The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars

The first historical information we have about ancient Athens relates to events in the final third of the seventh century BCE when Athens was governed by a birth aristocracy of rich landowners. In 622, Draco compiled a written code of harsh laws that seemed to have confirmed the hold of the landed aristocracy on power.¹ The prevailing constitutional order excluded from power individuals who over time had become wealthy but were not members of the traditional aristocracy. In 594, with continued conflict between the aristocracy and the common people, Solon, a man “of high birth, but of middling wealth and station” (Andrewes, 1982, p. 377) and a poet, was called and accepted by both sides to resolve the crisis.² Solon confronted a breakdown of the social order and must have worried about the opportunities that such anarchy offered to ambitious rich individuals to impose their will as ‘tyrants’³ on an apathetic public and the consequent instability.

To resolve the crisis, Solon introduced significant constitutional, political and economic reforms aiming to ameliorate the economic hardship that had hit poorer sections of the population and offered them a partial say in the government of Athens. He reorganized the governance of Athens, granted standing rights to previously disenfranchised Athenians, allowing them to appeal against the decisions of magistrates, and empowered any third uninjured party to take legal action on behalf of an injured person for a crime. The constitutional and political reforms founded a new political dispensation, replacing government by a birth aristocracy with a timocracy, that is, one based on wealth, by adding “the wealthy to the well-born in the running of the state” (Hansen, 1999, p. 44).⁴ Solon divided the Athenians into four classes according to annual agricultural output (although questions remain about the exact meaning of sizes and comparability of different products). Those with 500 or more measures of grain or olive oil, called pentacosiomedimnoi; those with 300–500 measures, called hippeis, rich enough to maintain a horse; those with 200–300 measures, called zeugitai, rich enough to afford a pair of oxen; and those with less than 200 measures, called thetes, mainly landless laborers. Political offices were then allocated according to economic rank with the highest offices reserved for the two richest classes and the fourth altogether excluded. All classes however, that is, the lowest included, were free to attend the assembly of the demos. By extending eligibility for political office to non-aristocrats of higher and lower means, the traditional landed aristocracy could no longer monopolize political power.

Solon’s economic reforms included seisachtheia, the “shaking of burden” of poor Athenian farmers indebted to the rich into what was effectively a form of serfdom and turned them to small landholders.⁵ His reforms also made economic idleness a crime and mandated that fathers had to teach their sons a trade.⁶ By granting all Athenians the right to participate in the assembly and establishing the right to appeal against the decisions of the government (archontes) in front of the court, Solon set in motion a sequence culminating in the establishment of democracy after the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/7.

Ancient authors did not doubt the existence of the law against neutrality but, with Solon lamenting stasis and recommending restraint in his poetry, they found it rather baffling. Writing about Solon in the first century CE, Plutarch (Lives, Solon, XX, 1967, p. 457) reiterates the existence of the law and offers a normative justification for it:

Among his other laws there is a very peculiar and surprising one which ordains that he shall be disfranchised who, in time of faction, takes neither side. He wishes, probably, that a man should not be insensible or indifferent to the common weal, arranging his private affairs securely and glorying in the fact that he has no share in the distempers and distresses of his country, but should rather espouse promptly the better and more righteous cause, share its perils and give it his aid, instead of waiting in safety to see which cause prevails.

Yet, some residual doubts may remain about the existence of such a law. The main source, The Athenian Constitution, was written more than two hundred years after the events, while Plutarch (46–119 CE) was separated by 600 years from Solon’s era and wrote biographies of famous statesmen rather history. Nevertheless, one may be confident in the allegiance of the Athenians to the spirit of the law: In the ‘Funeral Oration’ by word of Pericles in 431, Thucydides (II.40.2, 2009, p.92) declares.

… our politicians can combine management of their domestic affairs with state business, and others who have their own work to attend to can nevertheless acquire a good knowledge of politics. We are unique in the way we regard anyone who takes no part in public affairs: we do not call that a quiet life, we call it a useless life.⁷

Starting with the English historian Grote in the mid-nineteenth century, several scholars saw the law as aiming to defend Solon’s constitution and deter potential tyrants. However, modern historians have debated the existence of such a law and mulled over its exact meaning (see Goušchin, 2016 for a recent survey).

Hignett (1967, pp. 26–27) rejected the existence of the law on neutrality, arguing that it was a priori improbable, inconsistent with Solon's views in favor of moderation, and it was not explicitly referred to by the orator Lysias in the “Against Philon” (speech 31), a forensic speech seeking to convict Philon for not taking sides during the civil war of 403 when the democrats overthrew the rule of the Thirty Tyrants.

But such arguments were discarded by Goldstein (1972), who concluded that Solon’s law was not applicable in the circumstance of 403.⁸ Bers (1975) considers the law as authentic, arguing that Solon’s motivation was to force his supporters to actively back his constitutional dispensation. This of course begs the question of why the law prohibited apathy instead of mandating that Athenians must support the new Solonian constitutional order, an issue noted by scholars and explicitly addressed by our formal model. In the wording of Solon’s law, an Athenian who shies away from taking sides is declared atimos translated as an ‘outlaw’. For Manville (1980), the law against neutrality fitted the historical setting of Solon’s reforms, since “… with new public rights came new public obligations. Those who failed to support the revolution would lose their share in it and consequently, for the first time, atimia entailed loss of a share in the polis. The atimos was now a different kind of outlaw: one with no claim to the citizenship which implied rights in the assembly and protection of suit and appeal” (pp. 218–219).⁹ For Wallace (2007), the law against neutrality is consistent with the rationale of the reforms initiated by Solon where “every citizen, rich or poor, was expected to involve himself in public affairs … not least in times of civic strife … or be expelled from the civic body” (p. 61).

Van’t Wout (2010) focuses on the language of the law as given in Aristotle’s Athenian Constitution and argues that Solon’s law on stasis “should be read as one that requires citizens to play an active role in the resolution of a conflict” (p. 290). Teegarden (2014) discusses several arguments against the authenticity of the law, including that it was contrary to Solon’s revulsion of stasis and the problem of how to enforce it. He rejects these arguments reasoning that the law would deter a coup attempt and thence prevent stasis. He also accepts that Solon wanted all Athenians to be actively involved in the life of their polis and difficulties of enforcement do not deny its authenticity. Nevertheless, Teegarden rejects the authenticity of the law on different grounds. If one believes that the purpose of the law was that whatever type of regime ruled Athens it must enjoy majority support, the law would have allowed the overthrow of the very constitutional order introduced by Solon. However, he argues that Solon could not have consented to the unravelling of his constitution; henceforth, Solon would not have passed a law against neutrality. Noting that there already was a law against tyranny, and, in particular, a law against tyranny enacted by Solon, one wonders why the law against neutrality was necessary. Goušchin (2016) answers this question by arguing that the law against neutrality was genuine and that it aimed to “close the path to tyranny by awakening the citizens’ activism and consequently preventing stasis” (p. 107).

An additional indirect indication favoring Solon’s authorship of the law against neutrality is its consistency with the general thrust of the Solonian legislation granting “permission for anyone who wished to seek retribution for those who were wronged” (Athenian Constitution, 9.1, Aristotle, 1984, p.50). This amounted to an extension of “the right to start a prosecution by a third party on behalf of an injured person or simply in the public interest” (Hansen, 1999, p. 30); as such it alluded to a call for conflict, a principle that corroborates the law against neutrality.

Forsdyke (2005) observes that in addition to the elite versus non-elite conflict present in Athens before Solon, violent intra-elite competition for control of Athens was a fundamental problem. Intra-elite conflicts were characterized by violent clashes ending with the exile of the defeated side, only for the latter to regroup and return to the polis seeking revenge and exile the former victors in a repeated cycle of instability. Fordsyke maintains that an essential part of Solon’s reform program was to resolve this intra-elite conflict and argues that it was for this reason that Solon initiated the law on civil strife.¹⁰ “By requiring non-elites to take sides in a situation of political conflict between elites, Solon hoped to prevent the violent and rapid transfer of power from one elite faction to another. In particular, elites would be deterred from seeking power violently, since they would now have to face the opposition of the entire citizen body and not just a narrow group of rival elites” (ibid. p. 99).

An additional perspective is also relevant to the law. Larsen (1949) argued that majority voting emerged in the Seventh century to prevent civil war, as a result of the new military technology of hoplite (heavy infantry) fighting where the number of spears amassed by each side turned out to be decisive. By banning neutrality, Solon acknowledges at least implicitly the potency of majority voting as a way to resolve civil conflict peacefully. That is, to be decisive citizens with newly granted political rights must engage in public affairs.¹¹

The law ultimately failed to protect the Solonian constitution. The Athenians split into three competing sides, the Men of the Plain (around Athens), the men of the Coast, and the Men beyond the Mountains. Peisistratus, the leader of the latter, after two unsuccessful attempts in 561 and 555, eventually established himself as tyrant in 546 remaining in power until his death in 527. He was succeeded by his sons, Hippias and Hipparchus, but after the assassination of the latter (for personal rather than political reasons) Hippias became an oppressive ruler. He was overthrown in 510. A conflict between rival aristocrats followed, pitting Isagoras, who asked Sparta to help him to establish oligarchy, against Cleisthenes, who allied himself with the demos. In 508, Cleisthenes prevailed, and his constitutional reforms founded the Classical Athenian democracy.

In the present paper, we follow the commonly accepted interpretation that Solon’s law was a law against neutrality. In closing this review, two observations are worth making. First, enforcing the law against neutrality may sound problematic (although it bears noting that problems of enforcement do not necessarily negate the existence of the law). However, since the law did not mandate to defend a particular regime, enforcement in the sense of punishment had to be retrospective. That is, whoever emerged victorious from the stasis would administer the relevant sanction to those who had fallen foul of the law. Second, from a modern standpoint, an important consequemce of the law is that it forces citizens to participate in political disputes. This way, citizens are more likely to take an active interest in what exactly is involved in the dispute; therefore it punishes rational ignorance.

Solon’s law against political apathy grapples with the ever-present question of how to motivate citizens to engage in politics so that interest groups do not capture the state. In this light, the paper relates to three partially overlapping strands of political economy literature, the rational voter participation in politics, cohesive institutions, and inclusive institutions.

Following the intuition of the rational voter ignorance (Downs, 1957; Tullock, 2005), apathy is “rational” for non-elite citizens since the expected gains from participating in social conflict are insignificant while the risks are large.¹² It follows that the prospect of public goods provision may not motivate mass mobilization to overthrow a dictator or, contrarily, to support an existing institution. Tullock (ibid. pp. 261–291) demonstrates that ordinary citizens will stay neutral in a fight between the government and a revolutionary side unless they expect significant rewards or sanctions from the winner of the fight. Further, neutrality may be costlier than taking sides if the winner of the conflict is likely to feel that those who did not support him during the fight cannot be trusted. Therefore picking the right side is very important. This issue plays much in our theoretical investigation.

Limited political awareness and apathy may result from individuals responding emotionally to institutional practices, elite manipulation and the established social and cultural context (DeLuca, 1995). Congleton (2001, 2007) notes that rational ignorance generates biased expectations, while it also incentivizes candidates for political office to attend to the policy preferences of relatively well-informed voters and, thus, adopt policies advancing their interests.¹³ Thence, a reduction in rational ignorance should improve the efficiency of the government.

Cohesive institutions ensure that the interests of actors out of political power (like opposition parties) are not dismissed so that the distribution of rents is more inclusive and the risk of political violence is lower (Besley & Mueller, 2018; Besley & Persson, 2011). Fetzer and Kyburz (2021) report evidence that cohesive institutions can prevent violent redistribution. However, building cohesive institutions by force is rather unpromising (Besley & Mueller, 2021). The same seems to be true for compulsory voting, which may be efficient in theory (Krasa & Polborn, 2009), but has only ambiguous empirical support. Voter turnout indeed tends to be higher (Singh, 2015) but reluctant voters seemingly cast invalid votes (Kouba & Lysek, 2019), and are less willing to acquire political information (Singh & Roy, 2018).

Inclusive institutions, distributing economic and political power broadly, in combination with state capacity, promote economic prosperity (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012). Acemoğlu and Robinson (2016) refer to Solon’s reforms as making Athenian politics pluralistic and founding inclusive institutions. Acemoğlu et al., (2001, 2002) present evidence that European colonies, which had more inclusive institutions in the past, also tend to be more inclusive today and also have higher incomes per capita. Tabellini (2010) finds similar effects for European regions. The meta-analysis of Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008) shows that democracy may not have a direct effect on economic growth but has a significant indirect effect via its positive impact on inclusive economic institutions.

We assume a society consisting of three Players indexed by \(i=A, S, P,\) with exogenous incomes \({Y}_{i} ,\) where \({Y}_{A}={\theta }_{A}Y,\) \({Y}_{S}={\theta }_{S}Y,\) and \({Y}_{P}={\theta }_{P}Y,\) and \({\theta }_{A}>{\theta }_{S}>{\theta }_{P}=1.\) Players \(A\) and \(S\) are two (unequally affluent) rival elite players, both able to dominate the polis’ politics. Stylistically, \(A\) includes the highest class of members with 500 measures of output; these are primarily the traditional landed aristocracy, hostile to the affluent non-aristocrats and the previously disenfranchised. \(S\) includes wealthy non-aristocrats who were excluded from political office before the reforms; these are mainly the second income class but may also include wealthy non-aristocrats. Player \(P\) is the common people, who are not necessarily poor but do not qualify for the highest public offices due to property restrictions. They include the third and fourth Solonian wealth classes (zeugitai and thetes). In addition to income, since Solon’s reforms redistributed power away from the aristocrats and elevated the previously disenfranchised, all Players “have a share” (“μετέχειν”) in the state (“πόλις”). We formalize this by modelling each Player as receiving a share of rent \(G\) from public office. Let \(G\) be written as a proportion \(\gamma\) of \(Y\) so that \(G =\gamma Y\) and the players \(A, S {\text{and}} P\) may receive (unequal) shares\(a, \sigma {\text{and}} \rho\), respectively, of those rents, where\(a+\sigma +\rho =1\).

Two constitutions are considered: First, a pre-Solonian status quo ante, an aristocratic regime, where only Player \(A\), the rich aristocratic elite, held office and received all rents; \(a=1, \sigma =\rho =0\). Second, the status quo constitutional order established by Solon, where all three Players take part in the government of Athens receiving (unequal) rent shares.¹⁴ We may then write \(a>0, \rho \ge 0\) and \(\sigma =1-a-\rho >0\). Hence, the Players’ payoffs under the Solonian constitutional status quo are

We further assume that Player \(S\), the elite player empowered by the Solonian constitution, has the power to determine the distribution of the rents, but cannot confiscate the income of the other players.

When Players \(A\) and \(S\) accept the status quo social peace prevails. Player \(P\) is generally agnostic about the political order and will only defend the Solonian status quo if it benefits him. Due to the privileges under the status quo ante, Player \(A\) accepts the Solonian order only if it is prohibitively expensive to challenge the Solonian elite; otherwise, he launches a coup to change the distribution of rents. The ensuing conflict destroys a fraction \(\phi\) of incomes and rents.

Figure 1 shows the options open to the players and consequent outcomes. We investigate three different cases: First, neutrality is allowed and Player \(P\) is free to choose between participating and not participating in the civil war. Second, neutrality is banned and punished, so that Player \(P\) is punished, modelled as an income loss. Based on the resulting outcomes, we identify the shares of rents for Player \(A\) and \(P\) that Player \(S\) must grant to avoid conflict. Third, Neutrality is banned and Player \(P\) is free to ally with Player \(A\) to bring down the Solonian order. We then identify (i) the minimum share of the rents that stops Player \(A\) from mounting a coup, (ii) how this share is affected by the decision of Player \(P\) to stay neutral or not, and (iii) the condition leading Player \(S\) to incentivise Player \(P\) to defend the Solonian order.

The calculus of Player \(P\) changes when the law against neutrality mandates that Player \(P\) allies with Player\(S\). Specifically, we assume that irrespective of who wins the conflict, Player \(P\) is punished if he does not participate in the conflict.¹⁶ Let the punishment be equivalent to a loss of a proportion \(x\) of the income of\(P\). It is also assumed that \(xY\) is dissipated rather than accruing as an extra gain to the victorious elite player \(;\) hence, the latter has no material benefit from punishing Player \(P.\) The payoff of Player \(P\) is then written as

Player \(P\) takes the side of Player \(S\) if \({U}_{P}^{D}{>U}_{P}^{X}\). Substituting, we have that Player \(P\) joins Player \(S\) for values of a share in the rents larger than the critical value \({\rho }_{S}^{X}\) given below

From (15), we have that a necessary condition for \({\rho }_{S}^{X}>0\) is \(x<\frac{{\theta }_{A}+\phi \left({\theta }_{S}+1\right)}{{\theta }_{A}+{\theta }_{S}+1}\), a condition assumed to hold. Comparing (10) and (15) we have

With the critical share for siding under punishment smaller than the share without punishment, Player \(P\) now defends the Solonian constitutional order for a lower share of the rents. Accordingly, the ban on neutrality broadens the available instruments of Player \(S\) from carrots to sticks. Banning neutrality complements the redistribution of rents because it enables Player \(S\) to negatively incentivize Player \(P\) by punishing him for neutrality. Due to the limited resources available for positive incentives, adding negative incentives may increase the chance for social peace as it lowers the costs for abiding by the constitutional order and strengthens the social stability.

Punishing neutrality also changes the calculus of Player \(S\) and specifically the conditions for offering a rent share to Player \(P\); his payoff is

As before, \(S\) gives a share of rents to \(P\) if \({U}_{S}^{SX}>{U}_{S}^{SN}\) holds. Again, substituting (5) in (11), (8) and (15) in (17) and manipulating, Player \(S\) gives a share to Player \(P\) for values of rents larger than the critical value \({\gamma }^{X}\)

Figure 4 illustrates the ban on neutrality.

The ban reduces the rent share to Player \(P\) to defend the Solonian order. Thus, banning neutrality introduces negative incentives as Player \(P\) reduces his demands for defending the Solonian constitution. Nonetheless, as Fig. 4 shows, the ban has, at least in part, a positive effect on \(P\) because he now receives a share of the rents for smaller total rents than before \(\left({\gamma }^{D}>{\gamma }^{X}\right)\). Accordingly, banning neutrality is a kind of paternalistic instrument, forcing \(P\) to reduce his demands but allowing him to participate in rent sharing. The ban is therefore an inclusive institution for Player \(P\) for smaller rents available. However, it works against inclusion for larger rents as it then helps Player \(S\) to appropriate parts of the rents of Player \(P\).

The ban has several redistributive effects, which generally benefit Player \(S\), the ruling Solonian elite. For small total rents available \(\left({{\gamma }^{X}<\gamma <\gamma }^{D}\right)\), the share of Player \(P\) comes at the expense of Player \(A\), who reduces his demands because of the non-neutrality of Player \(P\). However, Player \(A\)’s share falls by more than the gain of Player \(P\). A significant part of this reduction, as Fig. 4 shows, goes to Player \(S\). For larger total rents \(\left(\gamma >{ \gamma }^{D}\right)\), there is no scope for a redistribution from Player \(A\) because he would not accept the Solonian order. Nonetheless, Player \(S\) is able to redistribute rents to himself by dropping Player \(P\), in which case the ban ceases to be an inclusive institution turning into a mean of predation instead.

All in all, a ban on neutrality, by strongly incentivizing Player \(P\) to support the Solonian constitution, creates a significant advantage for Player \(S\), the ruling elite. We may then infer that, by not mandating \(P\) to support \(S\), Solon was cautious to deny Player \(S\) full prerogatives in the rent-seeking competition.

An alternative instrument to restrict the political power of elites is to introduce competition between them for supporters.¹⁷ Accordingly, we analyze how the situation changes if the ban on neutrality allows Player \(P\) to ally with the aristocratic player \(A\) against the Solonian status quo. For concreteness, we restrict the analysis to equilibria with rent shares larger than zero; otherwise, the arrangements would be unstable.

If Player \(P\) supports Player \(A\) when the latter attacks the Solonian constitution, they form an alliance denoted by \(T\). In exchange for \(P\)’s support, Player \(A\) grants him a share of the rents \({\rho }_{A}\) if the alliance is successful in ousting Player \(S\). Analogously to the cases analysed above, the probability \(R\) that this alliance wins against Player \(S\) is assumed to depend positively on the alliance’s income and negatively on the income of \(S\)

It is again posited that if the \(T\) alliance loses Player S will confiscate the incomes of both \(A\) and \(S\) and get the entire rent. Upon substitution, the players’ payoffs are

Player \(A\) tries to win Player \(P\) over if \({U}_{A}^{T}\ge {U}_{A}^{D}\); otherwise, \(P\) sides with \(S\). Upon using (7.1) and (20.1), the previous inequality is satisfied when

The above shows the maximum rent share Player \(A\) is willing to offer to Player \(P\) to win him over. Given the new opportunities and expected support from \(P\), \(A\) will now only refrain from a coup to overthrow the Solonian order if \({U}_{A}^{T}\le {U}_{A}^{S}\). Upon using (3.1) and (13), the latter inequality is satisfied when

Recalling (8), we have, as intuition suggests, \({\alpha }^{T}={\alpha }^{D}\) when \({\rho }_{A}={\widehat{\rho }}_{A}^{T}\). In other words, Player \(A\) is willing to offer a share of the rents to Player \(P\) until his own share shrinks to the size he receives when Player \(P\) sides with Player \(S\).

Similarly, Player \(S\) tries to win Player \(P\) over if \({U}_{S}^{T}\le {U}_{S}^{D}\). Upon using (7.2) and (10), the inequality is satisfied when

The latter shows the maximum rent share Player \(S\) is willing to offer to Player \(P\) to win him. Finally, Player \(P\) decides to side with Player \(S\) and defends the Solonian order against a coup by Player \(A\) if \({U}_{P}^{T}<{U}_{P}^{D}\). This inequality yields

As expected, \({\rho }_{A}^{C}\) is a positive function of \({\rho }_{S}\). In other words, the more rents \(S\) grants to \(P\) the higher the offer from \(A\) must be to get \(P\) on his side. Based on these results, the payoff functions of the three players in case of conflict can be written as

To simplify, we assume that Player \(P\) is indifferent if \(\rho_{A} = \rho_{A}^{C}\) holds. In this case, each one of the elite players assumes that they both have the same chances to convince \(P\) to support them and thus expect to receive half the respective payoffs. Figure 5 illustrates the payoff functions for the elite players.

As both players maximize their payoffs under consideration of their opponents best possible responses, the concept of Nash equilibria is used to solve the problem of choosing the values of rents maximizing their benefits. In this case, a unique Nash equilibrium exists and both players offer their maximum willingness to pay for the support of Player \(P\); see Appendix 1 for the Proof. Accordingly, are the equilibrium shares, players \(S\) and \(A\) offer to Player \(P\). Given the structure of the model, Player \(P\) is indifferent regarding his support as \(\rho_{A}^{C} = \rho_{A}^{*}\) \(\left( {{\text{for}} \rho_{S} = \rho_{S}^{*} } \right)\) also holds true. Accordingly, Player \(S\) grants \(\rho_{S}^{*}\) as the share of rents to Player \(P\) and, at the same time, Player \(A\) commits to \(\rho_{A}^{*}\) if he would be able to overthrow the Solonian constitution with the help of Player \(P\). Based on that result, Player \(A\) receives a share of the rents amounting to. under the Solonian constitutional order. A necessary condition for \(\alpha_{S}^{*} > 0\) is, again,

The share of Player \(S\), \(\sigma_{S}^{*}\), is the remainder and amounts to

This is the only possible stable distribution because Player \(P\) never remains neutral in a conflict under those conditions, even for \(x = 0\); see Appendix 2 for the proof.

Finally, this distribution is also sufficient to prevent Player \(S\) from launching a coup when i.e., for not too-low costs of conflict; see Appendix 3 for details. At the same time, \(\sigma_{S}^{*} > 0\) holds true for all \(\phi > \phi^{S}\), implying a stable distribution.