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Erschienen in:

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

11. The Theory of Public Goods

verfasst von : Toshihiro Ihori

Erschienen in: Principles of Public Finance

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

In Chap. 8, we investigated taxation from the viewpoint of efficiency. In this chapter, we investigate government spending from the viewpoint of efficiency. Here, the notion of public goods is important. As explained in Chap. 1, public goods have properties of non-rivalness and non-excludability. Non-rivalness in consumption means that an increase in someone’s consumption does not reduce the availability of consumption for others. Non-excludability means that someone cannot be excluded from consuming a good because of technical or other reasons simply because she or he does not pay the price.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Income Redistribution

Nächstes Kapitel Public Spending and the Political Process

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Titel: The Theory of Public Goods
verfasst von: Toshihiro Ihori
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Buch: Principles of Public Finance
Print ISBN: 978-981-10-2388-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-10-2389-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2389-7_11