The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Geopolitics

This chapter points exclusively to the classical or traditional version of geopolitics. Common to most research, other versions exist as well, these being the “critical geopolitics” of a postmodern bent with emphasis upon deconstruction of elites’ alleged corruption and upon an emancipatory conclusion, and the power politics or “media geopolitics” set on Great Power actions and policies contributing to international instabilities. Both approaches give a negative impression against geopolitics. The classical version departs from both types in its possession of multiple theories and platforms available for a neutral study of foreign affairs, the focus of this chapter. The author much prefers, respects, and endorses the classical version, although he will accept the other two approaches for having utility as well.Accordingly, the pages that follow will describe what the author believes to be the essentials of the classical geopolitical model, this intended to depict it as a legitimate international relations theoretical construct.

The three major paradigms of international relations (Realism, Constructivism, Neoliberalism) have for too long fought a spurious war (Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan power in international relations: A synthesis of realism, neoliberalsm, and constructivism. Cambridge University Press, 2010b, Journal of Political Power, 14, 209–234, 2021). The contest has been a fabrication of method over substance, of concepts over theory, of epistemology over ontology. Basic assumptions and tenets have produced a set of paradigmatic lenses that interpreted similar outcomes in heterogeneous ways. But in fact, the three lenses themselves could very well be interfaced to produce a more thorough and integrated whole. The advantages would indeed be of value toward producing a better understanding of the nature and outcomes of international relations. This chapter proposes the foundations for building such an integrated vision of world politics by (1) integrating treatments of power among the paradigms and (2) synthesizing epistemological principals from the three paradigms into one unified paradigm: a Cosmopolitan vision of international politics.

Geopolitics ought to be inseparable from geography, maps, and visual arguments. The classics of geopolitics were well illustrated and made visual arguments, primarily through printed maps. Maps, however, have become rare or forgotten as core elements of twenty-first century geopolitical arguments. Very few contemporary strategists and scholars draw on the assistance of maps or visuals to illustrate their work on international relations. Indeed, visual complements to the written text were more common in the last part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century than they are today. Geopolitics emerged as an academic discipline at a time when sophisticated maps were easier to produce and consume, and the heyday of geopolitics in the middle of the twentieth century coincided with a cartographic golden age. During the Cold War and in the period that followed, the spatial frame of geopolitics disappeared: the “geo” in “geopolitics” got lost. Geopolitics is newly prominent in recent years: the present volume is a good example of rigorous study of geographic patterns of international relations and the structure of the international system. New geopolitical arguments deserve new visuals to illustrate them. To that end, this chapter concludes with ten original maps that highlight select dimensions of the international order at the close of the first quarter of the twenty-first century.

The term “international law” came into general use in Western languages in the nineteenth century. The new term was meant to emphasize that this would coordinate relations between states. In the late twentieth century, especially after the end of the Cold War, many analysts envisioned a law of global ordering which could constrain states, even in their treatment of their own citizens or of the natural environment within their own borders. New international institutions and newly elaborated legal practices seemed for a time to lend support to this view. But more recent experience suggest states are not so easily constrained merely by what others regard as international law. There is more coordination than ever in state practices regarding communication, transportation, and various aspects of international trade and investment. But sovereign states remain the most powerful actors in international affairs and legal institutions cannot by themselves constrain differing priorities of the most powerful states.

I argue that, when empires arise, they are the bearers of (and are legitimized by) certain values, certain religious orthodoxies, certain technologies, certain norms of inter-sovereign politics, and certain cultural forms. Rather like supernovas in the present-day cosmos, their traces and effects can be seen in any later geopolitics. As obvious a feature of the contemporary world as the distribution of languages is an outcome of long-gone imperial expansion, producing an affinity between, for example, Arabic-speaking nations or Spanish-speaking ones.

This chapter examines the relationship between geopolitics and the far right, offering a broad overview ranging from the imperialist inception of geopolitics thought to the rise of America First and the neo-Eurasianist theory of a multipolar world. Examining the roots of “classical geopolitics” from Bismarck to the Nazi Reich, this chapter discerns the fundamental characteristics of classical geopolitics, showing its integration into Cold War “forward strategy” pertaining to anti-Communist global alignment and support for Latin American dictatorships. The chapter further reveals the continuity of geopolitical analysis from the Nazi period through the post-war European far right, providing the groundwork for the emergence of Traditionalist neo-Eurasianism after the Cold War. Lastly, the chapter analyzes the dual emergence of and complex relationship between the complimentary frameworks of America First and civilizational multipolarity, amid the rise of illiberal hybrid warfare. Through a discussion of recent international developments and conflicts, the chapter concludes with a reflection on trends toward renewed bifurcation and the problem of balance in International Relations.

This chapter outlines a divergence at the current geopolitical conjuncture between two trends: liberal internationalism and totalitarian revisionism. It describes how the rules-based order constructed after the Second World War faces existential challenges from revisionist powers having features of totalitarianism, chiefly Russia, China, Iran, and Islamic Jihadists, and argues that democracies committed to an open world of optimal economic and cultural exchange should respond with awareness of the dangers they present. The chapter cautions against both nationalist isolationism and naïve liberal globalism in favor of a foreign policy grounded in conservative internationalism. It concludes by discussing more robust, concerted, and effective international cooperation in defense of free markets, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

By the end of the twentieth century, the Cold War was over; economic prosperity and liberal, free nation states seemed to be spreading worldwide, while pundits pronounced that the United States was at the peak of its global influence. The so-called liberal international order, set in motion from Washington, DC, at World War II’s conclusion, appeared to have reached its long dreamt of ascendancy, to have tamed the provocations of classical geopolitics – which postulated a world of geographical difference and great power rivalry. That order, pieced together chiefly by the United States, merged political, economic, financial, and humanitarian features into a cooperative multilateral structure, with the United States as the centerpiece nation. From its beginnings, it was plagued by a bipolar Cold War between former wartime allies, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the United States. The end of that contest did not bring the desired utopia. Terrorist attacks; domestic differences within the United States about the meaning and functioning of liberalism, government, and international affairs; economic distress at home and abroad; a flourishing anti-globalist populism and illiberalism; a rising, undaunted China; and a disruptive war in Ukraine all left the world questioning if the liberal international order could – or should – survive.

This chapter analyzes the contemporary geopolitical trajectory of Canada during the twenty-first century, during the Harper (2006–2015) and Trudeau (2015–) governments. It argues that Canada’s stance on the world stage is characterized by a tension between its nostalgic middle power aspirations, its geographically induced strategic dependences toward the United States in a context of renewed “great power competition” in the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific, and domestic pressures that constrain its willingness to invest in its international policy. Acting as underlying variables are the omnipresent impacts of climate change, its diverse and dispersed non-urban communities, and its economy. As such, this chapter explicitly provides a multicausal understanding of Canada’s geopolitical behavior that accounts for the material, ideational, and domestic factors that act as constraints and drivers of state behavior.

Until the early nineteenth century, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) consisted largely of European colonies where Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, France, and Holland extracted wealth and resources and sold finished goods. By the 1820s, Mexico and most of South and Central America became independent, with European possessions remaining only in the Caribbean. With the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States signaled to the Europeans that it would not tolerate further colonization in the hemisphere, even if it still lacked the power to enforce the doctrine until later in the century when it became the dominant military and economic power, especially after the Spanish-American War. Until it was challenged by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States’ economic, political, and military influence in LAC remained paramount throughout the first half of the twentieth century, with European power greatly diminished by two devastating world wars. The advent of the Cold War placed Latin America and the Caribbean in the center of geopolitical competition, with the United States shoring up anticommunist military dictatorships, and the Soviet Union supporting revolutionary movements across the hemisphere. The early twenty-first century marked the beginning and rapid expansion of Chinese trade, investment, and influence in LAC, driven by economic considerations rather than ideological ones in the case of the former Soviet Union. Today, China is the largest trading partner of most countries in South America, the United States remains the primary trading partner with Mexico and Central America and has deep security ties with the entire region, the European Union is the largest foreign direct investor in LAC, and a diminished Russia still exerts political, if not military or economic, power. Contemporary geopolitics in Latin America and the Caribbean consists primarily of strategic economic competition between China and the United States and to a lesser extent the European Union, as well as competition for political influence along an autocratic/democratic fault line, with China and Russia on one side and the European Union and the United States on the other.

Broadly defined the Caribbean encompassed the island chains of the Lesser and Greater Antilles, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guyenne on the South American mainland facing the Atlantic, the Dutch islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao that are north of Venezuela, and Belize in Central America. This set of countries share much in terms of being small states, cultural overlap, and similar colonial experiences. In the twenty-first century, there is a mix of traditional nation-state geopolitics being played out as well as new challenges concentrated around three major narratives. These are the energy transition from fossil fuels to renewables, climate change, and new Cold War rivalry between the United States and China. Moreover, there are interrelated issues of failed (Haiti) and weak states (Cuba) in the Caribbean, transnational crime, and healthcare diplomacy. The major power in the Caribbean is the United States, which had faded as a concern in the post-Cold War era and is now more engaged in the region, especially since China has proved to be an adept player in economic statecraft, while Russia has renewed ties with a number of countries and new actors, Iran and Turkey, have reached out to the region in largely economic ways. Caribbean geopolitics have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, and the first half of the twenty-first century is likely to be highly challenging reflecting upheaval in the global political and economic system.

The United Kingdom has adapted to the geopolitical shift in global affairs since the end of the Cold War. It has utilized its levers of national power to sustain its position internationally, although it has suffered some setbacks. Domestically, public opinion has been divided over the United Kingdom’s relationship with Europe and the United States. However, in foreign policy, it is more a question of continuity rather than change. As a nuclear power, the United Kingdom is committed to its regional NATO alliance to confront the aggression of Russia and seeks to shape the international environment with its convening influence. The UK is also a global actor and has renewed its alliance with the “Five Eyes” nations in order to address the growing assertiveness of China. It continues to use the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and multilateralism to exercise responsible global leadership through the UN Security Council and for its own legitimacy.

The Northern Ireland Protocol was designed by the EU as a solution to the challenges of Brexit on the island of Ireland; it had remarkably little input from either the UK government in London or the devolved Northern Ireland Executive, which had collapsed before the formal negotiations began. EU dominance of commerce, its far higher competence in the policy and legal areas at stake, its control of the exit process as well as its political unity made it by far the strongest party in the negotiations. This resulted in a very one-sided agreement in 2018 (partly revised in 2019) which was unable to work operationally and destabilized Northern Irelands politics and society. It was only when these problems became clear and the UK was able to communicate a better understanding of both Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement that the British state was able, in the Windsor Framework of 2023, to reverse some of the concessions that it had made in the early stages of the negotiations.Tags: Northern Ireland Protocol; Windsor Framework; Brexit; Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement; EU-UK relations; Safeguarding the Union; Northern Ireland; Withdrawal Agreement.

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine structurally changed the geopolitical situation on the European continent, turning Ukraine into a border state of the Western security architecture. The European Union reacted by according it candidate status for membership. The geopolitical ramifications of the war range much further, however, as Russia is outflanking the EU and NATO toward the south, building a presence from the Mediterranean and the Gulf to Central Africa. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, however, Russian influence may be waning. Meanwhile, Russia has become even more dependent on China, which refrains from actively supporting its war effort. This is evidence of a multipolar world: Each of the great powers prioritizes its national interests, while other states increasingly are hedging. In that context, the EU must base its strategy on more explicit geopolitical analysis.

Ireland’s place on the map remains constant, but its economic, political, and strategic geography is very much on the move. Unlike most transatlantic democracies in 2024, Ireland remains one of a handful of Western states continuing with a neutral security policy and military non-alignment. This chapter traces evolution in Irish geopolitical thought and foreign policy. The chapter examines the wider geopolitical context as Ireland gained its independence through an extended revolutionary period from the prospect of Home Rule from Westminster in the early 1910s to the end of its Civil War in 1923. It is argued that Irish traditions in foreign policy activism following small state interests in support of multilateral international institutions took shape from the 1930s onwards, but Irish neutrality has historically combined both idealist and pragmatic elements. Ireland pragmatically remained neutral during World War II as an act of war-avoidance. The end of World War II brought an abrupt dilemma for Irish policymakers where the USA expressed a welcome for Dublin to join NATO in the years around the alliance’s inception in 1949, but Ireland was unwilling to enter a military alliance that would involve the United Kingdom as long as the territorial dispute it perceived over Northern Ireland remained unsolved. Ireland was once a relatively peripheral and poor European country. This has changed thanks to a remarkable economic transformation over recent decades, but this has also created new geopolitical challenges on security in recent years that are perhaps unprecedented in Ireland’s independent history to date.

The objective of this chapter is to estimate how much – or how little – maneuverability Portugal still has presently, and in the upcoming decades, to navigate and adjust to systemic pressures. To achieve this objective, this chapter assesses three specific systemic pressures: the EU membership of Portugal, the Anglo-Portuguese and the US-Portuguese alliances, and the Chinese investment (and thus economic influence) in Portugal, listing the leverage, interests, and power of these countries and supranational organization in Portugal.The object is approached from the point of view of neoclassical geopolitics, an innovative method that joins geopolitical factors and systemic imperatives with the geopolitical agents’ perceptions and capacities. The chapter adopts a qualitative approach and a multivariate model of causation by combining individual, domestic, and international-level explanations.Apart from formulating several scenarios for Portugal in the short and long terms, one of the chapter’s main results was to concluded that, whereas both the systemic pressures of the EU membership of Portugal and the Chinese investment came with a price on Portuguese sovereignty, the Anglo-Portuguese and the US-Portuguese alliances remain as the systemic opportunities for the country, in economic, political, and security terms.

Geopolitical analysis and geostrategy are vital parts of the Scandinavian realist tradition. It is not a clearly defined academic school, and its connections to various forms of realism is often undefined or implicit, but it tends to be united by its policy relevance and empirical emphasis. More specifically, in the Cold War period geopolitical studies in Scandinavia was characterized by a small-state perspective, focus on state strategies, and the power of history. State strategies were explored as various forms of small-state adaptation in classic concepts like the Nordic balance, the Swedish double policy, and Finlandization. Even if critics have pointed out explanatory shortcomings, the return of Russia as regional threat has also reinforced the use of geopolitical analysis. Future issues in Scandinavian geopolitics are both conceptual (what is it?), theoretical (what can it explain?), and empirical (the impact of shifting power structures in international relations).

While the physical conditions of the Arctic are subject of rapid climate change, the geopolitical situation in High North is also changing rapidly. What was widely perceived as the region of so-called peaceful and harmonic “Arctic exceptionalism” turns out to be a normal, strategically contested arena of great power politics as any other region on earth. First of all the Russian Federation followed by the United States and the PRC are the three dominant players in the High North, whose interests, actions, and power plays are going to shape the fate of the Arctic for the next decades to come.

This chapter aims at capturing the ongoing geopolitical processes in Eastern Europe in search for the dominant trends from geopolitical perspective. Commencing from Harold Mackinder’s definition of Eastern Europe and exploring the impact of historical process, the research frames a wide and inclusive definition of the term. The analysis concentrates on the impact of the dominant powers in the region on the political developments over the last three decades. The processes of regional fragmentation and consolidation as a part of the West reveal the major shift that took place in Eastern Europe. The findings highlight the fact that the process of westernization of Eastern Europe increased the region’s resilience to the extent that other dominant powers have less and less capabilities to consider the region as a shatterbelt. Despite Russia’s intentions, the war in Ukraine further consolidated Eastern Europe and decreased its ability for destabilization even in conflicts where Moscow is considered to have leverage.

This chapter is an attempt to explore how geopolitics of Ukraine, which is openly attacked by its northern neighbor, imperialist Russia, was and still is directly connected to Russian academic imperialism and to Russian intelligence, which still tries to influence and shape the geopolitical situation of independent Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is indicative of Vladimir Putin’s broader foreign policy agenda, namely, to reassert Russia’s position as a global superpower, and its position as the regional super power within Eastern Europe. However, Baltic State membership in NATO is a major roadblock to Russian revanchism. This chapter argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stands as a warning of what could happen to the Baltic States, and suggests steps the Baltic States and NATO can take to prevent this happening.

This chapter interrogates the claim that the Russian war against Ukraine represents a “return” or “resurgence” of “great power politics.” It argues that this cyclical temporality, in which the world order is imagined to be returning to, or still locked within, a condition of great power competition inhibits scholars of international relations (IR) from identifying the features of novelty and transformation in the twenty-first-century world order. The chapter pursues the claim that rather than a world order of attenuated hierarchy – that the concepts of unipolarity, multipolarity, and great power competition all, in different ways, assume – power in the contemporary world order is becoming more diffuse among a wider range of actors and this is undermining and reshaping traditional geopolitical hierarchies. Rather than a resurgence of great power politics, the opposite may be occurring: a fragmentation of order in which no state can expect to create the “spheres of influence” historically associated with a select few dominant powers.

In this chapter, Grigas provides an update on Russian foreign policy vis- à-vis its near abroad following Russia’s 2022. As a follow up to her book, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (Yale, 2016), Grigas discusses her proposed framework to analyze Russian foreign policy: the Seven-Stage Reimperialization Trajectory. An analysis of events in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Kazakhstan is provided. Grigas discussed the academic and foreign policy response to the Russian invasion of 2022 and 2014 and the accompanying debate between “Realists” and “Russo-realists.”

The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the geopolitics of the modern world is being shaped as we speak. We are facing challenges arising from the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the response to them is the task of the entire global community. However, the consequences of the largest war in the modern world, initiated by the Kremlin in 2022, may not unfold as expected in Russia. Today, it is only clear that changes in the international relations system are inevitable. Perhaps the most significant of these changes will be that only one of the participants in the Russian-Ukrainian war may remain within internationally recognized borders.

This chapter proposes a heterodox interpretation of contemporary Western Balkan geopolitics, and how the same should be understood in a historical context. In contrast to many recent writings on “great power competition in the Western Balkans” (Wilson, 2019; Bagheri, 2020; Schwarz, 2021), the analytical emphasis here is not on the great powers per se nor on how the Western Balkans (do not) fit in their respective strategic postures. The level of analysis is local, namely how regional actors have capitalized on – or even weaponized – the prevailing disinterest in and ignorance (Considerations of disinterest, ignorance, ambivalence, inconsistency, or reluctance in international relations are relatively few and far between but not entirely novel (Dueck, 2008; Fehl, 2012; Destradi, 2016)) of foreign powers in regional affairs and dynamics. Because of this prevailing ignorance, regional actors, above all Serbia and Croatia, have in recent years again leveraged the fleeting interests of great powers – in whose grand strategies the Balkans have remained perennially peripheral – to advance their own local agendas. The essence of this program has been the expansion of Serbia and Croatia’s borders and/or their influence, at the expense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring states like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Montenegro, and to a lesser extent North Macedonia (Notwithstanding continuing concerns with Serbia’s pretensions toward North Macedonia (Belford et al., 2017), in the recent years nationalist sentiments in Bulgaria and Greece have posed a far greater challenge to Skopje than the general revanchist orientation of Belgrade).

In the multi-ethnic states of the Carpatho-Pannonian region (CPR), there is a conflicting relationship between two identities: civic and ethno-cultural. The first refers to the Western concept of the nation state: all persons living in a given territory defined by state sovereignty are citizens of that state regardless of their ethno-cultural origin, while the second refers to the ethno-cultural origin of a national community, often called “ethnic-nation” or “Kulturnation.” The mixture of these two concepts of nations frequently creates geopolitical tensions in the CPR. The general application of the concept of “unitary nation state,” which refers to a model of the nation state where the majority of the population represents one nation, has been contributing to conflicting relationships between ethnic minorities and majorities of states in the region. This type of state is based on the sovereignty of the majority, which in the case of states having different minorities leads to the domination of the largest ethnic group over the less numerous communities, which cannot provide a framework for peaceful coexistence among various ethnic groups in multi-ethnic states. This chapter argues that in ethnically diverse regions such as CPR, the autonomies are one of the most effective tools of minority protection, conflict prevention and conflict resolution and are safeguards for ensuring the cultural survival and protection of collective rights of national minorities. From a geopolitical perspective, the implementation of the different types of autonomies can represent a factor of stability and cohesion for the CPR by assuring territorial integrity of the states of the region and reduce the risks of separatist conflicts. This study briefly presents the various concepts of autonomies; then, it examines the historical roots of autonomies in the Carpathian Basin (the core area of the Carpatho-Pannonian region) and after it will focus on the current geographical possibilities of ethnic-based territorial autonomies in this region.

Due to Central Asia’s strategic location as well as the presence of hydrocarbons, for the past 30 years the region has been of great interest to global and regional powers such as Russia, China, the United States, the EU, India, Iran, and Turkey. The states of the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have adopted multivector foreign policies to balance outside interests. Through their flexible and pragmatic foreign policies, these states have avoided outside domination and exploited competition between external powers to advance the interests of their (predominantly) authoritarian regimes. Because of great and regional power interest in the region, Central Asian regimes have a great deal of opportunity to extract benefits from these powers, but they rarely do so collectively. To date, efforts to form coherent, robust regional Central Asian institutions have failed. Among the many reasons for these failures include the colonial legacy of undelimitated borders as well as a lack of economic interdependence, the entrenchment of personalist autocratic regimes in the region, and the establishment of externally sponsored international organizations such as the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is having profound effects on the region, it remains unclear whether, in the short or medium term, a regional hegemon will emerge or a regional organization will form.

In case of Turkey’s security culture long-term structural and short-term conjectural factors come into play. Turkey’s geographical location, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the legacy of Ataturk, and the decades-old westernization process tend to produce long-term impact on Turkey’s security culture, whereas political ideologies and geopolitical imaginations of ruling elites, the structure of polarity and distribution of power capabilities at the systemic level as well as type of government at different periods can be considered as producing short-term impact. Turkey is a middle power, sits at a very critical geographical location, and embodies an imperial mindset. This suggests that its approach to geopolitics is defined more by structural than conjectural factors.

The Middle East, spanning from Libya in the west to Iran in the east, and from Turkey in the north to Yemen in the south, has long been a focal point for powerful political actors throughout history. Its strategic location as a crossroads of trade routes has increased its status as one of the world’s most significant regions. In the past century, the discovery of oil in the region and its subsequent dominance as a global energy source have further heightened the region’s importance. This chapter analyzes key geopolitical aspects and trends, shedding light on the recent rise of China’s influence in the Middle East. It also explores two crucial natural resources: oil and water. While the former is abundant, and the latter is scarce, both resources exert great influence on regional and international politics. Additionally, the chapter examines territorial and boundary-related conflicts within the unique context of the Middle East’s human and cultural landscape. The chapter also outlines the potential consequences of ongoing global warming developments. Finally, it places the current geopolitical landscape within a broader historical context.

This chapter examines the geopolitics of Israel in relation to what it establishes are the two main pillars of its foreign relations: shared security concerns and the need for diplomatic support. It begins by demonstrating the nature of the existential threat that led to Israel pursuing alliances based on these concerns, before showing that both of these needs are ongoing even in a post-October 7 environment. It ends by assessing Israel’s relations with global and rising powers, and suggests that, though October 7 has proven to be a turning point for Israeli understandings of the geopolitical realities of its neighborhood, in terms of major alliances with rising powers, little improvement is likely. By contrast, the current geopolitical reality may have a greater impact on Israel’s strongest diplomatic and security alliance, with the USA, owing to both Israeli and domestic politics. It concludes by warning that Israel is still under existential threat, and that the need for shared alliances and diplomatic support currently seems greater than at any point in Israel’s history.

Iran presents a fascinating case to examine geopolitics. It is a place of contradictions and compromises, of promise and defeat, of proxies and partners. Like all places, its unique trajectory is shaped by its histories and the people who remember, by external forces that prompt deliberations and action, and by its own choices, and these inform the tools and means Iran selects to achieve its domestic, regional, and international aspirations. Perceived as a pariah, hegemon, and neighbor, the Islamic Republic of Iran, given its geography, historical legacy, strategic calculations, and domestic fragility, faces a challenging geopolitical space that will test its leaders, institutions, and citizens to forge a sustainable future.

The chapter analyzes the geopolitical and economic transformation the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are undergoing (The GCC consists of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain.). In light of substantial domestic and geostrategic shifts, the Gulf monarchies need to position themselves in a multipolar world in order to preserve their political legitimacy and their economic stability. Hence, such shifts also challenge the traditional character of the Gulf rentier economies and have resulted in new political approaches in terms of socioeconomic liberalization, identity construction, and energy transition. Against this backdrop, the GCC states are promoting socioeconomic diversification, multi-alignment in global affairs and regional reconciliation on different levels.

Since its independence in 1932, Iraq’s political trajectory reflected and contributed to creating a regional order in constant change, influenced by both intra-regional dynamics and extra-regional ones. The chapter offers an overview of the geopolitics in and of Iraq by situating it at different geographical scales. By first framing Iraq within its regional context, it highlights its position in relation to key events that represented critical junctures in the structuring of an evolving regional order. At the international level, it pays particular attention to three critical events that projected Iraq at the center of international agendas: the First Gulf War, the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the 2014 campaign against the so-called Islamic State. Lastly, the chapter turns to the domestic level, in relation to which it problematizes the Iraqi state opening up the analysis to a less-rigid state-centric perspective.

The geopolitical landscape of Yemen is complex and extends beyond its borders. This chapter examines Yemen’s civil war by focusing on both the internal and regional dimensions of that landscape. The internal dimensions of that war are based on a web of historical grievances and power struggles in which geography intersects with other factors. The analysis shows how, throughout history, the state has exploited identity divisions and fueled ethnonationalist sentiments through manipulation, extractive policies, and a mentality of revenge. Turning to the regional dynamics surrounding the Yemeni civil war, the analysis then highlights the interplay between US foreign policy shifts in the region and broader regional tensions, particularly the escalating Cold War between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Realist perspectives illuminate the strategic maneuvering of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, driven by their geopolitical ambitions and security concerns. Although pragmatism has prevailed thus far, reconciliation and sustainable peace in Yemen remain fragile and elusive.

East Africa is firmly implicated in global geopolitics. This chapter is grounded in three theoretical premises about geopolitics. We posit that contemporary geopolitics in East Africa (and the “Global South” at large) are infused with enduring patterns of coloniality. Relatedly, geopolitics cannot be grasped in isolation from hierarchical, racialized, and spatialized power structures of the global economy, hence the neologism geopolitics-cum-geoeconomics. Thirdly, contemporary geopolitics in East Africa constitute a complex amalgamation of intraregional political, economic, and security dynamics and the region’s external relations and entanglements. Empirically, the chapter discusses how the COVID-19 pandemic has engendered vaccine geopolitics which have recently culminated in the EU’s efforts to export mRNA production to Rwanda. East Africa’s geopolitics of (in)security are dissected with reference to the regionalized conflict in the Eastern DRC and the growing military footprint of foreign powers in the greater East African region. The chapter furthermore documents repercussions of Russia’s war against Ukraine and problematizes growing foreign interests in East Africa’s “green” – and “not so green” – energy sources and the intensifying scramble for the region’s “critical” minerals. It is shown how infrastructural geopolitics related to East Africa’s integration into competing connectivity initiatives, notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the EU’s Global Gateway, and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, have further curtailed regional integration. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the likelihood of “non-alignment 2.0” emanating from East Africa. Instead of coordinating a regional and decolonial geopolitical strategy, East African governments have opted to engage in “omni-alignment,” trying to maximize national dividends from the competitive and extractivist logics of contemporary geopolitics-cum-geoeconomics.

North Africa is a region with tremendous geostrategic importance. Situated at the nexus of Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, the region has drawn the attention of external powers for centuries. North Africa is inextricably tied to Europe through geography and history and has been a theater of proxy conflict – both diplomatic and, at times, violent – from global powers including the Arab Gulf states, Russia, and China. Additionally, the North African states, themselves, are one of the least united regions in the world and have experienced disputes, particularly over Western Sahara. Global and regional powers have, at times, exploited these disagreements to the detriment of North Africa, exacerbating existing fissures and preventing further economic and political integration that is necessary for a more prosperous and stable region.

Studies cast in the heuristic frame of hierarchy often impute imperialist and non-progressive motives in the transactions of Asian states in Africa given the power asymmetry between the two continents. To the extent that the analytical logic and conclusions derived from studies of this nature are valid, they are informed by the thinking that African actors cannot decipher and counter imperialist designs and as such are willing victims of imperialism, cannot encode and actively pursue strategic interests, do not value the status of being sovereign, are not rational, and as former imperial subjects of European, suffer from historic amnesia. This chapter avoids the analytical drawbacks of the hierarchy heuristic with the aid of the concept of heterarchical geopolitical economy and meta-institutions. It demonstrates that African actors have leveraged agency-enhancing dividends from interactions with Asia to correct disruptive legacies of Western imperialism.

With China’s phenomenal rise and India’s growing global influence, Asia has become the center of great power politics in the present century. India has been building stronger strategic ties with a wide range of countries including the United States and finds itself at the heart of the Indo-Pacific strategy that seeks to counter China. Discarding its traditional non-aligned movement rhetoric, India has begun to pursue a realist foreign policy based on national interests, though it still participates in various non-Western formats that include both Russia and China. As the Himalayan neighbors compete for global power and influence, the evolving conflict in the bilateral and multilateral dynamics between India and China has become an evident feature of the increasingly complex world of Asian geopolitics. India’s non-judgmental attitude toward the Russian aggression against Ukraine is primarily directed at mitigating India’s insecurities by preventing Russia from developing stronger ties with China. India’s continuing emphasis on strategic autonomy and championing of the Global South is also aimed at achieving great power status between the conflicting interests of the United States, China, and Russia. The chapter argues that the world is in the midst of a momentous geopolitical repositioning, and India’s aim is to become a part of the emerging multipolar global order.

Eurasia’s contemporary geopolitics is addressed through the prism of the People’s Republic of China’s investment in the supercontinent’s supply chains. These logistics investments on land and at sea through China’s Belt and Road Initiative have underpinned the country’s economic and political transformation as the Eurasian pacemaker. Attention is focused initially upon the policy’s domestic antecedents before tracking investments in international transport developments within the Silk Road Economic Belt’s three transcontinental economic corridors and in the three shorter economic corridors designed to integrate Southeast Asia and South Asia more closely into China’s Eurasian economic and political landscape. Then the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road is explored through an examination of investments by China’s state-owned enterprises in a string of ports on Eurasia’s southern fringe before examining developments in the Arctic that have completed the country’s circumnavigation of the island supercontinent. The contemporary geopolitical repercussions stemming from China’s enhanced economic connectivity through its Belt and Road Initiative have affected countries and regions in markedly different ways. These consequences are illustrated by reference to India, Iran, Japan, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Central Asia, the Eurasian Economic Union, the European Union, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

This chapter outlines the geopolitical landscape of East Asia. Its main argument is that the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are two regional “flash points” where continental and maritime powers have collided. After laying out the analytical framework, it offers an overview of the strategic history of East Asia focusing on four historical episodes to establish connections between Korea and Taiwan: Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s original plans to invade China in the late sixteenth century (1592–1598), the rise of seikanron (conquest of Korea) and the expedition of Taiwan in the 1870s, the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), and the Korean War (1950–1953). It further demonstrates their continued importance in the context of US-China rivalry by assessing their military value and outsized role in the production of semiconductors which makes them “chiplands.” The chapter concludes with a brief remark on the evolving regional structure and the value of geopolitical analysis.

China’s rise over the past four decades to be the second largest economy in the world (in real terms) and the subsequent political influence this has generated are a defining feature of geopolitics today. As China’s international position has changed, so too have the geopolitical priorities of its leadership. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long sought to restore the country to what it considers to be its rightful place among the great powers. “National rejuvenation” has since become a central tenet of Xi Jinping’s rule and is associated with a more assertive global role for China. This has included the push toward a multipolar world, encouraged by CCP initiatives that aim to further its economic, political, and technological influence.China’s success and its evolving geopolitics have brought it into increased strategic competition with the United States, which is seeking multilateral cooperation to counter its rival. Nowhere are the risks of this competition more evident than the potential for conflict over Taiwan.

Geopolitics is the study of how geography shapes state foreign and security policy. This chapter shows how in Southeast Asia the impact of geography is mediated by history, culture, and political leadership. It shows how states in similar geographic locations have developed different geopolitical outlooks. Southeast Asia has become an arena of US – China geopolitical rivalry, particularly over the South China Sea. Through ASEAN regionalism, Southeast Asian states seek to avoid the destabilizing consequences of this rivalry but without a common approach. Because of Southeast Asia’s political and cultural complexity, some countries have tilted to China, others to the USA, while some struggle to maintain distance from both. Proximity to China governs the geopolitics of five mainland states. Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, which have tilted to China, Myanmar struggle with Chinese influence while Vietnam has opposed China in the South China Sea. The five maritime states of Southeast Asia are more distant from China and open to alternative approaches. Indonesia and Malaysia have pursued nonalignment and have avoided alliances but they have come under Chinese pressure in the South China Sea. By contrast, the Philippines is firmly allied with the USA while Singapore depends on the US sponsored regional order without being allied with it. Tiny Brunei looks to China economically and strives to accommodate it in the South China Sea.

The South China Sea (SCS) has long been regarded as one of the most complex and challenging ocean-related maritime disputes in East Asia. The SCS dispute has become the locus of disputes that have the potential of escalating into serious international conflicts. The chapter Reviewing Geopolitics in the South China Sea examines the geopolitics and potential conflicts in the region and explains whether such geopolitical aspirations will play an important role in Southeast Asia. The conflicts are triggered due to the availability of rich natural deposits, rare-earth minerals, flora and fauna, rare metals, methane hydrates, and rich fishing grounds. The chapter will analyze whether China’s blue water strategy, and its unclear intentions have created the image that the South China Sea will be the best place for China to wage wars and why this area is important to Asia-Pacific nations and the global community. China’s irredentist impulse and its desire to prevent any threat in the contested waters are evident from its description of the sea as “China’s historical waters.” China’s assertiveness undermines the national interests and freedom of navigation for claimants. This chapter will discuss a few recommendations to evaluate whether conflicts might be better managed in the future and reduce the chances of miscalculations as well.

How a country views the geopolitics of the world around it, and its role within it, is a reflection of its identity and sense of self. This chapter examines who Australia thinks it is, and how that national strategic identity affects Australia’s understanding of regional and global geopolitics. It begins by exploring some key elements of Australia’s strategic identity, such as its psychological attachment to the Anglosphere despite (or because) of its geographical location in Oceania, and its indigenous identity. It then examines how Australia’s strategic identity informs its geopolitical perspectives, particularly its understanding of the Asian region, and its concerns about China.

Taiwan’s geopolitical significance outweighs its land area and population. After the outbreak of full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Taiwan was often referred to as another potential flashpoint that could lead to armed conflicts. Indeed, there appeared many similarities between Ukraine and Taiwan, as both represented challenged democracies on the doorstep of expanding authoritarianisms seeking a revanchist agenda, and to certain extent their survival hinged on the continuing support from international allies. Taiwan’s strategical importance derives from the triple sources in democracy, economics, and culture. Taiwan spent most of its postwar era in the rule of martial law (1949–1987), in which opposition parties, street protests, and strikes were outlawed. Riding on the worldwide third-wave democratization, Taiwan gradually transitioned from one-party authoritarian rule to a vibrant democracy. As an economic power house, Taiwan is the leading supplier of advanced chips. Being the only democracy in Chinese-dominant societies, Taiwan’s political freedom debunks the myth of Asian authoritarianism.

This chapter examines Japan’s evolving geopolitical stance from the pre-war period to the present.Initially characterized by a dual identity as both an Asian and a Western state, Japan’s strategic ambivalence was resolved through the dismantling of its empire and alignment with US security interests. In the post-war period, Japan adopted a passive security approach focused on trade and a low-profile military posture, but was criticized for lacking a robust security strategy. However, recent geopolitical shifts, including North Korea’s military and missile program, China’s economic and military rise, and Russia’s war against Ukraine, have prompted Japan to reassess its posture. As a result, Japan has abandoned its post-war pacifism, adopted a proactive approach to security and recalibrated its foreign policy. By assuming a leadership role in the Indo-Pacific, Japan is now cooperating internationally to counterbalance China’s influence. This chapter examines Japan’s security evolution in response to contemporary challenges.

In this chapter, we examine the concept of Ecological Unequal Exchange (EUE) and the relationship between EUE and geopolitics. We discuss the historical and theoretical underpinning of this concept, including its causes and consequences. We focus on two critical twenty-first century processes, the transition away from fossil fuels toward renewable energy and the geopolitical rivalries and conflicts that have emerged during this transition. We will illustrate EUE and its relationship with geopolitics using examples from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country that has long been exploited via EUE and that today is a central site of geopolitical rivalries over its raw materials that are critical to the energy transition, including cobalt and copper.

This chapter examines the intricate interplay between geopolitics and international trade, exploring how these spheres have continually influenced and shaped each other throughout history. It delves into the complex dynamics that underpin global trade relationships, highlighting how economic interests are interwoven with political power and strategic decision-making. The chapter traces the evolution of this relationship from the ancient world’s trade routes to contemporary geopolitical conflicts, such as the US-China trade war and the implications of Brexit. It critically analyzes foundational theories and works in geopolitics and trade, assessing their insights and relevance to modern global challenges. By exploring the roles of geography, resource allocation, national interests, and security concerns, the chapter provides a comprehensive understanding of how geopolitical strategies and trade policies coevolve, influencing global dynamics and shaping the future of international relations and commerce.

Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, henceforth China) in 1949, the Global South has had an important place in China’s grand strategy of national rejuvenation. Empirically, it is in the twenty-first century that China’s engagement with the Global South has been most robust. Particularly in the economic realm, China has emerged as arguably the most consequential economic partner for the majority of developing countries. A significant aspect of China’s national rejuvenation is its quest to “regain” its former status as the center of global order. This chapter notes that China has utilized a neomercantilist geoeconomic strategy designed to create a hub-and-spoke network of “beneficial dependency” centered around extensive networks of economic partnership agreements which are premised on intensifying economic exchanges between China (hub) and developing countries (spokes). Through this, not only does China satisfy its development needs and address the development needs of developing countries, but it also enhances China’s ability to garner global consent and legitimacy and exercise coercion to attain its six core interests.

Geopolitical beta refers to identifying geopolitical and political phase shifts that will underpin the macro environment over the long term. Long-term investors must take geopolitics into consideration as it is the most salient factor influencing long-term asset returns. The two frames of analysis are geopolitics – great power confrontation – and politics, domestic arena that sets economic policy. The interaction of these two paradigms produces the macroeconomic context that influences investment returns. We believe that the world will remain multipolar on the geopolitical front and that most economies will strive toward a dirigiste form of capitalism. Long-term investors, however, should determine their own forecasts and plan accordingly. Political and geopolitical frameworks will impact long-term growth and inflation forecasts. The most favorable investment environment – producing a high-growth/low-inflation outcome – is a unipolar geopolitical context combined with laissez-faire policies. In our view, this is not a likely policy mix over the rest of the decade. Investors should expect growth outcomes to be relatively favorable over the rest of the decade. But we remain firmly in the inflation camp as the unipolar-laissez-faire context is unlikely to repeat.

Over the last 30–40 years, globalization has reshaped the business world and led many companies to operate in many more countries and regions than ever before. At the same time, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of China, and the U.S.-led war on terror have all led to a chain of events that has made the world’s geopolitical context more complex than ever. Business leaders, however, are largely ill-equipped to analyze geopolitical trends and are often taken by surprise by events. The Chapter on geopolitics and business strategy attempts to address this situation by providing business leaders with a framework they can use to better align their business strategies with the geopolitical complexity of the world.

This contribution argues that transnational inequality (inequality between countries) matters because it affects leaders’ perceptions of fairness and hence their willingness to contribute toward securing global public goods. There has been a significant convergence in per capita national income levels over the past three decades, and this helped to lift billions of people out of income poverty. However, major inequalities in two crucial areas remain and have worsened. Climate iniquities and divergences in preventative and curative health provision, and the effect of a ballooning post-COVID public debt crisis, rest heavily on the minds of leaders in the industrializing world, affecting their responses to multilateralism as a global institutional form. This problematizes the cooperation required to deal with the main geopolitical challenges of our era, namely, the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, cybersecurity, financial stability and the amelioration of sovereign debt, reliability of global supply chains, development and distribution of preventative and curative medical care, and managing rivalry between the interdependent giants of the world economy.

A spate of accelerating global food crises over the past 15 years has boosted the profile of food security as a site of world politics. Long a matter of economic concern, food security has become a subject for geopolitical calculation and strategy, albeit in ways that tangle with and reflect back on global economic markets, supply chains, and trade. This chapter outlines a geopolitical economy approach to understanding this shift, blending insights from international political economy with those from critical geopolitics to attend to both the material and discursive dimensions of contemporary global hunger. The chapter applies the geopolitical economy approach to understanding three recent global food crises associated with the 2007/2008 spike in food prices, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war in Ukraine from 2022. Highlighting the diverse forms of political and economic power that bisect and shape global food security, the chapter engages recent debates around topics including agricultural self-sufficiency, the weaponization and securitization of food, food protectionism, and food diplomacy along the way.

The extraordinarily fast-paced trajectory of globalization (sometimes dubbed “hyper-globalization”) that started around 1990 had abruptly ended around 2008 with the onset of the Great Recession. This, however, does not mean that the world has been experiencing a deep deglobalizing reversal in the following years. Instead, contemporary globalization has just become more comparable to its earlier, more moderate period before the hyper-globalizing decades. Nevertheless, the scale of the shift presages a skeptical view of the future of global openness and interconnectedness. Related occurrences, such as the ostensible end of the US-dominated unipolar moment, the rise of China, and the illiberal populist backlash against democracy and globalization, serve as even more ominous signs of the coming end of a globalized world. This chapter presents and examines these and related phenomena to argue that, though challenged and uncertain, the future of globalization likely remains bright. Recent broad reviews of the scholarly literature and systematic data samples both reveal that Francis Fukuyama’s once-celebrated thesis about the end of history, according to which the world should in the long term become much more capitalist and democratic than it currently is, still remains convincing – even after the sudden end of hyper-globalization.

This chapter discusses the flaws in the anti-capitalist perspective and examines its geopolitical ramifications. It begins by discussing the problems inherent in socialist economic planning and the Marxist value theory upon which it is based. It proceeds to critique Marxist international political economy theories of unequal exchange and investment imperialism and argues that following free trade principles of comparative advantage can benefit all countries. The chapter goes on to argue that capitalist globalization has led to unprecedented reductions in poverty rates around the world suggesting, however, that whereas free trade spurs growth and reduces poverty, complementary government policies are needed to maximize its benefits and assist those negatively impacted in the near term. In conclusion, the chapter argues that anti-capitalism can disrupt economic systems, trade relationships, and international alliances. Nationalist socialism can lead to a fragmented global economy that undermines growth and fuels geopolitical conflict. As such, countering anti-capitalism with reasoned argument is crucial to challenge its widespread influence.

This chapter touches upon inherent and deep-going features in our Western culture, which has been used in hybrid warfare to weaken the resilience and trustworthiness of the political West in international politics. The theoretical basis for this is a return to Carl Schmitt with a contemporary interpretation. The authoritarian regimes have identified a rift in our societies between softer liberal values such as democracy, freedom of speech, and human rights on the one hand and market values accentuated with the global economy on the other hand. In the political West (hereinafter just called NATO or NATO members), we can entertain both values, but when they come in conflict regarding other parts of the world, we usually choose the market over the softer values mentioned above. This is something the authoritarian regimes point out as a hypocrisy of especially NATO members as this is an information war about the legitimacy of political systems. Authoritarian states mean that NATO states showcase their own societies as good examples, even though the practice on the international level forces them to choose between fundamentally liberal values as on the one hand market logic and on the other hand human rights on a regular basis. Thus, by breaching the rules of the international system without a following firm reaction from the NATO states, the authoritarian states show that the NATO states care more about their own welfare than about supporting democracy and human rights abroad. This is a way to alienate the NATO members from the rest of the world, certainly those who perform badly on the democracy index (The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2021).

Insurgencies threaten key economic, strategic, and political areas of the world. Insurgencies disrupt the stability of countries, and regions, which in turn can disrupt the functioning of international relations. The efforts taken to defeat insurgencies, counterinsurgency (COIN), have dominated discussions on international security for more than two decades. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the difficulty of succeeding in this type of conflict. Although difficult, counterinsurgency has been a key feature of geopolitics. States have embarked upon counterinsurgency operations to ensure, or deny, access to key regions. States have intervened in other countries in an attempt to foster stability in economically and strategically important regions. This chapter explores how counterinsurgency has been used as a strategic tool by states to secure their power, relative to other states. It discusses how counterinsurgency was tied to the broader geopolitical concerns of the Cold War. It also explores how great power politics continues to influence contemporary approaches to COIN. The work also discusses how COIN is linked to “failed” states and why this concerns larger powers. The chapter also explores the link between counterinsurgency and nation building and discusses whether this has been successful.

The strategic importance of the West Africa region in geopolitics is underscored by various factors. These factors include the abundance of natural resources, the significance of maritime trade routes, the demographic and market potential, geopolitical influence, security concerns, political stability and governance, cultural and historical relevance, as well as regional integration and cooperation. This chapter employs a discursive framework to analyze the current terrorism threats and their geopolitical ramifications in West Africa. By referencing previous research in security, realism, and constructivism, the chapter investigates the impact of geopolitics and competition among major powers on the terrorism challenges in West Africa. The multifaceted nature of military support from major powers to fragile countries in West Africa is influenced by strategic interests, security considerations, economic factors, and ideological motives. The complex geopolitical dynamics in the region are evident in the diverse military assistance provided by Russia, France, and the USA. These dynamics have significant implications for regional stability, security cooperation, economic development, and power balance in Africa and beyond. Successfully managing these relationships requires diplomatic finesse, conflict resolution mechanisms, and tackling the underlying causes of instability in West Africa.

As it enters a new era of strategic competition, the United States and its network of allies faces a diversifying array of terrorism threats—from new far-right actors to longstanding Salafi-jihadist networks and groups. Moreover, state adversaries will likely eagerly exploit these non-state actors in advancing their own geopolitical goals. Accordingly, the United States finds itself in a counterterrorism dilemma, managing a three-front counterterrorism struggle at precisely the moment it wishes to reallocate resources to the Indo-Pacific. It would be well-served leaning into competitive advantages developed during the War on Terror, building on successes from the counterterrorism fight to better prepare to confront strategic rivals.

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the various reasons behind the apparent lack of action from the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in response to Russian aggression toward Ukraine in 2014, and put it in context from the post-2022 invasion perspective. An examination of the Crimea conflict, which erupted in March 2014, underscores the deficiencies in the EU’s approach to conflict resolution via the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as well as the ineffectiveness of its strategies. This conflict has jeopardized the EU’s credibility in its dealings with Ukraine and Russian influence. Initially, the EU was optimistic that a suitable diplomatic strategy would be crucial for collaborating with Russia to address the crisis in Ukraine. However, following the escalation of the conflict in Crimea and its annexation by Russia, the EU has recognized Russia’s unwillingness to compromise on its geostrategic interests. Consequently, the crisis in Crimea clearly demonstrates the need to address the ENP’s security failings and to prioritize the security aspect of the ENP. Conflict resolution should be paramount, paving the way for the Europeanization and economic transformation of the Eastern PartnershipEastern Partnership countries. Concerning the Eastern Partnership area, which is particularly influenced by Russia, the ENP’s security aspect requires careful development to prevent the Crimea crisis from leading to additional conflicts within the ENP region beyond the current war. Partner countries need the EU’s support and expertise in this domain.Regarding the initial Minsk accords from 2014, their limited effectiveness was apparent from the outset, with little chance of success. Their failure also impacted the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), which played a crucial role in the final agreement (Moorcraft, Putin’s wars – NATO’s flaws. Why Russia invaded Ukriane. Pen & Sword, 2023, p. 26). Many aspects of the agreement never came to fruition. One significant issue for the failure was Russia’s refusal to fully acknowledge its role in the conflict, maintaining deniability of its hybrid warfare tactics against Ukraine and EU-NATO members. Given the escalation in Crimea and its annexation by Russia, the EU now firmly believes in the necessity to confront the ENP’s security vulnerabilities and consider its security dimension more seriously. Conflict resolution must be a priority, leading to the Europeanization and economic transformation of the Eastern Partnership countries. With Russia’s significant influence in the Eastern Partnership region, the ENP’s security aspect must be meticulously developed to ensure the Crimea crisis does not trigger further conflicts within the ENP area. Support and expertise from the EU are essential for partner countries. In the case of Ukraine, the support has increased post-2022, but it is still very tentative.

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the norm and practice of humanitarian intervention and explore the different ethical and moral costs and benefits of the norm and the different forms it can take. In doing so, we consider the entire lifecycle of an intervention from the decision to take military action to the laws governing military intervention and to the question of what happens after intervention. To complement the ethical debates, some empirical patterns and drivers of humanitarian intervention are highlighted. We conclude with lessons for the future.

The chapter discusses the re-geopoliticization of arms transfers in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It raises questions about whether Western arms suppliers should review their export policies, whether Asian countries will become the new arsenal of the world, and whether the West and the Rest will grow apart in their arms acquisition patterns. The chapter argues that the renewed strategic importance of arms transfers should feed into future arms export policy decisions, and Western suppliers should reconsider the sale of weapons to countries that do not implement sanctions against Russia. The global arms trade is undergoing significant changes due to the geopolitical context, with Western arms suppliers focusing more on domestic and European markets and the decline of Russian exports creating opportunities for Asian countries such as China and South Korea to play a larger role. Overall, the chapter provides insights into the changing dynamics of the global arms trade.

Although geopolitics only has become a real buzzword over the last few decades, in one form or another the concept and its practice have been around since the beginning of mankind. So has been their enshrinement in literature. Geopolitics these days is most often discussed in the field of political science, but it is already figured in that discipline’s forerunner historiography. A more systematic approach to geopolitics emerged around the turn of the twentieth century. The same period also saw the first systematic approaches to world literature as a field of study. The geopolitical changes caused by two world wars and their aftermath, postcolonialism, decolonization, globalization, the rise of East and South Asia, and most recently refugee, health, and climate crises, all have greatly affected the theory and practice of world literature.

In May 2021, the UK government pledged to put animal sentience at the heart of government policy. The strategy’s stated purpose is to improve standards and eradicate cruel practices for animals both domestically and internationally. The Action Plan for Animal Welfare and other initiatives from the Global North to protect biodiversity outside its borders warrant critical scrutiny. This chapter examines the moral assumptions embedded in the Action Plan for Animal Welfare and the skewed – but not unfamiliar – power relations invoked by imposing northern-centric rules on the management of animals everywhere. Bourdieu’s (984) concept of habitus demonstrate that an appeal to animal rights and welfare is not a superior, objective ethical standpoint, but rather, it is an expression of cultural taste and the advancement of subjective aesthetic sensibilities. Imbuing animal welfare with absolute moral righteousness is analyzed as a type of antipolitics which obscures the Plan’s geopolitical overreaches. A vignette focusing on elephant management in Southern Africa highlights the social, cultural, political, economic, and ecological risks that ensue when powerful actors in the North impose idiosyncratic values on human-nature relations in the South. These impositions contradict decades of progressive conservation management philosophy and have negative practical consequences for local people in the South. Yet, alternative and endemic human-nature relations prevail in Southern Africa, despite their assiduous suppression by northern animal rights activists. Such relations remain embedded in concepts like sustainable use, community-based natural resource management, and environmental justice. A practical case in the South shows that “either-or” framings of wildlife management options (moral/immoral, preserve/utilize, consumptive/nonconsumptive) must be challenged and that polarizing viewpoints need not be in eternal opposition to each other.

The chapter offers an overview of the debate on the origins of the Covid-19 in Wuhan, China, with a special emphasis on its political and geopolitical implications. The debate currently consists of two main hypotheses, the zoonotic natural origin and the lab accident pathway, none of which has found conclusive evidence. Through an account of the various stages underwent by the debate over the past 4 years, the chapter sheds light on the contextual political elements – both in the United States and in China – that have influenced the scientific and public discussion on the origin of the pandemic. The chapter also discusses efforts of scientists and public health officials in the United States to sideline the lab accident hypothesis and to influence the media to amplify the natural origin. Such efforts are presented as related to an attempt to obfuscate the significant US funding received by a research facility in Wuhan, which is at the center of the lab accident hypothesis. Lastly, the chapter also discusses the alleged involvement of both Chinese and American military and security apparatuses in coronavirus research and anticipates that a further discussion of this particular aspect of the debate might lead to a worsening in the US-China relation.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has undergone a remarkable transformation since its inception, evolving from a discreet behind-the-scenes operator to a prominent and assertive lobbying force on the American political landscape. Initially established with the ethos of influencing policy from the shadows, AIPAC quietly navigated the corridors of power, leveraging its connections and influence to shape legislation and foster support for Israel. However, recent years have seen a notable departure from this clandestine approach, as AIPAC has embraced a more proactive and visible role in political advocacy. This shift is exemplified by its direct involvement in spotlight battles and its willingness to fund political campaigns, signaling a newfound determination to assert itself as a primary player in the realm of political influence. Despite these changes, AIPAC remains steadfast in its commitment to advancing Israel’s interests and strengthening the strategic alliance between the United States and Israel. Through bipartisan cooperation, strategic engagement, and multifaceted advocacy efforts, AIPAC continues to shape the relationship between the two nations, reaffirming its dedication to promoting mutual interests and shared values. As AIPAC adapts to the complexities of contemporary political landscapes, its evolution underscores the organization’s resilience and adaptability in pursuit of its mission to advocate for Israel and foster robust ties between the United States and its closest ally in the Middle East.

This chapter on the geopolitics of Islamist antisemitism will account for its emergence, starting with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Nazi collaboration in the 1930s and ending with the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023. The focus is on the emergence of Islamist antisemitism, Sayyid Qutb’s influential antisemitism, the Sahwa movement, and the emergence and ideology of the Islamic State (ISIS). It is concluded by a discussion on the future prospects of the geopolitics of Islamist antisemitism.

Can religious hate and discrimination lead to global or regional power shifts, and how is it related to gas, oil, and trade routes? For an untrained eye, issues like antisemitism or racism might seem related just to personal beliefs and not to geopolitics and the global struggle for power. However, as history has shown us—hate is not just a personal belief; it has everything to do with politics, diplomacy, and regional balances of power. Nowadays, hate and hate speech like antisemitism is disseminated using the main mass communication platform—the Internet. Powers are constantly engaged in cyber warfare and influence campaigns as they exercise their sharp power to influence others’ decisions. Russia and China are spreading misinformation/disinformation in many countries like the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union, to lower national stability and enhance social rifts. These, alongside other regional powers like Iran and Qatar, are engaged in the spread of antisemitism and anti-Zionism to downgrade from the global support to Israel, a regional power that aids with the Western dominance of gas, oil, and trading routes or decisions in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. This chapter explains how antisemitism is used by powers to shape geopolitical conflicts in the twenty-first century, specifically through the cyber domain with examples of political warfare and misinformation/disinformation campaigns like “Project Nemesis” or “Raven Mission” or the “Mapping Project” which, as suggested, was founded to oppose legitimization with, and support of, the state of Israel.

The global economy after the Great Recession has experienced a notable “de-globalization”: a proliferation of policies slowing or scaling back international economic integration, and a shortening of global value chains. Simultaneously, the same period has been characterized by a rise of populist politics in advanced industrialized democracies. This chapter discusses the connections between the two phenomena in light of existing literature and qualitative evidence, particularly from European countries that have been governed by populist parties. First, it examines to what extent populism has been a response to perceived excesses or inequities created by an earlier push toward international economic integration. Second, it seeks to assess to what extent the observed “de-globalization” is a result of policies advanced by populist politicians favouring domestic interests at the expense of a commitment to an integrated global economy. There is a degree of plausibility to both of these causal accounts, but in each case important qualifications are necessary.

Across developed nations, especially in the global North, mass arrivals of asylum-claimants and illegal migrants are upending familiar political party positions. At least 140 million migrants have arrived in OECD nations since the turn of the century, and receiving nations are increasingly trying to make it harder to reach their ports of entry or file a successful asylum claim. This chapter argues that the Geneva Refugees Convention needs to be replaced with a new treaty regime to set up a just transnational system for refugees and asylees in which a large number of high- and mid-income nations would cooperate to set fair standards for asylum throughout their bloc that recognize lethal poverty and gang warfare as just causes for fleeing, assign each member-state an annual quota based on several relevant ethical and economic factors, and massively reduce incentives to enter illegally or apply for asylum without strong grounds. Those passing a “credible fear” test could travel safely to the Just Asylum System zone and get temporary protection until their case is decided within six months, thus reducing the markets for people smugglers. And member nations would be assured that the burdens created by tyranny, civil war, and kleptocracy will be fairly shared among able countries and met—to the extent possible—within limits that are feasible for their society.