The Rise of Drones

Recent legal debates over preventive force have focused on the Obama administration’s use of drones1 to target terrorists and insurgents. In line with the argument made in Chapter 5 — that the transition from Bush to Obama saw an adjustment in tone rather than in substance with regard to use-of-force pursued by the United States — the Obama administration has made the use of drones a key staple in its counterterrorism strategy. While the Bush administration only used drones sporadically, the number of (documented) drone strikes under Obama’s watch has increased decisively since 2009, with strikes occurring both inside and outside declared theaters of war, that is, not only within the combat zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in Pakistan, Somalia and the Yemen. Not surprisingly, discourse pertaining to the standards governing drone usage gained attention when legal adviser to the Department of State, Harold Koh, posited his concerns in a speech at the American Society of International Law (ASIL) in 2010. These sentiments were followed — albeit somewhat belatedly — in the spring of 2012 with a series of key senior officials commenting publicly on the Obama administration’s use-of-force policy, specifically the administration’s approach to targeted killing. Despite further criticism from United Nations Secretariat actors and nongovernmental organizations, the practice has continued to expand during Obama’s second term.