Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0493-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
Nine days after he took office in March 1933, Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress to amend existing federal Prohibition policy so as to allow for the sale and consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. Over the following 8 days, the so-called “beer bill” was proposed, debated, passed and signed into law. This study analyzes the political decision making behind one of FDR’s earliest New Deal policies. Specifically, we consider how voter preferences, representatives’ ideologies, national party affiliations, and the influence of special interests affected legislative decision making. We find that special interests and party affiliations were particularly important drivers of congressional voting behavior.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Anderson, G. M., & Tollison, R. D. (1991). Congressional influence and patterns of New Deal spending, 1933–1939. Journal of Law and Economics, 34(1), 161–175. CrossRef
Baldwin, R. E. (1985). The political economy of U.S. import policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baldwin, R. E., & Magee, C. S. (1985). Is trade policy for sale? Congressional voting on recent trade bills. In NBER Working Paper 6376.
Bender, B., & Lott, J. R., Jr. (1996). Legislator voting and shirking: A critical review of the literature. Public Choice, 87(1–2), 67–100. CrossRef
Burden, B. C., Caldeira, G. A., & Groseclose, T. (2000). Measuring the ideologies of U.S. Senators: The song remains the same. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25(2), 237–258. CrossRef
Cherrington, E. H. (1915). Prohibition text book: Facts and figures dealing with the liquor traffic. Westervillle, OH: The American Issue Publishing Company.
Choi, Y. (2015). Constituency, ideology, and economic interest in U.S. congressional voting: The case of the U.S.—Korea free trade agreement. Political Research Quarterly, 68(2), 266–279. CrossRef
Couch, J. F., & Shughart, W. F., II. (1998). The political economy of the new deal. Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Coughlin, C. C. (1985). Domestic content legislation: House voting and the economic theory of regulation. Economic Inquiry, 23(3), 437–448. CrossRef
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1993). Legislative leviathan: Party government in the house. California series on social choice and political economy, 23. Berkley: University of California.
Fiorina, M. P. (1974). Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Fleck, R. K. (1999). Electoral incentives, public policy, and the New Deal realignment. Southern Economic Journal, 63, 377–404. CrossRef
Fleck, R. K. (2001a). Inter-party competition, intra-party competition, and distributive policy: A model and test using New Deal data. Public Choice, 108, 77–100. CrossRef
Fleck, R. K. (2001b). Population, land, economic conditions, and the allocation of New Deal spending. Explorations in Economic History, 38, 296–304. CrossRef
Fleck, R. K. (2002). Democratic Opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Journal of Economic History, 62(1), 25–54.
Goff, B. L., & Grier, K. B. (1993). On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking. Public Choice, 76(1–2), 5–20. CrossRef
Griffin, J. D. (2008). Measuring legislator ideology. Social Science Quarterly, 89(2), 337–350. CrossRef
Jackson, J. E., & Kingdon, J. W. (1992). Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes. American Journal of Political Science, 36(3), 805–823. CrossRef
Kahane, L. H. (1996). Congressional voting patterns on NAFTA. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 55(4), 395–409. CrossRef
Kantor, S., Fishback, P., & Wallis, J. J. (2013). Did the New Deal solidify the 1932 democratic realignment? Explorations in Economic History, 50, 620–633. CrossRef
Kiewiet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1991). The logic of delegation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kyvig, D. E. (1979). Repealing national prohibition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levitt, S. D. (1996). How do Senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology. The American Economic Review, 86(3), 425–551.
Lott, J. R., Jr. (1987). Political cheating. Public Choice, 52(2), 169–186. CrossRef
Marks, S. V. (1993). Economic Interests and voting on the omnibus trade bill of 1987. Public Choice, 75(1), 21–42. CrossRef
Martis, K. C. (1982). The historical atlas of United States congressional districts, 1789–1983. New York: Free Press.
McArthur, J., & Marks, S. (1988). Constituent interest vs. legislator ideology: The role of political opportunity cost. Economic Inquiry, 26(3), 461–470. CrossRef
Okrent, D. (2010). Last call: The rise and fall of prohibition. New York: Scribner.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Poelmans, E., Raisanen, S., & Taylor, J. E. (2017). Three- two beer, one recovery: The ‘beer bill’ and the economic turnaround of spring 1933. Working paper.
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1984). The polarization of American politics. The Journal of Politics, 46(4), 1061–1079. CrossRef
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2007). Ideology and congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Reading, D. C. (1973). New Deal activity and the States. Journal of Economic History, 36, 792–810. CrossRef
Rohde, D. (1991). Parties and leaders in the postreform House. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. CrossRef
Rohde, D. (1994). Parties and committees in the House: Member motivations, issues, and institutional arrangements. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19(3), 341–359. CrossRef
Selzter, A. J. (1995). The political economy of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Journal of Political Economy, 103(6), 1302–1342. CrossRef
Steagall, J. W., & Jennings, K. (1996). Unions, PAC contributions, and the NAFTA vote. Journal of Labor Research, 17(3), 515–521. CrossRef
Tosini, S. C., & Tower, E. (1987). The textile bill of 1985: The determinants of congressional voting patterns. Public Choice, 54(1), 19–25. CrossRef
Tullock, G. (1989). The economics of special privilege and rent seeking. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. CrossRef
Wallis, J. J. (1984). The birth of old federalism: Financing the New Deal. Journal of Economic History, 44, 139–159. CrossRef
Wallis, J. J. (1998). The political economy of New Deal spending revisited, again; with and without Nevada. Explorations in Economic History, 35, 140–170. CrossRef
Weller, N. (2009). Trading policy: Constituents and party in U.S. trade policy. Public Choice, 141, 87–101. CrossRef
Wright, G. (1974). The political economy of New Deal spending. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 59, 30–38. CrossRef
- The politics of beer: analysis of the congressional votes on the beer bill of 1933
John A. Dove
Jason E. Taylor
- Springer US
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta