3. Transnational Politics and the Chins in Malaysia

This book is concerned only with the transnational politics of the Chins and the Acehnese as it relates to the Malaysian state. But that is not to suggest that other irregular migrant groups living in Malaysia at one time or another have not engaged in similar activities. PULO and MNLF, for instance, may have engaged in some form of transnational politics, but this thesis cannot and does not try to cover all the various types of transnational politics that have occurred in Malaysia.

Scott (2009) for one objects to the term tribe in referring to the Chins, in that it infers an evolutionary political governance typology, in which tribes would fall into the pre-modern, less developed stage, with the state at the developed end of the spectrum. His contention is that the Chins had no aspirations to statehood. However, others who have written about the Chins (see Lehman 1963; Vumson 1986; Sakhong 2003) typically refer to the Chins as tribes, and do so in the relational, kinship sense. Lian Sakhong (2003: 17), for instance, writes: “Historical evidence suggests that the Chin were known by no other name than Chin until they made their settlement in “Chin Nwe”. However, after they were expelled from their original homeland, the Kale valley in Upper Chindwin, by the flood as oral traditions recounts [sic], or conquered by the Shan as modern scholars have suggested – the Chin split into different tribal groups with different tribal names and dialects and moved upland in the hill country that now constitutes Chin state”. We see here the author’s belief that there is a shared common ancestry between the different groups, a belief generally speaking shared by other Chin. Following their lead, I too refer to the different Chin groups as tribes.

A Burman kingdom that lasted from 849 to 1247 AD, and which was a precursor to the Burmese state (Thant Myint-U 2007).

Lian Sakhong is himself a noted Chin scholar. He is also the former secretary general of the Chin National League for Democracy and chairman of the CNC, an umbrella organisation based in Mizoram, representing various Chin organisations. Given his background, one might suppose there to be an inherent political bias to his writings. But his 2003 work which I have cited in this chapter is a scholarly analysis aided by the knowledge of and developed from his position as an insider. The book is based on his doctoral dissertation completed in 2000 at Uppsala University, while in exile in Sweden.

The Panglong agreement of 1947 saw the inclusion of the frontier peoples that included the Chins, Shans and Karens into the Union of Burma, but on condition of autonomy and the option of seceding from the union. All the ethnic minorities view the Burmese regime as having reneged on this agreement and this forms a core part of their dispute with the regime.

Among respondents in Malaysia, it seems quite commonplace to have spent some time at theology school either in Chin state or India, without ever having any intention of becoming a pastor.

The information mentioned in this paragraph detailing the profile and location of the Chins is based on numerous conversations and interviews with different Chin people over the years, and is generally well known within the community.

The flowering of the bamboo tree in Chin state in 2006 precipitated a statewide famine in 2007, the co-relation being that the fruit of the bamboo attracts rats and once the fruit is exhausted, the rats turned to the rice crops of the farmers, completely decimating the harvests. Twenty per cent of the Chin population, about 100,000 Chins, were said to have been affected by the famine which lasted for several years (Human Rights Watch R 2009).

An incident in 2005 underscores this, when UNHCR reportedly refused to assist or mediate on behalf of Matupi asylum seekers who had been arrested and imprisoned for 17 months for demonstrating in front of the Burmese embassy.

Besides the Chin, in Malaysia other Burmese groups in large numbers include the Mon, Arakanese, Kachins, Rohingyas and Burmans (UNHCR 2011).

The person who initiated the breakaway from CRC has since resettled to the USA, but others familiar with the rift are able to give accounts. These respondents asked to be kept anonymous.

The Zomi in Malaysia usually have their own event to mark the day, which they call Zomi National Day. The reasons for this have to do with their fractious relations with the other Chin tribes and disagreements over the use of the word Chin, which the Zomis consider to be an alien term.

I have since the 2008 Chin National Day event in Kuala Lumpur attended the ones held in subsequent years, in 2009 and 2010. My sense is that while the itinerary might differ from year to year, there is little variance in terms of the overall tone.

Some of the speeches on this day were in Burmese, with a few others relayed in English – the latter, one assumes, for the benefit of the invited guests from various NGOs. Victor’s speech was delivered partly in English and partly in Burmese.

In August 2003, the State Peace and Development Council headed by Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt came out with a seven-point plan that was supposed to introduce a democratic, representative system of governance and included holding a referendum on a new constitution scheduled for May 2008 the overall plan including the constitution which would have ensured the junta’s rule, was generally met with scepticism by the various Burmese ethnic minorities including the Chins (UNPO 2003). Hence, when Victor made this speech in February 2008, the referendum, which was just a few months away, would have been uppermost in his mind.

The same scenario continued to hold true at the time of writing this chapter in early 2011.

As of February 2011, there were reportedly 92,700 registered asylum seekers in Malaysia, with 85,300 of those coming from Burma. The UNHCR website shows the breakdown as follows: 36,600 Chins, 20,100 Rohingyas, 9,000 Myanmar Muslims, 3,900 Mon, 3,500 Kachins and other ethnicities from Burma (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2011). These figures, I should say, reflect asylum seekers actual registered at the time of publication and do not take into account the many thousands who have yet to register themselves with UNHCR.

It should be noted that the Rohingyas are consistently excluded from any inter-Burmese ethnic group cooperation due to the belief held by some of the Burmese ethnic minority groups that the Rohingyas are not originally from Burma.

The referendum in question was organised by the Burmese military junta, the State Peace and Development Council, and scheduled to occur shortly after this demonstration took place. The referendum was purportedly to give Burmese citizens the opportunity to vote for a plan to turn Burma into a democratic state with multi-party elections by 2010. The plan, however, was viewed with a great deal of scepticism outside of Burma and demonstrations were held in various parts of the world in which Burmese were urged to vote against the plan.

A detailed ethnography of the demonstration in support of the Saffron revolution that took place in 2007 in Kuala Lumpur can be found in Chapter 5.

In 2011, BEAP continues to function, and COBEM has its own office, which opened in January 2010.

The leadership of the CNF is primarily made up of former Chin university students who participated in the 1988 demonstrations and who, following the collapse of the administrative state machinery in all the provinces including Chin state, sought to form a new Chin government. However, the Burmese regime regained control of the entire country by late September 1988, and shortly after began a manhunt for all those who had been involved in or supported the revolt. In the ensuing months and years, an estimated 40,000 Chins fled into Mizoram, including several 100 Chin university students who went on to form part of CNF which had been set-up in March 1988 (Human Rights Watch 2009).

Other Chin political groups include the Zomi National Congress, Mara People’s Party and Chin National League for Democracy, but their support base and transnational activities are much smaller compared to the CNF. More recently other political actors include the Chin National Party and Chin Progressive Party that were formed in anticipation of the 2010 general elections in Burma. See postscript at the end of this book for more detail on what happened since the move towards political reform in Burma as of 2010.

In 2007, the organisation entered into ceasefire talks with SPDC (the Burmese military regime), but no agreement was reached. In 2012, CNF agreed to a ceasefire with talks to resolve differences with the government still underway.

The coordinator of the Chin Forum managing board was Salai Kipp Kho Lian (Germany), while its members were Pu Lian Uk (USA), Dr Za Hlei Than (USA), Pu Nang Lian Thang (Japan), Dr Lian H Sakhong (Sweden), Victor Biak Lian (Canada) Sui Khar (Thailand), Dr Ro Ding (USA), Pi Bianca Son Mang Khan (Germany) and Dr Salai Andrew Ngun Cung Lian (USA).

I discuss the fundraising activities of CNF as this relates to its intersection with the Malaysian state labour market and economy in Chapter 5.

A more detailed look at the UNHCR registration process and how this fits in with the Chins’ transnational politics forms part of Chapter 7.

At the time very few Chins actually made their way to New Delhi to seek asylum as cost and distance made the trip difficult and dangerous.

Popular support for CNF seems to hover between 50 and 70 per cent of the Chin population. “More than half” was told to me on several occasions. Whatever the figure is, it is clear that the support comes predominantly from the Lais and from the older generation, with the other groups less supportive of CNF due to lack of information and the divisions between the different groups as well as past encounters with CNA soldiers.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I will explore further the Chins’ relationship with the Malaysian state.