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Dieses Kapitel befasst sich mit der Führungsrolle und der politischen Umsetzung von vier britischen subnationalen Einheiten - Wales, Schottland, Nordirland und der Isle of Man - innerhalb der Under2 Coalition (U2C). Er untersucht, wie diese Organisationen ihre "Klimaaktivität" durch eine ausgeprägte Auseinandersetzung mit U2C entwickelt haben, wobei sie sich auf ihre politischen Instrumente, Ziele und Führungsstile konzentrieren. Die Analyse zeigt, dass Wales als Gründungsmitglied zwar eine starke normative und kognitive Führungsrolle gezeigt hat, Schottland, ein früher Schreiner, jedoch die größten Klimaambitionen an den Tag gelegt hat, indem es die meisten Strategien und ehrgeizigsten Ziele umgesetzt hat. Nordirland und die Isle of Man haben als spätere Partner Zeichen der Klimafolgschaft gezeigt und nach ihrem Beitritt zu U2C ihre Klimaschutzmaßnahmen verstärkt. Das Kapitel untersucht auch die Rolle von U2C bei der Gestaltung der Klimaschutzambitionen dieser Einrichtungen sowie die einzigartigen Herausforderungen und Chancen, vor denen jede dieser Organisationen steht. Die Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Komplexität der britischen Klimapolitik und die Folgen dezentraler Autonomie und wegweisender Klimaschutzgesetze für die Aufrechterhaltung und Intensivierung von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen.
KI-Generiert
Diese Zusammenfassung des Fachinhalts wurde mit Hilfe von KI generiert.
Abstract
This chapter examines climate policy efforts across four UK jurisdictions that joined the Under2 Coalition at different timepoints: founding member Wales, early joiner Scotland, and later joiners Northern Ireland and Isle of Man. Operating within the UK’s constitutionally asymmetric devolution framework, these subnational entities demonstrate varied climate leadership trajectories shaped by differential legislative powers, political contexts, and institutional capacities. Wales exhibits normative and cognitive leadership through pioneering an innovative intergenerational approach to climate action despite constitutional entanglement with English law limiting implementation capacity. Scotland, though only an early Under2 Coalition joiner, demonstrates the strongest climate ambition of all nations, driven by independence aspirations and serving as European Under2 Coalition co-chair, though recent difficulties in meeting the GHG emissions reduction target prompted the adoption of carbon budgets. Northern Ireland’s delayed policy-based climate action reflects post-conflict recovery priorities and repeated Assembly suspensions, while Isle of Man exemplifies followership through policy emulation and reliance on external expertise. The findings reveal mixed support for our two propositions regarding founding member advantages, highlighting how constitutional autonomy and political stability prove more decisive than membership timing in determining climate policy profiles.
Introduction
The UK has been described as a “paradoxical climate leader” (Rayner & Jordan, 2010). Despite being the first nation to enshrine carbon emissions reduction in law through the Climate Change Act 2008, climate policy development has since oscillated between the Conservative derogation of “green crap” and championing of net-zero delivery (Carter & Pearson, 2024). In short, a fundamental tension underlies the country’s enhanced climate ambitions and its record of inadequate policy delivery.
While valuable, this national-level focus has left subnational UK climate leadership in the shadows. When research does address it, subnational government is often presented as a singular, monolithic entity. This overlooks substantive “constitutional asymmetry”: the varied distribution of legislative and executive powers shaping subnational climate action (Royles & McEwen, 2015). In fact, UK subnational climate action is distinct from that of other political systems due to long-standing “Westminster pathologies”: short-termism, reactivity, fragmentation, siloed working practices, incrementalism, and top-down policymaking (Diamond et al., 2024).
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Against this backdrop, this chapter explicates how four actors—three UK subnational devolved administrations and one British Crown Dependency—have developed their “climate actorness” in distinct ways, exemplified by their varied engagement with U2C. It probes Liefferink and Wurzel’s (2017; see also Chap. 2) four ideal types of subnational climate leadership—structural, entrepreneurial, cognitive, and exemplary—alongside followership (emulating the activities of leaders) to examine the extent to which a U2C co-founder (Wales) adopted more ambitious climate measures than early (Scotland) and later joining (Northern Ireland, Isle of Man) subnational counterparts.1
Founding Member
Wales
Since 1998, Wales has been “entrained” in political devolution, receiving the most limited settlement of any UK devolved administration. This arrangement provided only secondary legislative powers, constrained financial autonomy, and continued reliance on Westminster, thereby restricting independent policymaking. In fact, of all the UK’s devolved administrations, Wales is the most intertwined with English Law (Cowell, 2017, p. 1248).
Nonetheless, Welsh climate ambition often exceeds that of the UK Government and other subnational actors (Royles & McEwen, 2015). In particular, Wales has leveraged subnational law to challenge economic primacy in favor of intergenerational thinking (Wallace, 2019). As Burns et al. (2018, pp. 7–8) put it, Wales has “re-fashioned environmental governance” by developing “distinctive institutions” and passing “innovative environmental legislation”—including the Wellbeing of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 and the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales. These (legislative) developments have been attributed to entrepreneurial subnational climate policy actors effectively negotiating context-specific policy innovation (Messham & Sheard, 2020).
The existing literature also attributes Welsh climate activity to factors including: (1) the historic prioritization of environmental issues, including an early statutory duty to promote “sustainable development” across all subnational functions (Williams, 2006); (2) significant renewable energy (hydropower) capacity; (3) a desire to (re-)assert a distinctive subnational identity; (4) sustained political will for climate action, evident from sustained cross-party consensus across the Welsh Assembly; and (5) a stable governance framework which has enabled coherent, long-term climate policy development (Newman et al., 2024).
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Furthermore, U2C membership provides opportunities to share solutions—including diverting 98 percent of municipal waste away from landfill in the two decades preceding 2022—and learn from others (e.g., on delivering a just industrial transformation; Irranca-Davies, 2024).
Early Joiner
Scotland
Scotland has implemented some of the most ambitious climate policies in the world. This activity has been attributed to contextual factors including substantive fiscal and renewable energy capacities and independence aspirations (McEwen & Bomberg, 2014).
Scottish decarbonization is inextricably linked to tensions between “old” (carbon-intensive) and “new” (renewable) energy sources. Advocacy for enhanced renewable energy capacity (from offshore wind to green hydrogen) juxtaposes Scotland’s reliance on substantive (and lucrative) North Sea oil and gas reserves.
Saliently, Scotland has prioritized a just net-zero transition, championed by ex-First Minister Nicola Sturgeon (Santos Ayllón & Jenkins, 2023). This echoes the deleterious legacy of 1980s coal mine closures—an archetypal unjust transition (Toulmin, 2025).
Others have likened Scottish climate ambition to Green Nationalism: a political ideology combining nationalist principles with climate action to consolidate claims to territorial distinctiveness and self-governance by adopting climate targets which exceed (inter)national ambitions. McEwen and Bomberg (2014) capture the situation well, describing how “the election of an autonomist, pro-independence party to the Scottish Government was associated with a step-change in the scale of ambition in the emissions reduction and renewable energy programmes. For parties seeking greater political autonomy or independent statehood, like the Scottish National Party […] climate ambition provides an opportunity to nurture perceptions of national prosperity and self-sufficiency, and to engage in ‘paradiplomacy’ to assert national autonomy and nurture their perception internationally as ‘nation-states in waiting’” (2014, p. 81). Similarly, Nash suggests Scottish climate policy echoes a logic of “anything Westminster can do [Holyrood] can do better” (Nash, 2021).
Ultimately, Scotland has diverged from, and regularly exceeded, UK climate policy ambitions. Despite (only) resembling an early joiner (having joined U2C in July 2015, two months after the founding signatories), Scotland is an important coalition member, serving as European co-chair. While climate action has seemingly been shuffled down the list of priorities following Sturgeon’s resignation, U2C offers a vehicle through which Scotland may maintain or step up its climate leadership.
Later Joiners
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has been described as displaying a “deficit in leadership” on climate policy vis-à-vis other UK subnational counterparts (Brennan et al., 2017, p. 3) and only joined U2C in 2021.
This deficit has been attributed to the Troubles and Northern Ireland’s ensuing reputation as a “post-conflict society” (Barry, 2009, p. 46) that prioritizes national security and economic recovery over climate action.
This status even led to Northern Ireland being dubbed the “dirty corner” of the (former) “Dirty Man of Europe” due to its lack of environmental and climate governance architectures (Brennan et al., 2017). Hwang describes relevant governance reforms as “piecemeal, ineffective, and sometimes retrogressive” and as precipitating environmental crises (2024, p. 30).
These interlocking governance challenges have been exacerbated by repeated suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly. There have been significant periods—roughly one-third of its lifespan since 1998—when climate policy has been delivered without Assembly oversight.
Nonetheless, the opportunity still exists to intertwine climate action with (post-conflict) economic growth (Barry, 2009, p. 46), while U2C membership could help fill a growing “capability/expectation gap” in climate governance (Gravey et al., 2025).
Isle of Man
The Isle of Man has been “late to respond” to climate change, echoing an island saying of “Traa dy Liooar” (literally, “time enough”), whereby decisions are slow to be implemented (McCartney, 2023, p. 1134). The island only joined U2C in 2021.
As a British Crown Dependency, Isle of Man occupies “a unique and liminal space” vis-à-vis climate action: despite being self-governed, it is often aggregated within the UK for data collection purposes, obscuring its (largely) independent status (McCartney, 2023, p. 1134).
Climate change vulnerability and energy security are salient local issues. While several power stations do exist on the island—including Pulrose (a diesel and gas-fired energy plant), Sulby (a hydroelectric plant), Peel (a source of backup/peak demand energy), and a waste-to-energy plant—Isle of Man imports 92 percent of its energy. Consequently, the subnational entity’s renewable capacity is minimal; the island’s “productive potential” goes largely unrealized (Watt & Wilby, 2025, p. 2). Compounding this, Isle of Man-UK trading relations favor path dependency: potential economic sanctions incentivize the use of (carbon-intensive) energy sources with predictable outputs to fulfill expected export quotas.
Isle of Man became the only island jurisdiction to be acknowledged by the UN as a Biosphere Reserve. This protective designation directly shapes climate action: it requires policy to “respect the natural environment” (Watt & Wilby, 2025, p.3) and has propelled peatland restoration, woodland planting, and blue carbon efforts.
Manx climate ambition is also reliant on external expertise. A commissioned report (Curran, 2019) expounds cross-sectoral recommendations to step up climate action. The report author has since served as an external climate policy advisor, (seemingly) shaping climate ambitions by, for example, advocating for a just transition, much as Scotland has.
Comparative Analysis
Policies
As a founding member, Wales exhibits similar legislative activity to—and has even been exceeded by—Scotland and Northern Ireland, reflecting its status as the devolved administration most intertwined with English law (see Fig. 7.1). On plan adoption, Scotland was by far the most active from the early 2010s onward (often exceeding UK ambitions), with Wales adopting the fewest plans. While Isle of Man did not adopt any climate legislation until after 2015—coinciding with the Paris Agreement—and has since remained the least prolific actor, it adopted a (relatively) similar number of plans to the UK devolved administrations before 2010 and has, following a 2012 Scoping Study, accelerated plan adoption.
Notably, all subnational entities exhibited (relatively) low legislative activity levels prior to 2015, indicative of limited devolved competencies and/or capacity constraints. The actors’ higher plan adoption rates exemplify their function as a (relatively) soft indicator of climate ambition. Nonetheless, all four jurisdictions (further) increased legislative activity around the time of the 2015 Paris Agreement and stepped up plan adoption post-2020 after declaring climate emergencies.
Despite (only) being an early joiner, Scotland adopted the most climate policies (particularly plans), underscoring its status as a long-standing climate leader, while Wales and Northern Ireland have steadily increased their policy adoption over time. In contrast, Isle of Man has stepped up climate policy adoption more recently and has engaged in substantive planning post-2012. The following subsection expands on these findings, comparing the climate policy adoption of Wales to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Isle of Man.
Welsh climate policy activity predates its co-founding of U2C. While successive Government of Wales Acts have ceded powers downwards, Welsh climate policy resembles a UK-wide pattern of persistent, yet differentiated, “cross-domain differences”: while “functional pressures” have enabled profound decentralization of some policy areas (waste, building, planning, agriculture), “obstinate centralization” dominates others, especially energy, where Wales has no devolved authority (Tatham & Lemaire, 2024, p. 23).
Despite limited powers, Wales has adopted several innovative climate policies. While some were adopted before co-founding U2C, coalition accession has (seemingly) helped maintain and step up climate ambitions.
Nonetheless, Wales has adopted fewer climate policies than Scotland and Northern Ireland, administrations that are less intertwined with the English legal system.
The Scotland Act 1998 commenced a devolution process which has ceded greater constitutional autonomy to Scotland than other devolved administrations, facilitating “distinctive and ambitious” climate policy development (Royles & McEwen, 2015, p. 1041).
While successive National Planning Frameworks have entrenched cross-sectoral climate ambitions, Scottish planning accelerated in the 2010s following legislation of a 2009 Climate Change Act, which exceeds the 2008 UK Act in climate ambition. Scotland’s landmark Climate Change Plan 2018–2032 articulates over 100 policies for a just net-zero transition, while a 2023 National Just Transition Planning Framework formalizes climate justice ambitions.
Overall, Scotland has adopted more climate laws and plans than the three other actors. While several policies were adopted before joining U2C, most were adopted after. U2C membership has even been described as key to “Scotland’s international capacity building engagement” (Scottish Government, 2024, p. 160) and as a tool for stepping up climate action.
In contrast, Northern Ireland has been slow to exhibit climate ambition. It was the last devolved administration to adopt a sustainable development strategy in 2006 (McClenaghan, 2008) and only established its Environment Agency in 2008 (the other UK devolved administrations did so in 1996).
While the Northern Ireland Act 1998 established the nation’s primary governance architecture—the Assembly and the Executive—it did not stipulate climate action. However, the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement 1998 enshrined environmental governance as an area of cross-border cooperation.
Climate policy adoption increased after joining U2C, coinciding with the 2020 declaration of a “New Decade, New Approach”, whereby Northern Ireland aligned with the Paris Agreement, published a just transition-focused Energy Strategy, and legislated a 2022 Climate Change Act. The Act codified net-zero by 2050 across three budgetary periods (spanning 2023–2037), 48% emissions reduction targets for 2030 and 2040, and climate action plans every five years.
Overall, while Northern Ireland adopted several climate policies prior to joining U2C, the most consequential, including the Act, were adopted after joining.
Various climate policy developments commenced in 2006 with early recognition of energy- and climate change-related challenges. This was bolstered by a 2010 report describing “significant untapped” renewable energy deployment and export potential. Cross-sectoral reforms and ambitious benchmarks for increasing the share of renewables in the island’s energy mix were outlined in 2013, signifying a shift from exploratory to strategic climate action.
A 2016 climate change mitigation framework moved Isle of Man closer to (inter)national norms (by setting specific transport, buildings, energy, and waste targets) and championed measurable policy outcomes. A 2020 plan necessitated “immediate” GHG emissions reduction, increased natural carbon capture, and operationalization of net-zero pathways analysis. In 2021, shortly after joining U2C, a landmark Climate Change Act legislated net-zero by 2050 and mandated five-year climate action plans. Prior to this, Isle of Man lacked specific climate change legislation or obligations: while the UK Government extended its ratification of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in 2006 and the 2015 Paris Agreement in 2015 to include Isle of Man, the island has never been subject to the 2008 UK Climate Change Act. A 2022 plan identified energy, transport, residential buildings, and agriculture as key emitting sectors, alongside forestry and land use as a carbon sink. It also articulated cross-sectoral and sector-specific targets alongside an explicit desire to replicate legislative solutions adopted across the UK (including Wales’ intergenerational approach).
Therefore, while Isle of Man articulated broad visions before joining U2C, it adopted more substantive, measurable policies afterward, emulating others.
Policy Instruments
This subsection examines the climate policy instruments adopted by each subnational actor relative to U2C membership (see Fig. 7.2).
Fig. 7.2
Policy instruments to reduce regional GHG emissions
Wales responded to its housing stock amassing 21 percent of national carbon emissions and ranking among the oldest and least efficient in Europe by prioritizing energy efficiency measures, including Building and Housing Quality standards.
It also operationalized various subsidies to incentivize renewable energy generation, increase public sector building energy efficiency, and reduce fuel poverty. Similarly, funding supports public sector energy efficiency and decarbonization projects, while the government provides financial support to public sector organizations and community enterprises working on energy efficiency and renewable energy projects.
Wales prioritized action on waste by adopting 70% (by 2025) and 100% (by 2050) recycling targets (Cowell et al., 2020) and a Circular Economy Fund (although Hobson (2022) describes this as a “rebadging” of pre-existing resource governance initiatives). It was also among the first to implement carrier bag charging (Thomas et al., 2016). In 2022, Net Zero Industry Wales was established to support industrial decarbonization, while a Net Zero Challenge Group was established (2023) to commission and share relevant expertise.
Wales has also supported hydropower—including establishing Dinorwig Power Station, a pumped storage hydroelectric power station—given the potential for hydropower to make a significant (about 15 percent) contribution to renewable energy generation capacities (Bere et al., 2017).
Overall, Welsh climate policy instruments target energy- and building-related decarbonization. While some instruments were implemented before co-founding U2C, most were implemented after. Nonetheless, most Welsh policy instruments are technologically specific, mirroring national-level instruments (Wade et al., 2022).
Scotland has adopted an array of climate policy instruments, including flagship fiscal mechanisms to promote climate justice. Between 2008 and 2022, Scotland sponsored a Climate Challenge Fund to support community-scale decarbonization. In 2010, the Scottish government launched the Community and Renewable Energy Scheme which has provided over £58m to over 600 projects.
A 2012 Climate Justice Fund (£24m) positioned Scotland as the first nation to proactively prioritize climate justice. In 2018, Scotland launched a Just Transition Commission to scrutinize relevant plans. In 2021, Scotland committed to treble its Climate Justice Fund contribution (£36m until 2026), while as COP26 host nation, it became the first global North country to pledge finance (one million pounds) to address Loss and Damage.
In 2022, Scotland announced a 180 million pounds Emerging Energy Technologies Fund to develop hydrogen and carbon capture and storage sectors between 2022 and 2026. This fund included a 10 million pounds stream to support renewable hydrogen solutions. This was bolstered in 2023 by a 90 million pounds Green Hydrogen Fund. Scotland has prioritized vehicle fleet decarbonization, contributing to an U2C-affiliated ZEV Community to accelerate ZEV uptake by sharing best practices. Finally, Scotland has prioritized peatland restoration since 2012, recognizing that this significant carbon sink covers over 20 percent of Scottish land (Ferretto et al., 2019).
In summary, Scotland has adopted various policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions, aided by its 2009 Climate Change Act and U2C membership. Several instruments (e.g., on climate justice) were implemented before joining U2C and others afterward (e.g., a Loss and Damage Fund).
Northern Ireland has introduced a limited number of policy instruments, including a 2010 8 million pounds Sustainable Energy Program, 80 percent of which supports implementation of domestic/business energy efficiency schemes through boiler upgrades, low-emission light fitting, and insulation installation for vulnerable individuals. It also adopted energy efficiency standards for new public authority buildings in 2019—expanding this to public and private buildings in 2020—prioritized peatland restoration, and, in 2020, committed to planting 18 million trees on 9000 hectares of new woodland by 2030. A 2022 Northern Ireland Climate Change Act created a Just Transition Commission (to develop climate resilient, environmentally sustainable jobs and low carbon investment) and a Just Transition Fund for Agriculture (to provide specific advice and financial assistance), echoing the activities of Wales and Scotland.
Despite being the smallest UK devolved administration, Northern Ireland wields significant power over energy (Muinzer & Ellis, 2017). This, however, has sparked controversy, exemplified by a 2012 Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme designed to “stimulate increased derivation of heat from renewable sources” (Muinzer, 2017). Despite successful rollout across other parts of the UK, Northern Ireland adjusted the scheme’s financial mechanisms in a maladaptive way, introducing inappropriate tariffs (subsidy rates were set higher than the cost of wood pellets, incentivizing businesses to burn pellets to earn money), and overlooking cost controls (no budget cap or tiered payment schemes were implemented), and oversight mechanisms (which enabled abuse of the system, including intentional overheating of empty farm buildings). These shortcomings shaped a projected overspend of about 490 million pounds (over 20 years), derision of the scheme as “Cash for Ash”, and the 2017 collapse of the devolved government.
Overall, Northern Irish climate policy instruments focused on the energy, waste, and forestry and land use sectors. While measures were implemented before joining U2C, Northern Ireland’s Climate Act was adopted afterward and stipulates several ambitious policy instruments (e.g., on climate justice). However, these are (largely) still to be implemented.
Isle of Man introduced climate policy instruments at a slower rate than the devolved administrations analyzed in this chapter. Instruments include a 2018 Sustainable Financing Framework (financing expenditure by issuing climate bonds), a 2018 Energy Efficiency Scheme (to incentivize low-carbon home improvements), and a 2021 Green Living Grant Scheme (to lower residential carbon emissions and energy bills through home energy audit and grant support). The government moved to institutionalize climate ambition in 2020 by forming a Climate Change Transformation team, establishing two climate funds—on Environment Protection and a Climate Change Mitigation—and prohibiting peat extraction from the island’s only public turbary.
In 2024, Isle of Man introduced renewable energy and sustainable technology training, government carbon literacy training, and a carbon credit project focused on natural carbon sequestration (whereas Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland contribute to EU/UK emissions trading schemes).
Finally, Isle of Man introduced several bans, including a 2023 ban on the sale, supply, and distribution of ten single-use plastics (following an EU directive), a 2024 (temporary) ban on bottom trawling three fishing sites, and a 2025 ban on fossil fuel heating system installation in new buildings.
Overall, Isle of Man adopted several specific instruments to reduce GHG emissions, most of which were introduced after joining U2C.
Targets
The following section explicates the GHG emissions reduction targets adopted by each subnational government. Unless specified otherwise, targets refer to a 1990 emissions reduction baseline.
All four jurisdictions adopted targets with various time frames (see Fig. 7.3). Short- and medium-term targets are considered the most ambitious as they put immediate pressure on policymakers to take action. The findings exhibit no clearly discernable link between U2C membership and target adoption. While Scotland adopted all three target types in 2009 before U2C participation, Wales adopted short- and long-term targets shortly after co-founding U2C (seemingly leveraging it to counteract constitutional capacity constraints), while Northern Ireland adopted short- and long-term targets shortly after joining in 2021, and Isle of Man set short- and long-term targets before joining in 2021, and adopted a medium-term target shortly after.
In short, while U2C membership may aid target adoption, this is often also shaped by subnational political, institutional, and legal factors. While Northern Ireland and Isle of Man exhibit some followership traits (by adopting targets shortly after joining U2C), Scotland has shouldered significant responsibilities within the coalition (as European co-chair) and was the first to adopt targets across all time frames (including a 2009 net-zero target).
The findings partially support the central propositions of this book presented in Chap. 2: that founding (and early) U2C members set more ambitious climate targets than later joiners due to stronger reputational incentives. The remainder of this subsection details the targets adopted by each subnational entity.
Wales adopted ambitious targets prior to co-founding U2C. In 2010—under the 2008 UK Climate Change Act, the primary legislative framework operating in Wales at the time (Muinzer, 2019)—Wales committed to 3% annual emissions reductions across areas of devolved competence vis-à-vis a 2006–2010 baseline. This covered about 70% of Welsh emissions, reflecting shared climate policy competencies across Assembly (about 30%) and UK and EU (about 40%) decision-making arenas. The remaining about 30% of emissions were to be realized by Welsh businesses, the public sector, and community actions. A GHG emissions reduction target of 40% by 2020 covering all Welsh GHG emissions was adopted in 2010, alongside sector-specific targets.
Welsh target-setting stepped up following adoption of the 2016 Environment (Wales) Act, which legislated emissions reduction targets of 45% by 2030, 67% by 2040, and 80% by 2050 as well as five-yearly carbon budgets.
In 2019, Wales adopted three cross-sectoral GHG emissions reduction targets: (1) 27% by 2020; (2) 45% by 2030; and (3) 67% by 2040. In 2021, following the UK’s Climate Change Committee’s (CCC; for details, see Seibicke, 2025) advice (2020), Wales adopted more ambitious targets—63% by 2030, 89% by 2040, and net-zero GHG emissions by 2050—plus corresponding carbon budgets covering 2021–25 (about 37% reduction) and 2026–30 (about 58% reduction).
Overall, Wales has adopted increasingly ambitious targets. While several targets were set prior to U2C co-founding, target-setting stepped up post-2016.
After implementing a 2009 Climate Change Act, Scotland set comprehensive, annual net-zero targets for 2010–2022 to facilitate regular scrutiny of progress. In 2023, further annual targets were set for 2028–2032. An updated 2019 Act—including a headline net-zero commitment by 2045 (up from 90% by 2050) and five years ahead of the UK—ratcheted up Scotland’s ambitions. Interim targets were also set, including a 75% GHG emissions reduction by 2030 (up from 66%) and 90% by 2040 (up from 75%).
In 2017, Scotland pledged to collaborate with U2C co-founder California to step up subnational climate action (by sharing best-practice offshore wind solutions) in response to President Donald Trump’s diminution of US national-level climate action. A 2022 CCC review recommended adjusting Scotland’s annual targets to reflect significant changes to the treatment of peatland emissions within emissions inventories. In response, Scotland revised its 2021–2029 targets accordingly.
The CCC went further in 2024, describing Scotland’s 2030 climate goals—specifically its 75% GHG emissions reduction target—as lacking credibility. Ultimately, it failed to meet 9 of the 13 targets adopted between 2010 and 2013 under the 2009 Act.
To restore credibility, Scotland withdrew its 2030 and 2040 interim targets and committed to drawing up new carbon budgets every five years for the period covering 2026–2045, emulating (sub)national approaches in the UK and Wales. Multi-year carbon budgets were deemed appropriate given the susceptibility of annual targets to annual GHG emissions fluctuations. Despite these changes, Scotland retained its headline net-zero GHG emissions by 2045 target.
In summary, Scotland has adopted targets with varying temporal horizons. While some were set before joining U2C (aided by stability provided by the 2009 Climate Change Act), others were adopted after. Scottish target-setting is intertwined with CCC guidance: while ambitions have regularly exceeded those of other UK devolved administrations, they have also been critiqued as overly ambitious.
Northern Ireland adopted GHG emissions reduction targets in 2007, committing to a 25% carbon footprint reduction by 2025. In 2011, Northern Ireland committed to a GHG emissions reduction of at least 35% by 2025. After joining U2C in 2021, Northern Ireland committed to an 82% GHG emissions reduction by 2050.
The 2022 Northern Ireland Climate Change Act legislated a net-zero GHG emissions target by 2050 (although methane was not required to be reduced by more than 46%). In 2024, two statutory instruments stipulated successive carbon budgets at an average annual reduction of 33% (2023–27), 48% (2028–31), and 62% (2033–37), as well as a GHG emissions reduction target of 77% by 2040.
Northern Ireland has therefore adopted progressively ambitious targets, supported by increasingly ambitious legislative solutions. Of these, one target was set before joining U2C and the rest afterward, reflecting a receding tendency to prioritize economic development over climate action.
Isle of Man formulated early targets, including a 2013 target of reducing GHG emissions by 80%. Over time, targets have become increasingly ambitious and precise.
In 2021, a landmark Climate Change Act legislated a net-zero emissions target by 2050 relative to a 2018 baseline, emulating the UK. A 2022 Strategy set two intermediate targets, namely, (1) a 35% GHG emissions reduction by 2030 and (2) a 45% one by 2035.
Overall, while a GHG emissions reduction target was set before joining U2C, increasingly ambitious targets were adopted after joining, (seemingly) to emulate other subnational actors.
Leadership
All four UK subnational governments used U2C membership to maintain and/or step up climate ambitions to varying degrees, displaying distinct, context-specific leadership/followership trajectories.
As a self-proclaimed climate leader (Irranca-Davies, 2024), Wales presents strong normative and cognitive leadership anchored in long-term thinking. The Wellbeing of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 garnered international recognition by embedding intergenerational equity into law and even influenced the UN Pact for the Future (Irranca-Davies, 2024). However, despite being a U2C co-founder, Wales enacted fewer climate policies than its devolved counterparts: structural constraints, including entanglement with English law, hindered its ability to decisively legislate. This finding aligns with portrayals of Welsh climate leadership as hampered by a lack of “implementation mechanisms” (Newman et al., 2024, p. 11) and centrally determined, annualized budgets (Wallace, 2019). Burns et al. (2018, p. 8) even caution against uncritical appraisal of Welsh climate ambitions, citing poor performance on issues including air quality. Nonetheless, Wales (broadly) exhibits climate leadership (notably on climate justice) and has used U2C, where feasible, to step up climate action.
As an early joiner, Scotland offers a contrasting example of climate leadership (McEwen & Bomberg, 2014; Royles & McEwen, 2015): adopting the most climate policies, adopting ambitious GHG emissions targets, leading on climate justice implementation, and even launching a Loss and Damage Fund. These activities are intertwined with a broader political narrative: policy-based climate action bolsters independence aspirations by exceeding national-level ambitions. However, this approach has limitations: multiple missed annual targets prompted a 2024 switch to carbon budgets every five years, resembling followership (by emulating UK and Welsh approaches).
Northern Ireland only recently demonstrated climate leadership potential: delayed U2C engagement reflects historic policy fragmentation and political instabilities centered around post-conflict recovery. Northern Ireland’s landmark 2022 Climate Act is indicative of wider climate policy emulation. While past environmental crises and scandals highlight enduring risks to credibility, a distinct opportunity remains to realize growing public expectations on climate action.
While Isle of Man stepped up climate action in the 2020s, it resembles a climate follower. U2C membership coincided with a wider proliferation of climate policy activity, including legislation of a 2021 Climate Act. Cognitive and entrepreneurial leadership was also limited: external expertise informed prioritization of climate justice, emulating exemplary Scottish leadership on this issue. In short, despite capacity constraints, Isle of Man leveraged protective designation, external expertise, and U2C membership to step up action.
Ultimately, all four subnational governments displayed different modes of climate leadership and/or followership, using U2C membership to shape climate ambitions to varying degrees. This illustrates that while U2C membership can shape policy-based climate action, subnational contexts also matter.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the extent to which a U2C co-founder (Wales) adopted more ambitious climate policies, instruments, and targets than one early joiner (Scotland) and two later joiners (Northern Ireland and Isle of Man). With reference to the existing literature on leadership and followership, it has addressed the central proposition of this book: that founding (and early) members face the strongest reputational incentives vis-à-vis later joining national counterparts due to a drive to maintain and enhance reputations as climate leaders.
The overall findings are mixed. While Welsh climate ambition (largely) exceeds that of later joiners (Northern Ireland and Isle of Man), Scotland, an early joiner, demonstrates the greatest climate ambition. Although Wales demonstrably used U2C to articulate leadership ambitions (e.g., on a just transition; Irranca-Davies, 2024), Scotland also resembles a climate leader despite (only) being an early joiner, and it remains to be seen whether Welsh climate justice ambitions are simply emulating Scotland’s pioneering work on this issue prior to joining U2C.
This reflects the complexities of the UK climate governance landscape in a microcosm, underlining the consequential nature of devolved autonomy and landmark climate acts for maintaining and stepping up climate action. While U2C membership may well provide (varied) reputational incentives to develop distinct “climate actorness”, the corresponding ability to seize opportunities to step up climate ambitions is context-specific.
Scotland exhibited the greatest climate policy ambition of all four actors, epitomized by its leadership role as European U2C co-chair. This activity is closely intertwined with historic state-building ambitions and comparatively greater devolved autonomy. In contrast, Northern Ireland and Isle of Man were slower to embrace climate action, prioritizing post-conflict economic recovery and internal capacity constraints, respectively. Nonetheless, both subnational entities raised their climate policy ambitions after joining U2C by legislating landmark climate acts, indicative of climate followership.
Overall, it remains difficult to definitively disentangle the extent to which U2C membership provides a mechanism for climate leadership and/or followership associated with reputational incentives, as the increase in climate policy adoption following U2C participation might simply reflect the growing salience of subnational climate action post Paris. Future research should explore this as a priority.
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For a valuable account of the different types of climate leadership exhibited by the UK in seeking to develop its own distinct “climate actorness”, see Moulton (2020).
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