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2011 | Buch

Transmission Grid Security

A PSA Approach

verfasst von: Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau

Verlag: Springer London

Buchreihe : Power Systems

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Über dieses Buch

In response to the growing importance of power system security and reliability, Transmission Grid Security proposes a systematic and probabilistic approach for transmission grid security analysis. The analysis presented uses probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and takes into account the power system dynamics after severe faults. In the method shown in this book the power system states (stable, not stable, system breakdown, etc.) are connected with the substation reliability model. In this way it is possible to:

estimate the system-wide consequences of grid faults; identify a chain of events that might lead to blackout; and rank the importance of different substation components at the system level.

Transmission Grid Security also presents the main features and basic mathematics of PSA. It provides the reader with up-to-date knowledge of the regulatory issues affecting the security of transmission grids in Europe.

Transmission Grid Security gives a practical method for the security analysis of transmission grids, making it a valuable text for engineers and system operators, as well as postgraduate students. It includes basic information and detailed modules for creating a reliability model that takes into account all the basic operations and components needed after grid faults.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
The basic functions of our modern society are dependent on electricity supply. Lighting, water supply, heating, traffic and fuel supply, food storage and delivery, payment transactions, telecommunication, and information systems are heavily affected by interruptions. Therefore, the electricity system can be regarded today as the most important infrastructure.
The introduction of electricity markets has brought economic aspects and cost awareness more in focus. The importance of the power system and the requirement to be effective have forced the system operators to analyze more in detail the benefits and costs of investments and maintenance in the power system. Furthermore, the effects of unreliable electricity supply on modern society have been under consideration. The method presented in this book is an approach to treat the security systematically using an established reliability method, probabilistic safety analysis, PSA. The method suits best for the power systems where the dynamic behaviour after faults plays a role and the stability has to be considered.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Chapter 2. Grid Security: Problem Statement
Abstract
Chapter 2 presents the basic properties of meshed transmission grids, concentrating especially on the reliability. The concepts of N − 1 criterion, adequacy, and security are presented. Different substation schemes are addressed.
The dynamics of the power systems after faults are briefly described. The PSA approach, used in this book, is presented, and the motivation to use it for reliability analyses for transmission systems is given. The state of the art in the field of the reliability assessments of power systems is described.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Chapter 3. Basic Concepts of Transmission Grid Planning
Abstract
Electric power systems play an important role in a modern society supplying electricity continuously to diverse applications. Conventionally, the power system has been functionally divided into three parts, the generation system, the transmission system and the distribution system. Electric power systems cover virtually all populated areas and the majority of people are dependent on services electricity supply facilitates.
What is characteristic of alternating current power systems is that a balance must be kept between electricity generation and consumption at every moment since in practice large scale electricity storage does not yet exist. The Chapter describes transmission planning from long term time frames to real-time system operation, presents factors that set the limits to the transmission capacity, and presents the most important components of the transmission system.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Chapter 4. Basic Concepts of Reliability Theory
Abstract
Elements of reliability theory and of the methodology of probabilistic safety analysis (PSA), necessary to understand their implementation to perform the probabilistic security assessment of the transmission grid, are reviewed in this chapter.
The approach chosen is top-down. Starting from the definition of risk, PSA is presented as the tool estimating the residual risk in a system, once protection systems are devised. In order to do so, event trees are introduced to represent those scenarios developing either to safe or undesired final states, after the occurrence of an initiating event. Fault trees are then shown to connect the occurrence of the branch events in the event trees to the logical combinations of basic component failures.
At a second stage, a bottom-up presentation of the quantification process is provided. Component reliability is first summarised to characterise basic events in some elementary cases. The calculation of the probability of the fault tree top events is explained, based on the prior identification of the minimal cut sets of the system.
Finally, some comments are provided on the limitations of this classical PSA approach and on the impact of grid dynamics on the development of accident scenarios.
Liisa Haarla
Chapter 5. Grid Faults and Component Failures
Abstract
The Chapter describes grid faults; mainly short circuits and trips of big generators. These common faults or credible events affect system stability and security. The Chapter also discusses component failures, their causes and the calculation of failure rate estimates and unavailabilities. Fault and failure statistics are briefly described, too. The focus in all these subjects is in the grid security and in the substation reliability model: circuit breakers and protection systems.
The chapter describes component failures focusing on the most important components needed in the PSA substation model: circuit breakers, protection relays, and telecommunication channels. The chapter gives some failure and fault statistics. It presents an example of component failure data for the substation model, derived from the Finnish 400 kV component failure statistics.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Chapter 6. Substation PSA Model
Abstract
Chapter 6 describes how to create the substation model, the core of the PSA application, for grid security. The model consists of event trees and fault trees described in Chap.​ 4. First, the modelling principles and then the details of the model are presented. The properties of the model are based, to some extent, on the actual Finnish 400 kV transmission grid, which shows that the method is applicable to grids of real size. The example presented to illustrate the method is for line faults.
The steps presented in the Chapter and needed in the construction of the substation reliability model are:
  • The selection of credible events (faults) for analysis and their frequency. Fault frequencies might vary according to the season.
  • Defining the substation functionality: the busbar and circuit breaker arrangements that affect the construction of the substation reliability model.
  • The selection of grid topologies and power flows included in the analysis.
  • Defining the extent of the model, for example the main protection relays, the structure of the protection, fault clearance times, the local and remote backup protection and their functionality, breaker failure protection.
  • Defining the principles for event tree and fault tree construction.
  • The construction and analysis of event tree and fault trees.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Chapter 7. Dynamic Consequence Analysis
Abstract
Chapter 7 presents the combination of the reliability model and dynamic simulations of the power system. The chapter describes the simulations that are made according to the results of the substation model presented in Chap.​ 6. The Chapter illustrates how to find out the power system consequences of the substation failures after line faults.
The Chapter describes how the simulations are performed, how the results of the grid dynamic simulations of the chains of events (defined by the end branches of the event trees) are made. The end branches of event trees define different chains of events, most of them with extended fault durations and additional trips caused by backup protection systems. It also presents how to classify the results of dynamic simulations by using different power system states. In this way, the simulations reveal which chains of events lead to a system breakdown and which lead to other system states.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Chapter 8. System Level Results
Abstract
In this Chapter, the combination of the substation model and power system simulations is described. The Chapter discusses the results of the event tree analysis; the chains of events, minimal cut sets, contributing factors, importance measures, and sensitivity analyses are presented. Furthermore, based on these results, some recommendations are made. The Chapter also includes a description of indices to characterize the system breakdown.
A power system state as a common measure enables importance measures in such a way that different components can be ranked. The frequency of the power system states can be estimated; but more important than this, are the minimal cut sets and chains of events that may lead to a system breakdown or other power system states. Different importance measures, Fussell-Vesely, risk achievement worth (also called risk increase factor), risk reduction worth (also called risk decrease factor), are presented.
Liisa Haarla
Chapter 9. Perspectives for Future Power System
Abstract
The Chapter describes the framework to ensure that secure system operation is also met with the electricity market and in the future power system. Legislation and agreements set requirements for transmission system planning and operational planning. The market design takes care of the implementation. In this section, the European electricity market design is referred to. The European market design illustrates ways for implementation and possibilities to face challenges introduced by electricity markets, the sustainable production of electricity and new emerging technologies.
The Chapter briefly describes electricity markets, sustainability and emerging new technologies in relation to system reliability, the co-operation and co-ordination between transmission system operators, the Chapter discusses the different congestion management methods of ensuring that induced power flows are within transfer limits.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Chapter 10. Conclusions
Abstract
The Chapter summarises the claim of the whole book: using a probabilistic method combined with power system dynamics can give information on the security of a power system by identifying its vulnerabilities, and by ranking them. By doing this, the significance of different components and their influence on the security of the power system are revealed. Applying this information, it is possible to eliminate those contributing factors that are dominant in order to reduce the residual risk. These results can then be used for grid planning, operation, and maintenance.
The Chapter also discusses the justification of the method, gives the interpretations of the results and proposes ideas to use the method in other ways than the one presented here. The limitations of the method are also presented.
The overall goal of the transmission system development is to strive for balanced system design, where the respective contribution of different components to the system breakdown would be balanced and no component would have a significantly higher influence. This implies that a failure of a single component should not be responsible for a large proportion of the credible chains of events that can lead to a system breakdown. The Chapter also presents some thoughts on how the results may be used for transmission grid and maintenance planning and proposes ideas to use the method in other ways.
Liisa Haarla, Mikko Koskinen, Ritva Hirvonen, Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Transmission Grid Security
verfasst von
Liisa Haarla
Mikko Koskinen
Ritva Hirvonen
Pierre-Etienne Labeau
Copyright-Jahr
2011
Verlag
Springer London
Electronic ISBN
978-0-85729-145-5
Print ISBN
978-0-85729-144-8
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-85729-145-5