Due to the diffusion of global scandals, several studies have been conducted that seek to go beyond a rational approach to moral conduct and business ethics, and understand why workers engage in ‘outside the rules’ behaviour (e.g., Fox et al.
2001; Spector and Fox
2005). Considering individuals to be consistently conscious, controlled, and always able to discriminate between right and wrong does little to help understand the diffusion of unethical conduct and the reasons individuals may engage in it (Bersoff
1999; De Cremer and Tenbrunsel
2012). According to Bandura, ‘most of the traditional moral theories tell only half of the story in the regulation of moral behaviour’ (
2016, p. 24). For example, some of them do not fully examine the mechanisms by which moral standards are translated into actions. They do not examine how moral standards influence moral conduct in different situations and assume that moral standards are invariant across different realms of life (Bandura
2016). However, social-cognitive theory (Bandura
1986) represents a comprehensive framework explaining the self-regulatory processes linking thoughts and actions that allow understanding why people engage (or not) in misbehaviour in different settings and domains of activities (Bandura
2016). This theoretical perspective considers, on the one hand, the regulatory processes that inhibit deviant and transgressive conduct, keeping the behaviour in line with moral standards even in situations in which wrongdoing may result in personal gain or is promoted by peer and social pressure. On the other hand, it considers the mechanisms that temporarily silence the internal moral control system, allowing ‘otherwise good people’ to engage in behaviour not in line with their standards without resulting in self-condemnation.
In the following sections, we describe the model under study and the rationale for the hypothesised pathways in more detail.
Overall, the present study contributes to the literature on unethical conduct and social-cognitive theory in several ways. This is the first paper examining the longitudinal interplay between two opposite social-cognitive dimensions of the self-regulatory system in influencing misbehaviour over time. Although some researchers have investigated the role of R-SE in influencing MD (Bandura et al.
2001; d’Arripe-Longueville et al.
2010), no previous studies have tested their reciprocal influence. The concurrent examination of these two variables is in line with Bandura’s recommendation regarding studying both self-regulatory beliefs and MD to understand how the moral control system works (Bandura
2016). Specifically, while R-SE inhibits transgressive conduct, MD fosters it. In addition, previous findings almost exclusively provide empirical support for the idea that both MD and R-SE are antecedents of deviant and transgressive conduct (e.g., Bandura et al.
2001). However, an opposite relationship in which behaviour influences these dimensions of the moral self-regulatory system can also be hypothesised in line with social-cognitive (Bandura
1978,
1986) and self-perception (Bem
1972) theories. Although Bandura (
1986) posited a reciprocal relationship between cognitive processes and behaviour, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have investigated the cross-lagged relationships of both MD and R-SE with misbehaviours, and we aim to fill this gap.
Specifically, our contribution will provide further knowledge about these paths using a longitudinal design that examines the influence of behaviour on R-SE and MD over time, controlling for individuals’ previous levels in these dimensions (see Fig.
1). Furthermore, while the role of behaviour as a source of self-efficacy beliefs has been vastly corroborated, only a few studies have examined the role of behaviour in reinforcing justification mechanisms. In addition, the role of behaviour in influencing the different dimensions of the moral self-regulatory system has been overlooked. Hence, our research will shed some light on how self-efficacy beliefs, which may inhibit transgressive conduct, may reinforce moral control, making the activation of MD more difficult. Similarly, we will better understand how MD, which may foster transgressive conduct, may weaken moral control, reducing the beliefs people may have about their capability of regulating their conduct and resisting peer pressure. Finally, a further added value of this study is the investigation of the role of these two variables related to moral processes in relation to cheating behaviour, which has been underestimated in the literature on academic dishonesty. However, the examination of MD is particularly relevant in line with Murdock and Anderman (
2006), who stated that ‘academic cheating, like other deviant behaviours, is empirically related to students’ neutralising or explaining away the wrongness of the behaviour’ (p. 137). In addition, the examination of R-SE is also relevant in accordance with Bandura, who suggested that self-regulation based on internal rather than legal and social control is pivotal since ‘a civil society is largely a self-governing one’ (
2016, p. 5). Indeed, academic institutions have the responsibility of placing well-prepared individuals into the labour market, not only in terms of technical skills and knowledge but also in terms of ethical competencies. Because higher education represents a critical stage for the moral development of future workers (McCabe et al.
2012) during which moral agency can still be improved (Colby et al.
1983; Rest
1988; Treviño and Nelson
2011), the results of this study may provide useful insight by increasing knowledge regarding the interplay between unethical conduct and self-regulatory dimensions that may either suppress or foster transgressions.
The Social-Cognitive Perspective on Transgressive Behaviour
In his social-cognitive theory, Bandura (
1986) described the nature and function of morality within the broader framework of human agency. Specifically, Bandura recognised individuals as active agents, who are able to exercise their intentional influence over their own functioning and over the course of the events by their actions. Self-regulatory processes, which allow people to control and modulate their behaviour, are paramount for the exercise of human agency (Bandura
2001).
Within this theoretical framework, moral agency is exercised through self-regulatory processes that allow individuals to regulate their behaviour according to their ethical and moral norms defined and shared within their social system. Bandura (
2016) clarified that these self-regulatory processes may assume two forms: (a) a proactive one that fosters the engagement in behaviour consistent with moral principles and standards that result in positive self-evaluative reactions, such as pride and satisfaction and (b) an inhibitive one that hinders the engagement in morally and socially sanctionable behaviour that brings negative self-evaluative reactions, such as blame and self-condemnation. Hence, in relation to the exercise of morality, the self-regulatory processes operate to keep individuals’ conduct within the boundaries of their social and moral norms on one hand and to suppress engagement in ‘out of the rule’ behaviour on the other hand.
In the exercise of moral agency, self-regulatory processes are rooted in the beliefs individuals have about their perceived level of control over their moral behaviour (Bandura
2001,
2016). Moreover, R-SE informs the level of inhibitory control that people have on transgressive and deviant behaviour when this type of conduct may be promoted and/or easily accessible. The protective role of this cognitive dimension in preventing and hindering transgressive behaviour has been empirically attested (e.g., Bandura et al.
1996,
2001; Caprara et al.
2002; Cattelino et al.
2014; d’Arripe-Longueville et al.
2010; Newton et al.
2012). However, R-SE has not been previously examined in relation to cheating behaviour, a form of deviant conduct that is instrumental, common, and, in some cases, even approved and promoted by peers. Drawing on existing literature, we expected that the perceived capability to resist deviant peer pressure hinders the engagement in cheating behaviour. Hence, we stated the following hypotheses:
Within the moral agency theory, Bandura depicted not only the process leading individuals to behave in line with their moral standards but also the process allowing them to deactivate or weaken the moral control (
1991,
2016). According to Bandura, transgressive conduct cannot be considered ‘ethical lapses’ (
2016, p. 48) but the result of the activation of MD, a set of social-cognitive mechanisms creating the conditions for ‘persuasive self-exonerations’ (
2016, p. 48). Specifically, MD represents the other side of the self-regulatory process that makes it possible to misbehave while avoiding the activation of moral control. Moreover, MD allows ‘otherwise good people’ to temporarily and selectively silence the internal moral system and engage in a behaviour that they would generally consider wrong without incurring any self-censure (Bandura
1991,
2016). More specifically, MD intervenes in the translation of thought into action by removing the restraints on transgressive conduct and the associated condemnatory self-reactions (Bandura
2016).
Moral disengagement operates through eight mechanisms at four sites of the self-regulatory process that allow individuals to perceive transgressive and deviant conduct as morally acceptable and as an appropriate means to pursue their own goals (Bandura
1991,
2016). A set of mechanisms operate at the behavioural locus, converting wrongdoing into acceptable action. Specifically, moral justification results in the ‘sanctification’ of misconduct by re-construing the misbehaviour as serving higher moral and ethical principles. In addition, through euphemistic labelling, individuals ‘sanitise’ the wrongdoing by describing it using a mild and masking language. Through advantageous comparison, individuals reduce the wrongness of their misbehaviour by comparing it with more flagrant and incontrovertible misconduct. Another set of mechanisms operate at the agency locus, obscuring individual responsibility in relation to the misconduct. In particular, through displacement of responsibility, individuals exonerate themselves for misacting considered to be dictated by authorities. Similarly, through the diffusion of responsibility, individuals exonerate themselves by considering the misbehaviour a common practice enacted by the social group. A third set of mechanisms operate at the outcome locus, altering or hiding the actual consequences of the misconduct. In particular, through disregarding and distortion of consequences, the effect produced by misconduct is reduced, reframed, or removed. Finally, a set of mechanisms operate at the victim locus. Through dehumanisation, individuals divest victims from human characteristics or attribute subhuman qualities to them. In addition, through attribution of blame, victims are considered responsible for what they suffered and do not have anyone else to blame but themselves.
Overall, MD has been studied in relation to different types of behaviour, and results have consistently attested to its role in fostering deviant and transgressive conduct (e.g., Gini et al.
2014; Shulman et al.
2011) and hindering prosocial and helping behaviour (e.g., Bandura et al.
1996; Paciello et al.
2013). Accordingly, we anticipate that the more individuals deactivate their internal moral system, the more likely their engagement in behaviour will not be in line with their internal moral system and social norms. Hence, in line with the existing literature, we hypothesised that:
As suggested by Bandura (
2016) MD ‘is not a dispositional trait’ (p. 26) and, accordingly, several authors have investigated the different factors that may promote or hinder the propensity to morally disengage. Specifically, studies have shown that moral identity, empathy, and self-efficacy among others negatively influence it (e.g., Bandura et al.
2001; Deter et al.
2008; Hyde et al.
2010; Moore et al.
2012). On the contrary, dimensions such as psychological distress, negative emotions, insecurity, and peer exclusion positively influence MD (e.g., Bao et al.
2015; Fida et al.
2015: Fontaine et al.
2014; Newton et al.
2012; Paciello, Fida, Cerniglia, Tramontano, & Cole, 2013). Furthermore, this conceptualisation of MD is also in line with the literature about its development highlighting that, although MD for some individuals tends to be stable across time (Paciello et al.
2008), in the general population this stability is on average moderate. In addition, the definition of MD as a process variable rather than a dispositional trait (such as for example Big Five, McCrae and Costa
1987) is also mirrored in the way it is measured. Indeed, similarly to SE, Bandura recommended to assess MD in relation to the specific realm of life under study. In line with this, several scales have been developed to measure MD in relation for instance to civic and minor transgression (e.g., Caprara et al.
2009), sport misbehaviour (e.g., Boardley and Kavussanu
2007,
2008), and counterproductive work behaviour (e.g., Fida et al.
2015). Based on these premises, it is likely that if on the one hand, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, morally disengaging in the past provides further encouragement for morally disengaging in the present or future, on the other hand this stability does not rule out intra-individual variability in, and the influence of individual and contextual factors on MD over time. However, it must be acknowledged that in some studies MD has been conceived as a dispositional trait (e.g., Samnani et al.
2014).
In line with this, according to the social-cognitive theory (Bandura
1986), when studying human conduct, it is necessary to consider the effects that behaviour has on the individual cognitive system. Hence, limiting the analysis to the effect that individual characteristics have on behaviour without considering the reciprocal influence would only provide a partial understanding. This is also in line with the self-perception theory (Bem
1972), which posits a direct influence of behaviour on personal beliefs, attitudes, and, more generally, cognitive processes. Indeed, as individuals infer others’ attitudes and beliefs by observing their behaviour, they also infer their own attitudes and beliefs by observing their own conduct (Bem
1972). Furthermore, cognitions deriving from this internal self-inferential process reinforce the engagement in the same behaviour over time, strengthening the association between cognition and behaviour (Albarracin and Wyer
2000; Glasman and Albarracín
2006).
In line with this, Bandura (
1997) underlined that actual behaviour is a key element influencing self-efficacy beliefs. However, at least in relation to R-SE, while the previously mentioned studies provide evidence for the influence of R-SE on behaviour, to the best of our knowledge, there are no longitudinal studies empirically testing neither the opposite relationship nor the reciprocal influence. Hence, it is plausible to hypothesise that the experience of moral control failure would weaken the beliefs people have about their capabilities to resist internal and peer pressure to misbehave. Following this, we expected that:
Similar hypotheses were posited on the reciprocal influence between cheating behaviour and MD. Overall, this reciprocal path has been generally overlooked, although there is some evidence supporting it, such as the study conducted by Shu et al. (
2011) finding that MD is a ‘behavioural consequence’ of cheating. In addition, Fontaine et al. (
2014) found that aggressive behaviour in middle adolescence influences MD in late adolescence and in turn influences criminal behaviour in early adulthood. Hence, we expected that the engagement in deviant behaviour will reinforce the same mechanisms initially used to legitimise and justify it. This vicious circle between misbehaviour and MD weakens the moral control system and may lead in turn to a sort of ‘moral desensitisation’. In other words, by repeatedly misbehaving, people become gradually more tolerant towards discomfort and self-condemnation associated with the misconduct itself (Bandura
1986,
2016) ‘until eventually acts originally regarded as abhorrent can be performed without much distress’ (Bandura
1986, p. 385). Hence, we hypothesised that:
Furthermore, considering that (a) R-SE attests for the good functioning of moral self-regulation and a consistent actualisation of moral thoughts into behaviour, and (b) MD attests for the failure of moral self-regulation and a divorce between thoughts and action, it is likely that they hinder each other over time. However, no previous studies have specifically tested their reciprocal relationships, although there is some evidence suggesting the influence of R-SE on MD (Bandura et al.
2001). Nevertheless, we hypothesised that:
Finally, still in line with the reciprocal influence between cognition and behaviour, we consider that the reciprocal influence between R-SE and MD is not only direct but also indirect through the mediation of behaviour. Specifically, considering cheating behaviour an experience of moral failure, we hypothesised that: