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01.12.2013

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2012–2013

verfasst von: Ronald Drennan, Matthew Magura, Aviv Nevo

Erschienen in: Review of Industrial Organization | Ausgabe 4/2013

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Abstract

During 2012–2013, the Antitrust Division brought a wide range of litigated matters to successful conclusions. Litigation puts the economic analysis of an antitrust investigation to the ultimate test, and the Division continues to rely on its first-rate economic staff to help explain a wide range of matters to the courts. The four cases discussed below demonstrate the diverse set of issues the Division examines every year.

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Fußnoten
1
On June 4, 2013, ABI completed its acquisition of Modelo, and on June 7, 2013, ABI completed the sale of the required assets to Constellation.
 
2
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Sect. 6.
 
3
Complaint, paragraph 61.
 
4
Complaint, paragraph 9.
 
5
Complaint, paragraph 46.
 
6
Complaint, paragraph 51.
 
7
Complaint, paragraph 52.
 
8
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Sect. 1.
 
9
Press Release, March 25, 2013, Justice Department files Motion to Dismiss Antitrust Lawsuit Against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan After Michigan Passes Law to Prohibit Health Insurers From Using Most Favored Nation Clauses in Provider Contracts.
 
10
The economics literature on MFNs contemplates other possible theories of harm (for example, the possibility of facilitating collusion among sellers) as well as other possible efficiencies (such as reduced transactions costs). For a recent review of other theories of harm and possible efficiencies from MFNs, see Lear (2012).
 
11
Vistnes (2013) discusses how this uncertainty might also discourage the use of risk-based contracts—contracts that would have rewarded hospitals for providing services in a cost-effective manner. This working paper, and the Complaint itself, discuss additional ways in which the use of MFNs can harm competition.
 
12
BCBSM also had equal-to-MFNs with eleven of the thirteen small community hospitals in the Upper Peninsula.
 
13
This example is discussed in more detail in the Division’s October 18, 2010 Complaint, paragraphs 49 through 59.
 
14
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
 
15
Individuals charged in a price-fixing conspiracy sometimes go to court in hopes of avoiding jail time. Corporations are more likely to enter into a plea agreement. Before AUO, the last corporate defendant to litigate price-fixing charges through trial was Chek Food Stores, Inc. in August of 2009.
 
16
Opinion, p. 9.
 
17
Apple’s defense included other arguments of a particularly legal or factual nature which were also not compelling.
 
18
Opinion, p. 99.
 
19
“Disintermediation” includes Amazon’s promotion of self-publishing for e-book authors, one of the practices that contributed to much of the publishers’ desire to stop Amazon from making e-books so popularly accepted. The “wholesale model” refers to traditional arrangements between publishers and retailers, as opposed to the “agency model” created in the Apple contracts.
 
20
Note that some distinction should be made between Apple’s bookstore application and the capabilities of the device itself, which would have come to market whether publishers agreed to an Apple e-bookstore or not.
 
21
Opinion, p. 135.
 
22
Opinion, p. 121.
 
23
See Opinion, at p. 116: “Apple included the MFN, or price parity provision, in its Agreements both to protect itself against any retail price competition and to ensure that it had no retail price competition”.
 
Metadaten
Titel
The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2012–2013
verfasst von
Ronald Drennan
Matthew Magura
Aviv Nevo
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2013
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Review of Industrial Organization / Ausgabe 4/2013
Print ISSN: 0889-938X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7160
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-013-9412-x