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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. The Macro-institutional Determinants of Depoliticization and Resilience in UWSEs

verfasst von : Thomas Bolognesi

Erschienen in: Modernization and Urban Water Governance

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK

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Abstract

This chapter explores why the modernization of urban water systems in Europe (UWSEs) brings about the process of their depoliticization. Furthermore, it investigates why modernization implementation goes with a resilient dynamic of water systems. It appears that modernization renders the structure of property rights within the UWSEs more complex, expanding the distribution of associated rights of control. This mechanism is central to the depoliticization process. Institutional arrangements reflecting the organizational principles of modernization emerge more easily when institutional matrices give credibility to impersonal commitments and reflect a preference for flexibility. The diversity of capitalism allows these elements and their dynamics to be observed while explaining the variety of ideal-types of UWSEs.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Micro-institutional Determinants of Depoliticization and Resilience in UWSEs

Nächstes Kapitel Institutional Dynamics and Sustainability: The Trade-Off Between Broader Regulation and Consistent Regulation

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Titel: The Macro-institutional Determinants of Depoliticization and Resilience in UWSEs
verfasst von: Thomas Bolognesi
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Buch: Modernization and Urban Water Governance
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-59254-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-1-137-59255-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59255-2_5