The contest literature provides important instruments with which to analyze and model a wide range of economic interactions, mainly in the case of market participants who have to compete against one another. Examples include company advertising by firms, political competition, R&D races, sporting activities and many more. One very familiar application of contest models are promotion processes in companies where the employees concerned have to outperform their rivals in order to pursue their chosen career path. The focus of this present thesis is placed on these very promotion processes and provides a game theory model designed to analyze and understand the decisions of agents whether or not to compete against one another. Since the effect of group size on contests constitutes the overall subject of this model, the following review of existing game theory literature will focus on those publications that give particular consideration to group size.
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- The Model