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Erschienen in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 1/2021

16.04.2020

The Role of Target Termination Fees in REIT Mergers

verfasst von: Sridhar Gogineni, Pawan Jain

Erschienen in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics | Ausgabe 1/2021

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Abstract

Target termination fee provisions are widely used in merger agreements and require the target firm to pay the bidder a fixed cash fee in the event the target firm backs out of the agreement. We examine the determinants and consequences of target termination fee provisions in REIT mergers and test the competing agency and efficient contracting hypothesis. We find that target termination fee provisions are more likely in hard to value targets, that is, in deals involving large targets, targets with high leverage, and firms that were not targets of a takeover attempt in the recent past. Our results also suggest that target termination fee provisions are associated with higher offer premiums, announcement period returns, and higher deal completion rates. Collectively, our results indicate that termination fee provisions are used as effective contractual devices in REIT mergers to further target shareholder interests.

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Fußnoten
1
Estimates of returns and completion rates are based on columns 1 – 4 of Table 4 and Columns 2 – 3 of Table 5, respectively.
 
2
Please refer to Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012) and Anderson, Medla, Rottke, and Schiereck (2012) for an overall review of literature in REIT mergers.
 
3
Table 1 in Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012) presents a summary of target and acquirer returns documented by several papers examining REIT mergers.
 
4
Common reasons for cancellation of announced deals include unexpected changes in target or acquirer financial and governance characteristics, better offers from third-party bidders, and acquirer financing issues.
 
5
There are 6 deals with a termination fee greater than 5% of deal value in our sample. Offer premiums for these deals are higher compared to deals with no termination fee or with termination fee less than 5% of deal value.
 
6
While most empirical papers on REITs use data from 1993 onwards, a few recent papers (see for example Mulherin and Womack 2015) have used data prior to 1993. We chose include pre-1993 data to increase our sample size. We repeat all our tests with a sample limited to 1993 – 2014 and find our results qualitatively, and in most instances quantitatively, similar. Results are not presented for the sake of brevity and are available upon request.
 
7
We follow Schwert (1996) by estimating market model parameters, using CRSP value-weighted index as the market proxy, for each target firm using daily returns from the day -379 to day -127 relative to the deal announcement date.
 
8
We include deals without termination fee provision in this model. Termination fee is set to 0% for such deals.
 
9
We obtain information on matching rights from Merger Metrics, a unit of FactSet.
 
10
We do not need an interaction variable of matching offer rights and termination fee provisions in this specification as matching rights occur almost exclusively with termination fee provisions.
 
11
We also split our sample into high information asymmetry subsample (above median values of idiosyncratic volatility) and low information asymmetry subsample (below median values of idiosyncratic volatility) and rerun all the regressions. We find that results are qualitatively similar and do not report them for the sake of brevity.
 
12
Results are not presented for the sake of brevity and are available on request.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The Role of Target Termination Fees in REIT Mergers
verfasst von
Sridhar Gogineni
Pawan Jain
Publikationsdatum
16.04.2020
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics / Ausgabe 1/2021
Print ISSN: 0895-5638
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-045X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-020-09758-5

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