Transformations and Innovations of Territorial Autonomies in the Aftermath of the Economic Crisis

Louvin and Chassoud (2008), p. 841; Savino (2007), p. 443; Vesperini and Sgueo (2012), p. 1.

Keating and Pintarits (1998), p. 41.

Chiti (2009), p. 635.

Cannizzaro (2014), p. 271; Donati (2013), p. 8.

… judged unconstitutional by Constitutional Court, ruling. no. 50/2015.

De Martin (2014), p. 29.

Merloni (2014).

Pinelli (2015).

Vandelli (2012a, b).

Castelli (2012).

On the topic of the different forms of collaboration and aggregation between territorial authorities in Italy under the reform of 2014, see Vandelli (2014), Tubertini (2014a) and De Donno (2015b).

For further details see De Donno (2016).

On the contrary the attempt made by the Assemblée Nationale to introduce into the recent Law no. 991/2015 on the Nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République the universal and direct election of the members of all the intermunicipal entities’ deliberative body, from the communautés urbaines to the communautés d’agglomération and from the communautés de communes to the métropoles, failed.

For France, see Law no. 1563/2010, Loi de réforme des collectivités territoriales. Furthermore, Law no. 991/2015 has produced—as it had happened in the preceding years in the Italian legal system—a simplification of the associational frameworks, providing for the increase of the minimum size of the établissements intercommunaux à fiscalité propre (from 5000 citizens to 15,000) and the abolition of the pre-existing intermunicipal syndicats forms. For references on the French system after the recent reforms, see: Auby and Renaudie (2014).

Romano (1908).

In the UK the approved reforms, from the 2009 Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act to the new 2016 Cities and Local Government Devolution Act, have loudly emphasised asymmetries, through a system of devolution agreements which define—for every area—functions, leading to one, two or even three level systems, alternating or differently superimposing counties, districts, and unitary authorities, and configuring, in the end, associational models equipped with a directly elected mayor, flanked by a cabinet composed of leaders of the associated local authorities.

Court of Auditors (2015).

Tubertini (2014b) and Massari (2015).

Even if acting under the pressure of the recession, Greece experienced a top-down policy: local authorities of first level (“Municipalities” and “Communities”) were forced to merge through the so-called Kallikratis Program (Law no. 3582/2010), which reduced their number from 1033 to 325: see Akrivopoulou et al. (2012), p. 653 ff. Similar mechanisms have been employed in Latvia in 2009, with a radical reform that took down local authorities from 525 to 118, including 109 Municipalities (Novadi) and 9 Cities, about which see Frécon and Leuba (2011). On a different dimension stands Portugal: despite the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, signed in 2011 with the Troika, was determined to “reduce significantly” the number of Municipalities and Parishes (Freguesias), only Parishes have been affected, dropping from 4259 to 3091, while Municipalities were and still are 308, as Batalhão (2015) shows.

Cammelli (2012), p. 687.

Gardini (2013), p. 6.

De Martin (2014), p. 32.

Di Folco (2015), p. 157.

Belletti (2012), p. 285.

For a general overview, Council of European Municipalities and Regions (2013).

Regarding the Spanish experience, see among others Parejo Alfonso (2014) and Font y LLovet and Galán Galán (2014).

As stressed by Almeida Cerreda (2015), regarding Spain, Portugal and Italy’s experiences in comparison.

For a general overview of these measures, see Tubertini (2012) and Piperata (2012).

About the main aspects and goals of this last reform, see above all Pizzetti (2015) and Vandelli (2015a).

Tubertini (2016).

The empowerment of the Regions can be observed even in the French experience, as shown by De Donno (2015a).

Font y Llovet and Galán Galán (2015).

About the strict relationship between the Italian and French reforms, see Vandelli (2015b).

Vandelli (2012).

As strengthened by Carloni (2015).

Giannini (1959), p. 11.

As reported in http://​www.​rgs.​mef.​gov.​it/​_​Documenti/​VERSIONE-I/​Pubblicazioni/​Studi-e-do/​Annuario_​statistico_​RGS/​Annuario_​statistico_​della_​RGS_​2015.​pdf.

Realfonzo and Viscione (2015), p. 509.

Cammelli and Ziroldi (1997), p. 1.

Clarich (2010), p. 7.

Bassanini (2016), p. 2.

Santiago Iglesias (2015), p. 230.

Vandelli (2009), p. 25.

Trimarchi Banfi (1990), p. 57.

Bilancia (2014).

Brancasi (2011).

Tarasco (2012).

See now European Court of Auditors (2015).