1. The Strategic Dissonance of Australia’s Climate Security Response

For a comprehensive list of Australian initiatives relating to climate change, see Department of Environment at: http://​www.​environment.​gov.​au/​climate-change/​adaptation/​publications (12 June 2016).

While the ADF has not progressed any significant climate policy, public analysis of its response has increased in the lead-up to the release of the next Defence White Paper. Two important reports were the Centre for Policy Development, The Longest Conflict: Australia’s Climate Security Challenge and the Climate Council’s Be Prepared: Climate Change, Security and Australia’s Defence Force.

The ADF has a ‘strategy’ for literally dozens of issues. Examples include: ADF Indigenous Employment Strategy; Defence Air Quality Strategy; Energy Management Strategy; Waste Minimisation Strategy; Defence Pollution Management Strategy; Defence Environmental Education Strategy; Defence Noise, Vibration and Electromagnetic Radiation Generation Strategy, to name a few.

The Australian Department of Defence (‘Defence’) has an annual budget of $AUD31.9 billion (13th largest) in 2015 according to SIPRI (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016) and a full-time uniformed and public service workforce of around 75,000 people (Defence 2016b). Defence also manages an estate and infrastructure portfolio of more than 3 million hectares, 300 managed properties and 25,000 buildings (Defence 2016e).

The international community, more broadly, is divided on the securitisation of climate change. Two main camps are evident. In one camp are countries working to ensure climate change remains a non-securitised issue addressed outside the logic of security politics. Although exceptions exist, this position is mainly advanced by Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS), developing countries and the Third World. The main argument held by the BRICS+ is that whilst climate change may present certain kinds of threats to international peace and security, it primarily remains a sustainable development issue where focus must be on delivering mitigation and adaptation strategies as well as finance mobilisation, technology transfer and capacity–building in developing countries. In contrast to these positions are ‘pro-securitizing’ countries that have sought to frame climate change as a securitised issue to be dealt through multi-lateral, non-securitised and securitised forums. Countries subscribing to this ‘two-track’ approach mainly consist of developed countries such as those within the EU, as well as the US, UK, Australia and a collection of other small island nations plus some developing countries most affected by climate change. These countries argue that securitising climate change raises its profile, engenders a sense of purpose and urgency into international mitigation and adaptation strategies and should be viewed as part of a wider strategy of ‘preventative diplomacy’. See Thomas, Michael. 2013. ‘The Securitisation of Climate Change: A Military Perspective.’ Journal of the Australian Profession of Arms, no. 192: 7–18.

A list of the climate-security literature within the US and UK is extensive. Prominent examples (to name a few) include: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for US National Security (Schwartz and Randall, 2003), National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Centre for Naval Analyses, 2007), The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the US Armed Forces (Centre for New American Security, 2010), MoD Climate Change Delivery Plan (Ministry of Defence, 2010), US Navy Climate Change Roadmap (US Navy, 2010), National Security Implications of Climate Change for US Naval Forces (National Research Council, 2011).

For the UK, see Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti at: https://​www.​gov.​uk/​government/​people/​neil-morisetti (11 May 2015). For the US, see Rear Admiral David W. Titley at: http://​www.​navy.​mil/​navydata/​bios/​navybio.​asp?​bioID=​438 (11 May 2015).