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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. The Sovereignty of the Demos as ‘True Democracy’

verfasst von : Alexandros Chrysis

Erschienen in: ‘True Democracy’ as a Prelude to Communism

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on democracy–and ‘true democracy’ in particular—as the ‘self-determination of the people’ and the ‘solved riddle of all constitutions’. In this sense, sovereignty of the demos is presented as the (self-)legislative process par excellence, through which the Marx of democracy moved towards the ‘land’ of communism as the ‘riddle of history solved’. Dealing with the sovereignty of the demos as the nucleus of ‘true democracy’ and raising issues such as Marx’s critique of bureaucracy and the Marxian conception of ‘universal suffrage’, in this part of the book I aim at a further elaboration of ‘true democracy’ as a pre-communist version of a society without a (political) state.

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Fußnoten
1
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 19.
 
2
Ibid., p. 57.
 
3
Ibid., p. 55.
 
4
Ibid., p. 55.
 
5
Ibid., p. 56.
 
6
Ibid., p. 57.
 
7
‘According to the law (illusion) the constitution is, but according to reality (the truth) it develops. According to its definition the constitution is unalterable, but actually it is altered; only, this alteration is unconscious, it does not have the form of alteration. The appearance contradicts the essence’ (ibid., p. 56).
 
8
Ibid., p. 57.
 
9
Ibid., p. 57.
 
10
Balibar, in his postface to Balibar and Raulet (2001, p. 126, note 10), also agrees on Sieyès influence on the young Marx’s political ideas. Readers interested in the constitutional theory of Sieyès and, therefore, in its influence on Marx’s pre-communist theory of the state should read especially the Chaps. 5 and 6 of Sieyès’ Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État (1988, pp. 121–88).
 
11
For the impact of the history of the French Revolution on Marx’s theory of democracy as the outcome of his readings during his stay in Kreuznach, it is worth recalling Rubel’s analysis (1989, p. 13).
 
12
Hegel (1991, §301, Addition).
 
13
Ibid., §302.
 
14
Ibid., §303.
 
15
Ibid., §303 (Remark).
 
16
Ibid., §303.
 
17
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 67.
 
18
Ibid., p. 70. Elsewhere, Marx comments that ‘Hegel solves the enigma by recognizing the “distinctive feature of the estates” in the fact that in them “the specific insight and the specific will characteristic [of] civil society comes into existence relative to the state”. It is the reflection of civil society on to the state. As the bureaucrats are representatives of the state to civil society, so the estates are representatives of civil society to the state’ (ibid., p. 66).
 
19
Ibid., p. 69.
 
20
Ibid., p. 72.
 
21
Ibid., p. 73.
 
22
Ibid., p. 72.
 
23
Ibid., p. 72.
 
24
Ibid., p. 73.
 
25
Ibid., p. 74.
 
26
Lapine (1980, p. 210, 216).
 
27
‘Without doubt, Marx was unsatisfied from his previous analysis and deems necessary a revision of the object of his study’ (ibid., p. 208).
 
28
Marx, Critique in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 75.
 
29
In a similar vein, see the analyses by Desbrousses (2007, pp. 71–84) and Kouvélakis (2001, pp. 11–22).
 
30
Marx, Critique in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 80.
 
31
On this issue, see the penetrating analysis by Leopold (2007, pp. 62–7).
 
32
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 82.
 
33
Ibid., p. 77.
 
34
Ibid., p. 77.
 
35
Ibid., pp. 77–8.
 
36
See also Lapine (1960). Lapine, among others, argues that ‘in opposition to the articles in the Rheinische Zeitung, in which elements of materialism appear only in isolation from each other and rather in a piecemeal way, the manuscript of 1843 witnesses Marx’s conscientious passage to materialism’ (ibid., p. 58).
 
37
Baraquin (1974, p. 8) develops a different argument. He argues that ‘Marx’s approach to Hegel brings him closer to a liberal critique of the state or a defence of society against the state, which lives through their opposition and contradictions, [it brings him closer] than an attempt at restoring a Rousseau-type of citizen.’
 
38
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 83.
 
39
Ibid., p. 83.
 
40
Ibid., p. 90.
 
41
Ibid., p. 88.
 
42
Ibid., p. 90.
 
43
‘What Hegel wants, the “actuality of harmony”, and the “impossibility of hostile confrontation”, has indeed not been achieved thereby; we are rather left with the “possibility of harmony”. But that is the postulated illusion of the unity of the political state with itself …’ (ibid., p. 93).
 
44
Ibid., p. 91.
 
45
Ibid., pp. 112–13.
 
46
Ibid., p. 112.
 
47
At this point, it is worth quoting §306 of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in order to illustrate the ideological way in which Hegel supports and defends the political status of the landowning estate on the grounds of the institution of primogeniture:
This estate is better equipped for its political role and significance inasmuch as its resources are equally independent of the resources of the state and of the uncertainty of trade, the quest for profit, and all variations in property. It is likewise independent of the favour of the executive power and of the masses, and is even protected against its own arbitrariness by the fact that those members of this estate who are called to this vocation [Bestimmung] do not have the same right as other citizens either to dispose freely of their entire property or to know that it will pass on to their children in proportion to the equal degree of love that they feel for them. Thus, their resources become inalienable inherited property, burdened with primogeniture.
See also the Addition to the same paragraph.
 
48
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 105:
Here therefore participation in the legislature is an innate human right. Here we have born legislators, the born mediation of the political state with itself. There has been much sneering at innate human rights, especially by the owners of entailed estates. Is it not even stranger that the right to the supreme dignity of the legislative authority is entrusted to a particular race of men? Nothing is more ridiculous than the fact that the appointment by ‘birth’ of legislators, representatives of the citizens, should be opposed by Hegel to their appointment by ‘the fortuitousness of elections’.
 
49
Ibid., p. 95.
 
50
Ibid., p. 98.
 
51
Ibid., p. 100.
 
52
Ibid., p. 99:
In truth, primogeniture is a consequence of perfect landed property, it is fossilized private property, private property (quand même) at the peak of its independence and intensity of its development, and that which Hegel represents as the purpose, the determining factor and prime cause of primogeniture, is rather its effect, its consequence, the power of abstract private property over the political state; whereas Hegel represents primogeniture as the power of the political state over private property. He makes the cause the effect and the effect the cause, the determining the determined and the determined the determining.
 
53
Ibid., p. 102.
 
54
See also the conclusions drawn by Teeple (1984, pp. 209–15).
 
55
In this context, see the penetrating analysis set out by Garo (2001, pp. 89–104).
 
56
Hegel (1991, §308).
 
57
Ibid., §308 (Remark).
 
58
Ibid., §308.
 
59
At this point, it is worth mentioning and commenting on Fischer’s following argument: ‘Far from ending the Western state, the blending of executive and legislative in Marx’s “Civil War” simply represents specifically Rousseauian republican aspiration, and stands at the antipodes of Montesquieu’s republicanism’ (Fischer 2015, p. 71). No doubt the author of the ‘Civil War’ stands at the antipodes of Montesquieu’s republicanism. No doubt the author of the ‘Civil War’ is still influenced by Rousseauian republicanism. But who is this author? It is not just the Marx of democracy; it is now the communist Marx, who points to a classless and stateless society as the communist reformulation of his ‘true democracy’ as mediated by the proletarian democracy. Thus, it is in this communist theoretical context that Marx’s republican influence must be reconsidered.
 
60
Hegel (1991, §309).
 
61
Ibid., §309 (Addition).
 
62
Ibid., §310.
 
63
Ibid., §310 (Remark).
 
64
Ibid., §311 (Remark).
 
65
For interesting critical approaches to this issue, see, among others, Berki (1971, pp. 212–15) and Thomas (1994, pp. 36–7).
 
66
Leopold (2007, p. 74) follows a similar direction: ‘The echo of Rousseau here is a striking one. It might be said that, according to the young Marx citizens of both the Hegelian and the modern state participate in political life as members of a “multitude” (and not as part of “the people”).’ In a different vein, having taken into consideration Marx’s 1843 excerpts from Machiavelli’s, Montesquieu’s and Rousseau’s republicanism, Fischer (2015, p. 46) draws the following conclusion: ‘In 1843, Marx seems to hover between both positions, one leading to representative republican democracy, the other to a deep Feuerbachian cultural or anarchist communitarian democracy.’
 
67
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 116–17.
 
68
Ibid., p. 117.
 
69
Ibid., p. 114.
 
70
Ibid., p. 119.
 
71
Ibid., p. 119. As Marx mentions characteristically, when civil society is transformed into a real political society, ‘the legislative power is representation here in the sense in which every function is representative—in the sense in which, e.g., the shoemaker, insofar as he satisfies a social need, is my representative, in which every particular social activity as a species-activity merely represents the species, i.e., an attribute of my own nature, and in which every person is the representative of every other. He is here representative not because of something else which he represents but because of what he is and does’ (ibid., p. 119).
 
72
Ibid., pp. 119–20.
 
73
Springborg (1984) takes a similar line.
 
74
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 120–1.
 
75
In regard to the failure of Hegel’s mediation as a way to ‘heal the split’ between civil society and political state, see Leopold (2007, pp. 74–82).
 
76
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 81.
 
77
Ibid., p. 80.
 
78
Ibid., p. 32.
 
79
Ibid., p. 79.
 
80
Ibid., p. 81.
 
81
Ibid., p. 81.
 
82
For a similar view, see Lapine (1980, p. 195).
 
83
Hegel (1991, §279).
 
84
Ibid., §279 (Remark).
 
85
Ibid., §279 (Remark).
 
86
Ibid., §279 (Remark).
 
87
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 28.
 
88
On this point, see the penetrating analysis by Abensour (2011, pp. 48–52).
 
89
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 28.
 
90
Ibid., p. 29.
 
91
Ibid., p. 30, 31.
 
92
Ibid., p. 29.
 
93
Ibid., p. 29.
 
94
Ibid., p. 30.
 
95
Rousseau’s legislator, as approached in Chap. 7 of the second book of the Social Contract, is the agent who, within the framework of Rousseau’s democratism, establishes the founding conditions of the republic before retreating from the stage with the people transformed into a demos, i.e. a self-legislating community.
 
96
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 29.
 
97
On this issue, Mercier-Josa’s comment is correct (1999, p. 18):
In the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx argues that the dichotomy between the political state – that means between the constitution … – and the bourgeois-civil society cannot stay as a latent opposition, indifferent, but it is to be developed to a contradiction, the resolution of which is democracy conceived as the disappearance of the political state alone, in its difference from and its transcendence of the determinations of the real, terrestrial, concrete social life of the individuals, who are also citizens.
 
98
On this specific issue, see the remark by Hunt (1975, vol. I, p. 67), who refers to and comments on the impressions Thomas Hamilton formed of American society, a review that constitutes part of Marx’s Kreuznach Notebooks (MEGA 2 , IV.2, pp. 266–75).
 
99
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 31.
 
100
See also the analysis by Desbrousses (1987, pp. 72–4).
 
101
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 31–2.
 
102
Mercier-Josa (1980, p. 45) follows a similar direction:
The philosophical defence of the idea of the people’s sovereignty is not equivalent, for Marx, to a critique of the constitutional monarchy in favour of republic, but permits him the distinction between democracy and republic. Republic is not a radical negation of monarchy, but just one species of state, which allows the political state to subsist in its abstraction, like an empty universal that is placed beyond civil society and whose pretention to organically animate it is illusory.
 
103
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 31.
 
104
Ibid., p. 30.
 
105
According to the editors of Marx–Engels, Collected Works (vol. 3, p. 589), but also according to Henri Lefebvre (1982, p. 135), the ‘modern French’ to whom Marx refers is Saint-Simon and his followers, for whom the state, in a future society, will be transformed from being an instrument of rule over people into an instrument of administering things, thus losing its political character. Papaioannou (1999, p. 62n) excludes Saint-Simon from these ‘modern French’ who inspired Marx with regard to ‘true democracy’ but includes Considérant and perhaps Proudhon. Rubel (1971, p. 58) also considers that Proudhon was likely to be in Marx’s mind when he referred to the ‘modern French’ supporters of ‘true democracy’. Abensour (2011, pp. 134–5) deems it possible that Marx was referring to Considérant and his work The Manifesto of Democracy in the 19th Century. Finally, Löwy (2003, pp. 41–2) argues that Marx, having travelled in Holland at the end of March 1843, was informed about the French working-class movement and possibly also about the communist organisations of French workers through reading French newspapers (see also Marx’s letter to Ruge in March 1843). This type of information, Löwy assumes, must have influenced Marx’s view on ‘true democracy’.
 
106
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 30.
 
107
Ibid., pp. 30–1.
 
108
According to the challenging, though rather risky, formulation of Berki (1990, p. 662):
there are clear hints that Marx regards democracy as being essentially formless. He dismisses the ‘political republic’ as being democracy merely ‘within the abstract state form’ and insists that in democracy proper (that is, beyond the republic) the constitution is ‘the free product of man’, ‘constantly brought back to its actual basis’. If by ‘state’ we understand here a settled framework of offices, separated from social roles and relations (as Marx evidently does), then it is obvious that ‘democracy’ can no longer be a state. Democracy is sheer movement, constant actualization, rather than actuality. At the same time, Marx begins to demolish the realm of the ‘political’ which to him now signifies the illusory domination of the human ‘will’ over society.
 
109
In a different vein, see the analysis of Oizerman (1981, p. 173). ‘Such a view of democracy,’ writes Oizerman, referring to the Marxian ‘true democracy’, ‘does not yet signify a break with idealism, for it springs from the notion that the state is the realm of freedom or, at any rate, has to be such, in accordance with its concept.’ In opposition to this line of interpretation, Lukács (1967, pp. 531–5) recognises in the 1843 Manuscript Marx’s turn to materialism in relation to Feuerbach’s materialism, which, however, Marx succeeds in overcoming.
 
110
See the Preface by Gérard Raulet in Balibar and Raulet (2001), especially pp. 9–10.
 
111
Focusing his analysis on the rejection of the modern state per se, ‘even in its republican form’, Hunt (1975, vol. I, pp. 66–7) accurately argues:
Once Marx had grasped the civil society–state dichotomy as the Gordian knot of modern times, he could no longer set his hopes for human self-realization on a mere political transformation that would leave civil society unchanged. … Thus Marx had to cut the Gordian knot with a solution that would transcend both the state and civil society in some higher synthesis. Initially he would call this new synthesis ‘democracy’ or sometimes ‘true democracy’, as counterposed to the ‘republic as merely a particular form of the state.’
 
112
According to Oizerman (1981, p. 174), it is worth noting that Marx ‘does not yet describe democracy as a definite class structure of society, but rather contrasts it to the latter, which he designates as the political state. He holds that true democracy is a negation of the political state. That is the only kind of democracy, a non-political state, that fulfils social tasks, that is, effects the working people’s emancipation.’
 
113
Kouvélakis (2001, p. 17).
 
114
Extending the sense of the term ‘state’ to denote community, Kain (1991, pp. 36–7) argues in a quite contradictory way as follows:
For Marx, the political state is an estranged entity dominating civil society. He also rejects Hegel’s preference for monarchy and advocates a radical form of democracy capable of overcoming the difference between the political state and civil society. … Though opposed to a dominating political state, Marx is not against the state as an organic community of free individuals where there is no political state estranged from society.
 
115
Rubel (1971, p. 58).
 
116
In this vein, see Berki (1971, pp. 207–9).
 
117
For a theoretical, positive assessment of Hegelian bureaucracy, see MacGregor (1998, pp. 188–97). For an opposite view, see Lefebvre (1982, pp. 138–53). For his part, Liebich (1982) argues that Marx is not targeting the bureaucracy at the time of Hegel but the bureaucracy of Germany during the last years of Vormärz. A similar position is developed by Furet (1986, p. 14), noting that ‘the Germany that Marx is looking at is not anymore the enlightened Prussia of 1818–1820, but the reactionary Prussia of 1830 and 1840’.
 
118
Hegel (1991, §289, Remark).
 
119
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 45.
 
120
Nevertheless, Liebich (1982, p. 80) is not incorrect when he draws the conclusion that ‘an examination of the vocabulary of Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in its historical context does not lend credence to the idea that this text provides the foundation for a theory of the bureaucracy as a new class’.
 
121
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 45.
 
122
Hegel (1991, §279, Addition).
 
123
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 46.
 
124
Hegel (1991, §294). In this paragraph, as well as in its addition, Hegel conceives the role of the bureaucrat in contrast to that of a ‘knight errant’ (‘fahrende Ritter’) and also in opposition to the activity of a ‘civil servant who performs his work purely out of necessity [Not] without any genuine duty and likewise without any right’. In this sense, as Hegel remarks:
the service of the state requires those who perform it to sacrifice the independent and discretionary satisfaction of their subjective ends, and thereby gives them the right to find their satisfaction in the performance of their duties, and in this alone. It is here that, in the present context, that link is to be found between universal and particular interests which constitutes its concept of the state and its internal stability.
 
125
The ‘objective moment’ of the civil servant’s vocation in terms of knowledge aristocracy is described by Hegel as follows:
The functions of the executive are objective in character; as such [für sich] they have already been substantially decided in advance, and they must be fulfilled and actualized by individuals. Individuals are not destined by birth or personal nature to hold a particular office, for there is no immediate and natural link between the two. The objective moment in their vocation [Bestimmung] is knowledge [Erkenntnis] and proof of ability; this proof guarantees that the needs of the state will be met, and, as the sole condition [of appointment], at the same time guarantees every citizen the possibility of joining the universal estate.
 
126
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 46–7:
The bureaucracy is a circle from which no one can escape. Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of knowledge. The top entrusts the understanding of detail to the lower levels, whilst the lower levels credit the top with understanding of the general, and so all are mutually deceived. … The general spirit of the bureaucracy is the secret, the mystery, preserved within itself by the hierarchy and against the outside world by being a closed corporation.
 
127
Ibid., p. 46.
 
128
Ibid., p. 47.
 
129
Hegel (1991, §257).
 
130
Ibid., §260.
 
131
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 46.
 
132
Leopold’s challenging approach to the state–politics distinction in connection to his own understanding of the Marxian ‘true democracy’ (2007, pp. 254–62) moves in this direction. For his part, Castoriadis (2003 [1996], p. 330), while permanently ignoring Marx’s ‘true democracy’, insists that, although society without a state is possible, ‘society without institutions of power is an absurdity into which both Marx and anarchism lapsed’.
 
133
In this vein, see Avineri (1968, pp. 35–6).
 
134
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 29.
 
135
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 297.
 
136
While commenting on Castoriadis’s critique of Marx’s theory of democracy and politics, Dick Howard (2002, p. 96) makes the following remark:
The locus of this critique is Marx’s vision of the Paris Commune as a direct democracy that is the ‘finally discovered secret’ to the riddle of history he had sought since his youthful critique of Hegel’s theory of the state in 1843. … But Marx’s vision of democracy is not developed further; he treats its appearance in the Commune just as he treated it in the 1843 critique of Hegel.
 
137
Marx, Critique, in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 29–30.
 
138
Avineri (1968, p. 26, see also p. 41). Hunt (1975, vol. I, pp. 50, 74–5) adopts a similar perspective.
 
139
Avineri (1968, p. 34). Hunt (1975, vol. I, p. 75) also draws the conclusion that ‘“true democracy” may indeed be equated with communism’. For the opposite view, see Kain (1991, p. 36, footnote 57).
 
140
Avineri (1968, p. 40).
 
141
It is worth reminding the reader that Lucio Colletti (1975, p. 42, 43) makes a similar mistake, when arguing that ‘what is really understood by democracy here is the same as, many years later, Marx was to rediscover in the actions of the Paris Commune of 1871. … Almost thirty years later, the argument of 1871 clearly recalls that of 1843.’
 
142
As Colletti (1975, p. 41) rightly comments on this specific issue, ‘Marx not only distinguishes between “democracy” and the “political republic” (which is “democracy within the abstract form of the state”) but goes on to emphasize that democracy in this sense implies the disappearance of the state altogether’.
 
143
At this point, it is worth quoting Bakouradze’s (1960, p. 28) very careful formulation:
Despite the overall richness of the manuscript written by Marx, the world-conception of its author is not still that of a communist, even if the most important premises for a passage to communist ideas have been developed in the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The Sovereignty of the Demos as ‘True Democracy’
verfasst von
Alexandros Chrysis
Copyright-Jahr
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57541-4_5