Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security

Mutual accusation of interference in domestic affairs is a recurrent theme in Russian–American relations. The aim of the Chapter is to disclose the roots of mutual suspicions in this area. Before exploring interactions between Moscow and Washington, it first strives to define political subversion in general terms. It also recurs to the instances of foreign intrusion in domestic affairs during the Cold War to examine attributes of this strategy. After that, it tracks the rise of Russian concerns towards US policies since the 1990s and demonstrates how Moscow’s reaction triggered anxiety in the West. The development of mutual mistrust between Moscow and Washington followed a well-known model of the ‘security dilemma’ and despite initial asymmetries by late 2010s it produced the current balance of concerns.

Sandcastles, the really good ones, the ones that transcend simple piles of wet sand and shells and become works of art, are the product of meticulous and patient artists. Their chosen medium is mercurial and fickle. One errant move and the whole structure could fall apart. Similarly, their work is at the mercy of external forces beyond their control-high winds, a rough wave, or a passer-by bent on havoc. Over time, even with the best defences, sandcastles will erode and require reinforcement and rebuilding. It might seem a stretch to think of arms control treaties in the same way, but the similarities are striking. After all, diplomacy is an art, not a science.

Cyberspace and new digital technologies and ways of communicating will have a considerable impact on Euro-Atlantic security and strategic stability. Many of the central beliefs that underpinned international politics during the years of the Cold War have become increasingly irrelevant in the face of new types of economic competition, forms of conflicts, factors of power and international influence, new actors and a generally new global environment. Information technologies, the Internet and cyberspace are probably the most significant differences between the Cold War and the twenty-first century. Today, information exists in at least three different capacities: an asset, a tool and a domain, each of which has strategic importance. As a result, the “cyber” factor poses many new political challenges that every nation must deal with in its own unique way. The information revolution and cyberspace are therefore both significant game changers for international relations and security. The new environment is unprecedented, and thus it may prove very difficult if not impossible to employ past experiences as a means to address these emerging challenges.

Russia–West relations have suffered dramatically in recent years. The Ukraine crisis of 2014 wasn’t the direct reason for this downturn, but it was a significant turning point. Instead, Russian experts point to the failure to ensure Russia’s security in the Euro-Atlantic space after the Cold War as one of the main reasons for the crisis. The result is that since 2014, political, economic and people-to-people relations have been transformed, and on the whole, worsened. The question of how to build a cooperative Russia–West relationship therefore remains open.

This Chapter observes and analyses the tensions within the NATO–Russian relationship by focussing on the activities of the NATO Information Office (NIO) in Russia, especially how its political agenda has influenced the working processes in the office. Being a NIO project officer for almost two years (2012–2013), just before the Ukrainian crises, I implemented a number of successful projects within our small team and together with our Russian partner organisations and colleagues. Due to the confidentiality obligation within my working contract with NIO towards third parties, which continues beyond the termination of the employment relationship, I will not be able to mention all the details of some of the processes that I faced during my duties. However, there is considerable public information and media sources available, which cover the most relevant topics and tendencies discussed in this Chapter.

After five centuries of rivalry and hostility, Turkey–Russia relations appeared to have begun a new and more positive phase in the early 2000s, characterised by cooperation. However, this trend was rudely interrupted by the warplane incident that took place on 24 November 2015; when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian aircraft near the Turkey–Syria border. After a seven-month break in relations, a “normalisation” process has started with the aim of overcoming the negative effects of the incident.

On 24 September 2017, a general election was held in Germany. Instead of an expected government coalition between the Christian Democrats (CDU), the Liberals (FDP) and the Green Party, a grand coalition (“GroKo”) between the CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats (SPD) entered government in March 2018, and Angela Merkel was sworn in her for her fourth term as German chancellor. With rising populism and nationalism in Europe, and an increasingly unstable global order, the first round of failed exploratory talks came about like a harbinger of further difficult times for Germany. Since then, the new government has to deal not only with right-wing Parliamentarians from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) that entered the Bundestag (and is being represented in all 16 state parliaments from October 2018), but also with numerous security challenges in Europe. Perhaps chief among these, and although President Donald Trump is more than two years in office, is that it remains difficult to judge whether European NATO allies can still rely on the full support of the United States. Thus, Germany as a middle power in Europe has to consider the possibility of playing a more significant leadership role in the Euro-Atlantic space.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the so-called “frozen” or “protracted” conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In this sense it has many similarities to conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, it also has important differences from these conflicts, where the main actors can be described as post-Soviet republics that are supported by the West, versus de facto states supported by Russia. One of the most striking differences between these conflicts and the one in Nagorno-Karabakh is precisely the position of Russia and the West. Both have avoided providing decisive support to either side, and, moreover, they have cooperated for decades in their efforts to find a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Belarus is a former Soviet republic and now independent state that presents an interesting, yet poorly explored, empirical puzzle for Euro-Atlantic security. Theoretically informed research only rarely seems to focus on its foreign policy. When it does, it is often through the lens of the ‘last dictatorship of Europe’ or the discourse of ‘Russia’s geopolitical backyard’. While these lenses can be interesting in dealing with certain analytical questions, they shed only sporadic, and often distorting, light on the country’s overall international behaviour. It is not surprising, therefore, that the logic and nature of Belarus’s foreign policy are widely misunderstood in both academic and policy debates. Besides being a problem and challenge for Belarus itself, this established misunderstanding inhibits external actors’ ability to interpret Minsk’s behaviour in foreign affairs and to correctly identify the limits of the possible in dealing with Belarus. This, in turn circumscribes the Belarusian government’s ability to contribute more significantly to Euro-Atlantic security, an ambition it has declared since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014.

In September 2015, Russia staged a significant military comeback to the Middle East through its direct intervention in the Syrian civil war. The intervention was officially presented as an anti-terrorism operation and took the form of a bombing campaign in support of the Syrian army and its allies, including Iranian and Hezbollah troops. The Russian Aerospace Forces deployed in Syria were supported by strategic bombers flying from bases in Russia, as well as by Navy ships and submarines that launched cruise missiles from the Mediterranean and the Caspian seas. Thanks to this deployment, Russia was able to influence decisively the course of the Syrian crisis and consolidate its military presence in the country. The campaign was a display of recently (re)acquired military might. Moreover, it showed leaders in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that Russia is willing to uphold its commitments as an ally and take on a leading diplomatic role in subsequent negotiations.

Ukraine is a uniquely important country for Russia and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The two countries are united not only by history and religion, but also by structural, social, and economic ties inherited from the Imperial and Soviet eras. In fact, those ties account for a double-digit percentage of both countries’ respective GDPs. However, Russian-Ukrainian interdependence has been decreasing since 2004 due to choices made by the Ukrainian elite and the continuing political instability in Ukraine. Russia believes that the regime in Ukraine is hostile and will remain in power for a long time. This has forced Russia to continue reducing its dependence on Ukraine. It is in the interests of both countries to ensure that the process of reducing interdependence is both gradual and carefully thought out.

In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the whole security system in the Euro-Atlantic region has deteriorated due to the violation of its central principles and norms. Therefore the crisis represents the crucial test for the sustainability of all previous security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic and challenges the viability of continental security in general. The crisis is complex and its settlement must include solutions at four levels—geopolitical, geoeconomic, bilateral and domestic. Attempts to tackle only one or two of these three levels will fail to find a sustainable solution to the crisis. But it must be settled as soon as possible, because it presents a ticking bomb for the whole continent (the tragic experience of the rivalry between France and Germany in the nineteenth to twentieth centuries is perhaps a good analogy). In order to achieve this, all the parties involved should demonstrate real political will in finding a solution and apply smart diplomacy instead of hard power and confrontation.

The global system is in a state of flux, and security challenges are being felt very differently by the United States and Europe. This is having a significant impact on what we might think of as the “Euro-Atlantic space” and on the interests and policies of its members. European nations are wrestling with an unprecedented refugee crisis and Brexit, while the United States is increasingly concerned about a growing power competition with China. There even seems to be a transatlantic split on the implications of Russian activities in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and of the war with Georgia in 2008. The risk is that the current Euro-Atlantic security architecture, designed for a different time and set of challenges, may be unravelling in the face of a new type of global security landscape, and especially a transition to Asia as the fulcrum of the twenty-first century.