a FinTech Pilot Program; 8. Thailand: Bank of Thailand has set up a FinTech clinic; 9. Sweden: Established a National Innovation Council “to provide support and advice to established and startup businesses alike on issues such as regulatory and permit requirements.”; 10. United Kingdom: Project Innovate included the establishment of an innovation hub in 2015. So after: D. A. Zetzsche; R. P. Buckley; J. N. Barberis; D. W. Arner, (2017), p. 40–43.
 
47
The first regulatory sandboxes were created in 2016 in: United Kingdom (04/2016), Hong Kong (09/2016), Indonesia (09/2016), Malaysia (10/2016), Singapore (11/2016), Abu Dhabi (11/2016) and in Australia (12/2016). So after: D. A. Zetzsche; R. P. Buckley; J. N. Barberis; D. W. Arner, (2017), p. 64–66.
Then, further development of regulatory sandboxes took place, covering also Central and Eastern Europe. See, for example, the solutions in Lithuania: https://www.oecd.org/finance/insurance/Lithuania-review-of-the-insurance-system-2018.pdf The entities to be accepted will negotiate with the Bank of Lithuania mitigation of certain requirements for the duration of testing a business model or products. In October 2018, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) took steps to launch a regulatory sandbox in Poland and started to recruit operators, that is enterprises willing to test innovative FinTech solutions. The sandbox was to operate as a decentralized model. An operator could be an insurance undertaking, but also a startup accelerator. The testing environment was to be both virtual, i.e. in the form of a computer system simulating market behaviors, and operate with the involvement of actual customers, although without the option of investing any real financial means. The entire process was to be monitored and substantially supported by the supervisory authority. Unexpectedly, in March 2019, KNF suspended the launch of the regulatory sandbox because of non-finalized operator contracts, rules or the KNF’s own procedures. For more on that subject, see: M. Fras, M. Szaraniec, (2019), p. 90–109.
 
48
D. W Arner, D. A. Zetzsche, R. P Buckley, J. N. Barberis, (2017), p.291–292. For more on that subject, see: M. Szaraniec, (2020), p. 35.
 
49
The Office of the Financial Supervision Authority has published (16.01.2025) that, as of 17 January 2025, the communication of 23 January 2020 regarding the processing of information by supervised entities in public or hybrid cloud computing (the so-called Cloud Communication) is revoked. This document has so far systematized the requirements and expectations placed on supervised entities when implementing cloud services in the financial sector. The FSA informs that the repeal of the above regulation and the cancellation of the Cloud Communiqué is dictated by the convergence of the scope of the DORA Regulation and the implementing acts issued in connection therewith with the revoked guidelines and the Cloud Communiqué. In the opinion of the FSA, leaving the aforementioned acts in force would create a risk of interpretation doubts that could arise in view of the regulation of the same aspects by these acts and by the provisions of the DORA Regulation.
 
50
Communiqué of the Office of the FSC of 23 January 2020 on the processing of information by supervised entities in a public or hybrid computing cloud (https://www.knf.gov.pl/knf/pl/komponenty/img/Komunikat_UKNF_Chmura_Obliczeniowa_68669.pdf) (accessed 30.09.2024), together with questions and answers (Q&A) issued to this Communiqué with regard to the application of the Communiqué of the FSC of 23 January 2020, as well as extensive studies created on its basis by industry organisations: PolishCloud - Standard for Information Processing Implementations in Cloud Computing (https://zbp.pl/getmedia/3b776dc0-654d-4da4-a764-4b89ec366ad8/PolishCloud) (accessed 30.09.2024); Polish Insurance Association - Standard for Information Processing Implementations in Cloud Computing. A study for the insurance sector (https://piu.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/standard-chmura-obliczeniowa-1.pdf) (accessed 30.09.2024).
 
55
(accessed 30.09.2024).
 
56
J. Byrski, H. Hoser, (2020), p.61.
 
57
Ibid, p. 61.
 
58
D. Karwala, M. Szwarczyńska, (2019), No. 4870.
 
59
J. Byrski, H. Hoser, (2020), p.62.
 
60
W. Wojturska, (2022), p. 42.
 
63
Mariusz Fras, Oskar Zgonina, (2022), p. 97–113.
 
65
So: M. Szaraniec, (2020), p. 36.
 
66
On 2 August 2024, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance) entered into force - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689 - which is the world’s first comprehensive regulation on artificial intelligence. The Artificial Intelligence Act aims to ensure that artificial intelligence developed and used in the EU is reliable, with safeguards to protect citizens’ fundamental rights. The regulation aims to establish a harmonised internal market for artificial intelligence in the EU, encourage the use of this technology and create an environment conducive to innovation and investment. Member States have until 2 August 2025 to designate competent national authorities to oversee the application of the rules on artificial intelligence systems and carry out market surveillance activities. The Commission’s Office for Artificial Intelligence will be the key implementing authority for the Artificial Intelligence Act at EU level, as well as the enforcement authority for general-purpose artificial intelligence models. Most of the provisions of the Artificial Intelligence Act will become effective on 2 August 2026. However, the bans on artificial intelligence systems deemed to pose unacceptable risks will apply after just six months, while the provisions on so-called general-purpose artificial intelligence models will apply after 12 months. To complete the transition period before full implementation, the Commission has launched the AI Pact (https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-pact). Under this initiative, AI developers are encouraged to voluntarily adopt key AI Act obligations before the legal deadlines.
 
Zurück zum Zitat Byrski, J., & Hoser, H. (2020). Wpływ Komunikatu Urzędu Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego z dnia 23.01.2020 roku dotyczący chmury obliczeniowej na rynek ubezpieczeń w Polsce, Prawo Asekuracyjne nr 3/2020.
Zurück zum Zitat Chris, B., & Yadav, Y. (2019). “Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma.” Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 107, no. 2.
Zurück zum Zitat Czech, T. (2009). Charakter prawny rekomendacji KNF, Przegląd Prawa Publicznego nr 11.
Zurück zum Zitat Fedorowicz, M., & Michór, A. (2011). On the legal nature of the decisions of the new European Union financial market supervisory authorities, European Judicial Review, 2011/11.
Zurück zum Zitat Fras, M. & Szaraniec, M. (2019).Nowe technologie w dystrybucji ubezpieczeń - bariery i ułatwienia w prawie polskim i unijnym. Wybrane zagadnienia prawne, Prawo Asekuracyjne nr 2/2019.
Zurück zum Zitat Fras, M., & Zgonina, O. (2022). ECJ– Group organizer as a distributor by the terms of IDD Commentary Judgement of the Court (First Chamber) of 29 September 2022 in case C-633/20, Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände – Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV v. TC Medical air ambulance agency GmbH, Wiadomości Ubezpieczeniowe 2022/4.
Zurück zum Zitat Grzeszczak, R., & Słok-Wódkowska, M. (2015). The European financial supervision system and the EU mandate of national supervisors - selected aspects, Insurance News, 2015/1.
Zurück zum Zitat Karwala, D. & Szwarczyńska, M. (2019). Nowy Komunikat KNF w sprawie outsourcingu chmury obliczeniowej, Dziennik Ubezpieczeniowy 2019, nr 4870.
Zurück zum Zitat Kaszubski, R. (2006). Funkcjonowanie źródeł prawa bankowego publicznego, Zakamycze.
Zurück zum Zitat Kowalewski, E., & Ziemiak, M. (2014). W sprawie legalności wytycznych Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego, Wiadomości Ubezpieczeniowe, nr 3.
Zurück zum Zitat Michór, A. (2011). Administracyjnoprawne formy ingerencji europejskich organów nadzoru na rynku finansowym Unii Europejskiej, Ekonomia i Prawo.
Zurück zum Zitat Mroczkowski, R. (2011). Nadzór nad funduszami inwestycyjnymi, Warszawa.
Zurück zum Zitat Mrozowska, B. (2012). Bancassurance – regulacje prawne i samoregulacja rynku, Prawo Asekuracyjne, nr 3.
Zurück zum Zitat Nieborak, T. (2008). Aspekty prawne funkcjonowania rynku finansowego Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa.Nieborak, T. (2011). [in:] Ustawa o nadzorze nad rynkiem kapitałowym. Komentarz, (eds.) T. Nieborak, T. Sójka, Warszawa.
Zurück zum Zitat Orlicki, M. (2015). „Rekomendacje i wytyczne KNF – dialog nadzorowany, czyli «miękkie prawo» z twardym skutkiem”, Prawo Asekuracyjne nr 2, s. 3–14.Orlicki, M., & Rekomendacja, U. (2015). wytyczne dystrybucyjne, projekt ustawy o działalności ubezpieczeniowej i reasekuracyjnej – szansa na zmianę praktyki zawierania i wykonywania ubezpieczeń grupowych, Prawo Asekuracyjne, nr 1.
Zurück zum Zitat Senden, L. (2004). Soft Law in European Community Law, Hart Publishing, p. 156.
Zurück zum Zitat Skoczylas, A. (2002). Środki ochrony banku w postępowaniu przed Komisją Nadzoru Bankowego (wybrane zagadnienia), Prawo Bankowe, nr 2.
Zurück zum Zitat Szaraniec, M. (2016). The role of recommendations and guideline of the financial supervision commision (KNF) In combating the irregularities on the banking and insurance market in Poland, Studia Iuridica Cassoviensia, nr 1, published by Pavol Jozef Safarik, University in Kosice, Faculty of Law, http://sic.pravo.upjs.sk.
Zurück zum Zitat Szaraniec, M. (2017). Działalność gospodarcza pośredników ubezpieczeniowych. Studium publicznoprawne, Warszawa.
Zurück zum Zitat Szaraniec, M. (2020). Regulatory gaps concerning the introduction of new technologies in insurance distribution - the new role and activities of supervisory authorities. Outline of the problem, Prawo Asekuracyjne 2/2020.
Zurück zum Zitat Szaraniec, M. (2022). Insurance Outsourcing: a Legal Analysis. [W:] Marano P., Noussia K. (red.), The Governance of Insurance Undertakings: Corporate Law and Insurance Regulation (AIDA Europe Research Series on Insurance Law and Regulation; vol. 6), Cham: Springer, p. 71–93.
Zurück zum Zitat Śliwa-Wajda, M. & Wajda, P. (2023). Konsultacje projektów rekomendacji prowadzone przez Komisje Nadzoru finansowego – aspekty prawno-unijne, Wiadomości Ubezpieczeniowe nr 2/2023.
Zurück zum Zitat Tarasiuk-Flodrowska, A. (2011). Wybrane problemy prawne bancassurance w świetle rekomendacji dobrych praktyk, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu.
Zurück zum Zitat Tupin, R. (2001). Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 28 czerwca 2000 roku (sygn. Akt K 5/99), Przegląd Sądowy, z. 1.
Zurück zum Zitat Wojturska, W. (2022). Outsourcing chmurowy a reżim działalności nadzorowanej zakładów ubezpieczeń, Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego, nr 4/2022.
Zurück zum Zitat Wojturska, W. (2022). Outsourcing w technologii cloud computing w działalności krajowych zakładów ubezpieczeń, Warszawa.
Zurück zum Zitat Wronkowska, S. (2005). Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, Poznań.
Zurück zum Zitat Zetzsche, D. A., Buckley, R. P., Barberis, J. N., & Arner, D. W. (2017). “Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation,” Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 23, no. 1.