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Mind & Society

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03.01.2017

Understanding coevolution of mind and society: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria

verfasst von: Shinji Teraji

Erschienen in: Mind & Society | Ausgabe 1-2/2017

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Abstract

Theories of institutions can be classified into two broad approaches: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria. According to the first approach, institutions are conceived as rules that guide the actions of individuals engaged in social interactions. On the other hand, the second approach views institutions as behavioral patterns. In order to have a complete picture of institutions, we need to take both approaches into consideration. Individuals construct mental models to produce expectations about institutions, while institutions make individual expectations relatively compatible. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a general framework within which it is possible to analyze coevolution of individual mental models and institutions.

Vorheriger Artikel Disability, economic agency, and embodied cognition

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According to Hodgson (2003, p. 164), “[h]abits themselves are formed through repetition of action and thought. They are influenced by prior activity and have durable self-sustaining qualities. Through their habits, individuals carry the marks of their own unique history.”

A common illustration of a pure coordination game is the choice between driving on the left or right side of the road. There are two pure strategy equilibria with identical payoffs: everyone drives on the left and everyone drives on the right. All individuals share some interest in avoiding the non-coordinated outcome: some drive on the left and others drive on the right. When more than one equilibrium are possible, a player’s choice of strategy is not fully determined by the payoffs.

Within Austrian economics, emergence is typically conflated with the notion of spontaneous order (Harper and Lewis 2012; Rosser 2012). Austrian economists use the concept of emergence to explain how the interplay between the actions of numerous, independent individuals can generate an order which is not part of anyone’s intentions.

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Titel: Understanding coevolution of mind and society: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria
verfasst von: Shinji Teraji
Publikationsdatum: 03.01.2017
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Mind & Society / Ausgabe 1-2/2017
Print ISSN: 1593-7879
Elektronische ISSN: 1860-1839
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-016-0196-1

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