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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Understanding Spatial Abilities at Different Scales of Space

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Abstract

The previous chapter claimed that scale might indirectly influence spatial behavior by affecting the way how spatial information at different scales of space is processed. In other words, when treating scale not only as a spatial but also as a psychological construct, scale might have an impact on spatial thought, on the conscious reflection on the manipulation of spatial information.

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Fußnoten
1
Lobben (2004) uses the notion of navigational map-reading which emphasizes that the spatial product, the map, is in the focus of research. Since this study is concerned with spatial thought such as during navigation, which is mediated by maps, the term map-based navigation is used.
 
2
Wiener et al. (2009) proposed a far more differentiated taxonomy (hierarchical structure) of unaided navigation on the basis of the study of Montello (2005) and the landmark-route-configuration-model of Siegel and White (1975). As the current study focuses on map-based-navigation, their framework will not presented in detail here.
 
3
Allen (1999b) identified six possible means of accomplishing those two kinds of tasks (oriented search, following a marked trail, landmark-based piloting, path integration, habitual locomotion, using a cognitive map) that make, more or less, use of a particular spatial knowledge acquired from the spatial information that the individual engages with during movement (Montello 2005). The spatial behavior to accomplish any of the first two wayfinding tasks by any of those means is denoted as unaided wayfinding. Since this study involves the use of maps, it is not further elaborated.
 
4
The notion of mental transformation is used to address cognitive processes that rely on the transformation of mental images.
 
5
When taking a cognitive perspective on spatial abilities, one also has to examine representations and mental transformations. Both concepts have been described as being intertwined in a complex manner, thus being rather a single construct (e. g., J. R. Anderson 1978). A theoretical distinction between representations and transformations seems an adequate way to study cognitive processes (see also Tversky 2005). This approach is chosen in this study.
 
6
Whether such individual differences exist or not remains, however, a subject to intense debate (e. g., Pashler, McDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork 2008).
 
7
The expression ‘objects’ refers to flat, two-dimensional figures, and haptile, three-dimensional objects.
 
8
Another interpretation of the experiment is that mental images preserve metric relationships that are given during perception.
 
9
By now, landmarks can be understood as important features of the environment (e. g., Sadalla, Burroughs, & Staplin1980).
 
10
Studies with children that addressed paper folding (e. g., Harris, Newcombe & Hirsh-Pasek 2013) showed that the abilities to solve these tasks emerge quite early in children’s development, but did not yet address whether similar reaction time-patterns may be found.
 
11
Another explanation would be that the ‘body analogy’-group benefited from the additional spatial cue that might have helped during mental rotation. This interpretation was, however, not in line with research on additional spatial cues in mental rotation presented at this time (see Amorim, Isableu, & Jarraya 2006, p. 329, fur further discussion)
 
12
A key finding of his study is that cognitive processes of wayfinding differ for novices and experts. Since this study addresses children, the literature concerning experts has not been considered in this section.
 
13
The duality principle is not only inherent to maps but all kinds of Liben’s (1981) spatial products since it relates to the dual existence of those.
 
14
The latter aspects refer to three characteristic dimensions of a map the point of view of the map maker (see Liben 2006). These include viewing distance (distance from which referent space is represented, implying the notion of scale), viewing angle (‘bird’s eye’ vs. opaque views), and viewing azimuth (angular disparity from north).
 
15
In its broadest sense, the purpose principle therefore refers to a map as a tool for communication between the map maker and the map user (Ottosson 1987). The intended purpose of a map may influence the spatial characteristics of the map that are articulated by the map maker.
 
16
In both cases, it can be assumed that individual preference in the processing of spatial information contribute to which extent and how individuals represent knowledge (e. g., Kyritsis, M., Gulliver, S. R., Morar, S., & Macredie, R., 2009; Tascón, Boccia, Piccardi, & Cimadevilla 2017).
 
17
This process has further been denoted as spatial learning, spatial layout learning or environmental learning. Throughout this study, the term (spatial) layout learning may be used as a synonym to emphasize that cognitive mapping is a process.
 
18
Other notions are imagery maps, mental maps, environmental image, spatial image and spatial scheme (Siegel & White 1975). Cognitive maps have further been denoted as topographical schema (Piaget & Inhelder 1948/1956) and topographical representation (Hart & Moore 1973).
 
19
Downs and Stea (1981) further criticized that the metaphor of a map implies that it must be some kind of fixed product of an internalization process rather than a process.
 
20
Discussing the architecture of cognitive maps returns to the question of which frames of reference are involved during encoding of large-scale spatial information (Filimon 2015). The idea of a single coordinate system, for example, reflects the idea of an environmental frame of reference underlying the mental representation.
 
21
O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) assumed the existence of place and head cells. Place cells fire differently, depending on the location of an animal whereas head cells represent the heading of the animal in a particular location. Both cell types are part of the hippocampus. They concluded that the hippocampus functions as a cognitive map (see Hartley & Burgess 2002, for further discussion).
 
22
This is actually a transfer of the idea of a network of intrinsic frames to the representational level (see the developmental theory of Hart & Moore 1973, on fixed and coordinated frames of reference).
 
23
NRFT is therefore closely related to Poucet’s (1993) idea of local charts (representing vista spaces) that are connected by polar coordinate vectors in a graph.
 
24
There is empirical evidence that humans are able to encode vista spaces, the largest entities that can be perceived directly from one single vantage point, within one egocentric frame of reference in the cognitive map (see Meilinger 2007, for further elaboration).
 
25
This shift is different from the abilities to imagine shifts of the own perspective. It is stored in memory but is not a result of mental inferences. It connects encoded vista spaces and does not only operate on one visual stimuli (Meilinger 2008).
 
26
Again, individual preference in the processing of spatial information might affect how those are encoded by the individuals.
 
27
Although one might hypothesize that there is a relationship between the way information is presented and encoded and between the subsequent type of knowledge, the corresponding relations are not straight forward. There is converging agreement that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the mode of experience in the environment and the type of knowledge (Fields & Shelton 2006; Shelton & Pippitt 2007). The acquisition of route and survey knowledge is therefore not bound to the mode of experience. In particular, both types of knowledge can be acquired from direct experience without a map, thus involving permanent changing ground-level viewpoints or be acquired from map-based experiences involving areal and ground-level perspectives.
 
28
The map alignment effect has been particularly emphasized in the literature concerning ‘You-Are-Here’(YAH) maps for public spaces. When the posted map is not in alignment with the actual space, people tend to move towards the wrong direction by interpreting the ‘up’ on the map as ‘forward direction’ (e. g., M. Levine 1982; M. Levine et al. 1984).
 
29
The notion of visualization in this context has to be distinguished from the factor-analytical visualization-factor (see e. g., Eliot 1987).
 
30
Lobben (2007) investigated the role of self-location and other cognitive processes on the performance in map-based navigation. She concluded that besides map rotation, self-location abilities (the abilities to perform the process of self-location) are an important predictor, whereas route memory (an individual’s capacity to store a self-prescribed route in memory) was not.
 
31
In the process model, the term ‘model’ is used instead of ‘representation’ to emphasize that the process model, as originally introduced, is based on internalized information and schemata rather than spatial representations alone. Both Ottosson (1986) and Seiler (1996) assumed that the process is enriched by an individual’s schemata both for map and environment (not depicted in Figure 3.11). Map schemata might, for example, represent prior experiences of the map-reader while environmental schemata might represent prior spatial experiences in large environments during activities. During completion of the navigation plan, they might direct the initial attention of the individual to relevant information in the environment and on the map,and are therefore particularly relevant during anticipation processes.
 
Metadaten
Titel
Understanding Spatial Abilities at Different Scales of Space
verfasst von
Cathleen Heil
Copyright-Jahr
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32648-7_3