The March, 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Disaster – A Foreseeable System Accident?

The chapter presents a systems-theory-informed analysis of the 11 March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster. Following the Tōhoku earthquake, Fukushima-Daiichi suffered a series of failures that saw nuclear material released into the environment and the evacuation of 150,000 residents. Using a formula developed by Rose Challenger, Christopher Clegg and Mark Robinson (Understanding crowd behaviours, vol. 1. Practical guidance and lessons identified. The Stationery Office, London, 2010), the chapter argues that the disaster was a system accident originating in a spectrum of factors – social, economic, political and cultural. Secondly, the chapter argues that the disaster was foreseeable. Thirdly, the chapter argues that the mindlessness and groupthink that permeated Japan’s industrial, bureaucratic and political elites increased the likelihood of disaster. As to how a repeat can be avoided, the chapter offers three options. First, the world community could try to persuade Japan to abandon its nuclear programme. Secondly, Japan could generate her electricity entirely from fossil fuels and renewables such as solar, wind, hydro, tide and biomass. Thirdly, Japan could seed her nuclear plants with managers and workers not culturally predisposed to conformity and obedience. The author concludes that each solution is problematic.