Throughout the past decades, a primarily normative conceptualisation
of development cooperation has been one of its most distinctive features vis-à-vis other policy fields, which are basically defined or understood in functional terms. Nevertheless, also development cooperation is a manifestation of governmental functions. The underlying assumption of this functional approach is that in all states (as “political systems”) “the same functions are performed […] even though these functions may be performed with different frequencies, and by different kinds of structures” (Almond
1960, p. 11), and that this can also be applied to the external behaviour of states, which in the twenty-first century may go well beyond the function of “protecting the integrity
of political systems from outside threats, or expanding into and attacking other societies” (Almond
1960, p. 5).
Thus, in order to arrive at a functional understanding of development cooperation, the core question is not “What is the
purpose of development cooperation?” but rather “What
is development cooperation?” (Kloke-Lesch
1998a,
b).
6 The distinction between the basic (or abstract) function of a policy field on the one hand, and its (changing) substantial purposes (policy goals) on the other hand, is quite familiar in different policy fields. Foreign policy is essentially not understood, for example, as peace policy by definition, but rather in functional terms as the management and shaping of relations to other states (“Diplomacy
is intermediation” [Haynal
2002, p. 34]). Nor is economic policy primarily conceived, for example, as growth policy, but rather as governments’ actions influencing economic orders, processes, or structures.
By contrast, development cooperation has been normatively framed mainly by purpose, namely the promotion of economic and social development of “developing countries”, with the MDGs
having had narrowed this normative approach to the eradication of poverty (UN
2015a). The geographical limitation
7 to (changing) lists of “developing countries” is the inherently inevitable consequence of the underlying normative concept of development, followed by the membership of both the UN and the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). Furthermore, for some decades (and for many actors and scholars still today), the measures and instruments used for this purpose have been equalled to aid, or at least have had to show a certain grant element, characterising the so-called donor–recipient relationship
.
7.2.1 The Contested Notion of “Development”
Throughout the decades, development cooperation has mainly been based on a specific, normative notion of development itself (Kloke-Lesch
2019). These traditional discourses understand development mainly as a progressive (“positive”), primarily socio-economic process that needs to happen in the “developing countries” and had happened before in the “developed countries
”. Also, critical development studies
(Veltmeyer and Wise
2018), which argue in favour of alternative development paths, tend to stick to a normative and geographically limited (or at least focussed) notion of development.
8 At the same time, calls to reconsider and abandon the term “development” are growing, as the term appears to produce more misunderstandings than solutions and to perpetuate the dichotomies of Self/Other or South/North (Schönberg
2019).
In order to break free of these basically normative connotations of “development” and get a better grip on the manifold processes under “accelerated globalisation
”, the concept of transformation
studies tries to contribute towards a rethinking of international development (Alff and Hornidge
2019). Here, transformation is conceived as an open-ended and unpredictable process (“any process of change, including studying it, or attempts to actively shape it”) with an emphasis on “the negotiation processes inherent to unfolding change, rather than about its ultimate result or outcome” not “being bound or fixed to particular places, regions or areas” (Alff and Hornidge
2019, p. 142), and thereby also challenging the traditional geographical limits of the notion of development. This challenge also sneaked into the renewed definition of development studies that evolved within the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, which mentions as one of the emerging novel concerns “poverty and social exclusion in industrialised countries” while maintaining development studies as “also characterised by normative and policy concerns” (Mönks et al.
2019).
9 Moving these argumentations even further, one could also turn to a more neutral understanding of the notion of “development” itself as a term covering the change (“developments”) occurring or unfolding in any place.
On the normative side, the advent of the universal concept of sustainable development—with its economic, social, environmental, as well as political dimensions—constitutes a contestation
to both the purpose and the geographical focus of the traditional concept of development: the 2030 Agenda
claims that development everywhere needs to be sustainable. Thus, sustainable development as a concept cannot be confined to “developing countries”, giving rise to doubts whether the notion of development can have any separate normative meaning at all alongside the notion of sustainable development. In the same vein, “the concept of the global common good
as a normative and analytical framework
for development research
and policy and international cooperation
for global sustainability
” (Messner and Scholz
2018, p. 1) constitutes a fundamental change of perspective by moving the vanishing point of development and development cooperation beyond “developing countries” alone. These various contestations
have contributed to an emerging shift “towards a new paradigm
of global development
” where the term “international development” and the accompanying concept of development cooperation from the “North” to the “South” became seen as “increasingly inappropriate for encompassing the various actors, processes and major challenges with which our world engages in the early 21st century” (Horner
2019). In this context, it is worth noting that the notion of global development
is—and should always be—broader than a political product such as the 2030 Agenda
with its SDGs
, which by their very character are an expression of a political compromise
struck in a given moment in history.
10
7.2.2 Development Cooperation: Normative Overcharge and the Risk of Marginalisation
Based on a primarily normative concept of development, most development cooperation actors from the “North” have a penchant for occupying the high moral ground and deliberately trying to insulate themselves from political, economic, or other interests and concerns beyond their own remit all too easily denounced as selfish, amoral, or at least short-term, and denied having normative bearings of their own. This basically altruistic self-perception renders development cooperation quite a delicate position with regard to other policy fields. Since giving in to self-interest is seen as an aberration from the path of virtue and questioning their core identity, development cooperation actors hesitate to enter in a give-and-take situation with other departments.
In addition, aid that is also oriented towards securing domestic or national interests
is seen as a detrimental (“not always the most efficient, nor the most effective”) way to maximise global development
ambitions (Gulrajani and Calleja
2019). This claim of maintaining the “integrity
” or “purity” of development cooperation by the “North” as, for example, epitomised in the Principled Aid Index (Gulrajani and Calleja
2019), is an underestimated impediment when seeking political compromise
. On the other hand, counting in self-interest
and non-developmental normative concerns always has been—and continues to be—part of the political reality of development cooperation (Gulrajani and Calleja
2019; Mawdsley
2017). Denying this leads to the often observed hypocrisy in domestic and international development discourses, hampering the credibility
more than the very fact itself.
Also, the suggestion to understand development cooperation quite broadly as “a country’s policies and how these affect the current and future welfare and growth of other countries’ people and economies” and to include actors “that do not have an explicit policy towards other countries […] because their policies – for example, on climate, migration
, and trade
—have a bearing on people elsewhere, regardless of their intent” (Mitchell
2021) can be seen as an acknowledgement of the realities of cooperation while maintaining a traditional normative orientation. The talk of win-win cooperation and enlightened self-interest
tries to overcome this hypocrisy, but it does not change much the basic normative understanding of development cooperation.
It was after the end of the “East-West” conflict
, in particular, that development cooperation actors hoped to break free of the geopolitical considerations infringing on their activities and focus on their core normative purpose, which inter alia led to the Millennium Declaration (UN
2000) and the MDGs. However, the two decades following the MDGs
have shown something different and confronted a normatively overcharged notion of development cooperation with new contestations
. Insulating development cooperation from infringements by other policy fields, while at the same time confronting them with far-reaching developmental demands, can lead to isolation and marginalisation of the policy field or, eventually, to its subordination to others.
7.2.3 Time and Again Too Narrow to Cope with New Challenges
Lastly and most importantly, a normative and geographically limited self-conceptualisation of development cooperation makes it difficult for development cooperation actors to deal with emerging new challenges and new actors
. This could, for example, be observed after 1989, when Western donors
started to support and promote transformation
in Central and Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union by deploying institutions and instruments of development cooperation. This engagement
of development cooperation actors was heavily contested, both from within and beyond the traditional development community, arguing that these countries were not “developing countries”, the purpose of the engagement was not poverty reduction
, and including them in the official development assistance
(ODA) would crowd out traditional recipients.
11
The primarily normative and geographically limited understanding of developing cooperation encapsulated in the ODA
concept also holds sway over the discourses on the increased heterogeneity of “developing countries” (van Bergeijk and van Marrewijk
2013; Fialho and van Bergeijk
2017). There, it leads to calls to focus development cooperation on low-income countries
, to graduate middle-income countries
from the list of ODA
recipients, and to “hand over” cooperation with them to departments beyond the aid agencies
. A comparable debate runs about whether, or to what extent, support for global public goods
such as climate or biodiversity (Kaul
2017), activities in the context of military interventions such as in Afghanistan or Iraq (Dalrymple
2016; Kisangani and Pickering
2015), or, more recently, measures in the context of migration
(CSO Partnership
2017) should be considered part of development cooperation.
Furthermore, and not only in these topical contexts, foreign affairs as well as line ministries of DAC
countries have created budget lines and set up operational structures to implement projects in “developing countries” and to fund respective multilateral institutions, thus bypassing aid departments and agencies, and furthering the “fragmentation
of aid” (Klingebiel et al.
2016). To a significant extent, the emergence of these actors can be seen also as a reaction to the hesitation and refusal by traditional development actors to embrace new topics, for example in the areas mentioned above and the related concerns of other departments. Consequently, and although most of these activities are reported as ODA
, aid departments are struggling to coordinate and embed them into their broader frameworks of development cooperation.
These contestations
from within the individual DAC
countries are accompanied and reinforced from beyond the DAC
by the increasing relevance of other state actors and approaches often subsumed under “South-South” cooperation.
12 In its self-perception as well as in the UN, this type of cooperation is explicitly seen as distinct from ODA
(UN
2019b) by following the idea of a mutually beneficial cooperation taking quite different, multimodal
forms by linking financial and technical cooperation under concessionary terms with non-concessionary means, knowledge sharing
, trade
, and investment in all kinds of sectors.
The discussed concept of Total Official Support for Sustainable Development
(TOSSD) can be understood as an attempt to develop an overarching framework for all external, officially supported finance for sustainable development (UN
2019a). “Southern” actors see this as the “Southernisation” of ODA
and an attempt to measure “South-South” cooperation with a concept originally coming from the OECD
. Still, the vanishing point also of the TOSSD
concept lies in a group of countries categorised as “developing”.
7.2.4 What Is Development Cooperation?
Given these changing conceptualisations and contestations
of development cooperation, it seems useful to look for a more basic feature that is common to all the different manifestations: the function of development cooperation within the externally oriented policy fields (Kloke-Lesch
1998a,
b). Such a basic feature needs to be embedded into a broader functional understanding of externally oriented governmental activities. For this, it seems helpful to develop a very basic mapping of the external functions of a state as a “political system”, that is, the functions that relate to its external environment and are performed in order to maintain the system (see Table
7.1). These potential functions could be basically described as threefold: first, shaping relations
between countries, second, shaping conditions
within (other) countries, and third, shaping
global conditions.
Table 7.1
Functional mapping of externally oriented policies and the place of development cooperation
Shaping relations between countries is the most basic and oldest external function of states, including, on the one hand, the relations between the states (as “political systems”) themselves (from mutual recognition and diplomacy through to the threat and use of military force), and on the other hand non-governmental relations between the countries, such as the interactions of economic and societal actors or individual persons (e.g. flow of people, goods, services, capital, knowledge, and information). Traditionally, this function is exerted by a state primarily with a view to domestic and national purposes, while in principle respecting the concepts of sovereignty and non-interference with regard to other states.
However, as the internal developments of other countries sometimes matter, shaping the conditions within countries emerged as a second external function of states. This function can be exerted with high, low, or no respect for the principles of sovereignty and non-interference as well as on the basis, for example, of a request/invitation from the one state or a proposition by the other. It may relate to economic or social conditions (e.g. labour standards, security or human rights issues, or environmental as well as migration concerns).
Beyond the conditions within countries, there is increasing interest by states in shaping global conditions. This third external function of states relates to global public goods as well as other concerns that require more than measures just within countries (e.g. climate; oceans, including deep sea mining; biodiversity; global macroeconomic stability and a functioning trading system; health; air traffic security; space; and migration).
When exercising these functions, governments can use and combine a broad array of means. I suggest categorising them as regulatory, promotional, and cooperative. Regulatory means include laws and norms at the national and international levels. Promotional means refer in the first place to financial and other incentives for non-governmental actors (e.g. business, civil society organisations, individual persons) engaged in external activities. Cooperative means, in this context, are specifically understood as intended intergovernmental project and programme cooperation aiming at concrete, palpable outcomes.
All three external functions of a state can be performed in unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral ways. The motives can be selfish, altruistic, or enlightened. The objectives may lie at home or abroad. Furthermore, the functions can be intertwined. For example, countries can shape relations to other countries with the aim of changing conditions within these countries, or they can engage in shaping conditions within other countries while aiming at global conditions or pursuing domestic policy purposes.
When applying this understanding of external governmental activities, one can describe
the basic function of development cooperation as shaping conditions within (other) countries by using cooperative and promotional civilian means (Kloke-Lesch
1998a,
b). These instruments include, above all, (1) realising projects and programmes that are often accompanied by an active influence
on the framework conditions in the respective countries and (2) promoting non-governmental
activities in these countries. For this functional definition, it does not matter whether it is performed by a dedicated department (“aid agency
”) or by governmental entities scattered across departments. Furthermore, development policy in a broader sense would also try to influence the regulatory activities, for example by foreign affairs or trade
departments, with a view to its pursued objectives (“policy coherence
for development”).
Thus, this functional role of development cooperation can come into play wherever, whenever, and for whatever reason it is politically desired and possible to influence conditions in specific countries using civilian means, from unilateral through to multilateral ones. Such a functional approach to development cooperation would not start with the question whether countries, or people in countries, are needy, but rather whether there is a necessity or interest felt to impact on developments in countries, irrespective of whether they are listed as “developing” or “developed” countries.
Depriving the notion of development cooperation of its traditional normative core and geographical focus is not meant to allow for policies not strongly rooted in the norms
and values
that are enshrined, for example, in international law and national constitutions (Burchi et al.
2018). On the contrary, a functional approach
can be helpful in better analysing and understanding the realities and normative framings of international relations
and cooperation under changing circumstances, in comparing the activities of different actors by using a uniform terminology, and in identifying necessary next steps when implementing a new, ambitious, and universal normative framework such as the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development.
7.2.5 Untapped Potential: A Functional Reading of the 2030 Agenda’s Means of Implementation
The 2030 Agenda
marks a fundamental turn from the concept of “international development” organised around the “North-South
” binary, poverty eradication, and aid for “developing countries” to a universal concept of “global development
” with sustainable development at its normative core and requiring a broad range of MoIs
in and between all countries: domestic as well as international, non-financial as well as financial, concessional as well as non-concessional, and political as well as technical ones (Kloke-Lesch
2016).
Do the 2030 Agenda
and the steps to implement it actually live up to its proclaimed universal ambitions? On the conceptual and normative levels, the broadening of the substantial purpose of development into sustainable development is spelt out throughout the document and has, in principle, been accepted globally. With regard to the universality
of the agenda and the geographic shift from “developing countries” to all countries, as well as to global issues and global public goods
, the picture is more nuanced. On the one hand, the agenda calls on all countries for implementation (“These are universal goals and targets which involve the entire world, developed and developing countries alike” [UN
2015c]), and almost all of the SDGs
—including their substantial targets—are framed in a universal way. On the other hand, the document maintains the distinction between “developed” and “developing” countries and gives particular prominence to implementation in the latter, while calling on the former to support these endeavours. This lopsidedness gets stronger with respect to the means of implementation
, which rely mainly on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (UN
2015b).
The AAAA is a product of the Financing for Development process, which predates the universal 2030 Agenda
and has been limited to the implementation in “developing countries” (Kloke-Lesch
2016). The relation between the AAAA and the 2030 Agenda was a contested issue, in particular with regard to non-financial means of implementation
, the role of the “common but differentiated responsibilities
” principle beyond environmental issues, and to what extent the 2030 Agenda
and the individual SDGs
should contain specific means of implementation
(Dodds et al.
2017). Eventually, the AAAA was declared an integral part of the 2030 Agenda
and, in addition, means of implementation
targets were included both under each SDG and SDG 17.
7.2.6 Lopsided Universality: A Functional Mapping of the Means of Implementation of the 2030 Agenda
When applying the functional understanding of external governmental activities, the 62 MoIs
mentioned in the 2030 Agenda
13 (see Annex) can be understood as a regulatory framework geared towards the three fields of activities described (shaping relations
between countries/shaping conditions
within countries/shaping
global conditions) by using the three basic kinds of means (
regulatory,
promotional, and
cooperative instruments), leading to nine principle functional fields (plus the overarching MoI 17.14 on policy coherence
for sustainable development). In Table
7.2, I assign each MoI to one of these fields according to its main focus. In addition, all MoIs
are categorised according to their universality
or focus on a type of country, leading to five categories: (1) exclusively oriented towards “developed countries
”, (2) universally oriented with an additional focus on “developed countries”, (3) universally oriented, (4) universally oriented with an additional focus on “developing countries”, and (5) exclusively oriented towards “developing countries”. With all the reservations that these different kinds of rough categorisations and assignments entail, the analysis provides at least some general patterns that expose both the overall mindset that led to the MoIs
of the 2030 Agenda
and the blind spots or missing means of implementation
.
Table 7.2
Functional mapping of the means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda
With regard to fields of activities, the MoIs of the 2030 Agenda have a clear and strong focus on shaping conditions within countries. Two-thirds (40) focus on implementation within countries, whereas 14 address relations between countries, and only 7 relate to the shaping of global conditions. While a strong focus on domestic implementation is indispensable, the relatively lesser focus of the MoIs on global conditions is deplorable. Although this can be explained by the fact that the negotiations on the 2030 Agenda tried to avoid interfering with other processes, regimes, and institutions, such as the ones on climate or trade, it can also be seen as a missed opportunity for injecting a specific 2030 Agenda momentum into these areas and making them accountable to the 2030 Agenda processes. Regarding the types of instruments, the MoIs are quite evenly distributed between regulatory (19), promotional (23), and cooperative (19) instruments. The significantly strong showing of promotional instruments demonstrates the particular focus of the 2030 Agenda on the mobilisation of non-governmental actors, in particular from the business sector and civil society.
When checking the MoIs
against the universal aspirations of the 2030 Agenda
, three quite significant features emerge: (1) a first majority of the MoIs are framed in a universal way, addressing all countries, “developed” as well as “developing” countries alike; (2) a second, overlapping
majority of the MoIs
are exclusively, or with a special focus, geared towards “developing countries”; (3) not one of the MoIs is geared exclusively, or with a special focus, towards “developed countries
”.
14 More specifically: the first majority (34 out of 62) of the MoIs are framed in a universal way, including nine of them giving an additional reference to “developing countries”. When taking the latter together with the 28 MoIs that refer exclusively to implementation in “developing countries”, one arrives at a second majority (37 out of 62) of the MoIs geared at least partly towards the “developing countries”, including those that call for support by “developed countries
”.
Furthermore, two other features are significant. First, all but one of the MoIs (18 out of 19) that address the regulation of governmental and non-governmental behaviour (including norm-setting) are framed in a strictly universal mode; most of them (14) are related to the domestic implementation in both “developed” and “developing” countries. Second, most of the MoIs that are geared towards the promotion of non-governmental behaviour (16 out of 23) and international cooperation (12 out of 19) have an exclusive focus on “developing countries”, addressing primarily the external relations of, and the conditions within, these countries.
7.2.7 Unfinished Business: “Developed Countries” Are Not Left off the Hook
This two-faced character of the means of implementation
of the 2030 Agenda
—strongly universal on the one hand, and lopsided towards “developing countries” on the other hand when it comes to specifics—reveals that the Copernican turn
in development thinking being ushered in by the 2030 Agenda
is still incomplete with regard to implementation, institutions, and instruments. This incompleteness reflects the interests of, and power relations between, major groups of countries as well as institutional path-dependencies inherited from the pre-2015
world. As “developing countries” have become used to goals being set by the international community for their domestic development (such as the MDGs
), this is in many ways quite a new experience for “developed countries
”, in particular when operating within a common framework with “developing countries”. For “developing countries”, internationally agreed goals—including their commitments to implement them via domestic actions—have been acceptable as long as they are accompanied (quid pro quo) by commitments, although often vague, from “developed countries
” to support this implementation through aid and other means. “Developed countries” have more or less accepted these commitments but remained hesitant about accepting means to monitor and enforce their implementation, even more so if they relate to issues where their own domestic and the international development goals conflict (King
2016). Thus, this hesitation by “developed countries” tends to increase even further with the 2030 Agenda
, as now monitoring and implementation relate also to issues that are traditionally seen as being primarily domestic ones, without prima facie significant external relevance.
In addition, the pre-existence of the traditional development cooperation architecture with its institutions and instruments rendered it quite easy to draw on them when designing the MoIs
of the 2030 Agenda
. At the same time, this tended to be reinforced by the institutional interests of actors within this architecture on both the “donor” and “recipient” sides. At the same time, a more detailed inclusion of means of implementation
beyond the development cooperation architecture—for example in areas such as international human rights covenants, trade
agreements, international finance, or even environmental conventions—was met with some hesitation from many sides, not least by institutional actors in these areas that wanted to avoid “subordination” to a framework not of their own making. Thus, it is quite plausible that the negotiations on the 2030 Agenda
(Dodds et al.
2017) settled with a prevalence of MoIs
related to “developing countries” and development cooperation but only included a few weaker hints to other institutional arenas.
However, although the MoIs
do not make specific references to implementation in “developed countries
”, these are not released from their respective responsibilities
. The letter and the spirit of the majority of the MoIs are truly universal and establish a responsibility
, in the sense of “obligation” (Bexell and Jönsson
2017), also of “developed countries
” to act on the SDGs
domestically and in their relations with each other. Furthermore, the agenda itself calls on all countries to put “cohesive nationally owned sustainable development strategies” at the heart of the efforts and underscores “that, for all countries, public policies and the mobilization and effective use of domestic resources
, […] are central” (UN
2015c).
This is all the more compelling with regard to the “developed countries
”. Their gross domestic product (GDP) amounts to roughly three-fifths of global GDP, and their trade
and foreign direct investment just between them amount to roughly half of both. But it is not only these figures that matter due to their sheer size in addition to the spillover
effects on other countries and the planet that go along with them (Schmidt-Traub et al.
2019). Also, the patterns of production and consumption, of trade
and foreign direct investment, and, for example, of knowledge
production and technological development that prevail within and between “developed countries
” critically shape the global system and their interactions with other countries.
Furthermore, and most importantly, without being embraced also by the people of “developed countries” as a positive agenda that is beneficial to themselves as well, the 2030 Agenda will not get the required societal and political support. It is therefore of critical importance to link core societal concerns in “developed countries” to the SDGs and integrate them as guiding objectives in the respective domestic policies.