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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. The Theoretical Debate on the Great Crisis

verfasst von : Beniamino Moro

Erschienen in: Modern Financial Crises

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

According to Krugman, the central cause of the profession’s failure to forecast the current Great Crisis is the abandoning of Keynesian theory to explain crises and depressions and the prevailing of monetarism and neoclassical vision that whatever happens in a market economy must be right. According to neoclassicals, instead, economic models do not just fail to predict the timing of financial crises, they say that we cannot. This common sense is the heart of rational expectations models. So the correct conclusion should be that our inability to predict the crisis confirms neoclassical theories. Keynesians suggest that deficit spending is the right policy to put the economic system in a full employment equilibrium path, while neoclassicals think that fiscal stimulus is only a bad way to transfer money from taxpayers to inefficient bureaucrats, policymakers, and zombie firms. Anyway, Keynesians and neoclassicals share the opinion that we need a more tightening regulation of financial markets. Commercial banks, who are allowed to manage systemic contracts like bank deposits, and for that reason they have access to the lender of last resort, should be kept strictly separated from investment banks, hedge funds, and other financial speculative institutions, none of which should be considered too big to fail. This is the most important convergence between the two schools of thought.

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Fußnoten
1
The Great Moderation is a term sometimes used to describe the perceived end to economic volatility created by twentieth century banking systems. In 2004, Bernanke (2004) celebrated the Great Moderation in economic performance over the previous two decades, which he attributed in part to improved economic policymaking. The term was coined by Stock and Watson (2002).
 
2
See Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​6.
 
3
For a more detailed analysis of this view, see Chap. 10.
 
4
Presumably, here Krugman refers to the empirical CAPM, as opposed to the theoretical CAPM which, being consumption based, determines asset prices in absolute terms. The theoretical wealth portfolio return is in fact tightly linked to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption levels in two successive periods, whereas its empirical counterpart is generally represented by a benchmark portfolio of financial assets. See Cochrane (2001, Chap. 9).
 
5
Larry Summers once mocked finance professors with a parable about “ketchup economists” who “have shown that two-quart bottles of ketchup invariably sell for exactly twice as much as one-quart bottles of ketchup” and conclude from this that the ketchup market is perfectly efficient. This reasoning is labeled “ketchup economics.” See http://​marginalfoodie.​blogspot.​com/​2007/​09/​ketchup-economics-explained.​html.
 
6
The implicit allusion of this sentence is to the book, much debated during the 1980s, written by the post-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky (1982). See Chap. 10, Sect. 10.​6.
 
7
This conclusion was shared by Caballero (2010), who questioned that the core of the theoretical dispute on the recent Great Crisis was a matter of freshwater versus saltwater economics. Rather, it was a problem of distinction between core and periphery macroeconomics. For the core he meant the essence of the so-called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach, to which he attributed the confusion between the precision it had achieved about its own structure with the precision that it has about the real world, while for periphery macroeconomics he meant all those works at the intersection of macroeconomics and corporate finance that played a central role during the crisis, including liquidity evaporation, collateral shortages, bubbles, panics, fire sales, risk shifting, contagion, and the like. According to Caballero, the risk of economic theorizing was that the periphery descriptive analysis prevailed against the sound, but not always correct, core theoretical models.
 
8
The paper by Coenen et al. (2010) assesses, using seven structural models used heavily by policymaking institutions, the effectiveness of temporary fiscal stimulus.
 
9
Among Keynesians, it is worth noting that Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) sustain that the roots of the crisis are real and can be traced to the deepening income inequality of the last three decades, which led to a chronic deficiency of aggregate demand.
 
10
The term is used by Leijonhufvud in the same meaning as New Keynesian models.
 
11
The “corridor hypothesis” was put forward for the first time in Leijonhufvud (1973).
 
12
For a recent exposition of Minsky’s financial theory, see Ertürk and Özgür (2009) and Roncaglia (2010), while for a brief summary of his theory, see Chap. 10, Sect. 10.​6.
 
13
According to Zingales (2014), the very same forces that induce economists to conclude that regulators are captured should lead us to conclude that the economic profession is captured as well. As evidence of this capture, he shows that papers whose conclusions are pro-management are more likely to be published in economic journals and more likely to be cited. He also shows that business school’s faculty write papers that are more pro-management. To reduce the extent of this capture, Zingales suggests a reform of the publication process, which includes an enhanced data disclosure, from a stronger theoretical foundation to a mechanism of peer pressure. See Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​6.
 
14
This alternative approach to “unconventional” monetary policy has generated much discussion and a heated and at times confusing debate. The debate has been complicated by the use of different definitions and conflicting views of the mechanisms at work. Borio and Disyatat (2009) set out a framework for classifying and thinking about such policies, highlighting how they can be viewed within the overall context of monetary policy implementation. As regards the ECB’s quantitative easing policy, see Chap. 11, Sect. 11.​4.​5.
 
15
The same rule as the 1933 Glass–Steagall Act was passed in Europe with the 1934 German Banking Act and the 1936 Italian Banking Act, both of which compartmentalized the financial sector also in Europe.
 
16
This section is an extension of Sect. 1.​3 of Chap. 1.
 
17
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was the instrument used by the US government to purchase assets and equity from financial institutions to strengthen its financial sector. It was the largest component of the government’s measures in 2008 to address the subprime mortgage crisis.
 
18
One highly disturbing consequence of the TBTF-bailout problem that has emerged since the September 2008 federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is that market players are going to believe that every significant financial institution, should the occasion arise, would be subject to being bailed out with taxpayer funds. Businesses that are bailed out have competitive market and cost-of-capital advantages, but not efficiency advantages, over firms not thought to be systemically important (Greenspan 2010, p. 32).
 
19
According to Kindleberger (1978), having a lender of last resort exacerbates the problem. If one firm or institution thinks that in any extreme situation she cannot go bankruptcy, because there is someone that intervenes to bail out them, they partake in more risky practices. In fact, by simply bailing out these mismanaged firms or institutions, we are not giving them incentive to improve their operation. Thus, for Kindleberger, when the system runs from bubble to bubble and the subsequent panics and crashes are methodically cured with lender of last resort bailouts—as it seems to have happened over the last 15 years before the Great Crisis in the USA—those stabilization interventions turn out increasingly destabilizing.
 
20
Among others, this was the opinion expressed by Paul Krugman and US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who attributed the credit crisis to the implosion of the shadow banking system.
 
21
Dijkman (2010) sets out the main characteristics of a systemic risk assessment framework. The failure to spot emerging systemic risk and prevent the current global financial crisis warrants a reexamination of the approach taken so far to crisis prevention. In this regard, the paper by Kawai and Pomerleano (2010) argues that financial crises can be prevented, as they build up over time due to policy mistake. While one cannot predict the precise timing of crises, one can avert them by identifying and dealing with sources of instability (Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​6). For this purpose, policymakers need to strengthen top-down macro-prudential supervision, complemented by bottom-up micro-prudential supervision. The paper argues that national measures to promote financial stability are crucial and that once an effective national systemic regulator should be established, strong international cooperation is indispensable for financial stability. On the important distinction between micro-prudential and macro-prudential supervision approach, see Hanson et al (2011).
 
22
Systemically threatening institutions is among the major regulatory problems for which there are no good solutions. Early resolution of bank problems under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) appeared to have worked with smaller banks during periods of general prosperity. But the notion that risks can be identified in a sufficiently timely manner to enable the liquidation of a large failing bank with minimum loss has proved untenable during the crisis (Greenspan 2010, p. 33).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The Theoretical Debate on the Great Crisis
verfasst von
Beniamino Moro
Copyright-Jahr
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20991-3_8