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1996 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems

verfasst von : Paul C. Kocher

Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’96

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operations, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against a vulnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk, including cryptographic tokens, network-based cryptosystems, and other applications where attackers can make reasonably accurate timing measurements. Techniques for preventing the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman are presented. Some cryptosystems will need to be revised to protect against the attack, and new protocols and algorithms may need to incorporate measures to prevent timing attacks.

Metadaten
Titel
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
verfasst von
Paul C. Kocher
Copyright-Jahr
1996
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9