nach oben

Public Choice

Erschienen in:

01.09.2014

The use of eminent domain in land assembly: The case of the Tennessee Valley Authority

verfasst von: Carl Kitchens

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2014

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Eminent domain gives public agencies the right to acquire property from private individuals in exchange for just compensation. Following Kelo vs. New London 2005, the powers of eminent domain were extended, opening the door for potential abuses of power by government officials. In this paper, I empirically investigate the use of eminent domain using newly digitized records from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which extensively used eminent domain to construct dams in the 1930s. Using a sample of families living in one reservoir location, I find empirical evidence that land tenure, the number of property holdings, and debt levels affected the holdout decision, suggesting that holdouts are individuals with high subjective values. I then develop a screening model with asymmetric information in seller valuations to predict when eminent domain will be used and what settlement values and court awards would be. I test the model’s and find that individuals who held out increased their property value by about 5 %, and incentives to holdout existed only for individuals who received initially low settlement proposals.

Vorheriger Artikel Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects

Nächster Artikel The impact of closeness on electoral participation exploiting the Italian double ballot system

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

It has been noted that changes in the use of the property after its acquisition may lead to excessive takings. I refer the reader to Kim and Park (2010) for a discussion of change in use provisions in different countries and U.S. states.

Guidry and Do Quang (1998) essentially replicate Munch (1976) using a dataset from a different city.

Through the 1950s, dam locations of the TVA appear to have been driven by geography rather than politics. Later dam projects, such as the Tellico Dam, did show some signs of being politically motivated. Kitchens (2013a, 2013b) shows that TVA dams were located in places with large rivers and steep land gradients. These locations were suitable for generating electricity.

Empirically, it is not possible to distinguish the first TVA appraisal from an adjusted offer; thus, they will be treated as a single offer that either was accepted or rejected.

For a more detailed description, see McCarthy (1949).

These data were collected from the National Archives Southeast Region in Morrow, GA.

During this procedure, a large number of observations were not matched owing to the prevalence of share and tenant farming. The TVA annual report (1939a) indicates that only 152 of 1,182 families living in the reservoir were owner operators of at least one property.

The exact estimation procedure is similar to regression (2), presented later.

Individuals are defined as an owner-operator if they appear in both samples.

The prediction than eminent domain will not be used in a perfect information setting is robust to a variety of modeling assumptions, such as non-cooperative sequential move games, as well as Nash bargaining occurring with multiple sellers either simultaneously or sequentially.

It is assumed that the value of the developer, V _b, is large enough such projects are worth undertaking regardless of the distribution of seller types.

In the event that the value distribution is continuous, the buyer would offer a price above a threshold seller value, all sellers below that value would accept, and all sellers with higher values would reject, resulting in a similar separating equilibrium.

The assumption that the courts can perfectly identify types is a simplifying assumption that allows the model to predict scenarios in which eminent domain may be used in equilibrium. The assumption that the court can perfectly determine an individual’s type may be restrictive; however, as will be shown empirically, individuals are unlikely to increase their award by going to court if their property had not been undervalued initially.

Low-type sellers are indifferent between court and the private offer; it is assumed that in this case, they take the private offer.

Although the results generally correspond to the model, other models may explain the data. For instance, individuals who were difficult to deal with, such as those with unfavorable opinions of the TVA, could have received below-market appraisals by the TVA as a form of punishment, and eminent domain proceedings would have been the only opportunity for restitution.

Bebchuk, L. (1984). Litigation and settlement under imperfect information. The RAND Journal of Economics, 15, 404–415. 1984. CrossRef

Benson, B. (2008). The evolution of eminent domain power: a remedy for market failure or an effort to limit government power and government failure. Independent Review, 12(3), 423–432.

Blume, L., Rubinfeld, D., & Shapiro, P. (1984). The taking of land: when should compensation be paid? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99(1), 71–92. CrossRef

Buchanan, J., & Yoon, Y. (2000). Symmetric tragedies: commons and anticommons Journal of Law and Economics, 43(2000), 1. CrossRef

Chang, Y. (2010). An empirical study of compensation paid in eminent domain settlements: New York city, 1990–2002. The Journal of Legal Studies, 39(1), 201–244. CrossRef

Heller, M. (1998). The tragedy of the anticommons: property in the transition from Marx to markets. Harward Law Review, 111(3), 621–688. CrossRef

Guidry, K., & Do Quang, A. (1998). Eminent domain and just compensation for single-family homes. Appraisal Journal, 66, 231–235.

Innes, R. (1997). Takings, compensation, and equal treatment for owners of developed and undeveloped property. The Journal of Law & Economics, 40(2), 403–432. CrossRef

Kim, I., & Park, S. (2010). Eminent domain power and afterwards: Leviathan’s post-taking opportunism. Public Choice, 143(1–2), 209–227. CrossRef

Kitchens, C. (2013a). A dam problem: TVA’s fight against malaria 1926–1951. Journal of Economic History, 73(3), 694–724. CrossRef

Kitchens, C. (2013b). The role of publicly provided electricity in economic development: the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority 1929–1955. University of Mississippi working paper.

Kitchens, C., & Roomets, A. (2012). “Dealing with eminent domain”. University of Arizona working paper.

Kline, P., & Moretti, E. (2013). “Local economic development, agglomeration economies and the big push: 100 years of evidence from the TVA”. University of California at Berkeley working paper.

Lilienthal, D. (1944). Tennessee Valley Authority: democracy on the March. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

Lopez, E., Jewell, R., & Campbell, N. (2009). Pass a law, any law, fast! State legislative responses to the Kelo backlash. International Review of Law and Economics, 5(1), 1. CrossRef

McCarthy, C. (1949). Land acquisition policies and proceedings in TVA—a study of the role of land acquisition in a regional agency. Ohio State Law Journal, 10, 46.

Miceli, T., & Segerson, K. (2007). A bargaining model of holdouts and takings. American Law and Economics Review, 9(1), 160–174. CrossRef

Miceli, T., & Segerson, K. (2012). Land assembly and the holdout problem under sequential bargaining. American Law and Economics Review, 14(2), 372–390. CrossRef

Munch, P. (1976). An economic analysis of eminent domain. The Journal of Political Economy, 84, 473–497. 1976. CrossRef

Neufeld, J., Hausman, W., & Rapoport, R. (1994). A paradox of voting: cyclical majorities and the case of muscle shoals. Political Research Quarterly, 47(2), 423–438. CrossRef

Powell, J. (2007). FDR’s folly: how Roosevelt and his New Deal prolonged the great depression. Crown.

Schlesinger, A. (1959). The coming of the new deal. Boston: Houghton & Mifflin.

Shavell, S. (2010). Eminent domain versus government purchase of land given imperfect information about owners’ valuations. The Journal of Law & Economics, 53(1), 1–27. CrossRef

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Social and Economic Division (1935). TVA form 970-survey of families. Records of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Record Group 142. Box 86-89. National Archives and Records Administration- Southeast Region( Morrow, GA). Acquired November, 2008.

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) (1937). Annual report. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) (1939a). Annual report. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Real Estate Department (1939b). Land Registers. Guntersville Reservoir. Chattanooga, TN, acquired 1-7-2009.

Titel: The use of eminent domain in land assembly: The case of the Tennessee Valley Authority
verfasst von: Carl Kitchens
Publikationsdatum: 01.09.2014
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2014
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0102-x

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3-4/2014

Wolfgang Kasper, Manfred E. Streit and Peter J. Boettke: Institutional economics: property, competition, and policies, 2nd ed

Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives

Transaction costs can encourage Coasean bargaining

Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform

Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects

Thomas Piketty: Capital in the twenty-first century