Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
Having debated the causes of the crash, described the policy response during the acute phase of the crisis and reviewed the key ingredients of the global and local reform agenda—raising regulatory requirements, dealing with too big to fail, contemplating structural reform of the banking sector and revisiting the terms on which central banks provide liquidity insurance—we will now turn to briefly discuss other aspects of the prudential agenda.
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Acharya, V., & Öncü, T. (2013). A proposal for the resolution of systemically important assets and liabilities: The case of the repo market. International Journal of Central Banking, 9(S1), 291–349.
Bailey, D. (2014, November 24). The Bank of England’s perspective on CCP risk management, recovery and resolution arrangements.
Bailey, A. (2014a, October 16) Speech given at the City Banquet.
Bailey, A. (2014b, December 4). Changes in insurance regulation globally and how we should ensure the changes are appropriate and proportional. Speech.
Baker, G. (1992). Incentive contracts and performance measurement. Journal of Political Economy, 100(3), 598–614. CrossRef
Bartholdy, J., Boyle, G., & Stover, R. (2003). Deposit insurance and the risk premium in bank deposit rates. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 699–717. CrossRef
Bliss, R., & Steigerwald, R. (2006). Derivatives clearing and settlement: A comparison of central counterparties and alternative structures. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Q4, 22–29.
BoE. (2009, December). Financial stability report.
BoE. (2014). Depositor protection. Consultation Paper CP20/14.
BoE. (2015, March 4). European Central Bank (ECB) location policy for Central Counterparties. News release.
Borio, C. (2004). Market distress and vanishing liquidity: Anatomy and policy options. BIS Working Paper 158.
Bulley, A. (2015, June 2). Reflecting on Solvency II: Continuity and change. Speech.
Carney, M. (2015, December 1). Remarks in the December 2015 financial stability report press conference.
Claessens, S., & Kodre, L. (2014). The regulatory responses to the global financial crisis: Some uncomfortable questions. IMF Working Paper 14/46/
Cummings, F., & Noss, J. (2013). Assessing the adequacy of CCPs’ default resources. Bank of England Financial Stability Paper 26.
Cuomo, A. (2009). No rhyme or reason: The ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ bank bonus culture. Report.
Duffie, D., Li, A., & Lubke, T. (2010). Policy perspectives on OTC derivatives markets infrastructure. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 424.
EBA. (2015, May). Guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to deposit guarantee scheme.
Elliott, D. (2013). Central counterparty loss-allocation rules. Bank of England Financial Stability Paper 20.
European Commission. (2015, January 12). Solvency II overview. Fact sheet.
Fahlenbrach, R., & Stulz, R. (2011). Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(1), 11–26. CrossRef
Fisher, P. (2015, January 22). Regulation and the future of the insurance industry. Speech.
FSA. (2005, November). Insurance sector briefing: ICAS – One year on.
FSA. (2012, September). The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final report.
FSB. (2012, February). Thematic review on deposit insurance schemes.
FSB. (2014, November). Transforming shadow banking into resilient market-based financing.
Geithner, T. (2010, April 20). Written testimony before the house financial services committee.
Goodwin, F. (2009, February 10). Evidence to the Treasury Select Committee.
Gorton, G. (1994). Bank regulation when ‘banks’ and ‘banking’ are not the same. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 10(4), 106–119. CrossRef
Gorton, G. (2010). Slapped by the invisible hand: The panic of 2007. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2010). Regulating the shadow banking system. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, 261–297. CrossRef
Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2012). Securitized banking and the run on repo. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3), 425–451. CrossRef
Gorton, G., & Winton, A. (2002). Financial intermediation. NBER Working Paper 8928.
Gregg, P., Jewell, S., & Tonks, I. (2012). Executive pay and performance: Did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis? International Review of Finance, 12(1), 89–122. CrossRef
Haldane, A. (2009, April 28). Rethinking the financial network. Speech.
Hauser, A. (2015, January 29). Realigning private and public interests in wholesale financial markets. Speech.
HMT, BoE, & FCA. (2015, June). Fair and effective markets review final report.
Horner, J. (2002). Reputation and competition. American Economic Review, 92(3), 644–663. CrossRef
IADI. (2014, November). IADI core principles for effective deposit insurance systems.
IMF. (2010, April) Making over-the-counter derivatives safer. Global Financial Stability Report.
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Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank order tournaments as optimum contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841–864. CrossRef
McCarthy, C. (2008, May 13). Lessons from the financial crisis. Speech.
Merton, R., & Bodie, Z. (1993). Deposit insurance reform. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 38, 1–34. CrossRef
Miller, M. (1995). Do the M & M propositions apply to banks? Journal of Banking and Finance, 19, 483–489. CrossRef
Murphy D., Vasios, M., & Vause, N. (2014). An investigation into the procyclicality of risk-based initial margin models. Bank of England Financial Stability Paper 29.
Palomino, F., & Pratt, A. (2003). Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers. RAND Journal of Economics, 34(1), 113–137. CrossRef
Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A., & Boesky, H. (2013). Shadow banking. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Economic Policy Review, December, 1–16.
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Rajan, R. (2008, January 8). Bankers’ pay is deeply flawed. Financial Times.
Rajan, U., & Srivastava, S. (2000). Portfolio delegation with limited liability. Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Paper 1503.
Rehlon, A., & Nixon, D. (2013). Central counterparties: What are they, why do they matter and how does the Bank supervise them? Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q2, 1–10.
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Scharfstein, D., & Stein, J. (1990). Herd behaviour and investment. American Economic Review, 80(3), 465–479.
Sierra, G., Talmor, E., & Wallace, J. (2004). A unified analysis of executive pay. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Paper 2004–02.
Stulz, R. (2010). Credit default swaps and the credit crisis. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1), 73–92. CrossRef
Swain, R., & Swallow, D. (2015). The prudential regulation of insurers under Solvency II. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q1, 1–14.
Thoyts, R. (2010). Insurance theory and practice. London/New York: Routledge.
Tucker, P. (2010, January 21). Shadow banking, financing markets and financial stability. Speech.
Tucker, P. (2011a, April 14). Macroprudential policy: Building financial stability institutions. Speech.
Tucker, P. (2011b, June 1). Clearing houses as system risk managers. Speech.
Tucker, P. (2011c, October 24). Central counterparties: The agenda. Speech.
Tucker, P. (2012a, April 27). Shadow banking: Thoughts for a possible policy agenda. Speech.
Tucker, P. (2012b, October 25). The role of deposit insurance in building a safer financial system. Speech.
Tucker, P. (2014, April 11). Are clearing houses the new central banks? Keynote speech at Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Symposium on the Central Clearing of Derivatives.
Vause, N. (2010). Counterparty risk and contract volumes in the credit default swap market. BIS Quarterly Review, December, 59–69.
Woods, S. (2015, July 9). Adapting to solvency II, Speech.
Wendt, F. (2006). Intraday margining of central counterparties: EU practice and a theoretical evaluation of benefits and costs. DNB Working Papers 107.
Zhu, S. (2011). Is there a “race to the bottom” in central counterparties competition? DNB Occasional Studies 9/6.
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- The Wider Prudential Policy Agenda
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