The starting point of this paper is the energy transition currently taking place in Europe (and beyond) and the drastic temperature target set by Article 2(1) Paris Agreement (although the agreement remains vague regarding other aspects). In view of the temperature limit, the energy and climate transition (globally and in Europe) is, by all means, insufficient. Especially as it requires the immediate and complete phase out of fossil fuels is not obvious. In addition, energy transition is often mistaken for a power transition, wholly relying on technical approaches and neglecting the necessary sufficiency measures. Existing policy approaches fail because of lacking ambition in their targets, as well as rebound and shifting effects (understood in a broad sense). But there are promising alternative policy approaches, especially on a Law and Economics basis.
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See Ekardt (2016), §§ 4 E. III., 7 C.; Ekardt et al. (2015a, b), pp. 579 et seq.; Skillington (2012), pp. 1196 et seq.; Sterk et al. (2013); OHCHR (2015); OHCHR (2014).
Forests, fenlands and pastures can absorb and store greenhouse gas emissions, eliminating them from the carbon cycle. Therefore, they are valued as so-called “sinks”.
See Elmer et al. (2015), pp. 18 et seq.; Enquête-Kommission (2010), p. 497; Böcher and Töller (2012), pp. 22 et seq.; explicitly critical Becker and Richter (2015), pp. 3 et seq.; partially also Moreno et al. (2015), pp. 13 et seq.
See on phenomena which are difficult to exactly calculate Peters et al. (2015), pp. 8903 et seq.; even more radical Hoffmann (2015), p. 20, furthermore Becker and Richter (2015), pp. 3 et seq.
Visible in e.g. Heyen et al. (2013), p. 9; Paech (2012), pp. 69 et seq.; Hoffmann (2015), pp. 17 et seq.; Becker and Richter (2015), pp. 3 et seq.; Santarius (2015), pp. 273 et seq.; Klingholz (2014), pp. 100 et seq.; Stengel (2011), pp. 134 et seq.; Reimer and Tölle (2013), p. 589 (597); von Bredow (2013), pp. 66 et seq.; Voget-Kleschin (2013), pp. 97 et seq.
Hoffmann (2015), pp. 12 et seq.; Luks (2013), pp. 23 et seq. and 65 et seq.; Santarius et al. (2016), pp. 81 et seq.; Jackson (2013), pp. 81 et seq.; Heyen et al. (2013), p. 8; Becker and Richter (2015), pp. 3 et seq.; Bauriedl (2016), pp. 217 et seq.; Paech (2012), pp. 69 et seq.; Voget-Kleschin (2013), pp. 97 et seq.; on the data basis of very limited absolute decoupling see www.umweltbundesamt.de/tags/energieverbrauch [accessed 24 August 2017]; missing the point Handrich et al. (2015), p. 27; Paqué (2010), pp. 72 et seq. and 96 et seq.; Liebe and Preisendörfer (2013), p. 239 (242).
With a detailed calculation Piketty (2015), pp. 29 et seq.; Moreno et al. (2015), p. 28; disregarded in Liebe and Preisendörfer (2013), p. 239 (242); Paqué (2010), pp. 96 et seq.
See Jackson (2013); Paech (2012); Schulz and Bailey (2014), pp. 277 et seq.; Scheidler (2015), pp. 205 et seq.; Jensen and Scheub (2014); Miegel (2010); unclear Muraca (2015), pp. 59 et seq.; Stengel (2011), pp. 163 et seq.
Examples for that—without clearly distinguishing from macroeconomic development—in Posse (2015), pp. 59 et seq.; Heyen et al. (2013), p. 18; Wilts and von Gries (2015), pp. 41 et seq.
E.g. Stern (2009), p. 11 or 92; Radermacher et al. (2011), pp. 105 et seq.; Handrich et al. (2015), p. 27; Paqué (2010), pp. 72 et seq.; Fücks (2013), pp. 69 et seq.; Enquête-Kommission (2010), pp. 430 et seq.; Sukhdev (2013), pp. 209 et seq.; Schmidt-Bleek (2014), pp. 126 et seq.; see also Weimann (2009), p. 26 and Nordhaus (2008), pp. 32 et seq.; not with sufficient scepticism in UNEP (2010), passim and Kaven (2015), pp. 176 et seq. (in naming other authors like Jänicke, Altvater and Rifkin); explicitly contra Stern (2009) (in the spirit of the discription in this paper) Helm (2008), pp. 24 et seq. and Hänggi (2011), pp. 182 et seq.; left open in Ott (2011), pp. 54 et seq.; on empirical growth over decades and centuries Piketty (2015), pp. 105 et seq.; rightly on the problem Posse (2015), p. 59.
See Tichy (2009), pp. 4 et seq.; Paech (2005), pp. 84 et seq.; Hinterberger and Pirgmaier (2009), pp. 58 et seq.; Lutter and Giljum (2009), pp. 12 et seq.; Tichy (2009), pp. 4 et seq.; left open in Grunwald and Kopfmüller (2012), pp. 48 et seq.; more optimistic Kettner (2009), pp. 77 et seq.; Schneider (2009), pp. 71 et seq.; see also Kesselring (2015), pp. 1 et seq. These thoughts are not rendered wrong by the famous sociologist Werner Sombart, who declared “sustainability and “stationary” economy along with criticism of capitalism in the 1930s to be Nazi positions. References in Luks (2013), p. 42. Very elaborate theoretical economic criticism of growth is provided by Paech (2005), pp. 193 et seq.; on the connection to economic theory of decreasing marginal benefits Hänggi (2011), pp. 28 et seq.; unclear Radermacher and Beyers (2011), passim (on one side rightly observing that growth can also mean “0.1%” and then gradually even less, but at the same time predicting de facto a “ten times” richer world). On the defensive role of most NGOs in these debates Stoll (2014), pp. 124 et seq.
The technological potential was underestimated in Meadows et al. (1972), passim, at the same time, the environmental situation is also seen too optimistically (also because of lack of knowledge of climate change); rightly on this Klingholz (2014), passim; one-sided on the deficiencies Fücks (2013), pp. 81 et seq.; out-dated scepticism of Malthus (1977), passim, the substantial technological dynamic has been wrongly estimated.
On the uneconomic nature of sufficiency options Jakob and Edenhofer (2014), pp. 447 et seq.; (too) open in our opinion Pissarskoi (2014), pp. 235 et seq. There in our view neglecting that purely technical options are not enough, if 95% emissions reductions for climate protection, the shifting of problems in other countries reversed and other environmental problems (biodiversity, nitrogen cycles etc.) must be tackled at the same time. It seems furthermore improbable that—as claimed—there are more sufficiency measures in planning than are necessary to complement technological options. Same problems in Fücks (2013), pp. 69 et seq.; correctly Stengel (2011), p. 163.
This is still true if supposed that people nowadays are determined by many very subtle mechanisms in jobs, leisure, romantic relationships, emotions, identities etc., even if this external determination utilises the illusion of individual autonomy. One-sidedly therefore Schreiner (2015), pp. 104 et seq.; Schridde (2014); Gorz (2009), pp. 7 et seq. building on Sartre (1943), as well as Foucault (1973), pp. 30 et seq.; precise Fücks (2013), pp. 73 et seq.; Stengel (2011), p. 259; Prakash et al. (2016), pp. 288 et seq.
See also Deutscher Bundestag (2013), pp. 438 et seq.; Stengel (2011), pp. 183 et seq.; Schützenmeister (2010), pp. 267 et seq. und 275 et seq.; Ekardt (2016), § 2; Welzer (2013).
While the different aspects cannot be precisely differentiated; Ekardt (2001), § 13. 3.c; Entzian (2016), pp. 32 et seq. and 187 et seq.; Wilson (2015), pp. 185 et seq.; Kuckartz (2010), pp. 144 et seq.; Ernst (2010), pp. 128 et seq.; Klöckner (2015), pp. 153 et seq.; Deutscher Bundestag (2013), pp. 438 et seq.; Bruppacher (2014), pp. 51 et seq.; Blöbaum (2012), pp. 233 et seq.; Beckenbach (2003), pp. 13 et seq.
On the more recent debate Giddens (1988), pp. 51 et seq.; Gimmler (1999), pp. 27 et seq.; Pogge (2007), pp. 967 et seq.; Habermas (1981); Blöbaum (2012); Greve (2015), pp. 9 et seq.; Mead (1968), pp. 187 et seq.; Soff (2010), pp. 85 et seq.
Explicitly on this: Greve (2015), p. 20, who on p. 26 points out that individual actions cannot be allocated to “collective attributions” alone, because these attributions would again be actions, therefore leading to an infinite regress.
Similar in its intention: Habermas (1981); Giddens (1988), pp. 51 et seq.; Mead (1968), pp. 187 et seq.; Soff (2010), pp. 85 et seq.; and at last also Greve (2015), pp. 26 et seq.
On the following Ekardt (2016); Hennig (2017); similar von Bredow (2013). A brief version of the following list in Ekardt (2014), chapter IV, as well as in Hennig (2017), chapter 3.1.2.2; furthermore, von Bredow (2013), pp. 121 et seq.; an example for the transition of these points into the mainstream debate Pufé (2014), pp. 231 et seq.; Bauknecht et al. (2015), pp. 38 et seq.; Radkau (2011), pp. 580 et seq.; often, these problems are touched upon in Linz (2015), p. 10, only to be “forgotten” later. One aspect of the quantity problem is that many rather harmless individual activities add up to a harmful total. The typical focus of command-and-control law in individual activities suggests that some of those actions are “still okay”.
See e.g. SRU (2012), Tz. 13 et seq.; Hey (2014), p. 632; Heyen et al. (2013), p. 18; clearer in that regard Schmidt-Bleek (2014), pp. 80 et seq.; Santarius (2015), pp. 185 et seq.; von Bredow (2013), pp. 125 et seq. In terms of climate change missing the point, when discussing possible different results of “regulation competition”: Giegerich (2010), p. 57 (80); and Mehde (2005), pp. 94 et seq.
In detail shown in Schmidt-Bleek (2014), pp. 80 et seq. (however missing the crucial points when talking of policy instruments and explaining human motivation.).
See Fischer et al. (2013), pp. 12 et seq.; Santarius (2012), pp. 9 et seq.; Hoffmann (2015), pp. 17 et seq.; Santarius (2012), pp. 39 et seq.; Becker and Richter (2015), pp. 3 et seq.; von Bredow (2013), pp. 121 et seq.; Klingholz (2014), pp. 100 et seq.; now also Buhl (2017), pp. 327 et seq.; the discourse in political science largely overlooks rebound and shifting effects; see e.g. Jänicke and Lindemann (2009), pp. 171 et seq. (who instead emphasise the incentive-giving character of environmental policy and IASS (2011), pp. 18 et seq.
In contrast to Santarius (2012), p. 48 the problem should not be analysed limited to energy efficiency or even efficiency at all; see reference above on renewable energies, which are introduced into the market in addition to fossil energies.
In contrast to the debate that focuses on the end-user only, Santarius (2012), pp. 168 et seq. Shows in empirical depth that there are also rebound effects on the production side (contributing in total more than user behaviour). See also Peters et al. (2015), pp. 30 et seq.
“Psychological” rebound effects occur in Santarius (2012), pp. 87 et seq., 132 et seq., 211 et seq.; and Paech (2012), pp. 69 et seq.; see also Peters et al. (2015), pp. 30 et seq.