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Like war, threat policy is assigned to those political practices which characterize in particular international politics (This text was first published with the same title “Towards an Analysis of Threat Policy in International Relations”, in: German Political Studies, vol.1 (1974), edited by Klaus von Beyme (London–Beverly Hills: Sage): 59–103. On the analysis of threat policy, see references to the literature in Dieter Senghaas: Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit (Frankfurt: 1969). The following observations represent an attempt to expand and make more precise the questions raised in the above-mentioned book). As late as the 1950s this concept could be found in most of the ‘classical’ introductions to international politics and the theory of international relations. If today threat policy is no longer considered to be a given and an almost fixed component in international politics, and if at least in some scholarly studies it is no longer merely taken for granted as an irrevocable characteristic of politics between states and societies, then this is certainly due in part to the efforts of peace research. For peace research does not merely register the existence of threat policy but rather undertakes a critical, detailed analysis of threat policy from various points of view.
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This text was first published with the same title “Towards an Analysis of Threat Policy in International Relations”, in: German Political Studies, vol. 1 (1974), edited by Klaus von Beyme (London–Beverly Hills: Sage): 59–103. On the analysis of threat policy, see references to the literature in Dieter Senghaas: Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit (Frankfurt: 1969). The following observations represent an attempt to expand and make more precise the questions raised in the above-mentioned book.
Cf. for example the instructive collection of essays by Dean Pruitt and Richard Snyder (eds.): Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs: 1969).
Compare James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: 1969).
The transaction approach has been practised above all by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues since the fifties. Cf., inter alia, Karl Deutsch: Nationalism and its Alternatives (New York: 1969): 93 ff. and passim. For a discussion of this differentiation and its analytical relevance see Karl Kaiser: “Transnationale Politik”, in: Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.): Die anachronistische Souveränität (Cologne-Opladen: 1969): 80–109.
For an analysis, see, inter alia, Steven Brams, “Transaction Flows in the International System”, in: American Political Science Review (1966), 880–898 (in which the author analyzes the pattern of diplomatic exchange, of trade and the membership of nations in international organizations), including further references to the literature. Concerning the extent of real exchange processes in the international relations of the past 70 years, see Simon Kuznets: Modern Economic Growth (New Haven: 1966): 285–358, in which the author treats in particular the changes in trade and capital movement.
To illustrate the order of magnitude of one of the most important exchange processes, world trade: In 1967 in world G.N.P. (in current prices) amounted to 2500 billion dollars; world export (in current prices) c. 178 billion or 7.1 % of the world G.N.P. P; world military expenses amounted at the same time to 182 billion dollars, corresponding to 7.3 % of the world G.N.P. In analyzing this data one must consider that approximately 55 % of world exports flow from highly industrialized nations to highly industrialized nations; the two power blocs alone account for 90 % of the armaments expenses. These data alone suggest the importance of combining the model of transaction in international relations with a model of stratification if the essential characteristics of international politics are to be comprehended. An excellent presentation of the relevance of the transaction approach can be found in Donald Puchala: “International Transactions and Regional Integration”, in: International Organization (1970): 732–763.
For an analysis of psychological processes see above all J. K. Zawodny (ed.): Man and International Relations (San Francisco: 1966), 2 vols.; Herbert Kelman (ed.): International Behavior (New York: 1965); Jerome Frank: Sanity and Survival (New York: 1968); Ross Slagner: Psychological Aspects of International Conflicts (Belmont, California: 1967).
Klaus Faupel recently concisely described this special aspect (not unlike the autism theory to be discussed later) as “one-way bilateral relationship” and “two-way bilateral relationship”. See Faupel: “Internationale Politik und Aussenpolitik”, in; Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), op. cit, footnote 4, 23–47, especially 28–35 and the pertinent literature which is listed in full there. Faupel characterizes all relations which represent a direct sequence of action and response as ‘two-way’ (as, for example, in negotiations between two states), whereas, as he rightfully emphasizes, most perceptions in the relationships between states are neither in any way symmetrical, nor do they resemble a sequence but are rather decided by determinants which can be ascertained through the analysis of each given actor. This kind of relation is termed “one-way bilateral relationship”.
For an example of such a typological approach see Karl Deutsch: “The Probability of International Law”, in: Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.): The Relevance of International Law (Cambridge: 1969): 57–83, especially 70.
On these concepts and on the theory of international stratification see Johan Galtung: “International Relations and International Conflicts. A Sociological Approach”, in: Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, I (Geneva: 1966): 121–161, and recently by same author, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, in: Journal of Peace Research (1969), 167–191.
An early proposal for creating a typology of the degree of such foreign relations can be found in Karl Deutsch, ‘The Propensity to International Transactions,’ in: Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Social Processes in International Relations (New York: 1968), 246–254 (Table 1). In terms of the foreign trade of a country such as the Federal Republic, the distribution would possibly correspond to the following values: “high” = 1 % or more of one’s own export (and perhaps of import as well, in particular in symmetrical relations); “low” = 0.2 to 0.99 % of one’s own export; “minimal” to “none” = all values under 0.2 %.
For the literature, see the extensive references in Faupel, op. cit., 42–43.
As a comparison to my table see Fig. 1 in Karl Deutsch: “Macht und Kommunikation in der internationalen Gesellschaft”, in: Wolfgang Zapf (Ed.): Theorien des sozialen Wandels (Cologne: 1969), 471–483, especially 473. 1 did not use this figure for this article because the ‘deterrence type’ of international relations does not appear there.
In order to provide an insight into the order of magnitude of these ‘blanks’ the following data are presented: On a world chart of the export relations amongst 106 states which results in n (n−1) = 11,130 possible relationships, in 1964 only 4232 were occupied (the data for previous years are as follows: 1890, 504; 1913, 954; 1928, 2347; 1935, 2082; J954, 4243; 1964, 4232. Even taking into consideration incomplete recording or calculation of the data as well as the growing number of states, the order of magnitude of the existing compared with the non-existent relations does not differ appreciably from these data). For a more detailed discussion, see Karl Deutsch and Richard Chadwick: Regionalism, Trade and International Community (in progress). On the ‘theoretical’ character of international politics see Charles McClelland and Gary Hoggard: “Conflict Patterns in the Interactions among Nations”, in: Rosenau (ed.), op. cit., footnote 3: 711–724. McClelland’s data from 1966 suggest that—at least as far as the reporting of international politics records it—the ratio of rhetorical interactions to actual interactions (conflict and/or cooperation) is 66: 33. Although such data are difficult to compare, this ratio does provide an insight into the peculiar quality of international politics and the tendency which it promotes to self-presentation.
In the following text as well, I shall only refer to the recent, important literature. Bibliographical references can be found in Dieter Senghaas: Abschreckung und Frieden, op. cit., 296–316; as well as in Dieter Senghaas (ed.): Zur Pathologie des Rüstungswettlaufs. Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (Freiburg: 1970); and in Dieter Senghaas: Rüstung und Militarismus (Frankfurt: 1972). Of continuing relevance is John Raser: “Deterrence Research”, in: Journal of Peace Research (1966), 297–327; Philip Green: Deadly Logic. The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus: 1966).
Johan Galtung has recently convincingly illustrated the extent to which not only manifest but also latent violence belongs to the core of peace research in: “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, op. cit.. footnote 10. See also various articles in Ekkehart Krippendorf (ed.): Friedensforschung (Cologne: 1968); and in Dieter Senghaas (ed.): Friedensforschung und Gesellschaftskritik (2 nd ed.) (Munich: 1973).
The Stockholm Institute of Peace Research, SIPRI, has recently published information as to the extent of these preparations. See Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments 1968/69 ff. (Stockholm: 1969 fl). For a discussion of the theoretical relevance of armaments data see Alan Newcomb: “Initiatives and Response in Foreign Policy”, in: Peace Research Reviews (1969), no. 3, especially 74–75 and 78 where it is asserted that: “In a world in which the intent is usually assumed to be hostile, unless proven otherwise over a period of years, one should be able to measure Threat Perception by measuring Capability”.
Compare inter alia Nigel Calder: Unless Peace Comes (New York: 1968).
That is, the lead-time requirements.
The following works are of lasting significance: Charles Osgood: An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: 1962); and Erich Fromm: May Man Prevail? (New York: 1961).
In the fall of 1969 the American Administration withdrew somewhat from this position.
Cf. Herman Kahn: On Escalation (New York: 1965).
No matter how misguided such a characterization of deterrence policy may appear in the context of “detente”, it remains to the point; one need only glance at the literature on armament of the political, economic and military armaments-lobbyists in America to appreciate the extent of continuity. The teachings of the fifties, penned by prominent civilian strategists have been all too deeply understood! For a pragmatic critique of these teachings see Hans Morgenthau: “Four Paradoxies of Nuclear Strategy”, in: American Political Science Review (1964): 23–35.
In this connection, see in particular George Rathjens: “Die Zukunft des strategischen Rüstungswettlaufs. Optionen für die 70er Jahre”, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), op. cit. footnote 15; and George Rathjens and G. B. Kistiakowsky: “The Limitation of Strategic Arms” , in: Scientific American (1970), no. 1, 19–29; George Rathjens: “The Dynamics of the Arms Race”, in: Scientific American (1969), no. 4, 15–25; Abraham Chayes and Jerome Wiesner (eds.): ABM (New York : 1969); as well as Pierre Gallois: “De la Dissuasion Naturelle ä l’Insecurité Artificielle”, in: Politique Etrangère (1969), 548–579; Alain Joxe: “Fin de la Préponderance Stratcgique Americaine”, in: Politique Etrangère (1969), Part I, 451–470, Part II, 581–614. For an uncritical discussion of the problem, see Brent Scowcroft: “Deterrence and Strategic Superiority”, in: Orbis (1969), 435–454.
On this subject, see Milton Rosenberg: “Attitude Change and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era”, in: James Rosenau (ed.): Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: 1967), 111–160, as well as the important studies of David Finlay, Ole Holsti and Richard Fagan: Enemies in Politics (Chicago: 1967). See also the recent study by Michael Parenti: The Anticommunist Impulse (New York: 1969).
The growing critical discussion on armaments in the USA since the spring of 1969 shows how counterproductive such a militarization can become. In this connection, see my introduction to: Zur Pathologie des Rüstungswettlaufs, op. cit., footnote 15 and the third chapter of Dieter Senghaas: Rüstung und Militarismus, op. cit., footnote 15, chapter 3.
This was one of the strategic theses of the early 1960’s.
Compare inter alia Richard Barnet: Intervention and Revolution. America’s Confrontation with Insurgent Movements around the World (New York: 1968); as well as Gabriel Kolko: Hintergründe der US- Aussenpolitik (Frankfurt: 1970). See also Ekkehart Krippendorff: Die amerikanische Strategie (Frankfurt: 1970).
Compare Jerome Wiesner and Herbert York: “Keine Verteidigung möglich”, in: Krippendorff (ed.), op. cit., footnote 160: 199–216 as well as Herbert York: “Military Technology and National Security”, in: Scientific American (1969), no. 2: 17–29. York’s article is among the best written on this subject.
For a discussion of the concept ‘Pathology of Learning,’ see Karl W. Deutsch: The Nerves of Government (New York: 1966).
On the long-term consequences of the costs of armament, see Bruce Russett: “Who Pays for Defense?”, in: American Political Science Review (1969): 412–426; as well as chapter 3 of Dieter Senghaas: Rüstung und Militarismus, op. cit., footnote 15.
Joseph Schumpeter: “Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen”, in: Aufsätze zur Soziologie (Tübingen: 1953): 72–146.
On this subject, see Marc PiJisuk and Thomas Hayden: “Is there a Military-Industrial Complex which Prevents Peace?”, in: Social Issues (July, 1965): 67–117, as well as John Gurley: “Rüstungsgesellschaft und Friedenswirtschaft”, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), op. cit., footnote 15, 374–386, Jack Raymond: “Growing Threat of Our Military-Industrial Complex”, in: Harvard Business Review (May–June, 1968): 652–665; Murray Weidenbaum: “Arms and the American Economy. A Domestic Convergence Hypothesis”, in: American Economic Review (1968): 428–437; and Adam Yarmolinski: “The Problem of Momentum”, in: Chayes and Wiesner (eds.), op. cit., footnote 24, 144–149 (in comparison with chapter 3 of Dieter Senghaas: Rüstung und Militarismus, op. cit., footnote 15, chapter 3). For a comprehensive bibliography see Dieter Senghaas: Aufrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle (Stuttgart: 1972): 152–160.
Cf. Richard Barnet: The Economy of Death (New York: 1969); Ralph Lapp: Kultur auf Waffen gebaut (Cologne: 1969); John K. Galbraith: How to Control the Military (New York: 1969); as well as Harry Magdoff: The Age of Imperialism (New York: 1969); Fritz Vilmar: Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus (7 th ed.) (Hamburg: 1973); as well as my own studies cited in footnotes 1 and 16 (compare chapter 3).
My own first treatment of the subject can be found in: Abschreckung und Frieden, op. cit.. footnote 1, 187 ff.
E. Bleuler: Das autistisch- undisziplinierte Denken in der Medizin und seine Überwindung (Berlin: 1927), quotations from 1–7.
Theodore Newcomb: “Autistic Hostility in Social Reality”, in: Human Relations (1947): 69–86.
Erich Lindemann: “Individual Hostility and Group Integration”, in: Zawodny (ed.), op. cit., footnote 7: 62–75. Quotation from 64.
The figure has been borrowed from Abschreckung und Frieden, op. cit., footnote 1 and slightly extended.
Compare with the basic study of Johan Galtung: “East–West interaction Patterns”, in: Louis Kriesberg (ed.): op. cit., footnote 11, 272–307 in which Galtung demonstrates that the “top-dogs” have a high frequency of relations in one way or the other: whether positive (as in trade) or negative (as in mutual deterrence).
Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah: Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: 1965).
David Singer: “Feedback Processes in International Conflicts”, MHRI- Reprint (Ann Arbor: 1968). For the basic concept, see Karl Deutsch, op. cit., footnote 30; Raymond Bauer (ed.): Social Indicators (Cambridge: 1966), passim; as well as Mogoroh Maruyama: “The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Systems”, in: Walter Buckley (ed.): Modern Systems Research for the Modern Behavioral Scientist (Chicago: 1968); compare J. H. Milsum (ed.): Positive Feedback (New York: 1968).
For a detailed presentation of such processes, see Morton Deutsch: “Conflicts: Productive and Destructive”, in: Journal of Social Issues (1969), 7–42; Dean Pruitt: “Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action”, in: Herbert Kelman (ed.), op. cit., footnote 7, 393–432.
Klaus Jürgen Gantzel: “Rüstungswettläufe und politische Entscheidungsbedingungen”, in: Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.): op. cit., footnote 8, 110–137. This article contains an excellent summary and continuation of the previous discussion.
Studies along these lines are being undertaken by William Caspary: Formal Theories of Reaction Processes in International Relations (American Political Science Association, 1969, unpublished manuscript).
Thus the relevance of bureaucratic and organizational processes automatically grows in the analysis of arms races and international crises. See in this connection the excellent model analyses by Graham Allison: “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in: American Political Science Review (1969), 689–718. Also compare G. T. Allison: Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: 1971). Some references can also be found in Uwe Nerlich: “Abschreckung”, in: Staatslexikon, Supplementary issue (Freiburg: 1969): 14–23.
Historical material in which we can observe similar sequences can be found inter alia in Eckart Kehr: Der Primat der Innenpolitik (2nd ed.) (Berlin: 1970) above all in his discussions of Wilhelminian armaments policy; Robert Butow: Tojo and the Coming of War (Stanford: 1961); Masao Maruyama: Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (2 nd ed.) (London: 1962), in particular Parts 1–5; and on the present situation in America, see General David Shoup: “The New American Militarism”, in: The Atlantic (April, 1969), 51–56; on the general discussion, see David Singer: “The Outcome of the Arms Race”, in: IPRA Studies in Peace Research, Third Conference (Assen: 1970), 2: 137–146.
Henry Kissinger in the introduction to Urs Schwarz: American Strategy (New York: 1966): XII.
This has been clearly proven in American ABM debate since 1968 in which China and the Soviet Union alternatively took over the role of the enemy varying according to their utility at the moment. Compare Dieter Senghaas: Rüstung und Militarismus, op. cit., footnote 15, Chapter 3.
A good summary on such ‘cooperation: can be found in Eberhard Menzel: “Die Bemühungen um die Abrüstung seit 1945; Misserfolge und Teilerfolge”, in: Georg Picht and Heinz Eduard Tödt (eds.): Studien zur Friedensforschung (Stuttgart: 1969), 1: 73–97. Caspary has also ascertained that crises and striking events in international politics have a ‘half-life’ of some six months, i.e. after six months the attention directed at a past crisis has decreased by about 50 %. As quoted in Newcomb, op. cit., footnote 17, 20.
Kenneth Boulding: Beyond Economics (Ann Arbor: 1968): 288–302.
Morton Kaplan: Macropolitics (Chicago: 1968), 129ff.; and John Burton: Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge, England: 1968), passim, and by the same author: Conflict and Communication (London: 1969), passim.
For a brilliant study of the failure of the collective reality-testing in this connection, see Eugene Genovese: The Political Economy of Slavery (New York: 1961); and The World the Slaveholders Made (New York; 1969).
Compare Amitai Etzioni: The Active Society (New York: 1968), and Frieder Naschold: Organisation und Demokratie (3 rd ed.) (Stuttgart: 1972).
With the help of a project these data could most certainly be ascertained. One would not, after all, need to include all of the c. 15,000 presently conceivable relations between all states of the world.
That is, without thoughtlessly transposing from individuals to collective forms.
Compare Theodor Adorno: “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda”, in: Geza Roheim (ed.): Psychoanalysis in Social Sciences (1951), 279–300. Compare also Karl Menninger: The Vital Balance (Chicago; 1963), 153 ff., on “ego-impairment and loss of self-control”.
In this connection, compare Klaus Horn: “Politische Psychologie”, in: Gisela Kress and Dieter Senghaas (eds.): Politikwissenschaft (Frankfurt: 1969), 215–268 and the literature cited there.
Compare inter alia Franz Alexander: “On the Psychodynamics of Regressive Phenomena in Panic States”, in: Roheim (ed.), op. cit., footnote 57 (1952), 3 104–110; and Edith Weigert: “Conditions of Organized and Regressive Response to Danger”, in: Roheim (ed.), op. cit. (1955), 121–126.
Some initial thoughts in this direction can be found in Morris Ginsberg: “The Causes of War”, in: Sociological Review (1939): 121–143, especially 135.
Shortly after leaving the Pentagon, Defense Minister Clifford, indeed, once said that with regard to Vietnam the Americans had a suspicion which grew into a conviction and ended ultimately in an obsession, in: NBC-Interview, Channel 4, Detroit, June 19, 1969. More recently, see Joseph Gouldner: Truth is the First Casualty— The Gulf of Tonkin Affair: Illusion and Reality (Chicago: 1969).
For an example of such a development, see Fritz Stern: Bethmann- Hollweg und der Krieg. Die Grenzen der Verantwortung (Tübingen: 1968), and several pertinent statistics in Dieter Senghaas: “Politische und militärische Dimension der gegenwärtigen Friedensproblematik”, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), op. cit., footnote 16, 20; as well as Karl Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas: “Die brüchige Vernunft von Staaten”, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.): Kritische Friedensforschung (Frankfurt: 1971): 105–163.
On this subject, see Durbin and Bowlby’s discussion in Leon Bramson and George Goethals (eds.): War (2 nd ed.) (New York: 1968): 100–101, where they interpret violence as a flight from alarming complexity. See also, Karl Deutsch: The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: 1968).
The role of self-deception among the Americans in Vietnam has been treated in an on the spot analysis by Robert Jay Lifton: “Deception of War and Peace”, in: History and Human Survival (New York: 1970): 210–254.
For a discussion of this concept, see Karl Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas: “A Framework for a Theory of War and Peace”, in: Albert Lepawsky et al. (eds.): The Search for World Order, Festschrift for Quincy Wright (New York: 1972), 23–46.
Compare the references to the literature in footnote 7.
In this connection, see the pioneering article by Karl Deutsch: “Mass Communications and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflicts”, in: J. K. Zawodny (ed.): op. cit., footnote 7, 695–702.
James Rosenau has nicely characterized the structure and components of the opinion-shaping and decision-making processes in foreign policy in their mixture of deficient information and (in cases of conflict) of psychological intensity. Compare his contribution to the volume he edited: Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, 1967): 11–50.
For a differentiating analysis, see Lewis Coser: The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: 1956).
Charles Hermann: Crisis in Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: 1969), in which he compares a simulation analysis with real conflicts. Ralph White: Nobody Wanted War (New York: 1968), in particular the literature cited in footnote 43. For a general presentation see Ross Stagner: Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Belmont, California: 1967).
Robert Abelson et al. (eds.): Theories of Cognitive Consistency (Chicago: 1969).
Else Frenkel-Brunswick: “Social Tensions and the Inhibition of Thought”, in: Social Problems (1954): 75–81.
Compare in particular Pruitt, op. cit., footnote 43.
One of the most enlightening studies on this topic: James Thompson: “How Could Vietnam Happen. An Autopsy”, in: The Atlantic (April, 1968), 47–53, in which the author (himself a member of the government machinery in Washington) interprets the escalation of personal prestige and the exaggerated personal commitments, strengthened by public propaganda among other factors as what caused the kinds of groups of capable, committed men who regularly and repeatedly made mistakes and whose status depended upon their ultimately being proved right. Compare also the report, “The Stupidity of Intelligence”, in: The Washington Monthly (1969), no. 8, 23–28, in which a member of the American forces tells of the group pressures (for career reasons) which exist in Vietnam to consciously invent and play up ‘information on success’ even where there was no basis in reality of any kind for such a success. The distortion mechanism we have mentioned has important repercussions in their significance for theories on the outbreak of war. When this is coupled with analyses of the organizational sociology of the decision-making institutions, the image of ‘rational’ political decision-making groups and individuals should hardly be maintainable.
David Levinson: “Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy” in: Bramson and Goethals (eds.): op. cit., footnote 63: 133–146.
See recently in particular William Eckhardt: “Ideology and Personality in Social Attitudes”, in: Peace Research Reviews (1969), no. 2, as well as Newcomb, op. cit., footnote 17, Part II. On the following, see Eckhardt.
Here also lies the weakness of Robert Jervis’s otherwise valuable article: “Hypotheses on Misperception”, in: World Politics (1968): 454–479, Compare also Robert Jervis: The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: 1970).
On the problem as a whole, see Harold Wilensky: Organizational Intelligence (New York: 1967), which is probably the most important work on the subject and the early article by Benno Wassermann: “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction”, in: Political Studies (1960): 156–169, as well as the previously mentioned book by Goulden on the Tonkin Incident, op. cit., footnote 61.
Roberta Wohlstetter: “Cuba and Pearl Harbor, Hindsight and Foresight”, in: Foreign Affairs (1965): 691–707.
For this reason Faupel seems to me to be wrong on this point. He advocates the theses (footnote 8) that the ‘two-way’ aspect of the relations increases with this actual conflict. Considering all that has been discussed here, this seems precisely to be untrue. It is characteristic of escalation that it increases the ‘one-way’ aspect of bilateral relations. Under the premises of escalation and hostility, communication comes to mean soliloquy.
Compare Thomas Eliot: “A Criminological Approach to Social Control of International Aggression”, in: American Journal of Sociology (1952–1953): 513–518.
Compare James Payne: The American Threat. The Fear of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy (Chicago: 1970), a book which offers an exemplary collection of the absurdities of deterrence thinking.
Karl Deutsch, op. cit., footnote 63,126–129; Dieter Senghaas: Abschreckung und Frieden, op. cit., footnote 1, 284–286; also compare the studies in Pruitt and Snyder (eds.), footnote 2; in particular also Bruce Russett: “Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory or Decision Theory”, in: Journal of Peace Research (1967): 89–106, as well as Chihiro Hosoya: “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy. Japanese-US Relations 1938–1941”, in: Journal of Peace Research (1968): 97–115, as well as Philip Green: Deadly Logic (Columbus: 1966): 213–253.
Karl Deutsch, op. cit., footnote 11, passim.
In this connection, see Eva Senghaas-Knobloch: Frieden durch Integration und Assoziation (Stuttgart: 1969).
Compare Johan Galtung: “Über die Zukunft des internationalen Systems”, in: Futurum, 1: 73–116, as well as Galtung: “Theorien des Friedens” in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), op. cit., footnote 62: 235–246; and Johan Galtung (ed.): Cooperation in Europe (Assen: 1970).
Compare Kenneth Boulding: “Towards a Theory of Peace”, in: Roger Fisher (ed.): International Conflict and Behavioral Sciences (New York: 1964): 70–87.
Compare Coser, op. cit., footnote 68.
See in this connection Johan Galtung’s article which was quoted in footnote 10.
Compare the studies in Dieter Senghaas (ed.): Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen über abhängige Reproduktion (Frankfurt: 1972).
See in particular Lars Dencik: “Plädoyer für eine revolutionäre Konfliktforschung”, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), op. cit., footnote 10, 247–270.
On international ‘strategies of revolution’ and ‘rational behavioral strategies’ see Roger Fisher: International Conflict for Beginners (New York: 1969).
Karl Deutsch, op. cit., footnote 11; and Dean Pruitt: “Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and International Affairs”, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution (1969), 18–38. Pruitt has explicitly developed the theory of unterretaliation.
I emphasize the wide spectrum of societal levels because otherwise the danger of technocratic politics would exist. On these problems see Claus Offe: “Das politische Dilemma der Technokratie”, in: Claus Koch and Dieter Senghaas (eds.): Texte zur Technokratiediskussion (Frankfurt: 1970): 156–171.
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