2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
The Improved 16th-Order Differential Attack on 10- Round Variant of Block Cipher PRESENT
verfasst von : Yasutaka Igarashi, Toshinobu Kaneko, Satoshi Setoguchi, Seiji Fukushima, Tomohiro Hachino
Erschienen in: Computer Science and its Applications
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We study the improved 16th-order differential attack on 10-round variant of PRESENT that is a 64-bit block cipher supporting 80-bit and 128-bit secret keys proposed by Bogdanov et al. in 2007. Higher-order differential attack is one of the cryptanalytic techniques exploiting a low algebraic degree of an encryption/decryption function. In 2013 Wu et al. reported the 16th-order differential attack on 10-round variant of PRESENT, which requires 2
22.4
pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, and 2
99.3
times of encryption operation. In this article we adopt partial sum technique to solve an attack equation, which leads to low computational complexity. As a result we show that 10-round variant of PRESENT can be attacked with 2
22.3
pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, and 2
81.3
times of encryption operation.