In this paper we propose
threshold attribute-based signatures
(t-ABS). A t-ABS scheme enables a signature holder to prove possession of signatures by revealing only the relevant attributes of the signer, hence providing
for the signature holder. We define t-ABS schemes, formalize their security and propose two t-ABS schemes: a basic scheme secure against selective forgery and a second one secure against existential forgery, both provable in the standard model, assuming hardness of the CDH problem. We show that our basic t-ABS scheme can be augmented with two extra protocols that are used for efficiently issuing and verifying t-ABS signatures on committed values. We call the augmented scheme a threshold attribute based c-signature scheme (t-ABCS). We show how a t-ABCS scheme can be used to realize a secure
threshold attribute-based anonymous credential system
(t-ABACS) providing issuer-attribute privacy. We propose a security model for t-ABACS, give a concrete scheme using t-ABCS scheme, and prove that the credential system is secure if the t-ABCS scheme is secure.