Skip to main content

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Trade-Offs and Risks in Results-Based Approaches

verfasst von : Claire Chase, Aidan Coville

Erschienen in: Broken Pumps and Promises

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The growth in results-based approaches (RBA) to development financing is motivated by the underlying assumption that these approaches will incentivize implementing agencies to more closely align their actions and exert more focused effort on achieving the objectives of the program that have been agreed upon by the recipient and donor. At the same time RBAs strengthen accountability of both recipient and donor, by generating objective evidence that the agreed upon results have been achieved. But it should not necessarily be taken for granted that they are a more efficient approach to development just because payments are tied to results. If donor and government objectives are misaligned, RBA can help focus government actions towards a clear target that they may not otherwise focus on, but this comes with a shift in the risk burden towards the government agency, which is likely to come with an implicit risk premium.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
In reality, the exact sample size requirements will be a function of the variance in the output measurement at each level of aggregation, but the rule of thumb provides a close approximation for planning purposes.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Holmstrom B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J Law Econ Organ 7:24–52CrossRef Holmstrom B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J Law Econ Organ 7:24–52CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat McKenzie D (2012) Beyond baseline and follow-up: the case for more T in experiments. J Dev Econ 99(2):210–221CrossRef McKenzie D (2012) Beyond baseline and follow-up: the case for more T in experiments. J Dev Econ 99(2):210–221CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mumssen Y, Johannes L, Kumar G (2010) Output-based aid: lessons learned and best practices. World Bank, Washington, DCCrossRef Mumssen Y, Johannes L, Kumar G (2010) Output-based aid: lessons learned and best practices. World Bank, Washington, DCCrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ross S (1973) The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. Am Econ Assoc 63(2):134–139 Ross S (1973) The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. Am Econ Assoc 63(2):134–139
Zurück zum Zitat Sappington D (1991) Incentives in principal-agent relationships. J Econ Perspect 5(2):45–66CrossRef Sappington D (1991) Incentives in principal-agent relationships. J Econ Perspect 5(2):45–66CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat World Bank (2014) Program-for-results: an update. World Bank, Washington, DC World Bank (2014) Program-for-results: an update. World Bank, Washington, DC
Metadaten
Titel
Trade-Offs and Risks in Results-Based Approaches
verfasst von
Claire Chase
Aidan Coville
Copyright-Jahr
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28643-3_3