Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
This paper aims to establish and explore the links between two threads in the public finance literature. One is the use of tax thresholds to partition taxpayers into those who are liable to pay tax and those who are not. The other is the notion of ‘informality’ as a central challenge for tax design and implementation. Several insights emerge. First, the results make clear that the term ‘informal’ as used in the literature is imprecise and can consequently be very misleading: the models reveal a range of compliant and non-compliant behaviors with very different welfare and revenue implications. Second, the various forms of behavior considered suggest optimal thresholds generally higher than would otherwise be the case, with quite complicated implications for the associated patterns of (non)-compliance. Third, when (as is realistic) firms and individuals face multiple tax and non-tax obligations, the setting of optimal thresholds is considerably more complex.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Wallace, S. (Eds.). (2004). Taxing the hard-to-tax. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Almunia, M., & López-Rodríguez, D. (2013). Firms’ responses to tax enforcement policies: Evidence from Spain. University of Warwick, Mimeo.
Auriol, Emmanuelle, & Warlters, Michael. (2005). Taxation base in developing countries. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 625–646. CrossRef
Bastani, S., & Selin, H. (2012). Bunching and non-bunching at kink-points of the Swedish tax schedule. CESifo working paper no. 3865.
Burgess, R., & Stern, N. H. (1993). Taxation and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 762–830.
Chatterjee, U., & Wingender, P. (2011). Tax-threshold and bunching: Evidence from Indian firms. IMF, Mimeo.
Chatterjee, U., & Kanbur, R. (2013). Regulation and non-compliance: Magnitudes and patterns for India’s Factories Act. World Bank policy research working paper, no. 6755.
Coolidge, J. (2012). Findings on tax compliance cost surveys in developing countries. eJournal of Tax Research, 10, 250–287.
Dabla-Norris, E., Gradstein, M., & Inchauste, G. (2008). What causes firms to hide output? The determinants of informality. Journal of Development Economics, 85, 1–27. CrossRef
De Paula, A., & Scheinkman, J. A. (2010). Value-added taxes, chain effects and informality. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 195–221. CrossRef
Dharmapala, Dhammika, Slemrod, Joel, & Wilson, John Douglas. (2011). Tax policy and the missing middle: Optimal tax remittance with firm-level administrative costs. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 1036–1047. CrossRef
Ebrill, L., Keen, M., Summers, V., & Bodin, J. P. (2001). The modern VAT. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Erard, B., & Ho, C.-C. (2001). Searching for ghosts: Who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe? Journal of Public Economics, 81, 25–50. CrossRef
European Commission. (2004). European tax survey, directorate general customs union and taxation, Working paper no. 3.
Garicano, L., Lelarge, C., & van Reenen, J. (2013). Firm size distortions and the productivity distribution: Evidence from France. London School of Economics, Mimeo.
Gauthier, B., & Gersovitz, M. (1997). Revenue erosion and evasion in Cameroon, 1993. Journal of Public Economics, 64, 407–424. CrossRef
Gauthier, B., & Reinikka, R. (2001). Shifting tax burdens through exemptions and evasion: An empirical Investigation of Uganda. World Bank, Mimeo.
Goyette, J. (2012). Optimal VAT threshold: Official vs. effective enforcement. University of Sherbrooke, Mimeo.
Hindriks, J., Keen, M., & Muthoo, A. (1999). Corruption, extortion and evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 74, 395–430. CrossRef
Hsieh, C.-T., & Olken, B. A. (2014). The missing “missing middle”. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 19966.
International Tax Dialogue. (2007). Taxation of small and medium enterprises. http://www.itdweb.org/smeconference/conferencepapers.aspx.
Inter-American Development Bank. (2013). More than revenue: Taxation as a development tool. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Kanbur, Ravi. (2009). Conceptualising informality: Regulation and enforcement. Indian Journal of Labour Economics, 52(1), 33–42.
Keen, M. (2013). Taxation and development-Again. In C. Fuest & G. Zodrow (Eds.), Studies of critical issues in taxation and development (pp. 13–41). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Keen, M., & Mintz, J. (2004). The optimal threshold for a value-added tax. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 559–576. CrossRef
Keen, M., & Simone, A. (2004). Tax policy in developing countries: Some lessons from the 1990s, and some challenges ahead. In S. Gupta, B. Clements, & G. Inchauste (Eds.), Helping countries develop: The role of fiscal policy (pp. 302–352). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Kleven, H. J., & Mazhar, W. (2013). Using notches to uncover optimization frictions and structural elasticities: Theory and evidence from Pakistan. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 669–723.
Mubiru, A. (2010). Committee of Ten policy brief: Domestic resource mobilization across Africa: Trends, challenges and policy options. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/C-10%20Note%202%20English%20(final)_for%20posting%202.pdf.
Onji, K. (2009). The response of firms to eligibility thresholds: Evidence from the Japanese value-added tax. Journal of Public Economics, 93, 766–775. CrossRef
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2008). Governance, taxation and accountability: Issues and practices, development assistance committee guidelines and reference series. Paris: OECD.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2009). Is informal normal?. Paris: OECD.
Pomeranz, D. (2011). No taxation without information: Deterrence and self-enforcement in the value added tax. Tax Administration Review (forthcoming).
Saez, E. (2010). Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2, 180–212.
Slemrod, J. (2001). A general model of the behavioral response to taxation. International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 119–128. CrossRef
Slemrod, J. (2010). Buenas noches: Lines and notches in tax system design. Mimeo: University of Michigan.
Tybout, J. R. (2000). Manufacturing firms in developing countries: How well do they do, and why? Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 11–44. CrossRef
Zee, H. (2005). Simple analytics of setting the optimal VAT exemption threshold. De Economist, 153, 461–471. CrossRef
- Thresholds, informality, and partitions of compliance
- Springer US
microm, Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, Avaloq/© Avaloq Evolution AG, Avaloq/© Avaloq